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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNANCE PRACTICES, AUDIT 
QUALITY AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: UK EVIDENCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines two empirical studies. Firstly, it examines the relationship 
between corporate governance characteristics (relating to the size, composition of 
independent members, financial expertise and meeting frequency of boards of 
directors and audit committee) and audit quality. Secondly, the study investigates the 
effectiveness of corporate governance characteristics and higher quality auditors in 
constraining earnings management. There are three proxies of audit quality employed: 
audit fees, non-audit fees and industry specialist auditors. Based on data obtained 
from the FTSE 350 between 2005 and 2008, the first empirical findings suggest that 
independent non-executive directors on board demand an additional and extensive 
audit effort from the auditor in order to certify their monitoring function, resulting in 
an increase in the audit fees and the perceived audit quality. The results also indicate a 
positive relationship between independent board and non-audit fees, suggesting that 
independent board support the view that the joint provision of audit and non-audit 
services does not necessarily compromise auditor independence, but rather that it 
broadens the auditors‟ knowledge and improves audit judgement. The findings from 
the second empirical study suggest that higher quality auditors (which either charge 
higher audit fees or are industry specialist auditors) are likely to reduce earnings 
manipulation. However, no evidence suggests that NAS fees affect earnings 
management. In addition, the current study finds inconsistent results linking the 
corporate governance characteristics and opportunistic earnings. Overall, both 
findings are consistent with agency theory, which states that independent board and 
higher quality auditors are associated with effective monitoring, which in turn helps to 
improve the quality of financial reporting. The findings are of potential interest to 
policy makers, professionals and boards of directors, especially on issues relating to 
audit quality and the mandating of corporate governance practices. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of study  
The issues of audit quality, corporate governance and earnings management have 
received significant attention from government regulators, the auditing profession and 
the public, especially following the recent high-profile corporate scandals. The 
integrity of the financial reporting system is being questioned, the credibility of the 
auditor is in doubt and a firm's governance system is liable to be blamed because of 
the lack of auditor independence and oversight from the board. DeFond and Francis 
(2005) claim that the consequence of the corporate scandal has renewed the 
importance of independent audits and their linkage to the monitoring role of corporate 
governance. 
 
Agency theory provides an explanation of why independent audit is important to the 
financial market. The independent audit helps to mitigate the agent-principal conflict 
by providing the assurance that financial statements are carefully prepared and free 
from material error (Wallace, 1980). It also reduces the likelihood of accounting fraud 
and illegal reporting practices (Wallace, 1980), such as earnings management, so that 
the market participant can use the financial reports without any hesitation. In addition, 
the auditor can improve the quality of financial reporting through their competency 
and willingness to report an accounting misstatement (DeAngelo, 1981) and to 
respond to aggressive earnings conservatism
1
 (Ruddock et al., 2006). Furthermore, the 
regulators believe that good corporate governance is able to improve the ability of 
boards and their committees to manage effectively and in the best interest of 
shareholders, whose trust and confidence is gained through higher quality auditing 
(SOX, 2002; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010).  
 
                                                          
1
 Conservatism is defined as “the application of a higher standard of verification for favourable 
information” (Ruddock et al., 2006: 706). According to Ruddock et al. (2006: 740) “conservatism is an 
important attribute of financial reporting and is associated with the factors that underlie the demand for 
audit quality”. 
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In most cases shareholders depend on the ability of a board and its committee to 
monitor the independence of both the management and the auditors.
2
 Therefore, 
responsibility for the quality of financial reporting is laid on the effective board and 
its committee. Most prior studies have focused on the role of the audit committee as 
the main agent in ensuring the integrity of financial information and dealing with 
issues related to an external audit (Chen et al. 2005; Abbott and Parker 2000). 
However, given that the board of directors is responsible for appointing and removing 
the audit committee‟s members and the external auditors, their role is equally crucial 
in promoting a higher quality of financial reporting.  The Blue Ribbon Committee 
(BRC, 1999: 6-7) reports that, “the performance of audit committees must be founded 
in the practices and attitudes of the entire board of directors ... If the board is 
dysfunctional, the audit committee likely will not be much better.” Similarly, a few 
studies have indicated that the audit committee‟s effectiveness is associated with the 
composition of the entire board of directors (Menon and William, 1994; Collier and 
Gregory, 1999; Cohen et al., 2002; Boo and Sharma, 2008).  Therefore, in this thesis, 
while the demand for a higher quality auditor is recognised, the monitoring roles of 
board and audit committee are argued to be the more important mechanisms by which 
to promote a higher quality of financial reporting.  
 
Specifically, two empirical studies will be examined in this thesis: (1) the study of the 
relationships between the effective board of directors, the audit committee and audit 
quality and (2) the study of the relationships between the effective boards, the audit 
committee and auditor quality in respect of constraining earnings management. It has 
been argued that the firms with effective boards and audit committees constantly 
demand higher quality auditors because by employing higher quality auditors they add 
credibility to the financial reports, increase the firm‟s value and are able to safeguard 
themselves from damage to their reputations and legal exposure, all of which 
promotes the shareholders' interests (Carcello et al., 2002). When market participants 
lack the ability to directly observe the reported earnings, they may expect the 
managers of the firms in a strong monitoring environment to engage less in earnings 
manipulation. Therefore, the present study further argues that the firms with 
monitoring mechanisms that consist of the board of directors and an audit committee 
                                                          
2
 This referred to the minority shareholders.    
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with effective characteristics and a higher quality auditor have a greater ability to 
constrain opportunistic earnings, hence reducing uncertainty in the reported earnings.  
 
1.2 Motivation for the study  
This thesis is motivated by three major considerations. Firstly, studies of audit quality, 
earnings management and corporate governance continue to be important and to form 
a part of regulators' and policy makers‟ concerns.  Levitt (1998; 2000) claims that the 
assessment of audit quality and earnings management is crucial because it is reflected 
the investors‟ confidence in the financial reporting and it affects the allocation of 
resources. A lack of investors‟ confidence in audit quality and reported earnings can 
seriously undermine the financial market, since investors are the largest group of users 
that provide capital support to the economic system. Despite the importance of audit 
quality, the boards of directors and its committees are recognised as monitoring 
mechanisms that may influence the quality of financial reports (Carcello et al., 2002; 
Abbott et al., 2004; Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Lin and Hwang, 2009).  Therefore, 
how audit quality and the monitoring role of the board of directors and its committees 
affect the market‟s perception of reported earnings and audit quality remains 
important to the regulators and policy-makers. 
 
Secondly, the non-audit services (hereafter NAS) continue to be controversial and are 
viewed with scepticism due to the potential that they may compromise auditor 
independence. In this thesis, NAS will be one of the proxies for audit quality. Prior 
studies consistently suggest that the policy-makers, users and investors perceive the 
NAS as impairing auditor independence (Panel on Audit Effectiveness, 2000; SEC, 
2000; Beattie and Fearnley, 2002; Wines, 1994; Firth, 2002; Frankel et al. 2002; 
Raghunandan, 2003; Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; Larcker and Richadson, 2004). For 
example, in US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter SOX) banned the auditor 
from providing several services related to NAS.
3
 Consistent with SOX legislation, the 
                                                          
3
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted on July 30th, 2002, applies to US public companies 
(boards and management) and public accounting firms and has the objective of protecting investors by 
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures that are made pursuant to the securities 
laws. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Title II – Auditor Independence: Section 201: Services Outside 
the Scope of Practice of Auditors. The public accounting firms are prohibited from performing the 
following NAS for the financial statement audit clients: (1) bookkeeping or other services related to the 
accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; (2) financial information systems design 
and implementation; (3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind 
reports; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit outsourcing services; (6) management functions or 
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UK regulator also responds to NAS by issuing the Ethical Standard (ES) for auditors. 
For instance, the ES 5 requires auditors to assess possible threats that may impair their 
objectivity and independence, and to identify effective safeguards to reduce these 
potential threats. In addition, ES 5 has also banned several NAS services that were 
believed to have compromised auditors‟ objectivity and independence.4 In summary, 
both regulatory agents claim that the higher provisions of NAS can impair auditor 
independence. Despite the negative effect of NAS on auditor independence, several 
studies argue that the joint provision of audit and NAS may also broaden the auditor‟s 
knowledge and improve the audit judgement. This, in turn, enhances the quality of 
financial reporting (see Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988a; Arruñada, 1999a; 1999b; 
2000; Wallman, 1996; Goldman and Barlev, 1974). Such mixed arguments motivate 
the present study to examine the levels of NAS fees and their relation to corporate 
governance and earnings management.  
 
Furthermore, DeFond and Francis (2005) call for research on NAS studies to 
incorporate fees dependency as an alternative measure of auditor independence. They 
claim that, during the drafting of the SOX legislation, the study carried out by Frankel 
et al. (2002) has been used to generalize the implication of higher levels of NAS fees, 
and that subsequent studies in NAS fees have claimed that Frankel's research was 
sensitive to the research design, sample selection and model specification.
5
 They 
further argue that the SEC had never raised the issues of fee dependency when they 
proposed to ban NAS in 2000. Hence, DeFond and Francis (2005) call for research of 
NAS studies to take into account the total fees (the sum of audit and NAS fees) as an 
alternative measure of the financial dependencies that are believed to affect the 
auditor's objectivity. As far as the present study is concerned, no studies in the UK 
have employed the total amount of auditor fees in examining the relationships 
between corporate governance and NAS, and between the corporate governance and 
NAS in constraining earnings management. Therefore, the total fees will be one of the 
NAS measures to fill the gap in the UK literature. In fact, there are three other 
                                                                                                                                                                      
human resources; (7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; (8) legal 
services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and (9) any other service that the Board determines, 
by regulation, is impermissible. 
4 
The prohibitions are set out in Appendix 1. 
5
 Frankel et al. (2002) suggest that the firms that paid higher NAS fees are likely to have higher 
abnormal accruals, indicating the managerial discretion in managing earnings. 
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measures that will be employed in this thesis (i.e. the level of NAS fees compared to 
the sum of audit and NAS fees, the ratio of NAS fees to total fees and the ratio of 
NAS fees to audit fees) in order to ensure that the results are robust to several 
measures of auditor independence. 
 
Thirdly, most of the prior studies relating to audit quality, corporate governance and 
earnings management have been conducted in the US. This offers different 
institutional settings from the UK market and thus limits the generality of their 
findings for contexts beyond the US. Although the UK and the US share some 
common features, there are differences in corporate governance systems (e.g. Toms 
and Wright, 2005). In the UK, share ownership is less dispersed than in the US and 
the nature of investor activism differs and is shaped by the different rights of 
shareholders in the two countries (Kirchmaier et al., 2005). As noted by Aguilera et 
al. (2006), British institutional investors (mainly pension funds and insurance 
companies) tend to be more dominant than their American counterparts (mainly 
mutual funds). Also, major differences exist regarding the preparation of financial 
statements and the US disclosure system is more demanding. The US firms are 
required to disclose more detailed information about audit committees and auditors 
than are the UK firms (Lennox, 2003). Another area of divergence is the constraints 
on the exercise of board leadership (Aguilera et al. 2006). Most of the UK listed firms 
separate the role of the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), while most 
of the American CEOs are also the Chairman of the Board (Higgs Report, 2003). 
Also, CEOs‟ pay and stock-based incentives in the US are relatively higher than in the 
UK (Conyon and Murpht, 2000). 
 
The UK adopts a voluntary corporate governance system that operates on a „comply 
or explain‟ basis. The system is based on a set of good corporate governance practices 
to which listed firms are expected to adhere or, where they do not, they are expected 
to provide an explanation for their non-compliance in their annual report.
6
 This is 
different from the mandatory corporate governance regime adopted in the US under 
                                                          
6
 The UK Corporate Governance Code (formerly the Combined Code) was issued in 1998 and has been 
revised since then. The fundamental changes in the Code were made in 2003 based on the 
recommendations set out in the Higgs Report (which reviewed the role and effectiveness of non-
executive directors) and the Smith Report (which provided guidance on audit committees‟ functioning). 
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SOX. Indeed, the voluntary corporate governance system in the UK is one of the most 
comprehensive and it offers more specific guidelines on the formation of a board and 
its committee when compared with other countries that adopt a similar approach 
(Sharma et al., 2009). The voluntary formation allows the firms to choose the optimal 
structure of governance system to fit their needs. This could be different in the US 
where the firms are forced to follow the SOX requirements without any consideration 
of how they might prioritise their needs and raise concerns over the cost-benefit of 
SOX on smaller firms. 
 
Furthermore, the litigation environment in the UK differs from that in the US market 
and other regimes and, therefore, it has a different effect on an auditor‟s reputation 
and performance (Khurana and Raman, 2004). When auditors‟ reputations are less 
likely to be affected by the regulator or by litigation, there is also less incentive for 
them to perform high-quality audits (Francis, 2006; Khurana and Raman, 2004).
7
 
Therefore, in the UK, the current study expects to find it highly desirable that, in their 
monitoring roles, the board and its committee ensure the quality of an auditor‟ work is 
not jeopardised by the lower litigation environment.  
 
In summary, given that the US market offers different institutional settings, 
governance structures and litigation environments from those in the UK, the 
generalizability of American findings is limited. For these reasons, the present study 
examines the association between governance practices, audit quality and earnings 
management in the UK.  
 
1.3 Contributions to knowledge  
This thesis represents a comprehensive study on audit quality, corporate governance 
and earnings management, particularly in the UK market. Using the current data of 
FTSE 350 firms for the fiscal years of 2005 to 2008, the first part of this thesis 
examines the relationship between corporate governance and audit quality. The 
second part provides evidence linking audit quality, corporate governance and 
                                                          
7
 Khurana and Raman examine the relationship between cost of capital, litigation risk and financial 
reporting quality in the US and conclude that firms employing the big-4 auditors quantitatively have 
lower cost of capital than those with non-big 4 auditors but not in Australia, Canada and the UK due to 
lower litigation environment in these countries. They conclude that rather than brand name, the 
litigation risk drives the audit quality differences. 
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earnings management. Audit quality is measured using several proxies such as audit 
fees, NAS fees and industry specialist auditors. Corporate governance mechanisms 
are associated with the effective characteristics of the board and audit committee and 
they include committee size, composition of independent members, financial expertise 
and frequency of committee meetings. 
 
Several contributions to knowledge are made through this thesis. Firstly, it contributes 
to debates on the importance of audit quality and corporate governance issues 
subsequent to the recent audit failure scandals. The findings from the first empirical 
investigation suggest that independent non-executive directors on board demand an 
additional and extensive audit effort to certify their monitoring function, resulting in 
an increase in the audit fees and the perceived audit quality. The second empirical 
finding suggests that the higher auditor fees and industry specialise auditor are 
associated with reduced earnings manipulations. Together, both documented findings 
support the proposition of agency theory and the regulatory concern that an effective 
board of directors and higher quality auditors are associated with effective monitoring 
and improved quality of financial reporting.  
 
Secondly, this thesis contributes to the growing literature on studies of audit quality, 
corporate governance and earnings management. As stated in the motivations for the 
study, prior research in these areas has predominantly been undertaken in the US, 
which offers a different litigation environment, institutional setting, governance 
structure and auditor incentive,  thus limits the generalizability of the findings to other 
countries. In particular, the current study expands the prior literature in six areas: 
 
(1) To the best of the author's knowledge, no studies have examined the 
relationship between the industry specialist auditor as proxy for audit quality 
and the effective characteristics of the board and audit committee in the UK. 
Previous studies in this area were carried out by Abbott and Parker (2000), 
Beasley and Petroni (2001) and Chen et al. (2005) using US and Australian 
samples. The investigation of UK firms expands the existing literature by 
providing evidence from voluntary governance practice and different 
institutional settings and litigation environments, each of which, it is argued, 
drive quality differences in the audit market.  
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(2) None of the prior studies on how the auditor industry specialist affects 
corporate governance and earnings management has used the complementary 
approach to calculate the effect of the auditor industry specialist. Most of these 
studies utilized the market share and portfolio approach (Abbott and Parker, 
2000; Beasley and Petroni, 2001; Chen et al., 2005; Krishnan, 2003a; Balsam 
et al., 2003). According to Neal and Riley (2004) a complementary approach 
captures the complementary effect of both the market share and the portfolio 
approach and offers a solution for inconsistencies between these two main 
approaches. 
 
(3) Previous UK studies that examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and auditor fees (audit fees and NAS fees) have been undertaken 
by Collier and Gregory (1996), O‟Sullivan (1999; 2000), O‟Sullivan and 
Diacon (2002), Adelopo (2010) and Zaman et al. (2011). Specifically, Collier 
and Gregory investigate the effect of the establishment of an audit committee 
on audit fees, using the 1991 data, while O‟Sullivan examines the 
establishment of an audit committee and the effect of the composition of 
independent members on board and audit committee on audit fees, using data 
from 1992 and 1995. Recently, Adelopo (2010) examines more 
comprehensive corporate governance characteristics using single and 
simultaneous equations of audit and NAS fees on data from 2005 and 2006. 
Zaman et al. (20011) investigate the influence of audit committee 
effectiveness and several board characteristics (independent board, meetings 
frequency and duality role) on audit fees and non-audit fees using data 2001 to 
2004.  However, all of these studies do not consider financial expertise of the 
board of director. Previous US studies suggest that the boards of directors that 
are financially literate improve the quality of financial reporting (Xie et al., 
2003; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Lee, 2008). By examining the effect of the 
financial expertise of the board of directors on audit fees and NAS fees, this 
thesis extends prior research on the effect of financial literacy of board 
members on the auditor remuneration in the UK market.    
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(4) In relation to the studies examining the effect of corporate governance and 
auditor quality on constraining earnings management in the UK, prior studies 
have been undertaken by Ferguson et al. (2004), Peasnell et al. (2000; 2005), 
Antle et al. (2006), Kwon et al. (2007), Habbash et al. (2010), Sun et al. 
(2010) and Habbash (2010). Ferguson et al. investigate the NAS fees, the big-
5 auditors and several board characteristics (e.g. non-executive directors on 
board and CEO duality roles) on earnings management using the data from 
1996 to 1998, while Peasnell et al. examine the board of director 
characteristics (e.g. board size, non-executive directors on board, CEO 
duality), the establishment of audit committee and the big-5 auditors using the 
data in the period between 1991 and 1996. Antle et al. (2006) look at the joint 
determination of audit fees, NAS fees and discretionary accruals using data 
from 1994 to 2000, while Kwon et al. (2007) investigate how a country‟s legal 
system affects the industry specialist auditor in constraining earnings 
management in 28 countries including the UK. Habbash et al. (2010) 
investigate the commitment of independent directors (i.e. composition, 
meetings and directors fees) and number of board meeting , while Sun et al. 
(2010) only control the size of boards and audit committee meetings in their 
earnings management model. All of these studies exclude the financial 
expertise of board and most of audit committee characteristics (e.g. size, 
composition, financial expertise and meeting frequency) in examining the 
effect of corporate governance on earnings management. Recently, Habbash 
(2010) examines the corporate governance characteristics (board and audit 
committee characteristics) and auditor quality variables separately using two 
different earnings management models. In his first model, he examines only 
the board of director characteristics, while in second model he investigates the 
audit committee attributes and auditor variables. The current study fills the gap 
between all these studies by examining the characteristics of board, audit 
committee and auditor quality variables on the single earnings management 
model. Larcker and Richardson (2004) claim that when a firm's corporate 
governance and auditor quality are isolated from one and another, it may result 
in an incomplete analysis of earnings management because the monitoring role 
of auditors varies depending on the strength of the firm‟s corporate 
governance.   
24 
 
(5) In this thesis, audit quality is measured using several proxies: audit fees, NAS 
fees and industry specialist auditors. Even each proxy is measured using 
several approaches. For example, the NAS fees proxy consists of the natural 
log of NAS fees, the natural log of total fees (sum of audit and NAS fees), the 
ratio of NAS fees to total fees and the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees. While 
the industry specialist auditor is measured in five ways, three measures are 
continuous variables (equal to the respective auditor's market share and the 
auditor‟s portfolio share, and complimentary between the market share and the 
portfolio share) and two measures are dichotomous variables (the industry 
leader and the auditor‟s market share at a 30 percent cut-off point in each 
particular industry). By examining multiple proxies of audit quality and 
several measures for each proxy, the current thesis provides an analysis of the 
impact of corporate governance characteristics and earnings management that 
is more comprehensive than prior studies that mostly examined only a single 
proxy of audit quality. 
 
(6) The present study contributes to the methodology literature by considering the 
analysis using several estimations including the OLS regression, the robust 
regression, the least square regression with robust standard error, the quantile 
regression, the probit regression and the heteroskedastic ordinal regression. 
Several estimators are employed to ensure the efficiency of the data analysis 
since the OLS regression may not be an efficient estimator when some of the 
assumptions are not fulfilled. In addition, none of the prior research in 
corporate governance and audit quality employs the heteroskedastic ordinal 
regression that argues to increase the efficiency of logit/ probit regression in 
the presence of heterscedasticity. Further, all the analyses take into account 
endogeneity issues that have been neglected in a few previous studies.  
 
Lastly, this thesis contributes to the debate on the joint provision of audit and NAS. 
The result from the NAS model suggests that the firms with a higher provision of 
independent directors on the board are likely to be associated with higher NAS fees. 
This suggests that an independent board may support the higher provision of NAS that 
is likely to improve the quality of audits due to the presence of knowledge spillover 
effects. Furthermore, no evidence suggests that the NAS is associated with 
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opportunistic earnings. This finding contradicts the regulatory concern that the 
provisions of NAS compromise auditor independence and, thereby, reduce the quality 
of financial reporting.  
  
1.4 Structure of research 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters. This chapter discusses the background of 
the study, the motivation and the contribution that it makes.  
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical framework underpinning this study. The main 
discussion centres on agency theory as the primary theory, which suggests that the 
monitoring roles of the board of directors and the audit committee, as well as the 
demand for independent audits, help to mitigate the agency conflict. The importance 
of independent audit and different levels of audit quality for the firms and market 
participants is explained through several hypotheses such as: the monitoring 
hypothesis, the information hypothesis, the signalling hypothesis and the insurance 
hypothesis. The relevant explanations as to why the board of directors and its 
committee and the auditor demand different levels of audit quality and limit 
opportunistic earnings are also highlighted.  
 
Chapter 3 reviews the prior studies related to the three groups of subjects: audit 
quality, corporate governance and earnings management. Under the audit quality 
reviews, the current study defines audit quality and its possible measures. The 
effective characteristics of a board of directors and audit committee, including the size 
of the committee, the composition of independent members, the financial expertise of 
members and the frequency of meetings are also reviewed and discussed based on the 
propositions of agency theory and on prior documented evidence. The reviews on 
earnings management take into account the definition of earnings management, the 
motivation of opportunistic earnings and the measurement of earnings. Previous 
studies that are related to the association between audit quality and corporate 
governance and between the effects of corporate governance and auditor quality on 
constraining earnings management are also discussed. The end of the chapter follows 
the development of the hypotheses by previous authors.   
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Chapter 4 explains the methodology employed in this study. It explains and justifies 
the sample firm selection, the period of the study, the definitions and the 
measurements of the main variables, hypothesis variables, model specification and 
related control variables. The description of the source of data, the data collection 
procedures and analysis procedures are also discussed.   
 
Chapter 5 and 6 present the results of the empirical findings on the associations 
between corporate governance and audit quality, and the relationship between 
corporate governance, audit quality and earnings management, respectively. 
 
Finally, chapter 7 provides an overall summary and concludes the study. The 
implications, limitations and the recommendations for future research are discussed in 
this final chapter.   
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework for the present study. The main 
discussion is on the agency theory that highlights the relationship between principals 
and agents and the conflict that arises between them because of the different goals. As 
part to reduce the agency conflict, the monitoring role of board of directors and audit 
committee as well as the external audit are demanded. Several hypotheses related to 
the demand for audit and different levels of audit quality are also discussed in this 
chapter. The association between board of directors, audit committees, external 
auditors and financial reporting are highlighted. Finally, the summary and conclusion 
are presented in last section.  
 
2.2 Definition of corporate governance  
So far, existing studies have indicated that there is no specific acceptable definition 
for corporate governance (e.g. Solomon, 2007). However, several definitions of 
corporate governance have been discussed in prior studies (e.g. the Cadbury Report, 
1992; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Turnbull, 1997). For 
example, the Cadbury Report (1992: 15) defines corporate governance as “a system 
by which companies are directed and controlled.” This definition highlights the roles 
of the main players in an organisation that is comprised of shareholders, a board of 
directors and the auditor. As cited in the Cadbury Report (1992), the shareholders are 
responsible for appointing directors and auditors and for ensuring that the appropriate 
governance system is in place. The directors‟ function is associated with how the firm 
is governed, while the auditors‟ main role is to provide an independent check on 
financial statements to shareholders.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737) describe corporate governance as “dealing with the 
ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting return 
on their investment”. They suggest that legal protection of investor rights and 
concentrated ownership helps to control management discretion so that financiers are 
able to get returns on their investments.  
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Consistent with the Cadbury Report (1992), that stresses how firms are directed and 
controlled, Denis (2001: 192) states that corporate governance “encompasses the set 
of institutional and market mechanisms that induce self-interested managers (the 
controllers) to maximize the value of the residual cash flows of the firm on behalf of 
its shareholders (the owners)”.  Alternatively, Solomon (2007: 14) considers 
stakeholder concerns in the definition of corporate governance which is perceived as a 
“system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which 
ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act 
in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity.” 
 
These various definitions and explanations of corporate governance exist because the 
authors view corporate governance from different perspectives and through different 
theoretical frameworks. For example, the definitions of corporate governance that are 
outlined by Cadbury (1992), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Denis (2001) seem to 
agree that corporate governance is associated with ownership and control and that it is 
aimed at maximising the shareholders‟ wealth. These definitions are influenced by 
agency theory. On the other hand, Solomon‟s definition is consistent with stakeholder 
theory which believes that in addition to maximising the shareholders‟ wealth, social 
and environmental issues are of significant importance to the firm. Stakeholder theory 
acknowledges that individuals, both inside and outside a firm, such as employees, 
suppliers, customers, publics, governments or other individuals or groups may have 
an effect on or be affected by the actions of that firm. These groups of individuals are 
referred as stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). The firms are responsible to carry out the 
actions that not only benefit them, but that benefit society as a whole.   
 
Given that the current study examines the effect of the roles of the board of directors, 
the audit committee and the external audit on financial reporting quality (i.e. earnings 
management and audit quality), for the purposes of the study, corporate governance is 
viewed as a monitoring system of checks and balances to ensure that the interests of 
shareholders are safeguarded. Such a view can be expressed appropriately in agency 
theory. In addition, the focus of the current study is related to the quality of financial 
statements rather than on a firm's impact on social and environmental factors, 
therefore, stakeholder theory seems to deviate from the aim of the study.  
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2.3 Agency theory and information asymmetries 
The proposition of agency theory has been addressed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
by the introduction of the concept of agency cost. They apply the concept of agency 
cost to explain issues associated with the separation of ownership and control in a 
large corporation, consistent with Berle and Means‟ (1932) propositions.   
 
The ultimate element in agency theory is the conflict of interest between principals 
and agents. A principal (shareholder) assigns the power of the decision maker to an 
agent (manager) who, as an agent, executes their duties on behalf of the principal 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Conflicts and dissimilar interests lead to information 
asymmetries between the two parties. The existence of information asymmetries 
results in two major agency problems, namely, moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems. 
 
Moral hazard problems are associated with the problem of hidden actions when agents 
have the incentive to pursue self-interested behaviour. They arise when principals are 
unable to observe actions that are undertaken by the agents. Formally, an agent is 
expected to maximize the principal‟s wealth through their actions and decisions. 
However, agents tend to pursue their own interests. By contrast, adverse selection 
problems are associated with hidden information, where the agent has more 
information than the principal. Both problems may create, for example, the 
phenomenon of earnings management that, in turn, may cause shareholders, investors 
and debt holders to be unable to distinguish the true economic value of a firm.
8
  
 
According to agency theory, since the managers or agents are inspired by extrinsic 
motivations (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003), the principals have to identify ways to 
motivate the agents and to ensure that they act in the best interest of the principals. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that agency cost can be an alternative way to 
reduce agency conflict and they define agency cost as consisting of monitoring cost, 
bonding cost and residual loss. Monitoring costs are the costs that are associated with 
the appointment of appropriate agents, such as external auditors, and with 
mechanisms that control the agents‟ behaviour, such as the roles played by the board 
                                                          
8
 Earning management is defined as “in the sense of purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain” (Schipper, 1989: 92). 
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of directors. Bonding cost is the cost that is associated with contracting in order to 
ensure that agents always make decisions that support the principal‟s wealth. These 
costs include those that are related to the agent‟s compensation system. Residual loss 
is the agency loss that is associated with the imbalance between monitoring and 
bonding costs or, in other words, it is the reduction in principals' welfare that arises 
from an imperfect alignment of interest between agents and principals (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
 
In this thesis, the monitoring roles of board and auditor are studied as mechanisms 
that mitigate agency conflicts. The board of directors acts on behalf of the 
shareholders and represents the shareholders‟ interests through overseeing managerial 
functions. Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggest that agency theory is the most 
comprehensive theory that clarifies the board of directors‟ functions and that 
highlights the importance of their controlling role. Consistent with this notion, Hung 
(1998) also claims that agency theory is a convincing theory for explaining the 
boards‟ monitoring role.   
 
Alongside the monitoring role of a board of directors, Solomon (2007: 137) claims 
that the external audit represents another crucial element of a firm‟s internal control 
system and that it provides a check and balance system that helps shareholders to 
monitor and control the managements‟ activities. As pointed out by the Cadbury 
Report (1992: 36), 
 “The annual audit is one of the cornerstones of corporate governance. 
Given the separation of ownership from management, the directors are 
required to report on their stewardship by means of the annual report and 
financial statements sent to the shareholders. The audit provides an 
external and objective check on the way in which the financial statements 
have been prepared and presented, and it is an essential part of the checks 
and balances required.” 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that agency theory is essential to the present study since it 
recognizes the monitoring roles of board of director and an external audit as 
mechanisms to control management behaviours. The following sections explain the 
characteristics of board and audit committee that contribute to the effectiveness of 
their monitoring function and the role of an external audit.   
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Figure 2.1: A typology of the theories relating to the roles of governing boards  
(Source: Hung, 1998) 
 
2.2.1 The monitoring role of board of directors and audit committee 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that boards of directors are the primary decision 
makers in an organisation and that they have the power to compensate entire decisions 
that are made by the top management. Fama and Jensen also propose that, in the 
decision making process, the initiation and implementation should be separated from 
the ratification and monitoring of decisions in order to ensure that monitoring 
functions are more efficient.
9
  
                                                          
9
 The “initiation and implementation” of decisions are known as decision management, while 
“ratification and monitoring” are known as decision control (Jensen and Meckling, 1983: 304). 
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In other words, agency theory suggests that, in order to ensure that effective 
monitoring functions are in place, board of director members should include a 
representative from outsider members (hereafter non-executive directors) who is 
independent from management.
10
 Vance (1983: 46) adds that the independent non-
executive directors provide unbiased assessment that is “stockholder-oriented” and 
that establishes a best practice of “check and balance” on management's actions. The 
non-executive directors are also important because they possess significant knowledge 
(e.g. “capital market, technology, corporate law”) that enables them to complement 
insider information and act as arbitrators in any conflict that may arise between the 
insiders (Fama and Jensen, 1983: 314). In summary, the independent non-executive 
directors are better at monitoring management, due to their „independent‟ and 
„complimentary knowledge‟ characteristics.  
 
The proposition of independent non-executive directors in agency theory is 
contradictory to the principal of stewardship theory. Stewardship theory suggests that 
the manager is acting as a steward and that their endeavours promote their principals‟ 
interest (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997). The managers are inspired 
by non-financial motivations and intrinsic gratification resulting from hard work and a 
challenging working environment (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). As stated by 
Donaldson and Davis (1991: 51), the manager, “far from being an opportunistic 
shirker essentially wants to do a good job, to be a good steward of the corporate 
assets”. In order to maximize the potential of the managers, the appropriate approach 
is to establish an empowering structure (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Managers are 
supposed to be given clear instructions and a higher position in the organisation's 
hierarchy where they would have autonomy and authority to make decisions and they 
would be enabled to use their full capacity in achieving the organisation‟s objectives. 
From a shareholder's point of view, the dominant insiders (hereafter known as 
executive directors) on boards are preferred to non-executive directors. This is 
because they have greater knowledge and awareness of current operations and they 
                                                          
10
 Specifically, the outsider directors, however, can be distinguished between those who are 
independent from management and have no relationship that would effect the exercising of their 
judgments and decision making in the organization and those who are not (Lawrence and Stapledon, 
1999). The non-executive director who is related to management is also been known as gray or 
affiliated non-executive director. The independent non-executive director is believed to have better 
monitoring position than gray or affiliated non-executive director (Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999) 
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have more technical expertise and, hence, they assume a more responsible attitude 
towards the organisation (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Therefore, the shareholders 
could expect more return from them than from non-executive directors who are 
assumed to be less informed about the organisation and to have a self-serving attitude.  
 
Although stewardship theory identifies that executive directors are more beneficial 
than non-executive directors, the present study believes that the monitoring role of a 
board of directors as described by agency theory is more relevant to explaining 
variations in audit quality and earnings management. Agency theory recognises the 
independence of non-executive directors as a monitoring mechanism which is vital to 
the promotion of high quality audits and higher quality financial reporting. Hung 
(1998) suggests that the executive‟s task is focus on a „strategic role‟ rather than a 
„monitoring role‟. In real systems, the agents or stewards are intent on pursuing their 
own interests instead of the interests of others.   
 
As well as having an independent non-executive director on a board and in an audit 
committee, empirical evidence also suggests that the size of a committee, specific 
knowledge, experience and a greater frequency of meetings may strengthen a board 
and audit committee‟s monitoring functions (e.g. Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermark 
1996; Chen and Zhou 2007; Monks and Minow 2008; Dezoort 1998; Carcello et al. 
2002; Abbott et al. 2003a, Krishnan and Lee 2009; Menon and Williams 1994; Vafeas 
1999; Abbott et al. 2004; Ronen and Yaari 2008). Zahra and Pearce (1989: 308-310) 
claim that the efficiency of a board of director‟s function is dependent on the (1) size 
of board and the type of membership, (2) the attributes of the directors, such as their 
competence and skills, (3) the establishment of the appropriate committees and (4) the 
board of director‟s meeting (e.g. communication between directors, agenda and 
documentation). Walker (2004: 158) also notes that “the performance of audit 
committees necessarily depends on the people involved, their knowledge, skills, 
critical capacities, skepticism and determination”. The empirical evidence for each of 
these characteristics will be discussed later in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2.2 The role of external audit  
Audit functions have been observed to exist since the 13
th
 century to provide a form 
of assurance that the financial information provided by the management accurately 
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represents the financial position of the firms (Watt and Zimmerman, 1983).
11
 
Consistent with agency theory, audit function is viewed as a mechanism to reduce 
uncertainty on the levels of information asymmetry between shareholders/investors 
and management. As shareholders and investors have limited access to internal 
information from within a firm, the independent audit reports on the truth and fairness 
of financial statements that are prepared by management.  As outlined in the 
International Standard of Auditing, ISA (UK and Ireland) 200: Overall Objective of 
the Independent Auditor and the Conduct of an Audit in Accordance International 
Standards on Auditing (UK and Ireland), (ABP, 2009: 2-3): 
“The purpose of an audit is to enhance the degree of confidence of 
intended users in the financial statements. This is achieved by the 
expression of an opinion by the auditor on whether the financial 
statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an 
applicable financial reporting framework… As the basis for the auditor‟s 
opinion, ISAs (UK and Ireland) require the auditor to obtain reasonable 
assurance about whether the financial statements as a whole are free from 
material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error. Reasonable 
assurance is a high level of assurance.” 
 
Variations in the level of conflict and information asymmetry are assumed to differ 
from firm to firm and may demand different levels of auditing and of audit quality 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Watt and Zimmerman, 1986). The higher the agency cost, the 
larger the information asymmetries‟ gap and thus the higher the levels of audit quality 
will be demanded. The next section explains the relevant hypotheses in order to 
clarify why a firm's management, including the board of directors, audit committee, 
shareholders and investors, demands audit services and different levels of audit 
quality. 
 
2.3 Demand for external audit and different levels of audit quality 
Several hypotheses have been used in the prior literature to explain the demand for 
audit services and the different levels of audit quality. Each of these hypotheses is 
now reviewed. It is important to highlight that these hypotheses may appear to be 
                                                          
11
 The audit function exists as early in the development of business corporations since 1220, 
accomplished by the directors or shareholders of the companies. In between early and mid nineteenth 
century in UK and US, the audit then started been prepared by the professional auditors due to the 
increasing numbers of corporations and complexity of the accounts which required the skill and the 
expertise of professional auditors (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). 
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related to one and another (e.g. Wallace, 1984; Willenborg, 1999; Menon and 
William; 1994).  
 
2.3.1 Monitoring hypothesis 
The monitoring hypothesis is based on the agency relationship. Agency theory 
suggests that agency cost is a potential solution to agent-principal conflicts and that 
one of the answers to the problem is provided by an independent audit (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). According to Wilson (1983), the monitoring role of audit minimizes 
the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that arise from the information 
asymmetries problem.
12
 As cited in Wilson (1983), in the case of a moral hazard 
problem, the managers responsible for protecting a firm's assets may misuse the assets 
or fail to maintain them, in which case such actions are not directly observable by the 
owner and potential investors. In the case of an adverse selection problem, such assets 
have their own fixed values. The managers have more information about these values 
and they are able to manipulate information for their own personal gain. 
Consequently, owners need to adopt an effective way to monitor managers‟ 
opportunistic behaviour and the credibility of the information provided by managers 
as well as considering how to improve the investors‟ opportunities to observe such 
assets.
13
 One possibility of achieving this is through independent audits. Auditors 
provide managers and potential investors with reliable verification and information on 
the value of assets. In other words, the independent audit provides an assurance to the 
owners and potential investors that the information provided by managers is reliable. 
 
The independent audit can be generated by the principal (monitoring cost) or the agent 
(bonding cost). Humphrey (1997) argues that agents can demand an independent audit 
because principals normally tend to neglect monitoring activity as they are able to 
safeguard themselves from the risk of loss by paying lower wages to an agent (subject 
to the cost of an independent audit being less than the wage loss that an agent could 
suffer without an independent audit). The presumption is that principals will pay more 
                                                          
12
 The monitoring role also can be regarded as assurance role since Brown et al. (2008) suggest that the 
primary purpose of audit is to reduce the information asymmetries between managers and stakeholders 
which, consistent to Wilson (1983) that suggest the independent audit able to mitigate the moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems. 
13
 The owners are able to improve the accuracy and the reliability of the information to the potential 
investors via the appointment of reputation auditors (Wilson, 1983). 
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to agents for work that has been verified by an independent audit than that which has 
not been so verified. As pointed out by Wallace (1980: 14), “the stewardship 
(monitoring) hypothesis states than when one party is delegated decision making 
power, he has an incentive to agree to be checked if the benefits from such monitoring 
activities exceed the related cost.” 
 
According to Wallace (1980) an independent audit provides an assurance that the 
financial reports that are provided by the managements have been carefully prepared 
and they are free from material errors. Thus, the market participants including the 
potential investors can use the audited financial statements without any hesitation. 
Moreover, an independent audit also mitigates financial statement fraud and illegal 
reporting and improves the internal control and operational efficiency of a firm 
(Wallace, 1980; Chow 1982). For example, when managers know that their financial 
reports will be examined by auditors, fraud and illegal behaviour can be minimised 
indirectly because they are worried that such actions will be discovered by the 
auditors. In addition, when auditors perform an audit review or audit testing on the 
internal control system of a firm, they will discover if certain internal control 
procedures are missing or have not been performed properly. Thus, auditors typically 
provide recommendations to improve existing internal control systems. Such 
restrictions and recommendations are able to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 
of a firm‟s operation. In summary, these observations suggest that audit services not 
only provide a monitoring tool for owners, managers and potential investors, but also 
for the whole organization including its employees and creditors. 
 
2.3.2 Information hypothesis 
As previously stated, the higher the agency conflicts, the larger the information 
asymmetries and thus the higher the quality of audit services that will be demanded. 
Wallace (1980) suggests that investors demand audited financial statements because 
the quality of financial information is improved through an independent audit. He 
further suggests that audited financial information is able to (1) reduce market-related 
(systematic) and firm-specific (unsystematic) risks, (2) improve decision making and 
(3) provide access to new information for investors. As cited in Wallace (1980: 16-
17), a risk-averse investor may demand a higher rate of return for the higher levels of 
risk or pay a higher risk premium to reduce the levels of uncertainty or investment 
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risk. It is assumed that the risk premium is associated with an individual investor's 
assessment of an audit service; through audit, uncertainty about the accuracy of 
financial information provided by management can be reduced (Shakun, 1978). If the 
sum of risk premium for each investor is mutually adjoined exceeds the cost of audit, 
the audited financial information is beneficial to all parties since all parties enjoy less 
uncertain information. According to Wallace (1980), some investors may also reduce 
their investment risk by developing a portfolio of both audited and unaudited 
investment opportunities. Any reduction in the risk premium that is linked to the 
audited information will be compensated through a specific firm‟s audit cost. 
However, the unaudited investment portfolio may cause an increase in the variability 
of the market and thus the cost of audits could be balanced against the demand on the 
unverifiable market risk premium. Moreover, the barriers concerning to the portfolio 
diversification can create larger risk premium to offset the firm-specific risk of 
unaudited financial information. In summary, it is through audits that investors reduce 
both market-related risk and firm-specific risk (Wallace 1980; Shakun, 1978). 
 
According to Wallace (1980), the monitoring hypothesis seems to overlap with the 
information hypothesis since the part of the audited information that is valuable to 
agents and principals is also applicable to investors for their investment decisions. 
However, he further suggests that the monitoring hypothesis provides support for the 
practice of furnishing principals with an audited financial statement only within the 
period of the contract agreement (i.e. within the duration of the agent-principal 
relationship). According to the information hypothesis, financial information 
determines market value. Investors require financial information in order to make a 
rational investment decision even though they are on the outside of a contract of agent 
and principal relationships. In other words, in order to make investment decisions, 
investors need financial information from firms on a continuous basis and without 
time limits  
 
2.3.3 Signalling or reputation hypothesis 
Wallace (1980: 30) notes that “signalling is a kind of implicit guarantee”. In an 
agency relationship in which information asymmetry problems arise, the suppliers of 
financial statements are assumed to be dishonest in reporting financial information. 
As such, the users of financial statements are incapable of distinguishing between 
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honest and dishonest information. In this case, the demand for independent audits can 
be seen to result in the financial statement users receiving honest reports (Wallace, 
1980). Thus, audit services inform the market that the financial statements that are 
provided by management are also free from material errors. Such assurance provides 
the confidence to investors and other users of a financial statement that the reported 
accounting numbers are reliable. As pointed out by Wallace (1980: 36), “specifically, 
an audit can signal less noise or error in the financial report, greater fineness in the 
reporting methods (including with GAAP), and unbiased performance measures.”  
 
Furthermore, the signalling hypothesis offers an explanation for the demand for 
different levels of audit quality. According to Moizer (1992), in a market where 
sellers are unable to build a reputation, two major agency problems (moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems) collaborate to diminish the quality of the product. If 
buyers fail to make a distinction between the different levels of audit quality, they 
may view all audit services as being of average quality and will only be willing to pay 
for them at the same price. The audit providers do not, therefore, have any way of 
influencing a buyer to acquire their services in preference to any others. As a result, 
the moral hazard problem will arise because providers are likely to sell low quality 
and low cost services in order to maximise their profits and the profits that would 
come from providing good quality services are now accumulated among providers 
regardless of the quality of an individual provider (Moizer, 1992).  
 
Simultaneously, the adverse selection problem could also arise because of the 
possibly that the market will become driven by low quality providers and good quality 
providers will be forced to desist from the market (Moizer, 1992). The consequence of 
these effect trades of average quality services is that the market becomes smaller, and 
this leads to the potential for market collapse (Akerlof, 1970). The signalling 
framework provides a cure for market collapse because it explains the sellers‟ ability 
to provide a signal to uninformed buyers about the quality of their products or 
services where there is an assumption that the seller knows the quality of their product 
and the buyer does not (Bar-Yosef and Livnat, 1984).  
 
Since buyers are unable to determine the quality of a product in advance, several 
models of reputation capital suggest that the seller needs to expend resources in order 
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to establish a reputation (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983; Rogerson, 1983; 
Allen, 1984). For example, Klein and Leffler (1981) argue that higher quality sellers 
invest in non-salvageable firm-specific assets (e.g. advertising or marketing 
investment) in order to prevent their competitors from entering the market and thus 
they provide direct value to buyers. Shapiro (1983) suggests that sellers can establish 
their reputation by initially charging for a higher quality product at a minimum quality 
price that is equivalent to the cost of production because they are new entrants to the 
market. In the early period the sellers may suffer economic losses, but later they 
recover the price premium, provided that they maintain the production of higher 
quality products. As pointed out by Shapiro (1983: 669): 
 “… the premium for a high quality product represents only a fair rate of 
return on the investment in reputation. The typical time pattern of profits 
to a seller is given by an initial period of losses, i.e., investment in 
reputation, followed by a stream of profits… The higher the quality 
produced, the larger are the initial losses (investment in reputation) and 
the subsequent profits (premiums for high quality items).” 
 
Allen (1984) disagrees with the models proposed by Klein and Leffler (1981) and 
Shapiro (1983) by saying that investments in non-salvageable firm-specific assets are 
not practical in some industries and that sellers should probably not charge for a 
higher quality product at a minimum quality price and thus suffer losses in the initial 
period of investment. Allen (1984: 312) argues that sellers that produce a higher 
quality product should price it at a higher price which can be above the marginal cost. 
He claims that buyers “reassure themselves about high quality of each firm‟s output 
by verifying that the price charged and quantity produced are consistent with high 
quality‟s being more profitable than low quality”. When a seller charges for a high 
quality product at lower cost, it is perceived by the buyer that the seller has 
transformed a higher quality product into a lower quality product, and this leads to the 
buyer's resistance to purchasing any of the seller's outputs.  
 
Once the sellers‟ reputations have been established, they are then able to signal to the 
buyers that their products are endorsed with higher quality marks. Klein and Leffler 
(1981) suggest that firms with an established reputation are less likely to produce a 
low quality product because once the buyers are aware that they have purchased such 
a product, this information will quickly be disseminated to other buyers. Once their 
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reputation is damaged, sellers may fail to secure an adequate return on their quality 
product (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1982; 1983; Rogerson, 1983). 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The investment in reputation and the premium for high a quality 
product (Source: Shapiro, 1981) 
 
 
In relation to the audit market, Moizer (1997) claims that the signalling hypothesis 
does not necessarily entail a higher quality audit because it simply leads the market 
users to believe that the more expensive auditing firms offer a higher quality of 
service. Consistent with this is DeAngelo's (1981) assertion that since audit quality is 
unobservable and costly to measure, the market tends to use good reputation, derived 
from large auditors, as a signal of a higher quality audit. As mentioned in Shapiro 
(1983: 659):  
“The idea of reputation only makes sense in an imperfect information 
world. A firm has good reputation if consumers believe its products to be 
of high quality. If product attributes were perfectly observable prior to 
purchase, then previous production of high quality items would not enter 
into consumers‟ evaluations of a firm‟s product quality. Instead, quality 
beliefs could be derived solely from inspection.” 
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2.3.5 Insurance hypothesis 
The insurance hypothesis differs from the agency relationship hypothesis and it 
applies when auditors are involved in litigation. It suggests that audit services provide 
investors with a form with of protection in the event of an audit failure (Wallace, 
1980; Menon and William, 1994; Stice, 1991). In other words, the legal system allows 
the investors to recover their investment losses from the auditor if the audited 
financial statements contain a misrepresentation or a low quality audit. The 
probability of recovering such claims increases if the auditors are among the larger 
audit firms or those known as „deeper pockets‟ (Schwartz and Menon, 1985).  
Wallace (1980: 21-22) provides four explanations of why managers choose auditors 
as insurance in preference to insurance companies. Firstly, society assumes that 
managers who fail to guarantee that they are fully independent of their actions, 
without the auditors‟ attestation, are committing fraud or are involved in negligence. 
Secondly, the improvement in accounting and auditing firms that employ legal staff, 
legal services and in-house counsels, suggests that they are more efficient compared 
with insurance companies. Thirdly, the insurance companies use the cost-benefit 
approach when deciding whether to enter a legal defence or to decide on an out of 
court settlement. However, both the auditors and the firms that are involved in 
litigation will consider the effect on their reputation and thus, with a similar common 
interest, they will ensure that they protect their reputations. Fourthly, if investors 
suffer from losses because of an audited financial statement, the courts are likely to 
hold the auditors responsible and to require them to bear the losses. An auditor‟s 
contributions to an investor‟s losses are viewed by the court as „socializing risk‟. As 
stated in Wallace (1980: 22), “… because he is responsible for business failures, the 
auditor in turn shifts this cost to clients through higher fees and then to society 
through higher prices and lower returns on investment.” 
 
Several studies have empirically tested the insurance hypothesis. For instance, Menon 
and Williams (1994) use the case study of Laventhol and Horwath (L&H)
14
 and they 
examine the effect of L&H clients‟ stock price (1) when L&H filed their bankruptcy 
                                                          
14
 Laventhol and Horwarth (L&H) is one of the seventh-largest public accounting firms in the U.S. 
They declared bankruptcy on November, 1990 and filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the US 
Federal Bankruptcy Code.  
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and (2) on the announcement of a replacement auditor. They hypothesize that when 
L&H filed for bankruptcy, they came to the end of the operation and their investors no 
longer had access to recover their investment losses. Thus, their clients‟ stock prices 
were expected to decline. When the clients of L&H reappointed a new auditor, they 
assumed that the investment losses from L&H were not transferable to the new 
auditor, since investors can only claim from them if they have used the audited 
financial statement (prepared by the new auditor) for their investment decision. If the 
insurance hypothesis bears upon the L&H bankruptcy case, such a new appointment 
could provide a significant reaction in stock prices. However, if the market perceives 
that the appointment of new auditors could clarify the uncertainty of future 
monitoring, it may result in positive return. Their findings are consistent with the 
insurance hypothesis. The price reaction on both events supports the argument for the 
absence of the expected insurance coverage thus: the disclosure of the L&H 
bankruptcy had negative impact on their stock prices and the announcement of a 
replacement new auditor did not provide any significant reaction. 
 
In addition to this, Baber et al (1995) suggest that such price reactions were also 
driven by the monitoring function of L&H in which the insurance and monitoring 
hypotheses are difficult to differentiate. They suggest that financially distressed 
auditors are more likely to perform low quality audits because they are more 
concerned with their current position than with their competence and independent 
judgement. For example, in order to retain their clients and minimise their audit cost, 
financially distressed auditors are less likely to report an error or a misstatement that 
they discover during the auditing work or they may reduce audit testing in order to cut 
down the audit cost. They argue that if the investors were aware and if they perceived 
that L&H was incompetent and independent, then such a perception may have forced 
the stock prices to decline. However, Lai and Gul (2008) provide contradictory 
evidence to Baber et al. (1995). Using the likelihood of issuing modified audit 
opinion, the provision of discretionary accruals and the predictability of discretionary 
accruals for future earnings as proxies for audit quality, they suggest that the audit 
quality of L&H was not substandard. 
 
In another study, O‟reilly et al. (2006) examine the interaction of signalling and 
insurance hypotheses through studying audit opinion in an experimental setting. They 
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argue that a going-concern audit opinion (1) provides signals to the market that the 
firm is no longer feasible, thus affecting stock prices; (2) offers the auditor legal 
protection, although there is a possibility that investors are able to recover part of their 
investment‟ losses and (3) increases the value to investors because of the increased 
need for insurance coverage. Their findings suggest that the going-concern audit 
opinion reduces analysts‟ estimation of stock price because market participants 
consider the auditors‟ role as an insurance protector. In sum, the insurance hypothesis 
provides the most consistent support for the view that auditors are perceived by 
investors as the guarantors of their investment and investors “appear to be willing to 
pay a premium for the right to recover potential investment losses from auditors 
through litigation” (Menon and William, 1994: 341).   
 
As well as increasing the direct costs that auditors need to charge for in order to cover 
for investors‟ losses, such lawsuits also have an indirect impact on their reputation 
and perceived audit quality (Palmrose, 1991). The findings of Chaney and Philipich 
(2002) are consistent with those of Menon and Williams (1994) and Baber et al. 
(1995). They investigate the impact of the Enron audit failure on Arthur Andersen's 
(A&A) reputation as one of the big-five auditors. They examine the A&A clients‟ 
stock prices on the three days after A&A admit they shredded a significant number of 
audit documents related to the Enron engagement. Such an unexpected event results in 
a significant negative market reaction on the A&A clients‟ stock prices, suggesting 
that investors acted on the perceived low quality of the audit performed by A&A 
 
In a similar form of study Hillison et al. (2004) examine the audit clients‟ stock price 
reaction related to Ernst & Young‟s (EY) rumours of bankruptcy in late November 
and early December 1990 (event studies). Their findings suggest that the insurance 
hypothesis and the audit quality explanation account for the negative stock price 
reaction. Even though the big-4 auditors may provide a higher quality audit, market 
participants still react according to newly published information. When market 
participants lose their confidence in the credibility of audited financial statements, it 
effects a reduction in clients‟ stock price.   
 
Lennox (1999) has empirically tested the insurance hypothesis and reputation 
exposure (under the signalling hypothesis) using UK data between the periods of 1987 
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and 1994. According to the reputation hypothesis, the big-size auditors signal their 
audit quality by assuming that they are more likely to lose their client-specific rent 
when they provide a low quality audit. In order to avoid such loss, they have more 
incentive to provide a higher audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981). The alternative to this 
argument is that the wealth auditors or big-size auditors are associated with higher 
litigation risk (Dye, 1993). Similarly, in order to prevent such larger litigation claims 
(e.g. because of low quality audit) from the investors, the big-size auditors offer a 
more credible and higher audit quality. Lennox (1999) posits that the lower the audit 
quality undertaken by the auditors, the higher the potential of such auditors to be sued 
(because they fail to detect and report misstatement or negligence). He argues that, in 
the case of the big-size auditors that gain their „quality‟ from reputation capital, the 
auditor‟s litigation provides an accurate indicator. However, the insurance hypothesis 
considers the auditor‟s litigation to be a poor indicator because the auditors are likely 
to be sued if they are insufficiently conservative (type I error), but they will not be 
sued are if they are too conservative (type II error). Thus, although the big-size 
auditors provide higher audit quality than a smaller size auditor, there is a higher 
probability that they will be sued when a type I error arises. Lennox‟s findings suggest 
that the big-size auditors are more likely to be sued because they are more fearful of a 
potential litigation claim than of losing their client-specific rent or reputation capital.   
 
 2.4 The association between board of directors, audit committee, external 
auditor and financial reporting quality 
There are two research questions to be examined in this thesis. The first question 
concerns the relationship between the effective board and audit committee, and audit 
quality. The second question is concerned with the relationship between the effective 
board of directors, audit committee and auditor quality in constraining earnings 
management. Prior to explaining the reasons why these parties demand a higher 
quality audit and why they are more likely to constrain earnings management, it first 
reviews the roles of boards of directors and audit committees and their connection to 
an external audit. 
 
The board of directors is the main player in the success of a firm. They are responsible 
for setting the goals, strategies and values of a firm, in order to align them with the 
interests of their shareholders (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010). They are also 
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responsible for the transparency and fairness of financial statements, a duty which has 
been clearly stated in the Companies Act 1985 and the Company Reform Bill.  
Section 226 of the Companies Act 1985 requires directors to prepare and assume 
responsibility for the individual account and administration of the firm. While, 
Section 366 (1) of the Company Law Reform Bill (2005: 164) states that directors 
must not approve these accounts except they are satisfied themselves that the accounts 
have give true and fair view and have been prepared accordingly to the relevant 
financial reporting framework. These accounts, having been prepared and approved 
by the directors, are required to be audited by an external auditor as they are to be 
used by the public.
15
 As the highest point in the hierarchy of a firm's structure, the 
board of directors is accountable for all a firm‟s activities, strategies and financial 
performance including the sub committees‟ actions. 
 
Under a main board, there are several subcommittees, one of which is the audit 
committee. The audit committee has a direct link with the financial performance of 
the firm and the external audit services. Wolnizer (1995: 47-48) discusses in detail the 
tasks that audit committee members are expected to perform, from three perspectives:  
(1) accounting and financial reporting – The audit committee reviews financial 
statements, accounting policies, fraud, internal control, changes and all 
significant matters that could affect the financial statements.  
(2)  auditors and auditing – The audit committee provides recommendations for 
the external auditors, reviews the scale of audit fees and non-audit fees, writes 
a letter of engagement, reviews the audit plan, ensures auditor independence 
and allocates resources on the internal audit. In relation to the audit fees, 
Collier and Gregory (1996) claim that an effective audit committee is 
responsible for ensuring that the scope of an audit is sufficient, and to some 
extent the audit committee is able to ensure that the reduction of audit fees 
does not reach a level where it may potentially jeopardize the quality of audit 
work.  
                                                          
15
 As stated under Section 235 and 237 of Company Act, 1985 and Section 485to 488 of Company 
Reform Bill. 
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(3) corporate governance – The audit committee facilitates the relationship 
between the auditors and the board of directors, as well as reviewing and 
complying with corporate policies, ethical policies and codes of conduct. 
By implementing these tasks (1 to 3), firms are expected to enhance the credibility, 
objectivity and reliability of financial statements, improve the accountability of 
management staff, reduce any opportunistic behaviour of management, increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of internal control as well as that of internal and external 
audits and strengthen the function of the board of directors while helping them to 
meet their legal responsibilities (Wolnizer, 1995: 49). The overall implication is that 
the activities of an audit committee could improve the quality of financial reporting 
and corporate governance of firm.  
 
Similarly, Menon and Williams (1994: 123) suggest two possible advantages to be 
gained by establishing an audit committee. Firstly, the independent audit committee 
may act as an independent party between the internal audit and the external audit. The 
independent members of an audit committee help them to provide an unbiased 
assessment between internal audit function and external audit services, which in turn 
improves the quality and integrity of a firm‟s financial statements (Imhoff, 2003). 
Secondly, the audit committee may enhance the efficiency of a board‟s function 
particularly when the board has a large number of directors  
 
Furthermore, The Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC, 1999: 19) also agrees that the 
formation of an audit committee can enhance the credibility of the reported financial 
statements and thus maintain the investors‟ confidence. They stated that:   
“…the Committee believes audit committee will be more effective in 
helping to ensure the transparency and integrity of financial reporting and, 
thereby, maintain the investor confidence that makes our securities 
markets the deepest and most liquid in the world.” 
 
In addition to the important role of a board of directors and an audit committee, 
Bailey and Grambling (2005) suggest that an external audit serves as a key 
determinant of financial reporting quality. Power (1996) claims that an external audit 
adds credibility to the financial report provided by management. DeAngelo (1981) 
argues that the auditors improve the quality of financial reports through their 
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competency and independence audit. Furthermore, Ruddock et al. (2006) claim that 
the quality of financial reporting is improved when the auditors respond to the 
aggressive earnings conservatism.   
 
Anderson et al. (2001) posit that when a manager has a higher incentive to manage 
earnings, the auditor perceives that manager as more aggressive, as having a greater 
desire to look good in their financial statements and as expecting the auditors to agree 
with their financial statements. Therefore, auditors will limit earnings management 
when they believe that managers are manipulating financial statements. Moreover, 
according to Krishnan (2003b), by constraining earnings management, the auditors 
are able to improve the information value of earnings. If the market perceives that 
auditors are unable to limit opportunistic earnings, then the earnings‟ information 
value would be diminished simultaneously. According to Sankar and Subramanyam 
(2001), the restriction imposed by GAAP, and by auditors, on the discretion of 
reporting earnings may improve the content of earnings‟ information. 
 
There is a direct and an indirect link between the role of a board, an audit committee 
and an external auditor. Under the direct relationship, the principal roles of an audit 
committee are to make a recommendation to the board in relation to the appointment 
of the external auditor, to review the audit engagement and the audit fees and to 
monitor the external auditor‟s independence and objectivity as well as the 
effectiveness of the audit process (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010). As 
previously stated, in relation to the audit engagement and proposed audit fees, an 
effective audit committee is responsible to ensure that the scope of an audit is 
sufficient and that the proposed audit fees do not potentially jeopardize the quality of 
auditing work (Collier and Gregory, 1996). The reason for this is because auditors 
seek to minimise the total cost of an audit and endeavour to achieve a balance 
between the costs of audit resources and expected future losses as a result of legal 
liability (Carcello et al., 2002). It is reasonable to expect that an effective board of 
directors first reviews the overall scope of an audit and the proposed audit fees before 
accepting a proposal from the audit committee, since the board of directors is 
accountable for all their the sub committees‟ actions. In respect of auditor 
independence, specifically the provision of NAS, the authoritative guidance requires 
an audit committee to review NAS engagement and make sure that relevant 
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procedures are in place to ensure that the independence and objectivity of the auditors 
are not affected by the undertaken NAS. An audit committee is responsible for 
reporting and making recommendations to the board of directors on any actions taken 
to ensure that the auditor's independence has been safeguarded (UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010: 20). 
 
Indirectly, an effective board and audit committee may signal to management and 
auditor that they exercise a higher and more vigilant oversight function. For example, 
when management perceives that a board and audit committee are performing a 
higher monitoring function, they may voluntarily consider limiting the purchase of 
NAS (Abbott et al., 2003b) and will limit their own opportunistic earning behaviour 
by employing higher quality auditors. Similarly, auditors may see that an effective 
board and audit committee are associated with having a higher monitoring function 
and they are thus likely to be more demanding and to insist on having a higher quality 
audit (Carcello et al., 2002).  
 
Why do boards of directors and audit committees demand different levels of audit 
quality? Why do they constrain earnings management? Similarly, why do external 
auditors limit opportunistic earnings management? The answers to these questions lie 
in their implications for reputation capital, legal exposure and shareholder interests 
(Carcello et al., 2002). 
 
The reputation hypothesis posits that vigilant directors make costly investments to 
establish their reputation as effective monitors and, in return for being good monitors, 
they might be rewarded with an additional directorship in another firm (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). Evidence suggests that when directors suffer a damaged 
reputation, they are less likely to get opportunities to serve on another board. For 
example, Gilson (1990) claims that the outside directors of firms in financial distress 
hold significantly fewer seats on other boards following their departure, possibly due 
to reputation effect and legal exposure. In another study, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) 
examine the reputation impact for the outside directors of firms that are involved in 
financial fraud. They find that outside directors lose about 50 percent of their 
directorships in other firms when one of the firms that they serve is involved in 
financial fraud lawsuits. This finding indicates that sued directors on a board are seen 
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as weak monitors who may increase the likelihood of financial misconduct occurring. 
Moreover, they also find that a reduction in directorships may be driven by an outside 
directors‟ desire to reduce their future legal exposure.  
 
The reputation hypothesis is also applicable to auditors. A highly reputable auditor 
has an incentive not to produce a low quality audit because, once their clients discover 
that they provide a low quality audit, their reputation will be damaged and they will 
be unable to secure their clients and they will lose quasi rents (DeAngelo, 1981). 
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) provide evidence of the consequences that auditors may 
suffer if their reputations are damaged. They examine the effect of SEC disciplinary 
actions on audit firms and their findings suggest that the auditors tend to lose their 
market share and that they experience difficulty in retaining clients. In general, the 
auditors are likely to constrain earnings management because of the possibility of 
being sued or subjected to regulatory actions. These may be due to negligence in 
identifying misleading information in the audited financial statement. Evidence 
suggests that auditor litigation has positive relationship with earnings management 
(Lys and Watts, 1994; Heninger, 2001)
16
 and a failure to fulfil their role effectively or 
a neglect of their duties may increase an auditor's potential for future legal exposure 
(Lennox, 1999). 
 
As well as considering reputation capital and legal exposure, a board of directors and 
audit committee demand a higher quality audit in order to promote the shareholder's 
interests (Carcello et al., 2002). Several studies have suggested that investors perceive 
that the provision of NAS negatively affects auditor independence and undermines the 
audited financial statement. Lavin (1976; 1977) and Firth (1980) examine the 
perception of accountants, financial analysts and loan officers in the US and UK, 
respectively. Their findings suggest that when auditor independence is deemed to be 
impaired, investment and borrowing decisions will also be affected. These studies 
may suggest that investors are unfavourable towards a firm if they perceive that the 
auditing of financial statements has been impaired by the purchase of NAS.  
Therefore, the board of directors and audit committee monitor auditor independence 
                                                          
16
 The auditors are subject to lawsuits for the overstated earnings (Lys and Watts, 1994; Heninger, 
2001) but reveal no evidence for understated earnings (St. Pierrie and Anderson, 1984).  
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(e.g. in terms of the levels of NAS) in order to gain the investors‟ confidence and 
promote the shareholders' interests. 
 
A higher quality auditor may perceive by the investors to be associated with a higher 
credibility of information, which in turn increase the firm value (Titman and 
Trueman, 1986; Datar et al., 1991). Indeed the investors assume that the higher 
quality auditors are more sensitive to earnings surprises. For example, the existing 
studies suggest that the firms engage or switch to big-size auditors have lower 
earnings management and higher earnings respond coefficient compared to smaller 
size auditors, consistent to the view that big-size auditors provide more credible 
information to investors (Teoh and Wong, 1993; Becker et al., 1998). In other study, 
Khurana and Raman (2006) suggest that the higher NAS fees and total fees received 
by the auditors are viewed negatively by the investors because higher fees could 
possibly compromise the auditors‟ independent and audit quality through the auditors‟ 
economic bonding on clients. Such views have been expressed into the investor 
perception as a lower ex ante cost of equity capital. 
 
Overall, higher quality audits and a higher quality of reported earnings are not only 
useful for investors and the users of financial statements, but they are also beneficial 
to auditors, boards of directors and audit committees because they are able to 
minimise the potential for damaged reputation and legal exposure while also raising 
the support of shareholders. 
 
2.5 Summary  
Agency theory assumes that principals and agents have divergent interests and thus 
are likely to contribute to agency conflicts that include the phenomenon of earnings 
management. To align these interests, agency theory recognises the monitoring roles 
of a board of directors, an audit committee and external auditing as playing a part in 
the mitigation of agent-principal conflict. From the agency perspective there are 
several characteristics of board and audit committee (e.g. size, composition, expertise 
and levels of activities) that contribute to an effective monitoring function. The 
independent audit is also acknowledged by the agency theory as a control mechanism 
to reduce information asymmetry between the shareholders/investors and 
management by promoting truthfulness and fairness in financial statements. Several 
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hypotheses have explained why shareholders/investors or management demand 
auditing services and different levels of audit quality. These hypotheses include the 
monitoring hypothesis, information hypothesis, signalling/reputation hypothesis and 
insurance hypothesis. By employing a higher quality auditor and constraining 
earnings manipulation, a board of directors and audit committee assume that they are 
adding credibility to the financial statement and increasing a firms‟ value. At the same 
time, the board and audit committee are able to secure their reputation capital, avoid 
legal exposure and promote the shareholders' interests. Similarly, a higher quality 
auditor is less flexible towards opportunistic earnings due to the risk that wrongly 
reported earnings may incur reputation damage, increase future legal exposure, 
decrease a firm‟s value and disappoint shareholders.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the existing literature on three topics: audit quality, corporate 
governance and earnings management. It first reviews the definition of audit quality 
and how it is measured, and this is followed by discussion and review of the effective 
characteristics of boards and audit committees. Previous studies of earnings 
management, particularly those related to the motivation for earnings and earnings 
management measurement, are also reviewed. These reviews provide a general 
understanding of the areas of study that is being investigated in this thesis.  
 
Towards the end of this chapter, the discussions and reviews focus on the association 
between corporate governance and audit quality and between corporate governance 
and auditor quality in respect of constraining earnings management. These reviews 
help to identify similar studies that have been done and which provide potential 
evidence of research gaps that demand further investigation. For each of the main 
relationships, the development of tested hypotheses is also disclosed.  Finally, the 
summary and conclusion are presented in the last section.   
 
3.2 Definition of audit quality 
The most common definition for audit quality is derived from DeAngelo (1981: 186), 
she defines audit quality as “the market assessed joint probability that a given auditor 
will both (a) discover a breach in the client‟s accounting system and (b) report the 
breach.”  This definition is accessed by market as the ability of an auditor to detect 
accounting misstatements and then to express them in appropriate audit opinion. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) simplify DeAngelo‟s definition where the first part 
refers to auditor‟s competence and the quantity of inputs devoted to the audit, while 
the second part refers to an auditor‟s independence. In other words, according to 
Watts and Zimmerman, any factors that are associated with a lack of auditor 
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competence or a lack of auditor independence are able to compromise the quality of 
audit. 
17
 
 
Palmrose (1988) describes audit quality in terms of levels of assurances. Higher levels 
of assurances (i.e. possibility that financial statements contain fewer errors or 
misstatements) are associated with a higher audit quality and vice-versa. The grounds 
for this definition have been developed from audit failures (where an auditor has 
failed to detect a material error or misstatement) than can be traced in litigation cases. 
According to Francis (2004), audit failure can be classified as extremely low audit 
quality (end quality) that can result in several outcomes such as regulatory sanctions, 
litigation rates, business failure and earnings restatement.  
 
From the regulator‟s perspective, ICAEW (2002: 8) suggests a definition for audit 
quality by stating that, “At its heart [audit quality] is about delivering an appropriate 
professional opinion supported by the necessary evidence and objective judgements.” 
As long as the auditors provide an independent audit opinion that is supported by 
adequate audit evidence, the regulator assumes that such auditors have performed a 
quality auditing service.  
 
Despite the fact that technical qualities, such as an auditor‟s ability to detect and 
report errors, have been argued as the defining aspects of audit quality, Duff (2004) 
suggests that audit quality is made up of both technical quality and service quality (the 
levels of clients‟ satisfaction and expectations). Technical quality consists of 
reputation capital, capability, expertise, experience and independence scales, while 
                                                          
17
 Beattie et al. (1999: 71) claim that there are two broad categories of factors that affect an auditor's 
independence. They are, namely, economic and regulatory factors. They suggest that the economic 
factors are related to an auditor‟s economic dependence on clients, competition among auditors in the 
audit market, the provision of NAS, and deficiencies in the regulatory frameworks. The regulatory 
factors are those factors that are associated with accounting and auditing standards. For example in 
promoting the auditor independence, the Cadbury report (1992) provides the recommendation that the 
formation an audit committee is able to strengthen the auditors‟ independence and thus to enhance 
audit quality. Arruñada (2000) appends that the term “independent” is not exclusively confined to the 
relationship between the main client and auditor, but that it also encompasses other important attributes 
such as third parties and other clients. He cites the example of a client being more worried when the 
company of an auditor‟s other client collapses without prior notice than they are about having low 
quality audit. As a consequence, “clients have very strong incentives to monitor, evaluate and 
compensate audit firms‟ quality” (Arruñada 2000: 218). 
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service quality is defined by responsiveness, empathy and the provision of NAS and 
client services.
18
  
 
Following DeAngelo‟s and Watt and Zimmerman‟s definitions, this thesis defines 
audit quality as the competence of the auditors to detect errors and the objectivity (in 
fact and in appearance) of the auditors in reporting such errors.
19
 The terms “audit 
quality” and “auditor quality” are assumed to be synonymous, and this is consistent 
with Clarkson and Simunic‟s (1994: 208) suggestion that “an audit firm is assumed to 
supply a single level of audit quality that at a moment in time.”  
 
Several factors may influence the quality of an audit. Wooten (2003) claims that audit 
firms, audit teams and the professional judgement or auditor independence are the 
principal contributors to audit quality (as shown in Figures 3.1). A audit firm and 
audit team factors (e.g. human resources, audit processes, industry expertise, 
supervision, audit planning, and professionalism) directly contribute to the skill and 
competence of auditors in detecting errors and misstatements. The factors of audit 
tenure, audit fees and NAS not only directly impair auditor independence, but they 
also implicitly support auditor effectiveness. 
 
In addition, FRC (2008) suggests five key drivers for audit quality: (1) the audit firm 
culture, (2) skills and personal qualities of audit partners and staff, (3) the audit 
process, (4) usefulness of the audit reporting and (5) factors that are outside the 
control of the auditors (refer to Figure 3.2 for detailed outlines of key drivers). FRC 
(2008) suggest that the roles of internal governance mechanisms (e.g. audit 
committees) and regulatory requirements may help to improve audit quality. An 
                                                          
18
 The independence and NAS scales are relatively different from each other (Duff, 2004: 110). 
19
 Consistent with  AICPA (2009), in this thesis, the auditor objectivity or auditor independence in fact 
(mind) and in appearance are defined as: “Independence of mind—The state of mind that permits the 
performance of an attest service without being affected by influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing an individual to act with integrity and exercise objectivity and professional 
scepticism. Independence in appearance—The avoidance of circumstances that would cause a 
reasonable and informed third party, having knowledge of all relevant information, including 
safeguards applied, to reasonably conclude that the integrity, objectivity, or professional scepticism of a 
firm or a member of the attest engagement team had been compromised.” 
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effective audit committee is capable of enhancing audit quality through active 
involvement during the audit period and effective communication with the auditors.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: A model of audit quality (source: Wooten 2003) 
 
To sum up, audit quality can be described as the ability of an auditor to provide an 
independent audit which results in a financial statement that is free from 
misstatement, error and fraud. Since an audit‟s quality is influenced by three main 
parties (audit firm, audit‟ client and regulators), the attributes or factors that are 
associated with each group can be used as indicators for audit quality.   
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Drivers Indicators 
 
The culture 
within an 
audit firm 
 
The culture of an audit firm is likely to provide a positive contribution 
to audit quality where the leadership of an audit firm: 
 Creates an environment where achieving high quality is valued, 
invested in and rewarded. 
 Emphasis the importance of „doing the right thing‟ in the public 
interest and the effect of doing so on the reputation of both the 
firm and individual auditors. 
 Ensures partners and staff have sufficient time and resources to 
deal with difficult issues as they arise. 
 Ensures financial considerations do not drive actions and decisions 
having a negative effect on audit quality. 
 Promotes the merits of consultation on difficult issues and 
supporting partners in the exercise of their personal judgment. 
 Ensures robust systems for client acceptance and continuation. 
 Fosters appraisal and reward systems for partners and staff that 
promote the personal characteristics essential to quality auditing. 
 Ensures audit quality is monitored within firms and across 
international networks and appropriate consequential action is 
taken. 
 
 
The skills 
and personal 
qualities 
of audit 
partners and 
staff 
 
The skills and personal qualities of audit partners and staff are likely 
to make a positive contribution to audit quality where: 
 Partners and staff understand their clients‟ business and adhere to 
the principles underlying auditing and ethical standards. 
 Partners and staff exhibit professional scepticism in their work and 
are robust in dealing with issues identified during the audit. 
 Staff performing detailed „on-site‟ audit work has sufficient 
experience and are appropriately supervised by partners and 
managers. 
 Partners and managers provide junior staff with appropriate 
„mentoring‟ and „on the job‟ training. 
 Sufficient training is given to audit personnel in audit, accounting 
and industry specialist issues. 
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continued  
Drivers Indicators 
 
The 
effectiveness 
of the audit 
process 
 
An audit process is likely to provide a positive contribution to audit 
quality 
where: 
 The audit methodology and tools applied to the audit are well 
structured and: 
o Encourage partners and managers to be actively involved in 
audit planning. 
o Provide a framework and procedures to obtain sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence effectively and efficiently. 
o Require appropriate audit documentation. 
o Provide for compliance with auditing standards without 
inhibiting the exercise of judgment. 
o Ensure there is effective review of audit work. 
o Audit quality control procedures are effective, understood and 
applied. 
 High quality technical support is available when the audit team 
requires it or encounters a situation it is not familiar with. 
 The objectives of ethical standards are achieved, providing 
confidence in the integrity, objectivity and independence of the 
auditor. 
 The collection of sufficient audit evidence is not inappropriately 
constrained by financial pressures. 
 
 
The 
reliability 
and 
usefulness of 
audit 
reporting 
 
Audit reporting is likely to provide a positive contribution to audit 
quality where: 
 Audit reports are written in a manner that conveys clearly and 
unambiguously the auditor‟s opinion on the financial statements 
and that addresses the needs of users of financial statements in the 
context of applicable law and regulations. 
 Auditors properly conclude as to the truth and fairness of the 
financial statements. 
 Communications with the audit committee include discussions 
about: 
o The scope of the audit. 
o The threats to auditor objectivity. 
o The key risks identified and judgments made in reaching the 
audit opinion. 
o The qualitative aspects of the entity‟s accounting and 
reporting and potential ways of improving financial reporting. 
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continued 
Drivers Indicators 
 
Factors 
outside the 
control of 
auditors 
 
Factors outside the control of auditors which are likely to make a 
positive contribution to audit quality include: 
 An approach to corporate governance within the reporting entity 
that attaches importance to corporate and financial reporting and to 
the audit process. 
 Audit committees that are active, professional and robust in 
dealing with issues identified during the audit. 
 Shareholders that support auditors, where appropriate, thereby 
increasing the likelihood that directors and management will 
comply with their obligations in relation to the preparation of 
reliable financial statements.  
 Reporting deadlines that allow the opportunity to carry out an audit 
without undue reliance on work performed before the end of the 
reporting period. 
 Appropriate agreed arrangements for any limitation of liability. 
 An audit regulatory environment that focuses on the drivers of 
audit quality. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The key drivers of audit quality (source: FRC, 2008) 
 
3.3 A possible approach to measuring audit quality 
The measurement of audit quality is complex and problematic (see e.g. Wooten, 2003; 
Niemi, 2004; Jensen and Payne, 2005). However, Bailey and Grambling (2005), 
Francis (2004) and PCOB (2008) have identified several potential measures for audit 
quality in both academic literature and in practice. These measures are perceived as 
factors, indicators, behaviors or perceptions that have a direct and an indirect link with 
audit quality as defined in the previous section.  
 
Bailey and Grambling (2005) and PCOB (2008) discuss potential measures of audit 
quality based on the audit process that is adhered to in completing an audit 
engagement. These measures are associated with the audit procedures, the 
documentation of audit evidence and compliance with auditing standards. They 
classify them as input and output-based measures. Bailey and Grambling (2005) 
suggest that the inputs of audit processes are relevant to the quality control system of 
an audit firm. These include (1) how audit firms put an effort into promoting and 
emphasising desirable qualities (e.g. independence, objectivity, and professionalism), 
(2) internal control (e.g. an audit firm‟s internal review), (3) human resources (e.g. 
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competence and independence of staff) and (4) audit methodologies (e.g. audit 
policies and procedures). Moreover, in respect of human resources, Bailey and 
Grambling (2005: 15) suggest that the skills and competencies of auditors should be 
viewed in a broader context which goes beyond technical accounting and auditing 
skills. They argue that the level of professional scepticism of auditors may affect their 
ability to act independently when executing auditing work. Thus, the attribute of 
„independence‟ is desirable for every auditor and audit team member when it comes to 
achieving a higher audit quality.
20
 In short, Bailey and Grambling (2005: 14) state that 
“if audit quality is defined on the basis of inputs, those inputs could be loosely 
described as the „right‟ people, applying the „right‟ tools and procedures in the „right‟ 
organisational culture which includes appropriate internal monitoring”. The output-
based measures specifically relate to the audit opinion and whether that audit opinion 
reflects the “accuracy of management‟s assertions”, and it includes the issuance of 
going concern audit opinion and restatements (Bailey and Grambling, 2005:13). 
 
As an alternative to the suggestions that are given by Bailey and Grambling (2005), 
PCOB (2008) defines the input-based measures as the things and procedures that 
auditors have taken into account in arriving at a given audit opinion (e.g. the audit 
procedures used in detecting fraud, the experience levels of audit staff and audit 
partners, and the annual staff retention). The output-based measures refer to outcome 
or evidences that an auditor produces from work that has been undertaken. Such 
outcomes, for instance, can be measured by the number of frauds discovered and 
numbers of errors or misstatements detected.   
 
In general, the potential measures of input and output given by Bailey and Grambling 
(2005) and PCOB (2008) are limited to the factors that are associates with the audit 
process that was adhered to in completing an audit engagement. These factors of audit 
quality are beyond the audit process itself. A users‟ perception of audit quality is 
claimed to be one of the alternative measure for audit quality (e.g. audit fees, NAS 
fees and industry specialist auditor). Specifically, users reckon audit quality based on 
an auditor‟s reputation. Khurana and Raman (2006) claim that a user‟s perception of 
                                                          
20
 “Independence in fact allows the auditor to exercise judgement with an objective viewpoint, thus 
achieving actual audit quality, while independence in appearance leads investors to trust that the 
auditor is exercising professional judgement in an objective fashion” (Bailey and Grambling, 2005:15) 
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audit quality is important because it reflects public trust and confidence in a firms‟ 
reported financial information. Recognised the important these, in this thesis the audit 
quality measures will be based on the users‟ perceptions.  
 
Despite the various measures of audit quality that been used in the existing studies, 
the present study acknowledges the limitation of these measures. For example, with 
regard to an input-based measure, how do we ensure that the consistency of the 
input‟s attributes has not been diminished during the process of the audit engagement? 
Perhaps, information about the key drivers of audit quality, such as the education, 
experience and competency of the auditors is not publicly available and difficult to 
obtain. By using output-based measures the result of an audit is not necessarily 
observable just after work has been undertaken because the quality of audit 
information usually emerges over a certain period during which restatement or 
business failure or the identification of misstatements can occur (PCOB, 2008:9). The 
measures, such as audit firm size, that reflect an auditor‟s reputation may not be 
essentially accurate measures of audit quality. While there are factors that are believed 
to compromise auditor independence, such as NAS and audit tenure, it has also been 
argued that these same factors can enhance an auditor‟s knowledge and competency. 
The existing studies recognise that, to the certain extent, some measures (e.g. industry 
specialist auditors) have demonstrated a strong relationship with higher audit quality. 
The lack of the empirical evidence to support some measure as better audit quality 
indicators, does not mean that these measures are insignificant, as they may 
complement qualitative research on audit quality.  
 
In this thesis, three measures of audit quality will be employed based on auditor 
reputation and auditor independence points of view, namely, audit fees, NAS fees and 
industry specialist auditors. These measures have been extensively used in prior 
auditing research and each of them is now reviewed. 
 
3.3.1 Audit fees  
The link between audit fees and audit quality is suggested by the signalling or 
reputation hypothesis (Lindberg, 2001). Models of reputation capital suggest that 
sellers expend resources in order to build a reputation because buyers are unable to 
determine product quality before purchasing (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983; 
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Rogerson, 1983; Allen, 1984). Once a sellers‟ reputation has been established, they 
are able to convince buyers that their products have higher quality-assuring price, and 
thus earn economic rents. If buyers discover that sellers produce a low quality product 
(i.e. at the minimum-quality price), their established reputation will be impaired and 
the economic rents assigned to the higher quality product will disappear (Klein and 
Leffer, 1981). As concluded by Klein and Leffer (1981: 634), “our analysis implies 
that consumers can successfully use price as an indicator of quality”. 
 
There are several arguments for the proposition of audit fees as proxy for audit 
quality. Several studies suggest that higher audit fees are associated with higher audit 
quality in order to compensate for the high-price of reputation capital (i.e. big-size), 
auditors‟ industry specialization, as well as for increased audit effort (see Simunic, 
1980; Palmrose, 1986a; Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002). 
 
Craswell et al. (1995) argue that the reputation development of an auditors‟ brand 
name and industry specialization consumes a higher cost and thus results in higher 
audit fees. Evidence suggests that audit clients are willing to pay a fee premium on 
these auditors‟ reputations in order to get a better quality of service. The brand name 
auditors demonstrate the effect of a Big 8/6/4 premium that is justified for higher 
reputation capital, and thus they convey a higher quality differentiation compared to 
non-brand name auditors (Simunic, 1980; Palmrose 1986a).  
 
According to Palmrose (1986a: 108), the Big 8 auditors charge higher audit fees for 
two reasons: they indicate (1) higher audit quality or (2) monopoly pricing. After 
substituting the audit fees variable for audit hours, her finding supports that the Big 8 
auditors are consistent with higher audit quality providers. She indicates that “big 
eight designation is a quality surrogate, in that increased hours by big eight auditors 
would reflect greater productive activities (evidence acquisition) in providing higher 
levels of assurance (higher quality) to clients”. As well as the brand name auditors, 
prior studies provide further evidence of the relationship between audit fees premiums 
and industry specialist auditors. Craswell et al. (1995) and Ferguson and Stokes 
(2002) claim that the brand name industry specialist auditors earn additional fee 
premiums over non-specialist brand name auditors, which indicates a higher audit 
quality differentiation among them. 
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In other study, Wolinsky (1983) argue that the price may signal a differentiation in 
levels of quality. Although sellers are potentially capable of producing the preferred 
and various levels of quality, the higher quality products are more costly to produce. 
DeAngelo (1981) claims that larger sized auditors or auditors that earn higher fees 
have more resources to invest when compared with smaller size auditors. Hence, they 
contribute more to improving the quality of their work (DeAngelo, 1981).  
 
Elitzur and Falk (1996) suggest that audit fees have a positive relationship with 
planned audit quality. They examine planned audit quality and audit fees in a 
multiperiod model. Ordinarily, higher audit fees might inspire auditors to increase the 
audit quality. Hoitash et al. (2007) also agree that higher audit fees will increase the 
auditor‟s effort and result in a higher audit quality. 
 
In recent studies related to corporate governance, evidence suggests that lower audit 
fees could also be associated with a perceived higher audit quality. This is because the 
auditor might take into consideration that firms bound by a strong internal control 
environment will probably have a lower audit risk thus reducing the audit effort and 
audit fees by means of an effective internal corporate governance mechanism (Tsui et 
al., 2001; Boo and Sharma, 2008b; Griffin et al., 2008; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 
2009). Cohen et al., (2002) claim that an effective internal corporate governance 
mechanism may potentially contribute to a higher audit quality by lessening audit 
testing and enhancing the integrity of financial statements. Yeoh and Jubb (2001) 
suggest that an auditor and the internal corporate governance mechanisms share an 
identical common factor that contributes to a higher quality audit (i.e. independence 
from management). Griffin et al. (2008) provide evidence that the demand for audit 
services and internal corporate governance are co-determined by two countervailing 
relationships. In the first relationship, an increase in audit fees can occur due to the 
demand for effective corporate governance. The second relationship is associated with 
a decrease in audit fees because the auditors benefit from strong corporate governance 
and thus the audit risk and cost of auditing is reduced. Both relationships contribute to 
a higher audit quality. Consistent with this, Tsui et al. (2001) and Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2009) suggest that those firms which separate the dual roles of CEO and 
chairman and the audit committee equipped with financial expertise, are perceived by 
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auditors to have strong a internal control environment. This reduces the control risk 
and audit effort, leading to lower audit fees. 
  
Besides the empirical evidence on the relationship between audit fees and audit 
quality that has been discussed above, several reports from the regulators emphasise 
the importance of audit fee setting and how it may affect the quality of auditing work 
(The Cohen Commission, AICPA 1978; Treadway Commission 1987; Cadbury 
Report 1992; Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence, 1994). For example, The 
Cohen Commission (AICPA, 1978) suggests that audit firms need to identify and 
manage audit fees and other issues related to the audit resources (e.g. staff, time and 
partners participation) as these factors are likely to devalue audit quality due to the 
higher competition in audit market. Similarly, the authoritative body in UK also draws 
attention to the audit fees factor and how it may influence audit quality.  As postulated 
by ICAEW (2002: 9) “audit quality is achieved only if it is the keystone of the firm‟s 
overall strategy. Every single strategic decision taken by the firm will ultimately 
impact on quality including the firm‟s policy on audit fess”. Concisely, ICAEW 
alleges that an audit firm‟s policy on audit fees is one of the components that may 
affect the quality of audits. 
 
In opposition to the benefits of using audit fees as a proxy for audit quality, the 
present study notices the limitation that audit fees are an imperfect measure of audit 
quality. The audit fee is not necessarily accurate an as an indicator for audit effort as 
the appropriate measure for audit effort is the number of audit hours. However, Deis 
and Giroux (1996) provide some empirical evidence that audit fees and audit hour are 
significantly related to audit quality in their analysis of three important attributes: 
audit fees, audit hours and audit quality. Hence, it seems reasonable that more audit 
hours will lead to higher audit fees and promote a higher quality audit. In addition, to 
consider higher audit fees as a proxy for higher audit quality is consistent with 
signalling or reputation hypothesis. 
 
3.3.2 NAS fees  
The issue of the provision of NAS has been discussed broadly in the prior literature 
(see for example Beck et al., 1988a; 1988b; Beattie and Fearnley, 2002). The central 
arguments about NAS are generally concerned with auditor independence and 
64 
 
whether the joint provision of audit and NAS enhances or reduces auditor 
independence. In other words, it is a question of whether the joint provision of NAS is 
able to increase or decrease the quality of an audit. 
21
 Beattie and Fearnley (2002) 
claim that there no formal theory of auditor independence and they suggest that most 
of the definitions of auditor independence basically highlight the importance of an 
auditor‟s objectivity and integrity.  
 
Several studies suggest that the joint provision of audit and NAS may create potential 
benefits (see Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988a; Arruñada, 1999a; 1999b; 2000; 
Wallman, 1996; Goldman and Barlev, 1974). These studies claim that the joint 
provision of NAS enhances an auditor‟s independence through economies of scope 
and the auditor‟s economic power. Economies of scope can be defined as the savings 
that arise when both services (audit and NAS) are jointly provided by the same 
auditors. They can be divided into two types, namely: knowledge spillovers and 
contractual economies of scope (Arruñada, 1999a; 1999b). Knowledge spillovers are 
derived from the transformation process that occurs when both services need to use a 
similar set of information and/or require similar professional qualifications (Arruñada, 
1999a; 1999b). For example, when an auditor is undertaking an audit service,  
relevant information on the client‟s internal control system and competency in 
information technology are both necessary to the performance of the work. A similar 
set of information and qualifications are also essential to auditors when they are 
providing advice on a client‟s accounting information system. As mentioned by 
Wallman (1996), the gathered information flows both ways, when auditors undertake 
audit work they learn more about a client's business and this information is also useful 
when they provide NAS.   
 
The second type of economies of scope are contractual economies of scope which are 
related to the contractual advantages that stem from making better use of assets and/or 
                                                          
21
 Since the definition of audit quality comprises aspects of the auditors‟ competency and their 
independence (DeAngelo, 1981; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986), the present study argues that any 
factors that are associated with auditor independence will also have an impact on audit quality. NAS 
include compliance and assurances services such as taxation, accounting advice, due diligence, internal 
audit, training, services to SMEs, corporate recovery and insolvency, legal, forensic and litigation 
support, mergers and acquisitions, recruitment and human resources as well as  information systems 
and technology (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002; Arruñada, 1999a; 1999b). 
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the safeguarding of an auditor's reputation (e.g. big-size) that has already been 
developed through contracting and ensuring quality in auditing or NAS. The use of 
similar contractual resources, also referred to as “one-stop shopping”, provides both 
supplier and client with advantages that are contractual in nature (Arruñada, 1999a: 
775-6). In other words, clients and auditors can reduce the costs of searching and 
marketing for those services. Also, clients are assured of the quality of an auditor's 
performance. In addition to recognising the cost saving benefits of NAS, Goldman 
and Barlev (1974) and Nichols and Price (1976) provide a more complex view of 
auditor-client relationships. They suggest that economic power models provide the 
auditor with a potential source of power and independence to withstand auditor-client 
conflicts. Goldman and Barlev (1974) suggest that the higher the provision of non-
routine NAS, the more important these services are to clients and the greater the 
power that an auditor would gain. Such an increase in auditor's power allows them to 
be more independent because they are more able to resist the client's pressure. 
 
Despite the positive effects of NAS, their dual provision continues to be controversial 
and they are viewed with scepticism due to the potential that they may compromise 
auditor independence (Panel on Audit Effectiveness, 2000; SEC, 2001; Beattie and 
Fearnley, 2002) and cause economic dependence on clients (Beck et al. 1988a, b; 
Simunic, 1984). The foregoing evidence consistently suggests that both the user and 
the investor may perceive that NAS impaired audit independence (Wines, 1994; Firth, 
2002; Frankel et al. 2002; Raghunandan, 2003; Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; Larcker and 
Richardson, 2004) and this outweighs their positive effect of NAS and reflects a 
declining in audit quality. 
 
The first argument against the joint provision of NAS is the probability that it will 
make auditors economically dependent on their clients. As such, they are less likely to 
resist a client's pressure for the fear of losing them. As pointed out by Simunic (1984) 
and Beck et al. (1988a), the joint provision of audit and NAS creates knowledge 
spillovers or cost savings that lead to economic rents. In order to retain their clients, 
auditors tend to accept a client‟s preferences, and consequently they lose their 
objectivity. The second argument concerns the nature of NAS themselves and 
maintains that they may reduce an auditor‟s independence because of the conflict of 
interest that arises during the provision of audits and NAS. For example, they may 
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audit their own work, take a managerial role or act on behalf of a client‟s management 
in an adversarial situation and, therefore, become too close to a client's management 
(Panel on Audit Effectiveness, 2000; SEC, 2001; Beattie and Fearnley, 2002). 
 
In sum, generally, prior empirical studies provide inconsistent findings on the 
relationship between NAS and auditor‟s independence. Hartley and Ross (1972) claim 
that NAS are a minor problem in the total auditor independence issue.
22
 Some studies 
argue that NAS have little impact on auditor independence (Ryan, 2001; Craswell, 
1999) and a few suggest that NAS provide feasible advantages (Lai and Krishnan, 
2009).
23
 A number of empirical studies have been unable to find any association 
between NAS and auditor independence (Barkess and Simnett, 1994; Craswell, 1999; 
Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; DeFond et al., 2002), whereas 
other studies provide evidence that the joint provision of NAS impairs auditor 
independence (Wines, 1994; Firth, 2002; Frankel et al. 2002; Raghunandan, 2003; 
Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; Larcker and Richadson, 2004).   
 
In this thesis, consistent to the regulatory concern that NAS could compromise the 
auditor independence, the higher provision of NAS is indicate as a lower audit quality.   
 
3.3.3 Industry specialist auditors  
The theoretical foundation for the use of industry specialist auditors is derived from 
the reputation capital hypothesis as it applies to big-size auditors. Economic theories 
of product differentiation suggest that sellers expend their resources to build a 
reputation (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983). In the audit market, there are two 
levels of reputation development. The first level requires audit firms to invest in their 
brand name's reputation in order to differentiate the quality of their products. The 
                                                          
22
 Hartley and Ross investigate the perceptions of three groups of respondents on NAS, namely: 
auditors, financial analysts and management. Their results show that only 5.6% of the respondents rank 
the NAS provision as important threat to auditor independent. The overall findings suggest that that 
auditor independence in fact can be retained while providing NAS, but it is not essentially improved 
the auditor independence in appearance. 
23
 For example, Lai and Krishnan (2009) findings suggest that when the firms purchase the related 
services of financial information system (FIS) from the external auditors, they are more likely to have 
higher market value of equity, suggesting that the FIS related services are been priced by investors as a 
value-added activity. Such belief shows that NAS increased the firm value, thus contribute to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the overall firms‟ performance, despite raising a threat to auditor 
independence. 
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second level requires big-size auditors to actually differentiate the quality of their 
products among them. Due to the complexity and unique features of certain industries, 
buyers demand industry specialist auditors in order to deal with specific accounting 
rules and reporting requirements (Craswell et al., 1995). Such demands encourage 
big-size auditors to invest resources in a particular industry in order to gain industry 
specific knowledge and competency.  
  
Evidence suggests that specific knowledge, task-specific experience and training 
increase an auditor‟s competence (Ashton, 1991; Boner and Lewis, 1990) and results 
in auditors seizing increasing numbers of established audit clients in specific 
industries. The auditor market share rises as the number of their audit clients 
increases. The larger an auditor's market share is, the more likely clients are to 
perceive that that auditor would supply a higher quality audit. This notion is 
consistent with the studies that show that a firm‟s market shares signals their product's 
quality (Smallwood and Conlisk, 1979; Shockley and Holt, 1983; Caminal and Vives, 
1996). 
  
The industry specific knowledge and competency that is possessed by an auditor 
represents the main component of their audit quality. Taylor (2000) and Low (2004) 
claim that an auditor‟s knowledge of a clients‟ specific industry affects the level of 
audit risk assessment and other audit-planning decisions. When auditors have a higher 
knowledge and a better understanding of the clients‟ industries they are able to assess 
appropriately the levels of audit risk and to plan their audit strategies, and this can 
help them to anticipate the potential for misstatements 
 
Evidence has also suggested that the possession of industry specialist knowledge 
improves auditor performance. Owhoso et al. (2002) examine the effectiveness of 
industry specialist auditors in detecting errors during the audit review process for two 
specific industries, namely banking and health care. Their findings suggest that the 
auditors‟ experience in the specific industry enables them to detect error more 
effectively than non-specialist auditors. Auditors without specific industry experience 
perform below the nominal benchmark for error detection. Similarly, Bédard and 
Biggs (1991) show that the auditors who have greater manufacturing experience are 
better at detecting errors than the auditors who have less manufacturing experience.  
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Dunn and Mayhew (2004) find a positive relationship between industry specialist 
auditors and disclosure quality. Their findings suggest that auditors with specific 
industry knowledge are more able to assist their clients in developing industry specific 
disclosure strategies. O‟Keefe at al. (1994) find that industry specialist auditors are 
associated with a higher compliance with GAAS reporting standards than non-
specialist auditors. Carcello and Nagy (2004) report a negative relationship between 
industry specialist auditors and the incidence of fraudulent of financial reporting, and 
this indicates that industry specialist auditors are less likely to be associated with 
financial fraud. 
 
Several studies have linked auditor industry specialists with earnings management 
(e.g. Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003a). These studies report that the clients of 
industry specialist auditors experience lower discretionary accruals than the clients of 
non-specialist auditors. The findings suggest that industry specialist auditors are more 
likely to constrain earnings management and the opportunistic behaviour of 
management.  
 
In other studies, concerning market reaction, Knechel et al. (2007) claim that when 
firms switch from a Big 4 non-specialist to a Big 4 specialist auditor, those firms 
experience a significant positive abnormal return. Subsequently, the markets react 
negatively when firms switch from a Big 4 specialist to a Big 4 non-specialist. These 
findings indicate that the market perceives audit quality differences based on industry 
specialization.  
 
Beside the theoretical justification and empirical evidence for the connection between 
industry specialist auditors and audit quality, regulators and authoritative guidance 
have also emphasised the importance of an auditor being able to understand the 
client‟s industry setting before proceeding with auditing work (Knechel et al., 2007). 
For example, the UK Auditing Standard, ISA 300: Planning an audit of financial 
statement (ABP, 2004), states that an auditor needs to establish an understanding of 
the client‟s industry setting before planning their audit strategies. 
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In summary, most of the prior studies indicate that an auditor's industry knowledge is 
a crucial component in the efficiency and effectiveness of audit processes and that it 
increases the quality of auditing services. The use of an industry specialist auditor not 
only improves the quality of auditing work but is also perceived to be valuable to 
market participants. 
 
3.4 The effectiveness of boards of directors 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that the board of directors is the highest-level of 
control mechanism in an organization because they possess the ultimate power to 
compensate the decisions that are made by the top management. Evidence suggests 
that several characteristics of a board may influence their effectiveness in their 
monitoring role. These characteristics are: size, composition of independent non-
executive directors, financial expertise and meeting frequency. 
 
3.4.1 Board of directors size 
Board size is believed to be a fundamental aspect of effective decision making (UK 
Corporate Governance Code, 2010). Vafeas (2005) suggests that the size of a 
committee and the performance of the directors have a non-linear relationship. Both 
too small and too large a size of board is likely to make it ineffective. Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992), for example, recommend the ideal size for a board should not exceed 
eight or nine directors. Jensen (1993) claims that when a board has beyond seven or 
eight members, it is less effective due to the problems of coordination and process 
which, in turn, contribute to weak monitoring. 
 
Although average board sizes are relatively large, prior studies have shown that 
smaller boards are more effective as directors can communicate better on them and 
they are easier to manage.
24
 These factors promote a more resourceful conversation. 
For example, studies of board size and corporate performance have indicated that 
smaller boards are associated with higher market values. Yermark (1996) examines 
452 large U.S firms in the period between 1984 and 1991 and he documents a 
negative relationship between board size and firm value. Drawing from Yermark‟s 
                                                          
24
 Xie et al., (2003) and Vafeas (2005) report the average size of board in their samples are 12.48 and 
11.6, respectively. 
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study, Eisenberg et al. (1998) also provide a similar conclusion on board size and firm 
value in a sample of small and mid-size Finnish firms.  
 
In studies related to earning informativeness, Vafeas (2000) claims that market 
participants perceived the information content of earnings as being higher in the firms 
with a smaller board (with a minimum of five members). This is probably due to the 
commitment of each individual member and the likelihood of them accepting their 
responsibility as a personal obligation. By comparison, on a larger board, the 
responsibility of monitoring is divided among members and less responsibility is 
carried by each individual member (Vafeas, 2000).  
 
With regard to audit quality studies, Abbott et al. (2004) suggest that the firms with 
smaller board size experience a lower incidence of restatements as the smaller boards 
contribute to effective communication and there is less likelihood of a communication 
breakdown. This suggests that when board members communicate effectively, they 
reduce the incidence of misunderstanding and consequent errors, and that they are 
more sensitive to the issues that may affect their shareholders or investors‟ 
confidence, particularly concerning financial reporting issues.  
 
3.4.2 Independent board of directors 
Non-executive directors are associated with the responsibility for monitoring 
managers and thereby reducing agency costs that arise from the separation of 
ownership and control in day-to-day company management (Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Brennan and McDermott, 2004). The UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010: 11) highlights that one of the main responsibilities of non-executive directors 
is to “satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial information and that financial 
controls and systems of risk management are robust and defensible”. Thus, higher 
proportions of independent non-executive directors on boards are expected to induce a 
more effective monitoring function which then leads to more reliable financial 
statements. This is due to the incentive for independent board members to develop 
reputations as experts in decision making (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and to provide an 
unbiased assessment of a management‟s actions (Vance, 1983). 
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Prior studies indicate that an independent board is an effective monitoring safeguard. 
Beasley‟s (1996) study suggests that larger proportions of non-executive directors on 
boards tend to be negatively related to financial statement fraud. O‟Sullivan (2000) 
and Carcello et al. (2002) document a positive relationship between the proportion of 
non-executive directors on a board and audit quality. This suggests that independent 
board members demand more in-depth audit efforts from the auditor, leading to a 
higher quality audit. Similarly, a stream of literature on earnings management and 
independent boards suggest that the firms with a higher percentage of independent 
board members encounter a lower incidence of earnings management (Klein, 2002; 
Davidson et al., 2005; Peasnell et al., 2005; Xie et al., 2002). In summary, all of these 
studies recognise the independent board as facilitating effective monitoring.   
 
3.4.4 Board of directors expertise 
Board of director knowledge and experience are important elements in ensuring the 
effectiveness of a board's monitoring function. Carcello et al. (2002) suggest that the 
members of boards of directors who have more experience in terms of a higher 
number of directorships are more likely to demand high-quality audit work. Further, 
Chtourou et al. (2001) claim that the directors with a higher tenure of board 
experience are less likely to be associated with earnings management. Both studies 
conclude that higher levels of board expertise lead to a higher monitoring incentive.  
 
In addition, when the board of directors is financially literate they can understand and 
address issues relating to financial statements. Xie et al. (2003) find that earnings 
management is less likely to occur in firms that are run by a board of directors who 
have a corporate and financial background. Similarly, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) 
claim that the likelihood of earnings restatement is lower in firms whose boards of 
directors are financially literate. Evidence from auditor independence literature 
suggests that boards of directors with financial expertise tend to limit the NAS 
purchased from auditors as they believe that a provision of NAS compromises auditor 
independence (Lee, 2008).  
 
In summary, all of these studies recognise that the boards of directors who have 
specific knowledge and experience are useful in monitoring both management and 
auditors. Since this thesis examine the audit quality and earnings management, the 
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accounting and financial knowledge are beneficial to board of director to understand 
better the financial statements and issues related to financial reporting.  
 
3.4.4 Board of directors meetings 
One of the responsibilities of director is attending meeting and by doing so they 
would have privilege to vote on key decisions (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Conger et al. 
(1998) suggest that more frequent board meetings improve a board‟s effectiveness. 
The meetings are a key dimension of board operations (Vafeas, 1999) and an indicator 
of the effort put in by the directors (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Active boards that meet 
more frequently are more likely to perform their duties in accordance with 
shareholders‟ interests (Vafeas, 1999) and to put more effort into monitoring the 
integrity of financial reporting and thereby improving the audit quality.  
 
Vafeas (1999) finds that a higher meeting frequency is a reaction to deteriorating 
performance. Xie et al. (2003) argue that a board that rarely meets may only have time 
for signing management plans and listening to presentations and, therefore, time to 
focus on issues such as earnings management will be limited. This shows that board 
activity affects performance and it is an important factor in constraining earnings 
management. 
 
Carcello et al. (2002) and Krishnan and Visvanathan, (2009) suggest that a higher 
frequency of board meetings leads to higher audit fees, and this is consistent with the 
argument that when a board of directors meets more frequently, they demand an 
extensive audit effort from the auditor, which improves the quality of the audit 
process. In addition to this, Chen et al., (2006) examine the 169 firms under Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) enforcement actions between the period 
of 1999 to 2003. They suggest that the higher frequency of board meetings reduces 
the likelihood of fraud because regular meetings allow the directors to identify and 
resolve potential problems, particularly those that are related to the quality of financial 
reporting. 
 
3.5 The effectiveness of audit committees 
The audit committee is one of the committees that is established by the board of 
directors and whose main responsibility has to do with financial reporting. Apart from 
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the benefit that is gained from the establishment of an audit committee, prior studies 
suggest that the size, composition, expertise and meeting frequency of audit 
committees may impact their monitoring effectiveness (e.g. DeZoort et al., 2002; 
Walker, 2004). 
 
3.5.1 Audit committee size 
According to the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010: 19), “the board should 
establish an audit committee of at least three independent non-executive directors.” 
(C.3.1). It seems that the size is also one of the important characteristics that 
contribute to an audit committee‟s effectiveness.  
 
Consistent with the argument for an effective committee size, too small a committee 
size may mean that an insufficient number of directors are able to serve the committee 
and thereby the effectiveness of monitoring is decreased (Vafeas, 2005). This is 
probably due to an individual director being unable to perform their duties efficiently 
as the committee‟s assignments are spread across a small number of directors. In 
addition to this, when a committee is too large, the performance of the directors may 
decline due to the problems of coordination and process and therefore this is identified 
as another cause for weak monitoring (Jensen, 1993; Vafeas, 2005). 
 
The ideal average size of an audit committee is between 3 and 4 members (e.g. 
Vafeas, 2005; Xie et al., 2003; Abbott et al., 2004). Evidence from audit committee 
sizes suggests that firms with larger audit committees are more effective in 
monitoring management. Yang and Krishnan (2005) examine the relationship 
between audit committee size and quarterly earnings management in 896 US firms in 
the years 1996 to 2000. They find that quarterly earnings management is lower for 
firms that have a larger audit committee size.
25
 This may suggest that having a 
sufficient number of audit committee members increases the efficiency of an audit 
committee‟s function in terms of monitoring the integrity of financial reporting.  
 
                                                          
25
 Yang and Krishnan (2005) report the mean, first quartiles, median and third quartile of audit 
committee size as 3.587, 3, 3 and 4, respectively.  
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In another study, Chen and Zhou (2007) find that the firms with larger audit 
committees are more concerned about their auditors‟ reputations and tend to assign 
the Big 4 auditors. In summary, the larger the size of the audit committee, the more 
effective they are in monitoring financial reporting. 
 
3.5.2 Independent audit committee 
Agency theory suggest that the independence of a non-executive director is an 
essential quality that contributes to a committee‟s effective monitoring function 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983) and that the empirical evidence on audit committee 
independence is consistent with this proposition. Several studies suggest that 
independent audit committees are less likely to be associated with financial statement 
fraud (Abbott et al., 2004; Abbott et al., 2000) and more likely to be associated with 
lower earnings management (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Bédard et al., 2004; 
Davidson et al., 2005) and a lower incidence of earnings restatement (Agrawal and 
Chadha, 2005) . The independent audit committee is expected to provide unbiased 
assessment and judgement and to be able to monitor management effectively.  
 
In addition, Carcello and Neal (2000) provide evidence of the relationship between 
audit committee independence and the disclosure choices of  firms in financial 
distress. They suggest that firms with a higher percentage of independent audit 
committees are less likely to receive a going concern audit opinion from auditors. 
Further, Carcello and Neal (2003) suggest that independent audit committees are more 
effective in protecting auditors from dismissal following the issuance of a going-
concern audit report.  
 
In a study related to auditor quality, Abbott and Parker (2000) and Chen et al. (2005) 
suggest that having a higher proportion of independent non-executive directors in 
audit committees increases the tendency to assign industry-specialist auditors. In 
summary, all of these suggest that independent of audit committees are associated 
with a higher quality of financial reporting and that they can be regarded as effective 
monitors. 
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3.5.3 Audit committee expertise  
According to the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010: 19), “the board should 
satisfy itself that at least one member of the audit committee has recent and relevant 
financial experience.” DeZoort (1998: 17) argues that an audit committee member‟s 
experience in accounting and auditing is necessary for a sufficient understanding of 
oversight tasks. He suggests that:  
“…audit and internal control evaluation experience makes a difference in audit 
committee members‟ performance on an internal control oversight task. Of 
primary importance, audit committee members with experience made internal 
control judgements more like those of experts (i.e. practising auditors) in the 
area than did members without experience.” 
 
In other words, the regulatory concern and the experimental evidence suggests that 
having appropriate experience and knowledge, particularly in accounting and 
auditing, is likely to improve an audit committee‟s performance and judgement. 
  
The empirical evidence from archival studies also suggests that the financial expertise 
of an audit committee improves its monitoring ability and results in an increase in the 
quality of a firms‟ financial reporting. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) examine the 
association between the financial expertise of audit committees and financial 
reporting quality, measured by the level of accounting conservatism, in a sample of 
929 US firms from 2000 to 2002. They argue that, with financial expertise in 
accounting, audit committees can efficiently assess the nature and the appropriateness 
of accounting choices, constrain the aggressiveness of accounting policies and provide 
incentives to avoid the risk of litigation. Their findings suggest that audit committees 
with accounting financial expertise increased the overall audit committee‟s oversight 
function and thus they were more likely to promote accounting conservatism than the 
audit committees with non-accounting or non-financial expertise, particularly in an 
environment where the board of directors was strong.  
 
Similarly, DeFond et al. (2005) find that market participants react positively to the 
appointment of an audit committee with financial expertise in accounting, but no 
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reaction is noted for audit committees with non-accounting financial expertise.
26
 This 
is due to the fact that the appointment of committee members with accounting 
financial expertise improves the oversight function of the committees and thus 
provides a credible signal to the investors that the firms aspire to a higher quality of 
financial reporting. In addition, DeFond et al. (2005) suggest that positive market 
reaction is concentrated on the firms that are relatively strong in corporate 
government. Both studies conclude that an audit committee with financial expertise 
complements a strong corporate governance environment by improving the board‟s 
ability to protect shareholder interests and increase their firm‟s value.   
 
It has been suggested that an audit committee‟s financial expertise is associated with a 
higher quality of financial reporting (Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003a) and 
less likelihood of opportunistic earnings (Xie et al., 2003; Bédard et al., 2005). The 
reason for this is the financial knowledge and experience that improves an audit 
committee‟s oversight function and its ability to facilitate effectively the financial 
reporting process. Overall, the empirical evidence reviewed supports the proposition 
that the audit committee with financial expertise has improved their effective 
monitoring function. 
 
3.5.4 Audit committee meeting  
Several studies suggest that firms with a higher number of audit committee meetings 
experience less financial restatement (Abbott et al., 2004), are less likely to be 
sanctioned for fraud and aggressive accounting (Abbott et al., 2000; Beasley et al., 
2000) and are associated with a lower incidence of earnings management (Xie et al., 
2003). These studies suggest that audit committees who meet regularly during the 
financial year are linked to effective monitoring. The more frequently they meet, the 
more efficiently they discharge their oversight responsibilities.   
 
                                                          
26
 DeFond et al. (2005) and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) measure the audit committee expertise in 
three ways: accounting financial experts (directors with experience as certified public accountant, 
controller or chief accounting officer), nonaccounting financial experts (director with experiences as 
chief executive officer or president) and nonfinancial experts (directors who are neither accounting nor 
nonaccounting financial experts). 
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In another study, Krishnan and Visvanathan, (2009) found a positive relationship 
between audit committee meetings and audit fees, suggesting that the firms with a 
higher number of audit committee meetings demand more assurance and a higher 
quality audit from their auditors. In order to provide more assurance and a higher 
quality audit, the auditors may need to perform additional audit work in terms of 
enlarging the scope of the audit and increasing the levels of audit testing, which 
results in both higher audit fees and a higher audit quality. Therefore, the higher the 
frequency of an audit committee‟s meetings, the more their monitoring function is 
improved. 
 
 3.6 Earnings management 
According to Watt and Zimmerman (1990) and Fields et al. (2001), earnings 
management may derive from the flexibility of accounting choices that are given by 
GAAP. The GAAP allows managers to choose the appropriate reporting procedures 
and to make estimations and assumptions according to their business environment. 
Moreover, with an alternative on offer, the manager may choose the reporting 
procedure that could benefit and increase the wealth of all the contracting parties 
(Watt and Zimmerman, 1990). As a result, accounting choices may create the problem 
of earnings management.
27
 Such a problem, for example, causes shareholders, 
investors and debt holders to be unable to distinguish the true economic value of a 
firm because their reports do not accurately reflect the actual performance of the firm. 
 
Schipper (1989) defines earnings management “in the sense of purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining 
some private gain”. Healy and Wahlen (1999) claim that earnings management occurs 
when the managers use their judgement in preparing financial statements with the 
intention not to report the firm‟s actual economic performance or in order to gain 
benefit from the „adjusted figure‟. Consistent with this definition and description of 
earnings the present study views earnings management as the opportunistic behaviour 
of management.
28
 
                                                          
27
 As pointed out by Fields et al. (2001: 260), “not all accounting choices involve earnings 
management, and the term earnings management extends beyond accounting choice, the implications 
of accounting choice to achieve a goal are consistent with the idea of earnings management”. 
28
 The present study acknowledges that earnings management can also be regarded as beneficial 
information by the market. The managers may use earnings to communicate private information that 
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Managers engage in opportunistic earnings for several reasons such as for bonus 
compensation (Healy, 1985; Gaver at al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995), the 
avoidance of debt-covenant violation (Sweeney, 1994; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994), 
the prevention of earnings decreases and losses (Bugstahler and Dichev, 1997; Barth 
et al., 1999) and compensating for regulatory or political costs (Cahan, 1992; Jones, 
1991; Han and Wang, 1998). Each of these motivations is now reviewed. 
 
Agency theory suggests that one way to monitor an agent‟s behaviour is through their 
compensation contracts, enabling the interest between principal and agent to be 
perfectly aligned (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Such contracts, for example, can be 
formed between shareholders and managers or as debt-covenants between managers 
and lenders. Since compensation contracts and debt-covenants are usually linked to an 
accounting number, such contracts create incentives for managers to manipulate 
earnings (Watt and Zimmerman, 1978).  
 
Healy (1985) posits that managers tend to choose income-decreasing accruals when 
their bonus plans are binding at the maximum or minimum levels and income-
increasing accruals when their bonus plans are not binding. She argues that when 
earnings are extremely low and cannot meet the earnings‟ target within the accounting 
procedures, the managers have incentives to further reduce current earnings in terms 
of differing revenues or accelerating write-offs and these approaches are referred to as 
“taking a bath” (Healy, 1985: 86). These actions, however, do not necessarily affect 
current bonus awards but may help to meet a future earnings target. In contrast, Gaver 
et al. (1995) find the managers select income-increasing accruals when the bonus 
plans are falling below the lower bound, and vice-versa. They claim that their results 
are more consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis that states that managers 
manipulate earnings in order to reduce the divergence of reported earnings and to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
could potentially maximise a firm‟s value (Watt and Zimmerman, 1986; Holthausen, 1990; 
Subramanyam, 1996; Sankar and Subramanyam, 2001; Arya et al. 2003; Louis and Robinson, 2005). 
However, since earnings management is involved a higher degree of managerial judgment, the auditors 
and boards of directors safeguard themselves by constraining earnings management activities. Thus, the 
present study concentrates on the negative aspect of earnings management. 
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ensure that the current earnings reach the normal or expected earnings target.
29
 
Holthausen et al. (1995) find similar findings to Healy (1985), but find no evidence 
that income-decreasing accruals are associated with a lower minimum boundary and 
claim that Healy‟s results may be sensitive to the particular model used to estimate 
discretionary accruals. In summary, these studies conclude that bonus scheme plans 
create incentives for managers to manipulate earnings in order to maximise their 
bonus award. 
 
Sweeney (1994) examines a sample of firms prior the violation of accounting-based 
restrictions in debt agreements. She finds that when the managers of defaulting firms 
are approaching covenant violation they are more likely to report income-increasing 
accruals in order to offset their debt constraints. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) 
provide similar findings and they conclude that debt-covenants influence a manager‟s 
accounting decisions in the preceding year and during the year of the violation.  
 
In general, market participants and stakeholders appear to reward the firms with 
positive or higher earnings more than the firms with negative or lower earnings, and 
therefore managers manipulate earnings to meet these expectations. Bugstahler and 
Dichev (1997) provide evidence that managers manipulate earnings in order to avoid 
earnings decreases and losses. Specifically, their results on the frequency of 
distributions in earnings show that there are low frequencies of small earnings 
decreases and small losses but that higher frequencies of small increases in earnings 
and small positive incomes are unusual. Barth et al. (1999) suggest that the firms with 
patterns of increasing earnings are more likely to have larger earnings multiples (e.g. 
higher coefficient of earnings). 
 
In studies related to regulatory or political cost, Cahan (1992) finds that the managers 
of firms under anti-trust investigation report income-decreasing accruals during 
                                                          
29
 Mosses (1987: 360) define income smoothing as “as an effort to reduce fluctuations in reported 
earnings. Researchers generally have agreed that smoothing involves the use of some device to reduce 
the divergence of reported earnings from an earnings number that is “normal” or expected” for the 
firm.” 
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investigation years. Similarly, Jones (1991) suggests that managers tend to report 
income-decreasing accruals during the year of an application for import relief in order 
to obtain import relief benefits such as increases in tariff or reductions in quota. Han 
and Wang (1998) examine opportunistic earnings in two groups of firms: petroleum 
refining firms and the crude oil and natural gas firms during the 1990 Persian Gulf 
crisis. Their findings suggest that petroleum refining firms used income-decreasing 
accruals to mitigate the possibility of adverse political actions.   
 
In summary, the motivations reviewed above may reflect opportunistic behaviour on 
the part of management. This evidence suggests that managers use their discretion to 
manipulate reported earnings, and thus the monitoring roles of the board of directors, 
the audit committee and the external auditors are required in order to constrain 
earnings manipulation behaviour. 
 
3.7 Accruals-based measure of earnings management 
There are several potential instruments can be employed by managers to manipulate 
earnings management. This includes the flexibility of accounting method, income 
smoothing and accrual accounting. Among others, the managements are more favour 
toward the accruals accounting due to low cost and difficult to observe (Young, 
1999).   
 
The accruals can be divided into two components: the discretionary accruals and non-
discretionary accruals. The discretionary accruals also known as abnormal accrual or 
managed accruals, which always related to earnings manipulation. While, the non-
discretionary accruals referred as normal accruals or non-managed accruals. These 
terms are used interchangeably in earnings management studies (Kang and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 1995).  
 
McNichols (2000) identify three main measures of discretionary accruals in the prior 
literature. These include the aggregate accruals models, specific accruals models and 
the frequency distribution approach. Several models are introduced in relation to the 
aggregate accruals such as Healy‟s (1985) model, DeAngelo‟s (1986) model, Jones‟s 
(1991) model, the modified Jones model from Dechow et al. (1995) and the 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals model by Kothari et al. (2005). The main 
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differences between the models are how the researcher partitions the non-
discretionary accruals component from the total accruals and their ability to 
accommodate changes in firm‟s economic condition. The Healy (1985) model and the 
DeAngelo (1986) model assumed that non-discretionary accruals are constant, and 
these restrictions are seen to be unrealistic because accounting accruals change in 
response to economic conditions (Kaplan, 1985). As an alternative, Jones‟ (1991) 
model, the modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) and the performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals by Kothari et al. (2005) controls the variations of non-
discretionary accruals by taking into account the changes in total assets, revenues, 
receivables as well as the firm‟s performance (e.g. return on assets). In fact, the Jones 
(1991) and modified Jones models are recognised in the literature as the most 
powerful models for detecting earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995; Young, 
1999).
30
 However, the limitation of aggregate models is the risk of misspecification 
when they inefficiently isolate the discretionary component of total accruals. 
 
In relation to specific accruals, the discretionary accruals are an estimate based on 
single accruals. Examples of specific accruals models include the residual provision 
for bad debt (McNichols and Wilson, 1988), the loss reserves of property and casualty 
insurers (Petroni, 1992), loan loss provisions (Wahlen, 1994; Collins et al., 1995; 
Beaver and Angel, 1996) and tax expenses (Philips et al., 2003). McNichols and 
Wilson (1988) claim that when specific accruals represent a small part of the 
discretionary component, they may fail to reflect earnings management in cases where 
other discretionary components are manipulated. Thus, stated differently, the 
aggregate accruals models give rise to more comprehensive research design in 
capturing the discretionary components.  
 
The frequency distribution approach focuses on the behaviour of earnings where there 
is a specific intention (e.g. to avoid earnings decreases or losses) or certain thresholds 
(e.g. to report positive profits, sustain recent performance, and meet analysts‟ 
forecast). This approach was developed by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and 
                                                          
30
 Dechow et al. (995) evaluates the ability of the several alternative models such as Healy (1985), 
DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991), modified Jones and the industry model. While, Young (1999) 
evaluates the Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), modified DeAngelo, Jones (1991) and modified Jones 
models.  
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Degeorge et al. (1999), respectively. McNichols (2002) claims that the distribution 
approach provides specific predictions related to which firms will manage earnings 
rather than merely measuring the magnitude of managers‟ opportunistic earnings. In 
other words, the frequency distribution approach cannot infer earnings management 
activities, which are the main concern of this thesis.  
 
In summary, the designs of earnings management research are various and the 
advantage of each approach is relatively dependent on the research question. 
According to McNichols (2000: 333), if the aim of research is to examine the 
magnitude of earnings management, the aggregate approach is more appropriate 
because specific accruals are relevant to tests for the associations between specific 
accruals and hypothesised factors and this requires a researcher to model each accrual 
component according to the hypothesised factors. In addition, the findings of specific 
accruals are difficult to generalize when specific accruals are not sufficiently 
sensitive. On the other hand, the frequency distribution approach cannot be used to 
identify the magnitude or the level of opportunistic earnings. The aim of this thesis is 
to examine the relationship of effective boards, audit committees and auditor quality 
in constraining earnings management. Thus, the magnitude of earnings or the activity 
levels of management towards opportunistic earnings are a crucial component of the 
investigation. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, the aggregate approach is 
more appropriate when compared with the specific accruals approach and the 
frequency distribution approach. There are three models of aggregate accruals that 
will be employed: the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model, the cross-sectional 
modified Jones model and the performance adjusted discretionary accruals model. 
These models will be explained in Chapter four. 
 
3.8 The relationship between board of directors, audit committee and 
demand for audit quality  
The following section reviews prior studies that have examined the relationship of 
effective boards and audit committees to the various proxies of audit quality (e.g. 
engagement of Big-size auditors, industry specialist auditors, restatements, fraud, 
litigation against auditors, auditor tenure, the appropriateness of going concern audit 
opinion, audit fees and NAS fees). These studies suggest that several characteristics of 
boards and audit committees, reviewed in section 3.4 and 3.5, are linked with 
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effective monitoring that enhances the overall quality of financial reporting, and 
particularly the quality of audit services.  
 
Several studies suggest that boards of directors and audit committees may influence 
the selection of an external auditor (Knapp, 1991; Beasley and Petroni, 2000; Chen et 
al., 2005; Abbott and Parker, 2000; 2002). The selection criteria that are used are 
based on the skills and abilities of auditors in enhancing the audit process. Knapp 
(1991) examines the behaviour of audit committee members and their choice of 
external auditors. He claims that audit committees appear more likely to choose Big 8 
auditors than non-Big 8 auditors because the Big 8 auditors are inclined to report any 
material misstatements that they discover during their auditing work.  Moreover, he 
suggests that audit committee members perceive that during the early years of an audit 
engagement there is a gradual improvement in audit quality due to a „learning curve 
effect‟. However, audit committee members also tend to perceive that during the 
subsequent years of an auditor-client relationship the audit quality may progressively 
reduce because that relationship can impair an auditors‟ independence. 
 
Abbott and Parker (2000), Beasley and Petroni (2001) and Chen et al. (2005) examine 
more specific characteristics of boards and audit committees with respect to the 
selection of industry specialist auditors. As far as the present study is concerned, these 
are the only studies in this area that are based on US and Australian samples. There is 
no study that examined UK firms. Industry specialist auditors are more desirable 
because they are more reliable than non-specialist auditors for detecting errors 
(Bédard and Biggs, 1991; Wright and Aright, 1997) and frauds (Johnson et al., 1991; 
Carcello and Nagy, 2004). Abbott and Parker (2000) investigate the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors on boards and audit committees as well as the 
audit committee meetings. They suggest that the audit committees with solely 
independent non-executive directors that meet at least twice a year are more likely to 
employ industry specialist auditors. They also report insignificant relationship exists 
between the proportion of independent non-executive directors on boards and the 
employment of industry specialist auditors. Using a more specific sample, Beasley 
and Petroni (2001) claim that the property-liability insurers that have a higher 
percentage of non-executive directors on their boards tend to employ industry 
84 
 
specialist auditors.
31
 Chen et al. (2005) investigate the characteristics of the boards 
and audit committees of the top 500 Australian firms. They suggest that an audit 
committee with a higher percentage of non-executive directors is more likely to 
employ industry specialist auditors. However, they find no significant relationship 
between the audit committee meetings and expertise and the employment of industry 
specialist auditors. 
 
Abbott et al. (2004) claim that financial restatement may signal inefficiency of 
financial reporting because it indicates that auditors have failed to identify errors in 
prior financial statement. Such inefficiency can be regarded as being indicative of a 
lower quality of both financial reporting and auditing (Kinney et al., 2004). Abbott et 
al. (2004) suggest that audit committees with independent members that are active and 
have financial expertise are more efficient in monitoring the financial reporting 
process, and that this leads to fewer occurrences of financial restatement. Consistent 
with this evidence, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that boards or audit committees 
with independent directors who have financial expertise are also associated with a 
lower incidence of restated earnings.  
 
With regard to fraud, Beasley (1996) suggests that smaller boards‟ size and higher 
proportion of non-executive directors on boards improve the boards‟ function in 
monitoring the top managements‟ behaviour, particularly in preventing the financial 
statement frauds.
32
 However, her finding on the establishment of audit committee is 
not significantly related with the incident of fraud, contradicts to McMullen‟s finding. 
McMullen (1996) suggest that the establishment of audit committee encourages 
higher quality of financial reporting in term of fewer lawsuits for fraud, less quarterly 
                                                          
31
 The inconsistency of this finding with Abbott and Parker (2000) might be due to the different 
research design and variable definitions employed in the Beasley and Petroni (2001) study. Abbott et 
al. (2000) define industry specialist auditors based the three specific measurements that are employed 
in the Palmrose (1986), Craswell et al. (1995) and Dopuch and Simunic (1982) studies. These 
measurements are based on the audit clients‟ industry sales. Beasley and Petroni (2001) assigned 
indicators for dependent variables; value 2 if the auditors are both specialists and Big 6 auditors, value 
1 if the auditors are  non-specialist Big 6 auditors, and value 0 if the auditor is a non-Big 6 auditor. 
32
 In her analysis, she also differentiates between grey directors (the non-executive directors who are 
related to management) and independent non-executive directors. Her results suggest that both 
variables (percentage of grey directors and percentage of non-executive directors) are significant and 
have a negative relationship with the occurrence of financial statement fraud. This evidence shows that 
the term „independent‟ is insensitive to the definition of non-executive directors. The result for board 
size is presented in the supplemental analysis (Beasley, 1996).  
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earnings restatement, less SEC enforcement and less illegal action. In a similar area of 
study under the SEC enforcement samples, Dechow et al. (1996) claim that where the 
board of directors is dominated by the management, practising the dual role functions, 
CEO is also the founder of the firms, fewer representatives of outside block holders 
and no audit committee are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation. Using 
more audit committee variables, Abbott et al. (2000) suggest that audit committees 
which are comprised of solely independent non-executive directors and which meet at 
least twice a year encounter fewer fraudulent financial statements. This finding 
supports the effective role of independent non-executive directors as a key to the 
monitoring of the financial reporting and auditing process. Chen et al. (2006) examine 
the relationship between the board of directors‟ characteristics and financial fraud in 
China. They find that the firms with boards of directors that are comprised of a higher 
proportion of independent non-executive directors and that have a higher frequency of 
meetings are less likely to commit fraud. However their result for board size is 
insignificantly related with the incidence of fraud. 
 
Carcello and Neal (2000) examine the relationship between the composition of audit 
committees and the likelihood of going-concern audit opinion in 223 firms that 
experienced financial distress during 1994. They suggest that the higher the number of 
affiliated directors (i.e. grey directors) in the audit committee, the lower the likelihood 
of auditors in issuing going-concern audit reports. These imply that the predomination 
of affiliated directors in the audit committees are able to influence auditors‟ decision 
to issue the audit opinion (i.e. instead of issuing a modified report, the auditor issues 
unmodified report) and to dismiss the auditors if they refuse to issue clean reports. 
They further suggest that the audit committees with greater independence, equipped 
with financial expertise and lower stockholding are more effective in sustaining the 
auditor against dismissal after the issuance of new going-concern audit reports 
(Carcello and Neal, 2003).  
  
Prior studies on the relationship of boards of directors and audit committees to audit 
fees can be viewed from different perspectives. The demand-based perspective 
suggests that an effective board of directors and audit committee demands a higher 
quality audit and greater assurance from the external auditors in order to protect their 
own interests (Carcello et al., 2000). Specifically, Carcello et al. (2002: 369) claim 
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that a board of directors may seek to purchase a differentially higher audit quality to 
obtain an enhanced assurance in order to protect their “reputation capital, avoid legal 
liability and promote the shareholder interests”. From this perspective, a higher audit 
quality is indicated by higher audit fees, which are consistent with the extensive audit 
effort and audit time that is set by auditors while performing their services. 
 
Consistent with agency theory in respect to the vigilant oversight function of non-
executive directors, O‟Sullivan (2000) claims that the firms with a higher percentage 
of non-executive directors on boards are more likely to incur higher audit fees.
33
 In a 
similar vein, Carcello et al. (2002) examine the relationship between a board‟s 
composition, meetings and directorship, and the level of audit fees. Their findings 
suggest that firms with a higher percentage of independent non-executive directors
34
, 
more frequent board meetings and higher number of multiple directorships tend to 
demand a higher quality audit and a higher level of assurance. They inferred the 
demand for different levels of audit quality through the choice of big-size auditors 
because the size of auditors indicates different levels of quality (DeAngelo, 1981). A 
higher level of assurance is measured by the audit effort; “additional audit works” that 
are “beyond the auditors‟ cost-minimizing level” may result in a higher level of 
assurance (Carcello et al., 2002: 369). In their additional analysis, Carcello et al. 
(2002) replace the board characteristics with audit committee characteristics (i.e. 
composition, meetings and expertise). Their results show that audit committee 
independence and audit committee expertise are positively related with audit fees. 
However, the result for audit committee meetings is insignificantly related with audit 
fees. They examine further by integrating both the characteristics of board and audit 
committee and find that the results for the board of directors remain unchanged but 
that none of the audit committee‟s characteristics are significantly related to audit 
fees. This may suggest that, when a board is present, the audit committee‟s function 
might reduce as there is an increase in monitoring by the board. One of the limitations 
                                                          
33
 He does not differentiate between the types of non-executive director. 
34
 Carcello et al. (2002) differentiate the types of directors, i.e. the independent non-executive directors 
(non-management directors who are free from any interest) and grey directors (non-management 
directors who have an economic or personal interest in the firm). Their results suggest a significant 
positive relationship between audit fees and both types of directors (% of grey directors on board and 
% of independent non-executive directors on board at p<0.01 and p<0.10 respectively). 
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identified in Carcello et al. is that they did not consider the problem of endogeneity in 
their analysis. 
 
In contradiction to the evidence that is reported by Carcello et al. (2002), Abbott et al. 
(2003a) claim that the presence of a board of directors and an audit committee that is 
comprised of solely independent non-executive directors and at least one member who 
is equipped with financial expertise is positively associated with audit fees.
35
 They 
also report that the number of independent non-executive directors on board and the 
number of board meetings are positively related with audit fees. In another study, 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) examine the characteristics of boards and audit 
committees and their relationship to audit fees for 801 firm-year observations in the 
S&P 500 between 2000 and 2002. They find that the firms with a larger board size 
and more frequent board meetings are associated with higher audit fees. They also 
suggest a positive relationship between audit committee meetings and audit fees. 
 
As an alternative to a demand-based perspective, a supply-based perspective is based 
on the auditor‟s point of view. If auditors perceive that their client is surrounded by 
strong corporate governance, this may signal that the firm has effective internal 
control and this may reduce the auditor‟s risk assessment and decrease the audit fees. 
 
In order to give an understanding of how an auditor assesses an overall audit risk, the 
present study will first explain the audit risk model. SAS 300: Accounting and 
Internal Control Systems and Audit Risk Assessments (AICPA, 1995), defines audit 
risk as “the risk that auditors may give an inappropriate audit opinion on financial 
statements”. Similarly, the International Standard of Auditing, ISA (UK and Ireland) 
200: Overall Objective of the Independent Auditor and the Conduct of an Audit in 
                                                          
35 Abbott et al. (2003) highlight that there are several possible explanations for why their results 
contradict the findings of Carcello et al. (2002). Firstly, Carcello et al. (2002) employed a survey 
method, which may have been exposed to the non-response bias. Secondly, with regard to the type of 
sample, Carcello et al. (2002) used Fortune 1000 companies which are actually greater in number than 
the total population of SEC registrants. The size of firms used may account for the different findings. 
Lastly, the gap between the years of the samples (i.e. Carcello et. al used sample between April 1992 
and March 1993, but Abbott used sample between February 2001 and June 2001) may strengthen the 
influence of the audit committee‟s role due to increased enforcement by regulators during the period 
between the studies, and this may result in dissimilar findings. 
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Accordance International Standards on Auditing (UK and Ireland), (ABP, 2009: 6) 
describe audit risk as “the risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit 
opinion when the financial statements are materially misstated.” An audit risk model 
contains the elements of inherent risk, control risk and detection risk. Inherent risk is 
the risk that is associated with error and misstatement that occurs at the entity, account 
balance and class of transaction level. Control risk is the risk that the accounting and 
internal control system of an entity is unable to prevent or detect errors in a timely 
manner. Detection risk is the risk that an auditor‟s substantive procedures fail to 
detect errors and misstatements. Both the inherent risk and the control risk will 
determine the detection risk. If an auditor assesses an inherent risk and control risk to 
be low then the level of detection risk may be higher, leading to lower level of 
substantive procedures. In summary, the assessment of inherent and control risks are 
central in determining overall audit procedures.   
 
In respect to a client‟s internal control system, auditors assess the control procedure 
and the control environment. The control environment is determined by the overall 
“attitude, awareness and actions” of a board of directors and management regarding 
internal control and its importance to their organization, while control procedures are 
related to policies and procedures that have been established (AICPA, 1995). By 
holding the inherent risk constant and applying strong control procedures, it is 
possible for a positive control environment (strong board of directors and audit 
committee) to reduce both the control risk and the audit risk. Cohen et al., (2002: 579) 
point out: 
... in the case where a client‟s governance structure has effectively 
implemented a strong monitoring as well as strong strategic perspective, 
there is the potential for both a more efficient (e.g. less extent of tests of 
details) and a more effective (greater assurance of the integrity of the 
financial statements) audit.  
 
This may suggest that strong corporate governance promotes an effective internal 
control environment. An effective internal control, then leads to a less substantive test 
by an external audit and results in lower audit fees.  
 
Several studies have indicated negative relationship between the characteristics of 
boards and audit committee with audit fees (for example Tsui et al., 2001; Boo and 
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Sharma, 2008; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). Tsui et al. (2001) examine CEO 
duality roles and audit fees using 650 observations from Hong Kong firms. Their 
findings suggest that the firms that separate the roles of CEO and chairman tend to 
have lower audit fees, indicating that effective monitoring mechanisms are in place 
and that they have the effect of reducing control risk and audit effort. Drawing on the 
Tsui et al. (2001) framework, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) also suggest similar 
findings on CEO duality roles and audit committee expertise. As well as suggesting 
that a more effective monitoring role is served by separately functioning CEOs and 
chairmen, they also claim that auditors value an audit committee‟s accounting and 
financial expertise. The financial expertise of an audit committee reduces the firm‟s 
control risk, which in turn is reflected in less audit testing and lower audit fees. Their 
findings on audit committee expertise contradict the study done by Abbott et al. 
(2003a) that suggests a positive relationship between audit committee expertise and 
audit fees. They claim that Abbott et al. (2003a) use a broad definition of audit 
committee expertise that includes both accounting and non-accounting financial 
expertise. They define accounting financial expertise as the directors having 
experience as certified public accountants, auditors, chief financial officers or 
financial controllers. The direction of this variable was sensitive to such differences in 
the definitions of financial expertise. 
 
Prior discussions assumed that demand-based and supply-based perspectives are 
mutually exclusive. However, there is also a possibility that both perspectives could 
coexist and that they are not mutually exclusive (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). 
For example, when an effective audit committee demands to have a higher quality 
audit, it increases both the audit scope and the audit effort. Simultaneously, an 
increased effectiveness may also correspond to a strong internal control which is 
reflected in the auditor‟s assessment of audit risk (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). 
Boo and Sharma (2008) claim that, from the demand-based perspective, the 
association between corporate governance and audit fees in regulated companies (i.e. 
financial and utilities companies) is weaker because industry specific regulators share 
their monitoring and overseeing roles with the external auditor. Thus, they demand 
less extensive audit work in the presence of regulatory oversight. From a supply-based 
perspective, auditors perceive that when regulators provide an additional oversight 
role their presence may decrease the audit risk, thus there is less need for audit testing, 
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resulting in lower audit fees. They also find that having multiple directorships on 
boards or audit committees relates positively to audit fees by encouraging more audit 
effort, in order to protect reputational capital, and tends to result in higher audit fees 
(in the presence of regulators). Moreover, they claim that auditors perceive audit risk 
as being higher due to the time constraints of directors who serve on multiple boards 
and this also promotes the need for extra audit work. Goddard and Masters (2000) 
investigate two sets of UK data from 1994 to 1995. Their results show that, in 1994, 
firms with audit committees have higher audit fees, but the data from 1995 reveals 
that there is no significant difference in the level of audit fees between companies, 
with or without audit committees. This contradictory result may be due to the 
improvements in accounting systems and internal controls that were introduced by the 
regulators
36
. Similarly, O‟Sullivan (1999) also finds that there is no evidence that a 
board of directors‟ and audit committee‟s attributes influence the level of audit fees.37 
He explains that such insignificant findings may be due to the effect of monitoring 
functions that offset increased audit efforts.  
 
With regard to NAS fees, there are a very limited number of studies that have 
examined the relationship between NAS and board of director or audit committee 
effectiveness. To date there are only four studies that have investigated these issues, 
namely: Abbott et al. (2003b), Lee and Mande (2005), Lee (2008), Adelopo (2010) 
and Zaman et al. (2011). All of these are largely based on US firms. Abbott et al. 
(2003b) examine the 538 firms that filed with SEC between February 5, 2001 and 
March 15, 2001. Using the ratio of NAS fees to total audit fees, they suggest that the 
firms with audit committees that are solely independent and that meet at least four 
times a year are likely to limit the amount of NAS that are purchased as, in their view, 
the higher levels of NAS might potentially impair audit quality. In their further 
analysis, they find that audit committee expertise is insignificant with NAS fees ratio. 
Lee and Mande (2005) extend the Abbott et al. (2003b) study by modelling the audit 
and NAS functions simultaneously. They suggest that the firms with solely 
independent committee members who meet at least four times a year have lower rate 
                                                          
36
 The Cadbury Report (1992) applies to the annual reports of the years ending on or after 30 June 1993 
for UK public listed companies. 
37
 O‟Sullivan (1999) uses the 1995 data. According to Goddard and Masters (2000), the year 1995 is a 
transition year, as the Cadbury Report (1992) started to take effect from the middle of 1994. 
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of NAS purchase. However, when they model the NAS fees simultaneously, none of 
the audit committee characteristics are significant. Lee (2008) jointly investigates 
board of director and audit committee characteristics along with changes in NAS fees 
ratios (changes in total NAS fees to total audit fees). He claims that an effective audit 
committee (consisting of solely independent members of whom at least one-third have 
financial expertise) and board of directors (at least half of whom are independent and 
more than the sample median of whom are financial experts) are likely to limit NAS 
purchased in order to enhance auditors‟ independence. However, these three studies 
do not consider the characteristics of the size of committees or the financial expertise 
of board members. Adelopo (2010) examines more a more comprehensive range of 
board and audit committee characteristics (except for the financial expertise of boards 
of directors) using a simultaneous equation of audit and NAS fees from the FTSE 350 
in the periods of 2005 and 2006. He finds that the frequency of audit committee 
meetings and the levels of independence on boards are positively related to both audit 
fees and NAS fees. In addition, the results suggest the firms with larger board sizes 
are likely to have higher NAS fees but pay lower audit fees. Recently, Zaman et al. 
(2011) examine the association between the corporate governance quality, audit fees 
and NAS fees. The audit fees and NAs fees are measured by natural log of audit fees 
and NAS fees, respectively. They find that the larger firms with the effective audit 
committee are likely to purchase more NAS due to the complexity of their operations.  
Their study, however, do not control the size of board and financial literacy of the 
board‟ members. 
 
Overall, the studies of the effects of various characteristics of boards and audit 
committees do show that they have a significant impact on audit quality. Most of 
these studies, however, are undertaken by US based researchers and the results could 
not be generalized due to there being different institutional settings, legal 
environments and auditor incentives in other countries. By utilising three 
measurements of audit quality (audit fees, NAS fees and the engagement of industry 
specialist auditors), part of this thesis examines the relationship of the characteristics 
of boards and audit committees (e.g. size, composition, financial expertise and 
meeting frequency) to audit quality. As far as the present study is concerned, there is 
no prior study that examines the relationship between corporate governance and 
industry specialist auditors in the UK. The prior studies that relate audit fees and NAS 
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fees to corporate governance levels in UK are limited to the examination of several 
characteristics of board and audit committee (Collier and Gregory, 1996; O‟Sullivan, 
1999, 2000; O‟Sullivan and Diacon, 2002; Adelopo, 2010; Zaman et al., 2011). None 
of these studies examine the financial expertise of board members that has been 
suggested by the US studies to improve the quality of financial reporting (Xie et al., 
2003; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). These potential gaps demand further investigation 
since UK firms are unique in terms of their voluntary governance system. 
 
Consistent with the evidence and the theoretical bases for the measurement of audit 
quality that are provided under section 3.3.1 to 3.3.3, the present study views higher 
audit fees (Abbott et al., 2003a; Carcello et al., 2002; O‟Sullivan, 2000)38, lower NAS 
fees (Wines, 1994; Firth, 2002; Frankel et al. 2002; Raghunandan, 2003; Sharma and 
Sidhu, 2001; Larcker and Richardson, 2004), and the engagement of industry 
specialist auditors (Owhoso et al., 2002; Bédard and Biggs, 1991; O‟Keefe at al., 
1994; Carcello and Nagy, 2004) to be associated with a higher quality audit.  
 
Based on the propositions of agency theory, concerning monitoring roles, and the 
evidence from prior literature, the present study posits that a board of directors with a 
smaller size, more independence, more financial expertise and more regular meetings 
is defined as an effective board. Similarly, an audit committee with more members, 
that is solely independent, that possess financial expertise and that meets frequently is 
also described as being effective. It is argued that the boards of directors and audit 
committees with these characteristics demand a higher quality audit in order to 
safeguard their capital reputation, to avoid legal exposure and to promote 
shareholders‟ interests. Below are the summaries of hypotheses stated in a form that 
uses audit fees, NAS fees and the engagement of industry specialist auditors as 
proxies for audit quality:   
   
                                                          
38
 Despite the proposition that higher audit fees are associated with a higher audit quality and are 
consistent with a more extensive audit effort and audit time, the present study is aware of the possibility 
that lower audit fees could also associated with a higher audit quality. A supply-based perspective 
suggests that if auditors perceive that their clients have strong corporate governance, this may signal 
that the firm is supported by effective internal controls which, in turn, may reduce the auditors‟ risk 
assessment and decrease the audit fees (Tsui et al. 2001; Boo and Sharma, 2008b; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2009). 
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H1: There is a negative relationship between the board’s size and audit fees.  
H2: There is a positive relationship between the board’s size and NAS fees. 
H3: There is a negative relationship between the board’s size and the engagement 
of industry specialist auditor  
H4: There is a positive relationship between the independent board and audit fees.  
H5: There is a negative relationship between the independent board and NAS fees. 
H6: There is a positive relationship between the independent board and the 
engagement of industry specialist auditor  
H7: There is a positive relationship between the board’s financial expertise and 
audit fees.  
H8: There is a negative relationship between the board’s financial expertise and 
NAS fees. 
H9: There is a positive relationship between the board’s financial expertise and 
the engagement of industry specialist auditor  
H10: There is a positive relationship between the board’s meeting frequency and 
audit fees.  
H11: There is a negative relationship between the board’s meeting frequency and 
NAS fees. 
H12: There is a positive relationship between the board’s meeting frequency and the 
engagement of industry specialist auditor  
H13: There is a positive relationship between the audit committee’s size and audit 
fees.  
H14: There is a negative relationship between the audit committee’s size and NAS 
fees. 
H15: There is a positive relationship between the audit committee’s size and the 
engagement of industry specialist auditor  
H16: There is a positive relationship between the solely independent audit 
committee and audit fees.  
H17: There is a negative relationship between the solely independent audit 
committee and NAS fees. 
H18: There is a positive relationship between the solely independent audit 
committee and the engagement of industry specialist auditor  
H19: There is a positive relationship between the audit committee’s financial 
expertise and audit fees.  
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H20: There is a negative relationship between the audit committee’s financial 
expertise and NAS fees. 
H21: There is a positive relationship between the audit committee’s financial 
expertise and the engagement of industry specialist auditor  
H22: There is a positive relationship between the audit committee’s meeting 
frequency and audit fees.  
H23: There is a negative relationship between the audit committee’s meeting 
frequency and NAS fees. 
H24: There is a positive relationship between the audit committee’s meeting 
frequency and the engagement of industry specialist auditor  
 
3.9 The relationship of board of directors, audit committee and auditor 
quality in constraining earnings management 
An abundance of studies has examined the monitoring roles of board, audit committee 
and auditor quality and their effectiveness in constraining opportunistic earnings. 
These studies suggest that an effective board and audit committee and a higher quality 
auditor extend their monitoring functions to limit earnings management behaviour. 
The following are some of the key papers in this area.   
 
As far as the present study is concerned, there are only six relevant studies that have 
been done in the UK. These studies are Peasnell et al. (2000; 2005), Ferguson et al. 
(2004), Antle et al. (2006), Kwon et al. (2007), Habbash et al. (2010), Sun et al. 
(2010) and Habbash (2010). Peasnell et al. (2000) examine the association between 
the size of board and the proportion of non-executive directors on a board with the 
incidence of earnings management in UK firms in pre- and post-Cadbury periods. 
They find no significant relationship between the number of non-executive directors 
on board and earnings management in pre-Cadbury periods, but the results for post-
Cadbury periods suggest that there are fewer incidences of income-increasing accruals 
in order to avoid earnings losses or earnings decline when the board of a firm is 
comprised of a higher proportion of non-executive directors. The board size is 
insignificantly related with earnings management in pre- and post-Cadbury periods.  
 
Peasnell et al. (2005) investigate the effect of the proportion of non-executive 
directors on boards, CEO duality and the establishment of audit committees on the 
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likelihood of earnings management occurring. Their tests are conducted using UK 
data from the periods of 1993 to 1996 and they use discretionary accruals as a proxy 
for earnings management. They find that the firms with higher percentages of non-
executive directors on board are associated with a lower incidence of income 
increasing discretionary accruals, particularly when pre-managed earnings fall below 
zero or are less than prior reported earnings. However, there is no evidence to suggest 
that CEO duality, board size or the presence of an audit committee have any effect on 
the incidence of earnings manipulation. Both Peasnell et al.‟s studies do not consider 
endogeneity issues in their models. 
 
Ferguson et al. (2004) provide evidence from UK data for the periods of 1996 to 
1998. They examine the likelihood of firms being associated with earnings 
management activities (the firms that are criticized by financial analysts or investors 
or investigated by the Financial Reporting Review Panel due to alleged accounting 
irregularities and opportunistic accounting treatment, and the firms that restate their 
prior financial statements or make adjustments under FRS No. 12) and the absolute 
value of their discretionary accruals (using the modified Jones model) and their 
relationship to NAS. NAS are measured by the ratio of NAS fees to total fees, the 
natural log of NAS fees and the percentile rank of NAS fees by practice office. They 
find that NAS fees are positively related to earnings management.
39
 This suggests that 
the increased economic bonding between client-auditor may make auditors less likely 
to constrain a management‟s opportunistic earnings behavior, and thus reduce the 
quality of financial reporting. In addition, they also find that none of the corporate 
governance characteristics (i.e. CEO duality roles and the percentage of non-executive 
directors on boards) are significantly related to earnings management.  
 
Kwon et al. (2007) provide evidence from an international setting using data from 28 
countries, including the UK, from 1993 to 2003.
40
 Specifically, they examine how the 
country‟s legal system affects industry specialist auditors in respect to constraining 
                                                          
39
 Except for when they are measured by the likelihood of firms being subject to irregularities and 
opportunistic accounting treatments and by the percentile rank of NAS fees by practice office 
40
 The 28 countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, 
France, German, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand and the 
United Kingdom.  
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earnings management. They suggest that the use of industry specialist auditors is 
negatively related to discretionary accruals and positively related to the earnings 
response coefficient, and that the benefit of employing industry specialist auditors 
increases as a country‟s legal system becomes stronger. 
Antle et al. (2006) provide evidence from US and UK data. They investigate the audit 
fees and NAS fees data from the UK from 1990 to 2004, while from the US data is 
from the year 2000. They find that higher NAS fees decreased discretionary accruals, 
suggesting that there is a knowledge spillover effect resulting from the joint provision 
of audit and NAS.
 
Specifically, they employed the natural log of NAS fees as the 
measurement of auditor independence and the Jones (1991) model to detect earnings 
management. In relation to audit fees and earnings management, they find a positive 
relationship between audit fees and earnings management. They argue that higher 
audit fees may create a bias in the client-auditor relationship, thus inclining the 
auditor to allow opportunistic earnings behaviour. However, this study did not 
incorporate board and audit committee characteristics, which are also believed to 
influence the quality of reported earnings. 
 
Habbash et al. (2010) examine the commitment of non-executive directors (i.e. 
composition, meetings and directors fees) and chairman independence, using a sample 
of 227 UK FTSE 350 firms for fiscal year 2005 and 2006. In addition, they also 
control the number of board meeting in their earnings management model. They find 
that the non-executive directors‟ commitment and chairman independence are 
important to constrain the opportunistic earnings. Sun et al. (2010) investigate the 
association between the corporate environmental disclosure and earnings management 
and the interaction effect of the corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. size of boards 
and audit committee meetings) on the relationship between earnings and corporate 
environmental disclosure. They find no significant evidence the corporate 
environmental disclosure to be linked with reduced earnings manipulation but suggest 
that the audit committee diligence affect the relationship between earnings and 
corporate environmental disclosure. Both studies, however, do not fully integrate the 
other effective characteristics of board and audit committee in their model 
specification. 
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Habbash (2010) examines more comprehensively the characteristics of corporate 
governance and auditor quality including the size, proportion of independent 
members, levels of financial expertise, number of meetings, audit fees, NAS fees and 
the use of industry specialist auditors in the data from FTSE 350 between 2003 and 
2006. The audit fees are measured using the natural log of audit fees and the ratio of 
audit fees to total fees, while the NAS fees are defined as the natural log of NAS fees 
and the ratio of audit fees to total fees. The measurement of the use of industry 
specialist auditors is based on the market shares of audit fees and the number of audit 
clients in a specific industry. The analyses are undertaken using two separate earnings 
management models. In the first model, he examines the effect of board of director 
characteristics on earnings management. The results suggest a negative relationship of 
the size and the independence of boards to earnings management. In the second 
model, he investigates the effect of audit committee characteristics and external 
auditor variables on opportunistic earnings. He finds that the audit committees that are 
comprised of higher proportion of independent members and equipped with financial 
expertise are more likely to constrain earnings management. Moreover, the results 
suggest that firms that pay higher audit fees and lower NAS fees and that have 
employed industry specialist auditors are more likely to limit earnings manipulation 
behaviour. 
 
Although Habbash (2010) examines relatively similar characteristics of board, audit 
committee and auditor quality variables to those being investigated in this thesis, he 
does not incorporate both board and audit committee characteristics in a single model. 
Prior studies suggest that the effectiveness of an audit committee is associated with 
the composition of the entire board, therefore the joint monitoring roles of boards and 
audit committees are likely to strengthen the firm‟s corporate governance overall 
(Menon and William, 1994; Collier and Gregory, 1999; Cohen et al., 2002; Boo and 
Sharma, 2008). In addition, the segregation of tests on audit committee characteristics 
from those of board of director characteristics may result in an incomplete analysis of 
earnings management.  
 
In a similar vein, Klein (2002) investigates the effect of independent boards and audit 
committees on earnings management using data from 692 US firms in the period 
between 1992 and 1993. Her findings suggest that independent boards and 
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independent audit committees are effective in constraining opportunistic earnings. Xie 
et al. (2003) investigate more board and audit committee characteristics, including the 
level of CEO duality, board meeting frequency, the independence of board members, 
the level of expertise, board size, audit committee size, audit committee meeting 
frequency and audit committee expertise and independence in 282 US firms. They 
employ the Jones model and Teoh et al.‟s (1998) model to detect earnings 
management. They find that the firms with boards and audit committees with more 
independent members, who are equipped with corporate or financial expertise, and 
who have frequent meetings, experience lower levels of discretionary accruals.  
 
Bédard et al. (2004) examine the relationship between audit committee characteristics 
(e.g. size, independence, expertise and number of meetings) and earnings 
management in a sample of 300 US firms which consists of two subsamples: 200 
firms with aggressive earnings management (100 firms with the largest positive and 
100 firms with largest negative discretionary accruals) and the firms with the lowest 
levels of discretionary accruals around zero (50 positive and 50 negative). They find 
that financial expertise and the presence of solely independent audit committees are 
negatively related to the likelihood of aggressive earnings management. This is 
consistent with the arguments that these characteristics improve their oversight 
function in monitoring earnings management. The size and the meeting frequency of 
audit committees are not significantly related to aggressive earnings management. 
  
Vafeas (2005) analyses the data of 252 US firms in between1994 and 2000 to 
examine several board of directors and audit committee characteristics on the quality 
of reported earnings. The poor earnings quality is surrogated by small earning 
increases and the negative earnings avoidance. Evidence suggests that the small 
earnings increases are associated to the audit committee with insiders‟ directors, audit 
committee with director who are business executive and less frequent of audit 
committee meeting. While the results from the model of negative earnings avoidance 
suggest no significant relationship between the likelihood of avoiding negative 
earnings and the board and audit committee characteristics.
41
 
                                                          
41
 Specifically, Vafeas (2005: 1104) examines audit committee characteristics such as the percentage of 
committee insiders, percentage of active business executives, percentage of members with other audit 
committee experience, audit committee size, audit committee meeting frequency, median stock 
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Chtourou et al. (2001) examine the effect of board and audit committee characteristics 
(e.g. board size, board independence, board expertise, the presence of multiple 
directorships and director‟s tenure, CEO duality, the presence of independent 
nomination committees or solely independent audit committees, audit committee 
expertise and audit committee meeting frequency) and the Big 6 auditors on the extent 
of earning management in US firms. Their results suggest that audit committees with 
a higher percentage of independent members, solely independent and meet at least 
twice a year indicate a lower incidence of income-increasing accruals, while audit 
committees with financial expertise reduce the incidence of income-decreasing 
accruals. In addition, the results also suggest less likelihood of income-increasing 
accruals when firms have a higher proportion of independent members and less 
likelihood of income-decreasing accruals when the boards are larger in size and when 
the board members are equipped with board‟ experience. However, no evidence 
suggests that the employment of a Big 6 auditor constrains earnings management 
activities. 
 
In contradiction to Chtourou et al.‟s study on the impact of Big 6 auditors on earnings 
management, Becker et al. (1998) suggest that the firms with Big 6 auditors are more 
likely to report lower discretionary accruals than the firms with non-Big 6 auditors, 
and this is consistent with the argument that the Big 6 auditors provide higher quality 
audits and thus are more likely to constrain opportunistic earnings. Francis et al. 
(1999) suggest that the firms with a greater tendency for accruals are more likely to 
hire the Big 6 auditors as a credible signal to outsiders that they are less likely to 
manipulate earnings. They further argue that, even though their results suggest that 
the firms with Big 6 auditors have relatively higher levels of total accruals, they are 
less likely to be associated with higher discretionary accruals.  
 
Krishnan (2003b) investigates the pricing of discretionary accruals of firms audited by 
Big 6 versus non-Big 6 auditors. His findings suggest that the relationship between 
stock returns and discretionary accruals are stronger for the firms that are audited by 
                                                                                                                                                                      
ownership of committee members, mean tenure per committee member, mean directorships per 
committee member and mean committee memberships per committee member. For board of director 
characteristics, the percentage of outsider directors and board size is included.   
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Big 6 auditors as compared to those using non-Big 6 auditors. This supports the 
argument that Big 6 auditors improve the credibility of reported accruals. He also 
claims that the association between discretionary accruals and future profitability is 
greater for firms with Big 6 auditors, suggesting that the Big 6 auditors enhance the 
ability of discretionary accruals to predict future profitability. Kim et al. (2003) 
examine the direction of discretionary accruals and the selection of Big 6 auditors. 
They suggest that the Big 6 auditors are more effective in constraining income 
increasing accruals but less effective in constraining income decreasing accruals. 
 
In respect to industry specialist auditors and earnings management, Krishnan (2003a) 
investigates 4,422 US firms, audited by Big 6 auditors, in between 1989 and 1998. 
The use of industry specialist auditors is measured using market share and portfolio 
shares approaches. The cross-sectional Jones model is employed to detect earnings 
management. He suggests that the firms with industry specialist auditors are more 
efficient in mitigating opportunistic earnings than the firms with non-specialist 
auditors. Balsam et al. (2003) examine 19,091 US firms at the financial year-ends for 
1991 to 1999. They suggest that the levels of discretionary accruals are lower and that 
earnings response coefficients are higher for the firms with industry specialist auditors 
(and vice-versa). 
 
Frankel et al. (2002) examine data from 3,074 proxy statements files with SEC 
between 5, 2001 and June 15, 2001. They employ three measures of auditor 
independence: the ratio of NAS fees to total fees; the percentile rank of audit fees and 
NAS fees disaggregated by auditor; and the percentile rank of the sum total of audit 
and NAS fees. The level of earnings management is estimated using the propensity to 
just meet or beat earnings benchmarks, and the cross-sectional modified Jones model 
is used to estimate the levels of discretionary accruals. They find that the firms with a 
higher NAS fee ratio and a higher percentile rank of NAS fees are more likely to meet 
or beat earnings benchmarks and report higher discretionary accruals. These results 
are robust to alternative earnings management measures such as discretionary total 
accruals, discretionary working capital accruals, performance-matched discretionary 
accruals and also being applicable to the samples of income-increasing and income-
decreasing discretionary accruals. 
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In addition to their primary analysis of NAS fees, Frankel et al. (2002) also find that 
firms with higher audit fees (measured by the percentile rank of audit fees) are likely 
to have lower earnings management. This result supports the argument that higher 
audit fees may probably increase the number of audit hours, resulting in higher audit 
efforts (Deis and Giroux, 1996). It seems that higher auditor efforts may compensate 
for illegal behavior, including earnings manipulation, because management are more 
worried that such action may be discovered by the auditors. In agreement with this 
proposition, Caramanis and Lennox (2007) find that audit hours are negatively related 
to income-increasing discretionary accruals to meet earnings benchmarks. They 
conclude that a low audit effort increases the likelihood of a manager manipulating 
reported earnings. 
 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) replicated Frankel et al.‟s (2002) study using similar datasets 
and tests. Specifically, they measure auditor independence using (1) the natural log of 
audit fees, (2) the natural log of NAS fees, (3) the natural log of the sum of audit and 
NAF fees and (4) the ratio of NAS fees to total fee. Earnings management is 
measured using the models of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals (using the 
portfolio technique and adding the ROA variable in the discretionary accrual 
regression) and the earnings benchmark. Their findings are relatively similar to those 
reported in Frankel et al.‟s study except that they find no evidence that associates 
income-increasing discretionary accruals with the NAS fees ratio when performance-
adjusted measures are employed. 
 
In other studies, Chung and Kallapur (2003) investigate a sample of 1,871 US firms, 
audited by Big 5 auditors. They measure auditor independence as a ratio of the total 
fees (audit and NAS fees) to the audit firm‟s US revenues. The discretionary accruals 
are estimated using Jones‟ model. Their results fail to find any significant relationship 
between NAS fees and discretionary accruals. In a similar vein, Ruddock et al. (2006) 
examine the relationship between NAS and earnings conservatism. They also find no 
evidence that higher levels of NAS are associated with reduced conservatism.  
 
Larker and Richardson (2004) provide mixed results on the relationship between NAS 
fees and earnings management. Consistent with Frankel et al. (2002) they find a 
positive relationship between the ratio of NAS fees to total fees and earnings 
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management. Using other NAS fee measurements, they find that the firms with the 
higher levels of audit and NAS fees are likely to have lower earnings management. In 
their study, the auditor independence is measured using the ratio of NAS to total fees, 
the NAS fees, the sum of audit and NAS fees and the abnormal fees measurement. 
The cross-sectional Jones and modified Jones models are used to detect earnings 
management. They conclude that the monitoring roles of auditors are dependent on a 
firm‟s corporate governance structures. 
 
Based on a test of 434 listed Australian firms, Davidson et al. (2005) argue that the 
strength of internal governance mechanisms (e.g. board of directors, audit committee, 
internal audit and external auditor) shapes the practice of earnings management. They 
find that having an independent board, CEO duality and an independent audit 
committee are significantly and negatively related to reduce levels of earnings 
management. However, there is no evidence that internal audits, audit committee size, 
audit committee meeting frequency and use of a Big 5 auditor are associated with the 
level of earnings management. 
 
Osma and Noguer (2007) document evidence from Spain on the monitoring 
effectiveness of a board and its committees in relation to earnings management. 
Specifically, they examine the existence of institutional directors, independent boards, 
independent boards with financial expertise and independent audit committees and 
independent nomination committees. Their findings suggest that the institutional 
directors is negatively related to earnings management and that there is no evidence to 
support that the boards and it committees are associated with earnings manipulation. 
This contrasts with prior evidence documented in the US, UK and Australia. These 
results suggest that institutional directors are more effective in constraining earnings 
management practices than boards and their committees. 
 
Park and Shin (2004) investigate the monitoring roles of boards and the practice of 
earnings management in Canada. In similarity to Osma and Noguer (2007), their 
results suggest that financial intermediaries and institutional directors play a major 
role in constraining earnings manipulation and that there is no significant evidence 
that outside directors and their tenures are associated with the incidence of earnings 
management.  
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Overall, the results on the relationships of corporate governance characteristics and 
auditor variables to constraining earnings management suggest mixed findings. 
Failure to control corporate governance variables or auditor variables in a single 
model may explain the conflicting results in prior studies as being due to incomplete 
analyses of earnings quality determinants and the monitoring role of auditors, which 
vary depending the strength of the client‟s corporate governance (Larcker and 
Richardson (2004). Therefore, in this thesis, the investigation of corporate governance 
characteristics and earnings management will incorporate auditor variables in order to 
avoid this misspecification. 
 
The evidence reviewed suggests that an effective board and audit committee and a 
higher auditor quality are associated with a greater extent of monitoring functions, and 
are thus likely to constrain opportunistic earnings. In conjunction with the evidence 
from the prior literature and the arguments developed under Section 3.4 and 3.5 
regarding the effectiveness of boards and audit committees, the present study 
hypothesizes that boards of directors which are smaller in size, have more 
independent members, possess financial expertise and have more frequent board 
meetings, as well as audit committees which are larger in size, solely independent, 
equipped with financial expertise and meet frequently, all lead to more effective 
monitoring. These characteristics of board and audit committee are expected to 
constrain opportunistic earnings. Stated differently, the present study tests the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H25: There is a positive relationship between the board’s size and earnings 
management. 
H26: There is a negative relationship between the independent board and earnings 
management. 
H27: There is a negative relationship between the board’s financial expertise and 
earnings management. 
H28: There is a negative relationship between the board’s meeting frequency and 
earnings management. 
H29: There is a negative relationship between the audit committee’s size and 
earnings management. 
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H30: There is a negative relationship between the solely independent audit 
committee and earnings management. 
H31: There is a negative relationship between the audit committee’s financial 
expertise and earnings management. 
H32: There is a negative relationship between the audit committee’s meeting 
frequency and earnings management. 
 
Similarly, consistent with the evidence reviewed and the theoretical proposition of 
auditors‟ quality differentiation, the present study argues that the effectiveness of 
audit services varies among auditors. The higher quality auditors are expected to 
detect earnings management and questionable accounting practices better than the 
lower quality auditors. In this thesis, the higher quality of auditors is associated with 
higher audit fees, lower NAS fees and the engagement of industry specialist auditors. 
These expectations lead to the following hypotheses: 
H33: There is a negative relationship between audit fees and earnings management.  
H34: There is a positive relationship between NAS fees and earnings management.  
H35: There is a negative relationship between industry specialist auditor and 
earnings management.  
 
3.10 Summary 
In this thesis audit quality is defined as the technical ability of an auditor to detect 
errors and their objectivity in reporting the discovered errors. Prior literature 
recognises several proxies to measure audit quality including audit fees, NAS fees and 
the use of industry specialist auditors. Consistent with the signalling or reputation 
hypothesis, higher audit fees and the engagement of industry specialist auditors are 
associated with higher auditor quality. While, the lower NAS is regarded as lower 
auditor quality due to the scepticism of the regulators and the investors that higher 
NAS could compromise the auditor independence. Evidence from prior studies 
suggests that the boards of directors which are smaller in size, have more independent 
directors, are equipped with financial expertise and meet more frequently are effective 
in their monitoring role. Similarly, audit committees with more members, sole 
independence, more financial expertise and that are more active are suggested to have 
a higher oversight function. Therefore, consistent with agency theory proposition and 
prior empirical evidence, the present study hypothesises that these effective 
105 
 
characteristics of boards and audit committees are associated with a higher audit 
quality. In regard to earnings management, this thesis views earnings management as 
opportunistic earnings. The present study argues that the firms with effective 
characteristics of board and audit committee and higher quality auditors are less likely 
to allow earnings management because opportunistic earnings cause uncertainty about 
the economic value of a firm. Table 3.3 provides the summary of the key literature 
covered in this chapter. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of the key literature relating to board of directors, audit committee, audit quality and earnings management studies 
Author(s) Sample Country Audit quality 
related proxy(s) 
and earnings 
management/ 
Dependent 
variable 
Board of directors 
(BOD) and audit 
committee (AC) 
characteristics/ 
Independent 
variable(s) 
Results 
Abbott et al. 
(2003a) 
492 non- regulated 
firm and audited by 
Big-5 auditors that 
filed proxy 
statement with 
SEC in the period 
February 5, 2001 to 
June 30, 2001. 
US Audit fees BOD –  composition, 
multiple directorship 
 
AC – composition, 
expertise, meeting 
 
 
 
 
Higher audit fees are associated with: 
1.solely independent non-executive directors in 
audit committee 
2.at least one member of audit committee 
equipped with accounting or financial expertise 
3. higher board meeting frequency 
4. higher percentage of independent non-
executive directors on board 
The audit committee meeting frequency and 
board‟s expertise are not significantly correlated 
with audit fees. 
Carcello et al. 
(2002) 
258 firms from 
Fortune 1000 for 
fiscal year ended 
between April 
1992 and March 
1993. 
US Audit fees BOD – composition, 
expertise, meeting 
 
AC – composition, 
expertise, meeting 
 
The firms with the higher percentage of 
independent non-executive directors on boards, 
more expertise (multiple directorships) and 
higher board meeting frequencies are likely to 
have higher audit fees. When they replace the 
board attributes with audit committee attributes 
(i.e. composition, meeting frequency and 
expertise), their results show a positive 
relationship of audit committee independence and 
audit committee expertise to audit fees. The audit 
committee meeting frequency is not significantly 
related with audit fees. However, once they 
analyse board and audit committee attributes 
together, the results for the board of directors 
remain unchanged but none of the audit 
committee attributes are significantly related to 
audit fees. 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
Collier and 
Gregory 
(1996) 
315 firms for year 
1991 (Financial 
Times All Share 
Index) 
UK Audit fees AC – establishment 
 
The firms with the presence of an audit 
committee are likely to have higher audit fees. 
Tsui et al. 
(2001) 
650 firms from 
1994 to 1996 
Hong 
Kong 
Audit fees BOD – duality roles The firms that separate the functions of CEO and 
chairman roles are more likely to have lower 
audit fees, indicating effective monitoring 
mechanisms are in place, thus reducing the 
control risk and audit effort. 
Boo and 
Sharma, (2008)  
469 firms  with 
total assets exceed 
$US 1bilion in 
fiscal year 2001 
US Audit fees BOD/AC – size, 
composition, expertise, 
meeting 
 
The associations of the board/audit committee 
independence and board/audit committee size to 
audit fees are weaker for regulated firms than for 
non-regulated firms except in the case of 
board/audit committee directorships. 
O‟Sullivan 
(2000) 
402 UK large firms 
in 1992 
UK Audit fees BOD – composition, 
ownership 
The firms with the higher percentage of non-
executive directors on board are more likely to 
incur higher audit fees, indicating a higher audit 
quality. He also claims that there is a negative 
relationship between executive ownership and 
audit fees. 
O‟Sullivan 
(1999) 
146 UK large firms 
in 1995 
UK Audit fees BOD – composition, 
tenure, duality roles 
 
AC – size, composition 
 
There is no evidence that the board of director or 
audit committee attributes influence the level of 
audit fees. 
O‟Sullivan and 
Diacon (2002) 
117 insurance 
companies in 1992 
UK Audit fees BOD – composition, 
duality, ownership 
 
AC – establishment, 
composition 
 
The existence of an audit committee has a 
positive relationship with audit fees but the audit 
committee composition as well as the board 
characteristics has no significant relationship 
with audit fees.  
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 
(2009) 
801 listed on the 
S&P 500 for 2000 
to 2002, audited by 
Big 5 auditors. 
US Audit fees BOD – size, 
composition, meeting, 
duality roles, voting 
control, ownership 
 
AC – composition, 
expertise, meetings  
The firms with separated dual roles functions and 
audit committees equipped with financial 
expertise are perceived by auditors to have a 
strong internal control environment, thus 
reducing the control risk and audit effort and 
leading to lower audit fees. Board and audit 
committee meetings have a positive relationship 
with audit fees. 
Abbott et al. 
(2003b) 
538 firms that filed 
with SEC between 
February 5, 2001 
and March 15, 
2001 
 
US Non-audit fees 
(ratio non-audit 
fees to total fees) 
AC – composition, 
meeting 
 
BOD – ownership 
structure  
The firms that have audit committees that consist 
of solely independent non-executive directors and 
meet at least four times a year are likely to have a 
lower NAS fees ratio.  
Lee and Mande 
(2005) 
780 firms for fiscal 
year 2000, S&P 
Super 1500 
US Non-Audit fees AC – composition, 
expertise, meeting 
The audit committees that are comprised of 
solely independent non-executive directors and 
that meet at least four times a year are likely to 
limit the purchase of NAS. However, once they 
model the NAS endogenously, such relationships 
are insignificant. 
Lee (2008) 631 firms for fiscal 
year 2000 to 2001, 
S&P Super 1500 
US Changes in non-
audit fees ratio 
BOD – expertise 
 
AC – composition, 
expertise 
 
The independence and expertise of audit 
committees and boards of directors are likely to 
limit the level of NAS purchased. 
Beasley and 
Petroni (2001) 
681 property-
liability insurers 
during 1991 to 
1992 
US Industry specialist 
auditor 
BOD - composition The insurers with the higher percentage of non-
executive directors are more likely to employ an 
industry specialist auditor. 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
Chen et al. 
(2005) 
510 top firms listed 
on the ASX in 
2000 
Australia Industry specialist 
auditor  
 
BOD – multiple 
directorship 
 
AC – composition, 
expertise, meetings 
 
 
The firms with a higher percentage of non-
executive directors on their audit committees are 
more likely to employ industry specialist 
auditors. Audit committee expertise and the 
number of meetings are not significantly related 
to the engagement of industry specialist auditors. 
The results for board directorships are mixed. 
Abbott and 
Parker (2000) 
500 firms listed on 
the NYSE, AMEX 
or NASDAQ 
exchanges in 1994 
US Industry specialist 
auditor 
 
BOD – 
composition, 
ownership 
 
AC – composition, 
meeting 
 
 
The firms with audit committees that are solely 
comprised of independent non-executive 
directors and that meet twice a year are more 
likely to employ industry specialist auditors. The 
percentage of non-executive directors on boards 
is not significantly related to the engagement of 
industry specialist auditor across all 
measurements.  
Dechow et al. 
(1996) 
92 firms that 
subject to the SEC 
enforcement action 
between 1982 and 
1992. 
US Earnings management: 
discretionary accruals 
BOD – 
composition, 
ownership, duality 
roles 
 
AC – 
establishment 
 
Where a firm‟s board of directors is dominated 
by the management, members practice dual role 
functions, the CEO is also the founder of the 
firm, there are fewer representatives of outside 
block holders and there is no audit committee 
formation there is more likelihood of earnings 
manipulation. 
Klein (2002) 692 firms-years 
listed on the S&P 
500 for 1992 to 
1993 
US Earnings management 
: absolute value of 
discretionary accruals 
BOD – 
composition, 
ownership  
 
AC – composition  
 
 
Higher percentages of independent non-executive 
directors on audit committee and on board are 
associated with lower earnings management. 
However, there is no significant relationship 
between solely independent non-executive 
directors and earnings management.  
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
Xie at al 
(2003) 
282 firms-years 
listed on the S&P 
500 for 1992, 1994 
and 1996 
 
US Earnings 
management: 
current 
discretionary 
accruals 
BOD – duality roles, 
meetings, 
composition, size, 
expertise 
 
AC – size, 
composition, 
expertise, meeting 
Earnings management is less likely to occur in 
firms whose board and audit committee are 
equipped with a corporate and financial 
background and have a higher percentage of 
independent non-executive directors as well as 
higher number of meetings.  
Bédard et al. 
(2004) 
200 firms 
(aggressive 
earnings  
management- 
highest and lowest 
income increasing/ 
decreasing ), 
Compustat  in 1996 
US Earnings 
management: 
discretionary 
accruals 
BOD – multiple 
directorship, 
composition, 
ownership  
 
AC – composition, 
expertise, size, 
meeting 
The firms with solely independent audit 
committees that are also equipped with financial 
expertise are less likely to have aggressive 
earnings management. There is no significant 
relationship of audit committee size and the 
number of meeting to earnings management.  
Davidson et al. 
(2005) 
434 listed 
Australian firms 
for financial year 
ending 2000 
Australia Earnings 
management: 
absolute value of 
discretionary 
accruals  
BOD – composition, 
duality roles 
 
AC – composition, 
size, meeting  
Firms with a majority of independent non-
executive directors on boards and with solely 
independent audit committees are associated with 
lower earnings management.  
Peasnell et al. 
(2005) 
1,271 firms for 
fiscal year 1993 to 
1995 
UK Earnings 
management: 
discretionary 
accruals 
BOD – size, 
composition, 
ownership,  duality 
roles 
 
AC - establishment 
Firms with a higher percentage of non-executive 
directors on board are associated with lower 
income-increasing earnings management. 
However, there is no evidence that the presence of 
an audit committee affects the extent of income-
increasing earnings management.  
Park and Shin 
(2004) 
539 firm-year for 
1991 to 1997 
Canada Earnings 
management: 
discretionary 
accruals 
BOD – composition, 
ownership 
There is no significant relationship between the 
number of non-executive directors on board and 
earnings management. However, the 
representatives of active institutional shareholders 
reduce earnings management.  
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) 
159 matched-pair 
of public firms that 
restated earnings in 
200 and 2001 
US Restatement of 
earnings 
BOD – composition, 
expertise, ownership, 
duality roles 
 
AC – composition, 
expertise 
 
The likelihood of earnings restatement is lower in 
the companies whose board or audit committee has 
independent non-executive directors with financial 
expertise, but it is higher in companies in which 
the CEO belongs to the founding family.  
Carcello and 
Neal (2000) 
223 financial 
distressed firms 
during 1994 
US Modified audit 
report 
AC – size, 
composition 
The higher the percentage of independent non-
executive directors on audit committees, the lower 
the likelihood of the firms to receive a going-
concern audit opinion. The audit committee size is 
not correlated with the likelihood of a going-
concern audit report. 
 
McMullen 
(1996) 
219 of firms 
consist of firms 
that associates to 
the litigation, 
earnings 
restatement, SEC 
actions, illegal acts 
and auditor 
turnover with 
disagreement 
US Financial reporting 
consequences-
Litigation, 
earnings 
restatement, SEC 
actions, Illegal 
Acts, Auditor 
turnover 
AC - establishment The existence of an audit committee is associated 
with fewer lawsuits for fraud, fewer quarterly 
earnings restatements, fewer SEC enforcement 
actions, fewer illegal acts and fewer auditor 
turnovers that are related to disagreements.  
Chen et al. 
(2006) 
169 firms under the 
Chinese Securities 
Regulatory 
Commission 
(CSRC) 
enforcement 
actions during 
1999 to 2003. 
China Fraud and non-
fraud firms: coded 
1 if the firm is 
subject to an 
enforcement action 
statement, 0 
otherwise 
 
 
BOD- size, 
composition, 
meetings, duality 
roles, chairman 
tenure, ownership 
The firms with the lower percentage of non-
executive directors on board, lower board meeting 
frequencies, and shorter chairman tenures are 
associated with a higher likelihood of the incidence 
of fraud.  
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
Abbott et al.  
(2004) 
1. match-paired of 
88 restatement 
sample firms  from 
1991 to 1999 
 
2. 44 fraud firms 
under the SEC 
sanctions 
US 1.Restatement 
 
2.Fraud and non-
fraud firms 
BOD – size, composition, 
ownership, duality roles  
 
AC – size, composition, 
expertise, meeting 
 
 
The firms with audit committees that are 
solely independent, meet frequently and 
that possess at least one member with 
financial expertise are less likely to 
experience restatement. A larger board size 
is associated to a higher likelihood of 
restatements. Audit committee expertise 
and independence are negatively related to 
the incidence of fraud. 
Abbott et al. 
(2000) 
156 firms: 78 firms 
subject to SEC‟ 
sanction matched 
with 78 non-
sanctioned firms 
US Sanctioned and non-
sanctioned firms: 
coded 1 if the firm is 
alleged to have SEC 
sanction, 0 otherwise 
 
 
BOD – composition, 
ownership, duality roles 
 
AC – composition, 
meeting 
 
 
The firms with audit committees that are 
comprised of solely independent members 
and that meet twice a year are less likely to 
be sanctioned for fraud and aggressive 
accounting. Having a CEO who also chairs 
the board is associated with a higher 
likelihood of sanction.  
Beasley (1996) 150 firms: 
Matched-pair of 75 
fraud and 75 non-
fraud firms (SEC 
and Wall Street 
Journal Index) 
US Fraud and non-fraud 
firms: coded 1 if the 
firm is alleged to 
have fraudulent 
financial statement, 
0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
BOD – composition, 
ownership, duality roles 
 
 
Non-fraud firms are likely to experience 
lower levels of fraudulent financial 
reporting when the board has higher 
percentage of independent non-executive 
directors as compared with fraud firms. 
The board‟s composition rather than audit 
committee‟s presence is more important in 
reducing fraudulent financial reporting.   
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology used to test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 
3. The first section explains and justifies the sample firms selected and the time period 
during which the investigation was carried out. The chapter then outlines the 
definitions and measurements of the hypothesis variables (i.e. the effective 
characteristics of board and audit committee, audit quality proxies and earnings 
management). The model specifications and related control variables, the sources of 
data and the data analysis procedures are also discussed. Finally, a summary of the 
chapter‟s contents is also provided. 
 
4.2 Sample firms and period of study 
The sample population for this study is the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE 
hereafter) 350, which consists of FTSE 100 and FTSE 200, representing the largest 
350 firms by market capitalisation listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). These 
firms are selected because they include a broad range of industrial and commercial 
activities and account for a significant portion of the UK economic output.  
 
The main focus of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of the board of directors 
and audit committee in terms of corporate governance best practice, as outlined in the 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). Since some of the Code‟s provisions do not 
apply to the firms below the FTSE 350, the FTSE 350 firms provide an ideal sample 
to investigate (The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010: 5).  
 
The study examines a sample period of the fiscal years 2005 and 2008, following an 
event believed to have significant influence on this study. The event in question is the 
revision of the UK Corporate Governance Code, which was introduced in July 2003 
based on the recommendations set out in the Higgs and Smith reports, and which 
came into effect on 1 November 2003 for all UK listed firms. The Higgs Report 
provides a review of the role and the effectiveness of non-executive directors, while 
the Smith Report details the role of the audit committee. Allowing for a year‟s 
114 
 
transition period, the present study examines the fiscal period of 2005 to 2008 to 
ensure that all FTSE 350 firms meet the new requirements.     
 
4.2.1 Sample selection for regression analysis 
The initial sample of the FTSE 350 consists of 1,400 firm-year observations for the 
period 2005 to 2008. However, the present study excludes 504 firms that operate in 
the financial and utilities sectors, due to their unique characteristics and to specific 
regulations which may affect the results. The sample size has also been reduced by a 
further 168 firm-year observations as a result of missing information in Datastream, 
FAME and Thomson One Banker. Another 49 firm-year observations have been 
eliminated, since their annual reports were unavailable, as have another 5 firms which 
were not audited by Big 4 auditors in order to control for brand name (Craswell et al., 
1995; Chung and Kallapur, 2003). After the eliminations, the remaining sample is of 
674 firm-year observations. The sample selection procedure is summarised in Table 
4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Sample selection procedures 
Description 2005 2006 2007 2008 Pooled 
Initial sample (FTSE 350) 350 350 350 350 1,400 
Excluded:      
Financial and Utilities firms 146 120 115 123 504 
Missing data from Datasteam, 
FAME and Thomson One Banker 
31 39 46 52 168 
Audited by non-Big 4 auditors 1 2 1 1 5 
Unavailable annual report 5 8 7 29 49 
Final samples  167 181 181 145 674 
 
Two empirical investigations have been conducted, each of which use different 
samples. The first investigation examines the relationship between the board of 
directors, the audit committee and audit quality. The total sample analysed through 
the three proxies of audit quality is 674 firm-year observations.  
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The second empirical investigation examines the relationship between the board of 
directors, the audit committee and auditor quality in constraining earnings 
management. In line with the arguments set forth by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) 
and Subramanyam (1996), the sample for the second investigation is reduced from 
674 to 613 to ensure that each industry portfolio consists of at least six observations, 
in order to provide an unbiased estimation of discretionary accruals. Table 4.2 and 
Table 4.3, Panel A and B, report the distribution of the sample firms by year and 
industry, for the first and second empirical models respectively. 
 
Table 4.2: Sample size and industry description for the first empirical analysis –  
relationships between board of directors, audit committee and audit quality 
Panel A: Distribution of sample firms by year 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 Pooled 
Sample 
size 
N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent 
167 24.78 181 26.85 181 26.85 145 21.52 674 100.00 
           
Panel B: Distribution of sample firms by industry 
ICB 
Code 
Supersector level N Percent 
0500 Oil & Gas 36 5.34 
1300 Chemicals 16 2.38 
1700 Basic Resources 30 4.45 
2300 Construction & Materials 20 2.97 
2700 Industrial Goods & Services 229 33.98 
3500 Food & Beverage 23 3.41 
3700 Personal & Household Goods 49 7.27 
4500 Health Care 18 2.67 
5300 Retail 74 10.98 
5500 Media 47 6.97 
5700 Travel & Leisure 77 11.42 
6500 Telecommunication 17 2.52 
9500 Technology 38 5.64 
Total  674 100.00 
The sample observations consist of FTSE350 non-regulated firms audited by Big 4 
auditors.  
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Table 4.3: Sample size and industry description for the second empirical analysis –  
relationship between board of directors, audit committee, external auditor and 
earnings management 
Panel A: Distribution of sample firms by year 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 Pooled 
Sample 
size 
N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent 
149 24.31 167 27.24 170 27.73 127 20.72 613 100.00 
           
Panel B: Distribution of sample firms by industry  
ICB 
Code 
Supersector level N Percent 
0500 Oil & Gas 36 5.87 
1300 Chemicals - - 
1700 Basic Resources 26 4.24 
2300 Construction & Materials 18 2.94 
2700 Industrial Goods & Services 229 37.36 
3500 Food & Beverage 19 3.10 
3700 Personal & Household Goods 49 7.99 
4500 Health Care - - 
5300 Retail 74 12.07 
5500 Media 47 7.67 
5700 Travel & Leisure 77 12.56 
6500 Telecommunication - - 
9500 Technology 38 6.20 
Total  613 100.00 
From the total sample of 674 firm-year observations, the sample has been reduced to 
613 firm-year observations to ensure that each industry portfolio consists of at least 
six observations in every year.  
 
4.3 Sources of data  
There are four main sources of data relevant to the study, namely Datastream, FAME, 
Thomson One Banker and the firms‟ annual reports. Most of the variables identified in 
this study were taken from Datastream, FAME and Thomson One Banker. The other 
variables, for which data was not available from these sources, were collected from 
the individual firms‟ annual reports; this refers in particular to the variables relating to 
the board of directors and the audit committees.   
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4.4 The definition and measurement of the hypothesis variables 
The variables of interest examined in this study are explained in this section. There 
are three main variables to be examined: (1) the characteristics of the board of 
directors and the audit committee; (2) the audit quality proxies; and (3) earnings 
management.  
 
4.4.1 The board of director and audit committee variables 
The board of director and audit committee variables are related to their effective 
monitoring characteristics (e.g. size, composition, meeting and expertise). In both 
empirical investigations, the board and audit committee variables are independent 
variables. These variables are manually collected from the firms‟ annual reports, and 
each variable is presented in the following subsections.  
 
4.4.1.1 Board of directors size (BRDSIZE) 
Following Abbott et al. (2004) and Peasnell et al. (2000; 2005), the board of directors‟ 
size is determined by the total number of members on the board of directors, as 
presented in the annual report at the end of each fiscal year.  
 
4.4.1.2 Board of directors composition (BRDNED) 
The board of directors‟ composition is defined as the proportion of independent non-
executive directors to total board size. Non-executive directors can be either 
independent non-executive directors or gray or affiliated non-executive directors. 
However, the independent non-executive directors are believed to have a better 
monitoring position compared to the gray or affiliated non-executive directors, since 
they have no relationship that would impair their judgments or decision-making 
(Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999; Vance, 1983). This is consistent with agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
The definition of „independent‟ is based on the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010: 8), paragraph A.3.1: “The non-executive director is not considered to be 
independent if the director:  
(1) has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years;  
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(2) has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with 
the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior 
employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company;   
(3) has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a 
director‟s fee, participates in the company‟s share option or a performance-
related pay scheme, or is a member of the company‟s pension scheme;  
(4)   has close family ties with any of the company‟s advisers, directors or senior 
employees; 
(5)   holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through 
involvement in other companies or bodies;  
(6)   represents a significant shareholder; or  
(7)   has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first 
election.”  
 
The independent non-executive directors exclude the chairman of the board.  
 
4.4.1.3 Board of directors expertise (BRDEXP) 
The board of directors‟ expertise is measured by the number of directors with 
accounting and financial qualification and experience, in proportion to the total board 
size. Accounting and financial expertise provide the board members with an 
understanding of financial statements, which enables them to assess the effectiveness 
of the accounting policies provided by the management. Accounting and financial 
qualifications and experience include all relevant forms of formal education (e.g. 
Bachelor in Accounting) and professional qualification (e.g. ACCA, CIMA and 
CFA), as well as work experience (as finance director, chief financial officer, auditor 
or financial controller, for example). This definition of the variable is relatively 
similar to Xie et al. (2003). 
 
4.4.1.4 Board of directors meeting (BRDMEET) 
Following Vafeas (1999), the board of directors‟ meetings are measured by the total 
number of board of directors‟ meetings during the year. The meetings frequency 
captured the boards‟ activity levels. Regular board meetings allow the board members 
to identify and resolve potential problems that may arise in their firm, particularly 
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related to its financial health. The meetings are also an opportunity to generate and 
analyse strategic planning.  
 
4.4.1.5 Audit committee size (ACSIZE) 
The audit committee size is measured based on the total number of audit committee 
members presented at the end of fiscal year; this definition is consistent with Yang 
and Krishnan (2005). 
 
4.4.1.6 Audit committee composition (ACIND) 
The audit committee composition is measured by a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the 
audit committee consists solely of independent directors and coded as 0 if otherwise, 
consistent with the recommendations outlined in the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010). The rationale for having solely independent non-executive directors in the 
audit committee is to ensure greater impartiality and objectivity in decision-making. 
The definition of independence is relatively similar as defined in section 4.4.1.4. 
 
4.4.1.7 Audit committee expertise (ACEXP) 
As with the board of directors‟ expertise, audit committee expertise is measured by 
the number of directors with accounting and financial qualification and experience, in 
proportion to the total number of audit committee members. Accounting and financial 
expertise is essential to the audit committee members, since their main function is to 
ensure integrity in financial reporting. The accounting and financial knowledge may 
increase their understanding of financial reporting issues and of GAAP practices as 
well as better enabling them to assess the effectiveness of the firms‟ accounting 
policies. Accounting and financial qualifications and experience include all forms of 
formal education, professional qualification and work experience related to 
accounting and finance. 
 
4.4.1.8 Audit committee meeting (ACMEET) 
Following Krishnan and Visvanathan, (2009), the audit committee meeting is 
measured by the number of meeting during the fiscal year. The higher the number of 
the meetings, the higher the level of activities, which mean the more active they are.  
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4.4.2 Audit quality variables 
Three proxies of audit quality are examined in this thesis. In the first empirical 
analysis, the audit quality proxies are dependent variables, whilst in the second, they 
are represented as independent variables. The definition and measurement of each 
audit quality proxy are described below. 
 
4.4.2.1 Audit fees (LNAFEE) 
The present study uses audit fees as a first measure of audit quality. The audit fees 
variable (AFEE) is transformed to natural log and prefixed by LN to achieve normality 
of data, in order to prevent the largest firms from unduly influencing the findings. 
Data for this variable (LNAFEE) is gathered from the FAME database.  
 
4.4.2.2 Auditor independence (FEE) 
Four measures of auditor independence are employed; (1) LNNAF- the magnitude of 
NAS fees; (2) LNTOTALFEES - the sum of audit and NAS fees; (3) FEERATIO1- the 
fee ratio of NAS fees to total fees; and (4) FEERATIO2 - the fee ratio of non audit 
fees to audit fees. The LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES are transformed to the natural log 
to achieved normality of data distribution. The firms that reported zero NAS fees are 
set to one pound to allow for log transmission. The auditor fees data were taken from 
the FAME database. 
 
LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES are associates to the fee dependence of auditor on a 
client. Besides the audit fees received by the auditor, the level of NAS fees further 
increase the client-auditor economic bond as the auditor reliance on the client 
increases (Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988). Similar to Ashbaugh et al. (2003), the 
present study argues that the level of NAS fees and the sum of audit and NAS fees are 
better measures to capture the economic important of the client to the auditor than the 
NAS ratio. Although FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2 do not necessarily capture the 
client‟s importance, they do explain the financial link between the auditor and the 
client, and have an impact on the regulators‟ perception of independence (Ashbaugh 
et al., 2003).   
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4.4.2.3 Industry specialist auditor (SPEC_AUD) 
The existing literature suggests that the industry specialisation of auditors can be 
measured using several approaches, such as the market share approach (Krishnan, 
2003a; Dunn et al., 2000; Balsam et al., 2003; Velury et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2005) 
and the portfolio approach (Krishnan, 2003a), as well as a complementary approach 
set out by Neal and Riley (2004). Despite the limitations of each approach, they are 
recognised as the most appropriate measures for auditor industry specialisation.   
 
The market share approach interprets the industry specialist auditor as an auditor that 
can make a distinction among their opponents within a particular industry in terms of 
market shares (Neal and Riley, 2004). Market shares can be estimated for a specific 
industry using client sales, the audit fees, the total fees and the number of audit clients 
that are assigned to the particular auditor. The auditor(s) with the largest market 
share(s) in a particular industry (within-industry) are assumed to have the largest 
industry specific knowledge and a significant investment contribution towards the 
improvement of audit quality and economic of scales as compared to others 
competitors. Neal and Riley (2004: 170) claim that there are two disadvantages of 
using the market shares approach in defining industry specialist auditors: (1) more 
highly competitive auditors do not necessarily allocate significant resources to the 
development of audit technology and expertise; and (2) it is not appropriate for 
auditors to designate specialist in industries that are too small in generating significant 
revenues for them.  
 
An alternative to the market share approach, the portfolio approach assumed each 
auditor individually and takes into consideration the distribution of the client‟s sales, 
the audit fees, the total fees or the number of audit clients across the various 
industries. The auditors with the largest portfolio share are considered as industry 
specialist auditors in a particular industry if they generate the most revenues from 
their total income or clients‟ sales. This may reflect their investments in audit 
technologies and their industry-specific knowledge, even though they are not the 
market share leaders in that particular industry (Neal and Riley, 2004). However, even 
though the portfolio approach suggests that industry specialist auditors are driven by 
the size of industry, the specific efforts or investment made by the auditors may not 
necessarily reflect their expertise in that particular industry. This inconsistency may 
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cause larger auditors to be identified as specialists in most industries and none to be 
identified as specialists in the smallest industries (Neal and Riley, 2004).  
 
Neal and Riley (2004) introduce the weighted market share, a complementary 
approach which captures the complementary effects between the market share 
approach and the portfolio approach. This measure offers a solution for the 
inconsistency between the two main approaches. However, Neal and Riley note that, 
like the other two approaches, this approach does not consider the lead/lag period 
effect. Thus, to ensure the consistency and robustness of the findings, the present 
study considers all three of these approaches in determining the industry specialist 
auditors based on audit fees.  
 
In both empirical analyses, the industry specialist auditor is defined in five ways. The 
first three measures are known as a continuous variable which is equal to the 
respective auditors‟ market share (SPECLST_MS), the auditors‟ portfolio share 
(SPECLST_PS) and compliment between the auditors‟ market share and portfolio 
share (SPECLST_WEIGHTED). The last two measures are identified as dichotomous 
variables that depend on the auditors‟ industry market shares; first is the industry 
leader, SPECLST_MSLEADER, coded as 1 if the auditor has earned the largest market 
share in each particular industry and 0 if otherwise, and lastly SPECLST_30MS, coded 
as 1 if the auditor market share exceeds 30 percent in each particular industry and 0 if 
otherwise. Each of these measures is computed as follows: 
 
(1) SPECLST_MS 
This is a continuous variable. SPECLST_MS is defined as the proportion of 
audit fees received by the individual auditor relative to the total audit fees 
received by all auditors in that particular industry (Velury et al., 2003).   
1
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(1) 
where 
 i = an index of the auditors (i=1, 2, 3, 4); 
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 j = an index of clients; 
 k = an index of the industries 
 Ik = the number of auditors in industry k for year t; 
 Jikt = the number of clients audited by auditor i in industry k for 
year t; 
 AFEEijkt = the audit fees for auditor i‟s client j for year t. 
 
The variable AFEE denotes the client‟s audit fees and is sourced from the 
FAME database. The numerator is the sum of the audit fees of all Jik clients of 
auditor i in industry k, where the industry is defined at the sector level of the 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) available in Datastream. The 
denominator in equation (1) is the audit fees of all Jikt clients in industry k and 
year t reported in the FAME database, summed over all Ik auditors (all Big 4 
auditors) providing audits to that particular industry and year.  
 
(2) SPECLST_PS 
This is a continuous variable. SPECLST_PS is identified as the proportion of 
the total audit fees in each industry divided by the total audit fees of all 
industry received by the particular auditor. The computation of the auditor 
portfolio share is shown below: 
1
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(2) 
where 
 i = an index of the auditors (i=1, 2, 3, 4); 
 j = an index of clients; 
 k = an index of the industries 
 Jikt = the number of clients audited by auditor i in industry k for 
year t; 
 AFEEijkt = the audit fees for auditor i‟s client j for year t. 
124 
 
AFEE represents the client‟s audit fees and is sourced from the FAME 
database. As with the market share approach, the numerator is the sum of the 
audit fees of all Jik clients of auditor i in industry k, where the industry is 
defined at the sector level of the ICB. The denominator is the sum of the audit 
fees received by auditor i across all k industries in year t.  
 
 (3) SPECLST_WEIGHTED 
The last measure is a complementary measure which incorporates both the 
market share and the portfolio approaches. This is a continuous variable and 
was introduced by Neal and Riley (2004). SPECLST_WEIGHTED is 
computed as variable SPECLST_MS multiplied by SPECLST_PS.   
 
(4) SPECLST_MSLEADER 
This is a dichotomous variable. SPECLST_MSLEADER is coded as 1 if the 
incumbent auditor earned the largest market share in the particular industry, 0 
if otherwise. This measure identifies the auditor as the industry market leader. 
The computation is the same as Equation (1). 
 
(5)  SPECLST_30MS 
This measure is a dichotomous variable. SPECLST_30MS is coded as 1 if the 
auditor market share exceeds 30 percent in each particular industry, 0 if 
otherwise. The market share cut-off for specialisation is identified as at 30 
percent without specialisation, with each firm holds a market share of 
approximately 0.25 percent (1 firm/4 firms = 0.25). The 0.25 percent is 
multiplying by 1.20 yields 30 percent (Neal and Riley, 2004).  The 
computation of the auditor industry market share is as in Equation (1). 
 
Based on the computations of the market share and portfolio share approaches, Tables 
4.4 and 4.5 report the summary of Big 4 auditor industry specialists by year and 
pooled samples respectively. Across the years and pooled tables, according to the 
SPECLST_30MS definition, it can be considered that PWC is the specialist in most 
industries, while EY is considered to be a specialist only in the travel and leisure 
industry, except in 2008, when it also was known as a specialist in the media and 
technology industries. DL and KPMG are relatively comparable in terms of the 
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number of specialisations. For example, in the period 2005 to 2008 (pooled), DL is a 
specialist in four industries: basic resources, construction & materials, media and 
telecommunications, and KPMG is also a specialist in four industries, namely 
chemicals, construction & materials, industrial goods & services and food & 
beverages.  
 
Table 4.4: The Big 4 auditor industry specialists (by year) 
Panel A: Industry Market Share (in %) 
ICB 
Code 
2005 2006 
DL EY KPMG PWC DL EY KPMG PWC 
0500 23.856 8.106 - 68.038 10.269 14.463 - 75.268 
1300 9.926 - 82.410 7.664 - - 87.237 12.763 
1700 38.721 22.562 24.638 14.079 31.720 21.865 24.993 21.422 
2300 38.423 - 29.287 32.29 41.855 - 58.145 - 
2700 17.694 11.773 42.551 27.982 15.012 9.617 39.208 36.163 
3500 4.545 4.545 60.606 30.304 3.333 5.000 33.333 58.334 
3700 2.059 - 7.923 90.018 2.611 - 10.552 86.837 
4500 11.429 14.286 7.143 67.142 2.684 12.567 28.199 56.550 
5300 19.929 5.284 14.590 60.197 18.251 5.979 12.901 62.869 
5500 49.239 7.711 6.425 36.625 69.483 4.594 3.281 22.642 
5700 27.722 35.642 5.657 30.979 20.556 49.549 5.798 24.097 
6500 34.458 - - 65.542 55.523 - 4.331 40.146 
9500 8.299 22.189 3.239 66.273 28.619 3.773 4.463 63.145 
ICB 
Code 
2007 2008 
DL EY KPMG PWC DL EY KPMG PWC 
0500 29.228 8.115 - 62.657 15.822 15.583 23.859 44.736 
1300 - - 66.741 33.259 25.974 - 74.026 - 
1700 18.761 23.195 16.314 41.730 48.985 - 48.985 2.030 
2300 62.006 - 37.994 - 80.000 - 20.000 - 
2700 20.172 11.015 35.617 33.196 21.358 4.131 42.441 32.070 
3500 2.044 5.399 38.565 53.992 23.097 1.768 44.197 30.938 
3700 7.286 - 7.764 84.950 3.435 - 6.304 90.261 
4500 3.029 11.408 28.521 57.042 - 14.218 33.649 52.133 
5300 18.301 5.396 10.402 65.901 24.924 2.935 7.340 64.801 
5500 63.155 7.774 6.303 22.768 61.721 31.190 7.089 - 
5700 22.326 48.421 6.316 22.937 30.679 39.424 7.755 22.142 
6500 61.814 - 7.636 30.550 35.638 - 18.837 45.525 
9500 25.941 7.377 - 66.682 26.904 30.002 1.454 41.640 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
Panel B: Industry Portfolio Share (in %) 
ICB 
Code 
2005 2006 
DL EY KPMG PWC DL EY KPMG PWC 
0500 2.352 1.470 - 3.808 0.775 2.474 - 3.641 
1300 1.072 - 8.458 0.470 - - 6.871 0.588 
1700 22.776 24.413 13.765 4.701 13.587 21.216 11.726 5.877 
2300 4.928 - 3.567 2.351 3.651 - 5.555 - 
2700 23.507 28.777 53.693 21.102 17.427 25.291 49.854 26.886 
3500 0.621 1.143 7.866 2.351 0.612 2.079 6.701 6.856 
3700 0.725 - 2.649 17.987 0.612 - 2.707 13.026 
4500 3.313 7.617 1.966 11.047 0.653 6.929 7.518 8.815 
5300 5.311 2.590 3.693 9.106 4.529 3.361 3.506 9.991 
5500 15.865 4.570 1.967 6.699 32.386 4.850 1.675 6.759 
5700 10.144 23.994 1.967 6.436 5.965 32.570 1.843 4.478 
6500 8.282 - - 8.941 15.685 - 1.340 7.263 
9500 1.104 5.426 0.409 5.001 4.118 1.230 0.704 5.820 
ICB 
Code 
2007 2008 
DL EY KPMG PWC DL EY KPMG PWC 
0500 2.913 1.745 - 3.824 1.700 4.718 2.318 3.185 
1300 - - 2.165 0.521 0.960 - 2.478 - 
1700 9.790 26.125 10.788 13.336 11.213 - 10.148 0.308 
2300 7.236 - 5.619 - 6.408 - 1.450 - 
2700 22.088 26.030 49.425 22.259 25.675 13.997 46.171 25.552 
3500 0.376 2.144 8.991 6.083 8.372 1.806 14.497 7.432 
3700 1.986 - 2.683 14.184 1.282 - 2.128 22.318 
4500 0.753 6.125 8.991 8.689 - 13.545 10.293 11.679 
5300 4.668 2.970 3.363 10.294 6.408 2.127 1.708 11.042 
5500 16.137 4.287 2.041 3.563 13.948 19.866 1.450 - 
5700 6.019 28.173 2.158 3.787 7.604 27.542 1.740 3.638 
6500 24.121 - 3.776 7.301 11.213 - 5.364 9.494 
9500 3.912 2.401 - 6.159 5.217 16.399 0.255 5.352 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
ICB Code (supersector levels): 0500-Oil & Gas; 1300- Chemicals; 1700- Basic 
Resources; 2300- Construction & Materials; 2700- Industrial Goods & Services; 
3500- Food & Beverage; 3700- Personal & Household Goods; 4500- Health Care; 
5300- Retail; 5500- Media; 5700- Travel & Leisure; 6500- Telecommunications; 
9500- Technology; DL: Deloitte; EY: Ernst & Young; KPMG: KPMG Peat Marwick; 
PWC: Price Waterhouse Coopers. The audit fees is used as the based in calculating 
the auditor industry expertise. The following examples illustrate how the auditor 
industry expertise are been computed. For the period 2005, the total audit fees 
received by DL in the Oil & Gas industry amounted £1.136 millions and the total 
audit fees of DL for all industries amounted £48.3 millions. During the same period, 
the combined audit fees of all auditors (DL, EY, KPMG and PWC) in the Oil & Gas 
industry amounted £4.762 millions. The DL market share Oil & Industry, 
2005=£1.136/£4.762*100=23.856%. The DL portfolio share Oil & Industry, 
2005=£1.136/£48.3*100=2.352. The industry expertise for other auditors and the 
subsequence years are also been computed in a similar ways. The auditor expertise in 
bold is where market shares exceed 30%. A dash (-) means that the auditor did not 
have client in that particular industry.  
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Table 4.5: The Big 4 auditor industry specialist (by pooled) 
ICB 
Code  
Auditor Industry Expertise for 2005-2008 (in %) 
DL EY KPMG PWC 
MS PS MS PS MS PS MS PS 
0500 20.304 1.929 11.588 2.470 6.829 0.680 61.279 3.621 
1300 7.966 0.453 0.000 0.000 80.633 4.812 11.401 0.404 
1700 31.431 13.701 19.598 19.163 25.119 11.483 23.852 6.467 
2300 55.199 5.624 0.000 0.000 36.840 3.936 7.961 0.504 
2700 18.593 22.038 9.051 24.068 39.824 49.502 32.532 23.985 
3500 11.424 2.511 3.692 1.819 42.442 9.781 42.442 5.801 
3700 3.943 1.197 0.000 0.000 7.916 2.519 88.141 16.635 
4500 3.732 1.037 13.130 8.187 25.658 7.480 57.480 9.938 
5300 20.304 5.197 4.897 2.812 11.120 2.985 63.679 10.139 
5500 62.593 19.838 10.748 7.642 5.291 1.759 21.368 4.212 
5700 25.012 7.214 43.588 28.202 6.328 1.914 25.072 4.499 
6500 49.539 15.514 0.000 0.000 8.547 2.807 41.914 8.164 
9500 23.959 3.747 16.066 5.637 2.085 0.342 57.890 5.631 
ICB Code (supersector levels): 0500-Oil & Gas; 1300- Chemicals; 1700- Basic 
Resources; 2300- Construction & Materials; 2700- Industrial Goods & Services; 
3500- Food & Beverage; 3700- Personal & Household Goods; 4500- Health Care; 
5300- Retail; 5500- Media; 5700- Travel & Leisure; 6500- Telecommunications; 
9500- Technology; DL: Deloitte; EY: Ernst & Young; KPMG: KPMG Peat Marwick; 
PWC: Price Waterhouse Coopers; MS: market share, PS: Portfolio share; The audit 
fees is used as the based in calculating the auditor industry expertise. The following 
examples illustrate how the auditor industry expertise are been computed. For the 
period 2005 through 2008, the total audit fees received by DL in the Oil & Gas 
industry amounted £4.757 millions and the total audit fees of DL for all industries 
amounted £246.59 milions. During the same period, the combined audit fees of all 
auditors (DL, EY, KPMG and PWC) in the Oil & Gas industry amounted £23.429 
millions. The DL market share Oil & Industry, 2005-2008=£4.757/£23.429*100=20.304%. 
The DL portfolio share Oil & Industry, 2005-2008=£4.757/£246.59*100=1.929. The DL 
weighted market share Oil & Industry, 2005-2008=20.304*1.929/100=0.392. The industry 
expertise for other auditors are been computed in a similar ways. The auditor 
expertise in bold is consider to be a specialist according to SPECLST_30MS’ 
definitions (i.e. the auditors are considered to be a specialist when they had the market 
shares that exceed 30 percent).  
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4.4.3 Earnings management variables 
Earnings management is the dependent variable in the second empirical analysis and 
is measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals. In accordance with 
Becker et al. (1998), the absolute value of discretionary accruals measures the level of 
opportunistic earnings management activities and extreme reporting decision 
exercises by the managers.  
 
The total accruals are identified in order to estimate the discretionary accruals. There 
are two methods in computing the total accrual accruals; the first is the traditional 
balance sheet approach (e.g. Healy, 1985; Dechow et al., 1995), and the second is the 
cash flow approach (e.g. Becker et al., 1998; Subramaniam, 1996; Xie et al., 2003).42 
Both approaches are extensively used in the prior literature. However, Hribar and 
Collins (2002) suggest that the cash flow approach is better than the balance sheet 
approach when estimating the accruals for earnings management. They claim that the 
balance sheet approach contain the error measurement, which can lead to erroneously 
conclusion of the existing of earnings management when no such earnings 
management was detected.  Following Hribar and Collins (2002) argument, the 
present study employed the cash flow approach in computing the total accruals. 
 
The discretionary accruals are estimated using a cross-sectional variation of the Jones 
(1991), the modified Jones (1991) by Dechow et al. (1995) and the performance-
adjusted model by Kothari et al (2005). Following DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), the 
cross-sectional version is employed as it is more specific than the time version model 
                                                          
42
 Under the balance sheet approach, the accruals are measured as follows (Hribar and Collins, 2002: 
107): 
TACCt= ΔCAt – ΔCLt – ΔCasht + ΔDEBT – DEP 
 
where TACC=total accruals; ΔCAt=the change in current assets during year t; ΔCLt=the change in 
current liabilities during year t; ΔCasht=the change in cash and cash equivalent during period t; 
ΔDEBT=the change in debt included in current liabilities during period t and DEP=depreciation and 
amortization expenses during period t. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets. 
 
The cash flow approach, on the other hand, measures the accruals as the difference between earnings 
before extraordinary items and earnings before discontinued operation, less the operating cash flow 
(Hribar and Collin, 202: 109). 
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due to the small sample observations (Subramanyam, 1996). All data is sourced are 
from Datastream. 
 
4.4.3.1 Discretionary accruals under the Jones model (DACCJM) 
Two steps are involved in the estimation of discretionary accruals. First is the 
estimation of non-discretionary accruals, using the following model. This begins with 
the estimation of coefficients ά1, ά2, and ά3 for each industry in each year (at least 6 
firms in each industry) by using OLS regression. The second step is to estimate the 
error term in the model, which represents the discretionary component of accrual. 
This error term is the difference between the total accruals and the non-discretionary 
accruals.  
 
 
1 2 3
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(3) 
where: 
DACC ij = discretionary accruals for sample firm i in industry j for year t; 
TACCijt = total accruals for sample firm i in industry j for year t; 
TAijt -1     = total assets for sample firm i in industry j for year t-1; 
ΔRECijt = change in account receivable for sample firm i in industry j for year t; 
PPEijt   = gross property plant and equipment for sample firm i in industry j for 
year t; 
eijt = error term for sample firm i in industry j for year t; 
 
The total accruals are computed as earnings before extraordinary items and earnings 
before discontinued operations, less the net cash flows from operating activities. The 
industry (j) is classified using the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) by Dow 
Jones and FTSE. 
 
4.4.3.2 Discretionary accruals under the modified Jones model (DACCMJM) 
The estimation of discretionary accruals under the modified Jones (1991) model is 
relatively similar to the original Jones model, except that it takes into account the 
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changes in account receivable. The non-discretionary accruals are estimated using the 
model below; the steps involved are relatively similar to the original Jones (1991) 
model. 
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(4) 
where: 
DACC ij = discretionary accruals for sample firm i in industry j for year t-1; 
TACCijt = total accruals for sample firm i in industry j for year t; 
TAijt -1     = total assets for sample firm i in industry j for year t-1; 
ΔREVijt = change in revenues for sample firm i in industry j for year t; 
ΔRECijt = change in account receivable for sample firm i in industry j for year t; 
PPEijt   = gross property plant and equipment for sample firm i in industry j for 
year t; 
eijt = error term for sample firm i in industry j for year t; 
 
4.4.3.3 Performance-Adjusted Discretionary Accruals (DACCROA) 
Kothari et al. (2005) suggest that there are two ways to control the firms‟ performance 
in the estimated accruals. The first is by matching each firm-year observation with 
another from a similar industry and year with the closest ROA in the current. 
Alternatively, firm performance, including ROA, can be included in the discretionary 
accruals regression as an additional variable. Due to the small sample size, the second 
method is employed in this thesis.  
 
Similar steps are involved. Firstly, it begins with the estimation of coefficients ά1, ά2, 
ά3 and ά4 for each industry in each year by using OLS regression to extract the non-
discretionary accruals. Then, the error terms are estimated according to the difference 
between the total accruals and the non-discretionary accruals, which represents the 
discretionary component of the accruals. The model is as follows: 
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(5) 
where: 
DACC ij = discretionary accruals for sample firm i in industry j for year t-1; 
TACCijt = total accruals for sample firm i in industry j for year t; 
TAijt -1     = total assets for sample firm i in industry j for year t-1; 
ROAijt -1     = return on asset for sample firm i in industry j for year t-1; 
ΔREVijt = change in revenues for sample firm i in industry j for year t; 
ΔRECijt = change in account receivable for sample firm i in industry j for year t; 
PPEijt   = gross property plant and equipment for sample firm i in industry j for 
year t; 
eijt = error term for sample firm i in industry j for year t; 
 
4.5 Model specifications and related control variables 
Three models of audit quality are used to test the relationship between the 
effectiveness of the board of directors and the audit committee characteristics on audit 
quality. These models are: the audit fees model, the NAS fees model and the auditor 
industry specialist model. In order to examine the relationship between the board of 
directors, the audit committee and auditor quality in constraining opportunistic 
earnings, the earnings management model is employed..  
 
A number of control variables are included in the models due to their real effect on 
the estimation of audit quality and earnings management, all identified in the prior 
literature. Since the prior studies differ in their use of control variables, in this thesis 
the selection of the control variables are cited from key papers in the area of 
investigation. If these variables were not controlled, it would likely lead to bias in 
estimating audit quality and earnings management. Each of these models and related 
control variables are described below. 
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4.5.1 Audit fees model 
Simunic (1980) suggests that audit fees are a function of two basic components: (1) 
the quantity of resources and (2) the expected future loss components. The first 
component refers to the cost in audit resources associated with auditor effort or audit 
hours and the second component refers to the projected likelihood of future losses that 
the auditor may suffer, such as sanctions by regulatory agencies and litigation. These 
two components can be categorised into three set of variables, namely size, 
complexity and risk sharing (Simunic, 1980). DeFond et al. (2000) suggest that an 
audit fees model that contains these variables has a higher explanatory power and is 
more robust across samples, countries and time periods. Motivated by this reason, 
below is the estimated models used to examine the relationship between the board and 
audit committee characteristics, and audit fees: 
 
LNAFEE = α0 + β1BRDSIZE + β2BRDNED + β3BRDEXP + 
β4BRDMEET + β5ACSIZE + β6ACIND + β7ACEXP +   
β8ACMEET + β9SQSUBS + β10FORGN + β11RECINV 
+ β12LEVERG + β13LNASSET   + ε    
 
 
 
(6) 
Where 
Dependent variable: 
 LNAFEE = the natural log of audit fees;  
Hypothesis variables: 
 BRDSIZE = the numbers of board‟ members  during the year; 
 BDRNED = the proportion of non-executive directors on board to board 
size; 
 BRDEXP = the proportion of directors with accounting experience and 
financial qualification to board size; 
 BRDMEET = the number of board meetings during the year;  
 ACSIZE = the number of audit committee members; 
 ACIND = coded as 1 if audit committee had solely non-executive 
directors; 0 otherwise; 
 ACEXP = the proportion of audit committee members with accounting 
experience and financial qualification to audit committee 
size; 
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 ACMEET = the number of audit committee meetings during the year; 
Control variables: 
 SQSUBS = the square root of total consolidated subsidiaries; 
 FORGN = the proportion of foreign subsidiaries to total consolidated 
subsidiaries; 
 RECINV = the proportion of total assets in account receivable and 
inventory; 
 LEVERG = the proportion of debts to total assets; 
 LNASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; 
 
The choice of control variables captured the size, complexity and risk sharing factors 
(Simunic, 1980). These variables are relatively similar to those adopted in Abbott and 
Parker‟s (2003) study, which also examines audit fees and the characteristics of the 
board and audit committee. However, the current study excludes the variable of audit 
opinion, since all of the firms in the sample received an unqualified audit opinion. 
Despite the fact that the variable of audit opinion is a proxy for risk sharing, the 
present study replaces it with the LEVERG, consistent with Menon and Williams 
(2001). The current study believes that LEVERG and RECINV variables are sufficient 
to represent the risk sharing factor. All of the control variables are sourced from 
Datastream except for the SQSUBS and FORGN, which are hand collected from the 
annual reports. 
 
The variables SQSUBS and FORGN are proxies for the complexity of firm operation. 
SQSUBS is measured as the square root of the total consolidated subsidiaries and 
FORGN is measured as the ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries. The prior 
literature suggests that as the firms‟ business complexities increase, the auditors may 
need to put more audit effort and audit hours into dealing with the complex business 
operations, in turn resulting in higher audit fees (Simunic, 1980; Craswell and Francis, 
1999; Abbott et al., 2003a; Carcello et al., 2002). These studies argue that the level of 
audit effort increases with the geographical coverage and the number of transactions 
in the subsidiaries. The present study expects these variables to be positively 
associated with audit fees.  
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The variables RECINV and LEVERG are proxies for risk-sharing factors, where 
RECINV is measured as the proportion of total assets in the account receivable and 
inventory. According to Simunic (1980: 173), the account receivable and inventory 
are the two “risky” items in the balance sheet that need more specific auditing 
procedures. These items require the auditor to make confirmation, observation and the 
valuation because it anticipates the forecast on the future events and may expose to a 
higher material misstatement (Simunic, 1980). In addition to this, Pratt and Stice 
(1994) claim that a higher RECINV is associated with a higher probability of audit 
failure. Such considerable effort and the raised possibility of misstatement increase 
the likelihood of audit failure, thus requiring more audit hours, resulting in increased 
audit fees. In line with these arguments and the prior studies that control this variable 
in their audit fees models (Simunic, 1980; Pratt and Stice, 1994; Palmrose, 1986a; 
Francis and Stokes, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987; Abbott et al., 2003a; Carcello et 
al., 2002), the present study predicts a positive relationship between the variable 
RECINV and audit fees.    
   
LEVERGN is defined as the proportion of debts to total assets and measures the 
clients‟ financial condition. According to Pratt and Stice (1991), clients in poor 
financial condition can cause more frequent audit failure because the firms 
experiencing the weak financial condition probably carry a higher risk of material 
misstatement, which may be difficult for the auditors to detect. Prior literature treats 
the leverage as the auditor‟ perceived litigation risk (Simunic and Stein, 1996; Menon 
and Williams, 2001, Pratt and Stice, 1994). The higher the litigation risk, the higher 
the auditors perceived they may involve in litigation. It is been argued that the 
auditors increase the audit fees and audit effort in the firms that experience higher 
leverage, in order to trade off the auditor‟ litigation risk. Consequently, the LEVERGN 
is expected to be positively associated with the audit fees.  
 
LNASSETS is a measure of firm size and is defined as the natural log of the total 
assets (Simunic, 1980; Abbott et al., 2003a; Carcello et al., 2002). As the firm‟ size 
increased, the auditors extend the audit scope and audit test accordingly. Such 
extensive efforts increase audit hours and fees, and thus the present study predicts a 
positive relationship between total assets and audit fees. 
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4.5.2 NAS fees model 
Firth (1997) and Parkash and Venable (1993) suggest that NAS fees are the function 
of agency cost, audit complexity, audit risk and demand for consulting services. In 
line with these, the present study estimates the following model:  
 
 FEE = β0 + β1BRDSIZE + β2BRDNED + β3BRDEXP + 
β4BRDMEET + β5ACSIZE + β6ACIND + β7ACEXP+ 
β8ACMEET + β9INOWN + β10BLOCK + β11LEVERG + 
β12RETURN +β13LNASSET + β14 ACQ + β15NWFUND + 
β16NEWDIR + β17RESTR + ε    
 
 
 
(7) 
Where 
Dependent variable: 
 FEE = LNNAF, LNTOTALFEES, FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2. 
Hypothesis variables: 
 BRDSIZE = the numbers of board‟ members  during the year; 
 BRDNED = the proportion of non-executive directors on board to board 
size; 
 BRDEXP = the proportion of directors with accounting experience and 
financial qualification to board size; 
 BRDMEET = the number of board meetings during the year;  
 ACSIZE = the number of audit committee members; 
 ACIND = coded as 1 if audit committee had solely non-executive 
directors; 0 otherwise; 
 ACEXP = the proportion of audit committee members with 
accounting experience and financial qualification to audit 
committee size; 
 ACMEET = the number of audit committee meetings during the year; 
Control variables: 
 INOWN = the cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the 
directors of a firm;  
 BLOCK = the cumulative percentage shares ownership of the 
blockholders who hold at least 5 percent or more of 
outstanding common shares and who are unaffiiliated with 
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management;  
 LEVERG = the proportion of debts to total assets; 
 RETURN = the fiscal year total stock return; 
 LNASSET = the natural logarithm of total assets; 
 ACQ = the number of acquisitions made by the company during 
the year; 
 NWFUND = coded as 1 if the firm issued new shares or debt for cash 
during the year, 0 otherwise; 
 NEWDIR = coded as 1 if the firm appoint new external director during 
the year, 0 otherwise; 
 RESTR = coded as 1 if the restructuring program has occurred during 
the year, 0 otherwise; 
 
The choice of control variables is in line with the study conducted by Abbott et al. 
(2003b), which examines the relationship between NAS and the characteristics of the 
board and audit committee.
43
These variables have been found by the prior literature to 
be significant in explaining the magnitude of NAS purchased, which include INOWN, 
BLOCK, LEVERG, RETURN, LNASSET, ACQ, ISSUE, NEWDIR and RESTR (Firth, 
1997; Parkash and Venable, 1993). All of the control variables are obtained from 
Datastream except for the variables ACQ and NEWISSUE, which are sourced 
respectively from Thomson One Banker database and annual report.  
 
The variables INOWN, BLOCK and LEVERG control for agency costs. INOWN is 
measured by the cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the directors of a 
firm at the beginning of the fiscal year. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the 
higher the level of insider ownership, the lower the agency costs, since the directors of 
externally owned firms will presumably realign their interests with the external 
owners. Such alignment is likely to initiate greater monitoring because the directors 
perceive themselves to be more accountable regarding their actions, and are thus 
likely to demand a higher quality audit. Consistent with this argument, the present 
study anticipates a negative relationship between INOWN and FEE.  
 
                                                          
43
 However, the present study excludes the variable of the big-size auditor because all of the firms in 
the sample are audited by big-size auditors.   
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BLOCK is defined as the cumulative percentage of ownership of the blockholders 
who hold at least 5 % or more of outstanding common shares and are unaffiiliated 
with management.44 Parkash and Venable (1993) claim that when outside ownership 
is higher, the agency cost is likely to decrease because such significant ownership 
provides incentives for direct monitoring. Greater monitoring appears to limit the 
NAS purchased, as it seems that higher NAS compromises the independence of the 
auditor, resulting in a low-quality audit. On the other hand, Abbott et al. (2003b) 
claim that, as a result of information asymmetry between the management and outside 
blockholders, the latter probably have limited access to insider information and are 
therefore more likely to depend on the information provided by the management to 
facilitate their monitoring function. Since there are two opposite arguments regarding 
the BLOCK variable, the present study does not make any specific prediction about 
the relationship between BLOCK and FEE. 
 
LEVERG is also a measure for agency cost. Agency theory suggests that managers 
have the incentive to transfer wealth from debtholders to shareholders using various 
actions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As the amount of debt increases, the higher the 
incentive of wealth will be transferred from the debtholders to shareholders and thus, 
initiate greater demand for a highly independent auditor (Palmrose, 1986a; Simunic 
and Stein, 1987; Francis and Wilson, 1988; DeFond, 1992). ). In other words, the 
firms experiencing higher leverage are more likely to demand a higher quality auditor 
or a more highly independent auditor in order to verify the accounting number related 
to the covenant compliance. Since the prior literature suggests that the auditors‟ 
independence decreases as the amount of NAS purchased increases, the present study 
predicts a negative relationship between LEVERG and FEE.   
 
RETURN is a measure of firm performance and is defined by the total stock return for 
the fiscal year. According to Houghton and Ikin (2001), the poor performance of firms 
is related to ineffective and inefficient operations, inappropriate management 
strategies, lack of competitiveness and the obsolescence of product and information 
technology. These concerns might increase the incentive for firms to hire external 
                                                          
44
 The blockholders are also known as „institutional investors‟ or large investors, rather than individual 
investors, and include pension funds, mutual funds, corporations, insurance firms, private equity firms, 
banks and trusts (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009). 
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consultants for expert advice. Indeed, Firth (1997) argues that firms with a poor stock 
market return are more likely to demand external advice on how to improve their 
performance than firms with a higher stock return. Thus, the present study predicts a 
positive relationship between RETURN and FEE.  
 
LNASSET is a measure of firm size. The demand for NAS increases as the size of the 
firm expands (Firths, 1997; Houghton and Ikin, 2001). When the size of the firm 
grows, the firm becomes more complex and may thus demand greater NAS. FEE is 
therefore expected to be positively related to LNASSET. 
Corporate acquisition (ACQ), the issuance of new shares, the borrowing of cash 
(ISSUE), the new appointment of external non-executive directors (NEWDIR) and 
firm restructurings (RESTR) are the variables associated with the events that create the 
demand for NAS (Firths, 1997). These variables represent relatively irregular events 
but might potentially have a major impact on the firms. The present study expects 
positive relationships between these variables and FEE. 
 
4.5.3 Industry specialist model 
Prior studies model the industry specialist auditor as a function of agency cost, audit 
risk and firm‟ business complexities (Francis and Wilson, 1988; DeFond, 1992; Firth 
and Smith, 1992). Following these studies, the model specification is as follows: 
 
SPEC_AUD = β0 + β1BRDSIZE + β2BRDNED + β3BRDEXP + 
β4BRDMEET + β5ACSIZE + β6ACIND + β7ACEXP + 
β8ACMEET + β9INOWN + β10LNASSET + β11LEVERG + 
β12NWFUNDRATIO + β13ROA + β14SQSUB + 
β15FORNSALE +  ε       
 
 
 
(8) 
where 
Dependent variable: 
 SPEC_AUD = SPECLST_MSLEADER, SPECLST_30MS, 
SPECLIST_MS, SPECLIST_PS and 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED.  
Hypothesis variables: 
 BRDSIZE = the numbers of board‟ members  during the year; 
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 BRDNED = the proportion of non-executive directors on board to 
board size; 
 BRDEXP = the proportion of directors with accounting experience 
and financial qualification to board size; 
 BRDMEET = the number of board meetings during the year;  
 ACSIZE = the number of audit committee members; 
 ACIND = coded as 1 if audit committee had solely non-executive 
directors; 0 otherwise; 
 ACEXP = the proportion of audit committee members with 
accounting experience and financial qualification to audit 
committee size; 
 ACMEET = the number of audit committee meetings during the year; 
Control variables: 
 INOWN = proportion of outstanding ordinary shares owned directly 
by directors on the board; 
 LNASSET = natural logarithm of total assets; 
 LEVERG = proportion of debts to total assets; 
 NWFUNDRATIO = proceed from new debt and equity issuances/ total assets; 
 ROA = return on assets; 
 SQSUB = square root of total consolidated subsidiaries; 
 FORGNSALE = proportion of the firm‟ foreign sales. 
 
The control variables chosen are relatively similar to those chosen by Abbott and 
Parker (2000) and Chen et al. (2005), and include INOWN, LNASSET, LEVERG, 
NWFUND, ROA, SQSUB and FORGNSALE. The theoretical justifications of these 
variables stem from previous related studies on big-size auditors (Francis and Wilson, 
1988; DeFond, 1992; Firth and Smith, 1992).
45
 
 
INOWN, LNASSETS and LEVERG are the proxies for the agency variables. INOWN is 
a measure for the insider ownership, and there are two arguments to explain the 
relationship between INOWN and SPEC_AUD. Firstly, as the insider ownership 
increases, the directors align their interests with those of the external owners, and thus 
                                                          
45
 As explained in Chapter 3 (see page 66), the theoretical foundation for industry specialist auditors is 
derived from reputation capital theory among the big-size auditors. 
141 
 
initiate greater monitoring of management actions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Since 
they perceive themselves as part of the firm structure, they demand a higher quality 
audit, engaging the industry specialist auditor. This indicates a positive relationship 
between INOWN and SPEC_AUD (Abbott and Parker, 2000). The second argument 
suggests that as the insider ownership increases, the directors obtain more detailed 
inside information about the firms (Firth, 1997), and hence have less need for a higher 
quality auditor. This argument leads to a negative relationship between INOWN and 
SPEC_AUD. Since there are two possible arguments, no prediction is made for this 
variable.   
 
 LNASSET is a proxy for firm size. Chen et al. (2005) argue that larger firms are likely 
to engage a higher quality auditor because the agency costs increase as the firm size 
grows (Francis and Wilson, 1988; Firth and Smith, 1992). The higher the agency cost, 
the higher the demand for industry specialist auditors. The present study therefore 
predicts a positive relationship between LNASSET and SPEC_AUD.  
 
LEVERG is the ratio of total debt to total assets. As the level of leverage increases, the 
agency costs also increase as a result of the increased likelihood of wealth transferral 
from debtholders to shareholders. Such conditions create a demand for a higher 
quality audit to verify the accounting numbers in the debt contract by reducing the 
information asymmetry between the debtholders and managers. In line with Abbott 
and Parker (2000) and Chen et al. (2005), the present study controls LEVERG for the 
extent of agency cost in the auditor industry specialist model. The present study 
expects that the leverage will be positively related to the engagement of industry 
specialist auditors. 
 
NWFUND is defined as the firm‟s acquisition of new debts and equity issuances, in 
proportion to the firm‟s total assets. Titman and Trueman (1986) claim that the 
appointment of a higher quality auditor signal credibility of information to the users. 
Thus, several studies suggest that by engaging a higher quality auditor, i.e. an industry 
specialist auditor, the firms may increase the marketability of new securities to 
outsiders, because these firms are perceived to have more credible information 
(DeFond, 1992; Francis and Wilson, 1988; Johnson and Lys, 1990). It is been argue 
that the monitoring function by the reputable auditor increased the credibility of the 
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firm‟ information and thus more favour in making new securities or obtaining new 
borrowing. Consistent with Abbott and Parker (2000) and Chen et al. (2005), the 
present study predicts a positive relationship between NWFUND and SPEC_AUD.  
 
ROA is a measure of client profitability and risk. According to Abbott and Parker 
(2000), more profitable firms are more likely to engage industry specialist auditors 
because they are more willing to pay the fee premium. On the other hand, ROA could 
also act as a risk-sharing proxy. Some studies suggest that riskier firms are more 
likely to appoint a higher quality auditor in order to signal the credibility of 
information to outsiders (Datar et al., 1991; Hogon, 1997; Copley and Douthett, 
2002). These studies argue that the demand for a higher quality auditors increases 
with the firm risk. Since there are two possible arguments, the direction of this 
variable is not predicted.  
 
Similar to the audit fees model, SQSUB and FORGNSALE are the proxies for firm 
complexity. The more complex the firms‟ operation, the greater the need for a higher 
quality auditor (Collier and Gregory, 1996; Simon and Francis, 1988). Following 
Abbott and Parker (2000) and Chen et al (2005), it is been argue that the 
diversification of the clients‟ subsidiaries and higher foreign sales are expected to 
increase the complexity of the firms‟ financial reporting system, the audit program 
and audit scope, and these create the greater need for the industry specialist auditor. 
The present study expects a positive relationship between these two variables and 
engagement of industry specialist auditor.  
 
4.5.4 Earnings management model 
The earnings management model follows that of Klein (2002) and Bédard et al. 
(2004), who examine the effects of the board and audit committee characteristics and 
the auditor quality on opportunistic earnings. The model specification is as follows: 
 
 DACC = β0 + β1BRDSIZE + β2BRDNED + β3BRDEXP + 
β4BRDMEET + β5ACSIZE + β6ACIND + β7ACEXP + 
β8ACMEET + β9AQ + β10INOWN + β11BLOCK + β11MTBV+ 
β13LOSS + β14CFO + β15LEVERGN + β16LNASSET+ ε         
 
 
 
(9) 
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where 
Dependent variable: 
 DACC = DACCJM, DACCMJM and DACCROA  
Hypothesis variables: 
 AQ = LNAFEE, LNNAF, LNTOTALFEES, FEERATIO1,  
FEERATIO2, SPECLST_MSLEADER, 
SPECLST_MS30, SPECLST_MS, SPECLST_PS and 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED 
 BRDSIZE = the numbers of board‟ members  during the year; 
 BRDNED = the proportion of non-executive directors on board to 
board size; 
 BRDEXP = the proportion of directors with accounting experience 
and financial qualification to board size; 
 BRDMEET = the number of board meetings during the year;  
 ACSIZE = the number of audit committee members; 
 ACIND = coded as 1 if audit committee had solely non-executive 
directors; 0 otherwise; 
 ACEXP = the proportion of audit committee members with 
accounting experience and financial qualification to 
audit committee size; 
 ACMEET = the number of audit committee meetings during the 
year; 
Control variables: 
 INOWN = the cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the 
directors of a firm;  
 BLOCK = the cumulative percentage shares ownership of the 
blockholders who hold at least 5 percent or more of 
outstanding common shares and who are unaffiiliated 
with management;  
 MTBV = the market to book value ratio; 
 LOSS = coded as 1 if the firm had two or more years of negative 
income, 0 otherwise;   
 CFO = cash flow from operation scaled by lagged total asset; 
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 LEVERG = the proportion of debts to total assets; 
 LNASSET = natural logarithm of total assets; 
 
The control variables chosen are relatively similar to those used by Klein (2002) and 
Bédard et al. (2004), and include INOWN, BLOCK, MTBV, LOSS, CFO, LEVERG 
and LNASSET. Most of the prior studies on earnings manipulation find these variables 
to be significantly correlated with the level of discretionary accruals (e.g. Ferguson et 
al., 2004; Park and Shin, 2004).  
 
Similar to the NAS fees and industry specialist auditor models, INOWN and BLOCK 
are the variables grounded from the agency theory. As the level of insider or 
managerial ownership increases, they are more closely aligned with the interest of the 
external shareholders and thus, less likely to pursue opportunistic behaviour at the 
expenses of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Evidence suggests that 
managers with a higher level of ownership are more likely to increase the earnings 
informativeness and report more reliable earnings (Warfield et al., 1995). This 
situation arise because they perceive themselves as part of the firm‟s structure and 
therefore more responsible for their actions. In agreement with Klein (2002), the 
present study predicts a negative relationship between INOWN and earnings 
management. 
 
From the perspective of agency theory, the institutional investors or BLOCK could be 
an alternative monitoring incentive. According to Monks and Minow (1995), the 
institutional investors have the opportunity, resources, ability to monitor, discipline 
and influence management actions and decisions. When outside ownership is 
concentrated, such significant and collective shareholdings provide institutional 
investors with a greater incentive to collect information, to monitor activities and to 
encourage better performance from the management (Chung et al., 2002). Stated 
differently, as the cumulative shareholdings of the institutional investors increases, the 
more likely they are to constrain the management opportunistic behaviour, which in 
turns resulting lower earnings management. Consistent with this argument and 
following Klein (2002) and Bédard et al (2004), BLOCK is expected to be negatively 
correlated with the levels of opportunistic earnings. 
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MTBV is defined as the market-to-book value ratio and used as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. Skinner and Sloan (2002) and Matsumoto (2002) suggest that the 
managers of firms with higher growth opportunities face greater pressure to meet 
earnings targets. Thus, the higher the market-to-book value of equity ratio, the greater 
the incentive for managers to manipulate earnings. In line with Klein (2002), Collin 
and Kothari (1989) and Graver and Graver (1993), the present study expects that 
MTBV will be positively related to earnings management. 
 
LOSS is a dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if the firm had two or more years of 
negative income, 0 otherwise. The firms with negative income may have greater 
incentive to manage reported earnings in order to survive in the market. Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997: 124) claim that 30% to 40% of firms with slightly negative 
earnings exercise discretion to report positive earning. If the firms report negative 
earnings they may unable to grant loans and the investors are unfovour towards the 
negative earnings. This may suggest that the firms with negative income will engage 
more in earnings management as compared to the firms with positive income, in order 
to grant loans and promote the shareholders interests. Thus, the current study expects 
LOSS to be positively associates to DACC. 
 
CFO is defines as cash flow from the firm‟soperation scaled by lagged total assets.  
The managers with lower cash flow have a higher incentive to manipulate earnings by 
reporting future revenues or by delaying current costs in order to report they are in 
well financial condition (Leuz et al., 2003). This argument suggests a negative 
relationship between CFO and DACC, consistent with the evidence documented in 
Becker et al. (1998). Alternatively, the firms with a higher cash flow may also 
manipulate earnings or unstate the strong performance by creating a reserve for their 
future needs (Leuz et al., 2003). This is supported by Han and Wang‟s study (1998). 
They claim that the petroleum refining firms that benefited from higher oil prices used 
income-decreasing accruals to mitigate the potential of political risk. In addition, 
Frankel et al. (2002) argue that firms with a high cash flow are more likely to beat the 
earnings benchmark. This may suggest a positive relationship between firm 
performance and earnings management, but the mixed arguments offer no direction 
for this variable 
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LEVERG is used as a proxy for debt covenants violation. Press and Weintrop (1990) 
and Duke and Hunt (1990) claim that a firm with higher leverage is more likely to be 
associated with the debt covenants violation.  This is because as the level of debt 
increases, the firm may experience tighter accounting constraints, which in turn 
increases the higher possibility of debt covenant violations. Several studies suggest 
that in order to avoid violating restrictive debt covenants, the higher leveraged firms 
are more likely to choose accounting procedures that support income increasing 
accounting method (Bowen et al., 1981; Dhaliwal et al., 1982).  In particular, DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1994) suggest that the highly leveraged firms have a greater incentive 
to make income increasing discretionary accruals in order to avoid debt covenants 
violation. This may suggest a positive relationship between leverage and earnings 
management. However, DeAngelo et al. (1994) claim that in a time of financial 
distress, firms might engage in contractual renegotiations with lenders in order to 
deliberately reduce reported earnings. Such a situation may suggest a negative 
relationship between leverage and earnings management. Park and Shin (2004) report 
a negative relationship between leverage and earnings management for different 
reasons. They argue that highly leveraged firms might be less likely to manage their 
earnings because they are under the close scrutiny of their lenders. If the lender has 
closely monitored the earnings management activities of such a firm, then their 
earnings management will decrease with financial leverage. As a result of such 
differing arguments, the direction of this variable is not predicted for the current 
study. 
  
LNASSET is a proxy for firm size. The larger the firm size, the higher the likelihood 
that the manager will manipulate the firm‟s earnings .Watt and Zimmerman (1990) 
suggest that larger firms are associated with higher political costs, and that there is 
thus a higher incentive to manipulate reported earnings in order to mitigate potentially 
adverse political actions. Evidence from other prior studies also suggests a positive 
relationship between size and earnings management (Becker et al., 1998; DeFond and 
Park, 1997). However, Park and Shin (2004) provide an alternative argument. They 
claim that larger firms are followed by the external capital market, and are therefore 
less able to hide earnings manipulation because they are closely monitored by the 
press and by analysts. This suggests a negative relationship between LNASSET and 
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DACC. The mixed arguments propose no clear direction regarding the association 
between LNASSET and DACC. 
 
4.6 Data analysis procedures 
To analyse the data, the statistical software STATA 11 is used. The data analysis 
includes descriptive statistics, the correlation matrix, multivariate regression and 
robustness tests. Each of these is now reviewed.     
 
4.6.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Descriptive statistics describes the sample data on a single variable in an organised 
form. It includes the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, 
skewness, kurtosis, first quartile and third quartile. The mean, median, first quartile, 
third quartile and standard deviation measure the central tendency of the variable. The 
skewness and kurtosis explain the shape of the data distribution. Specifically, the 
skewness measures the symmetry of distribution while kurtosis measures the 
peakedness or flatness of the distribution (height), as compared to normal distribution 
(Hair et al., 2010:35-36). In addition to descriptive statistics, when the dependent 
variables are dichotomous and can be regarded as „low‟ or „high‟ groups, univariate 
analyses will be performed to test the mean differences between these two groups.  
 
The correlation among the variables is shown by pairwise correlation matrix. This 
explains the degree of linear association between two variables and ranges from +1 to 
-1, where a correlation of ±1 means that there is a perfect linear relationship between 
the variables. However, according to Hair et al. (2010: 200), a higher degree of 
intercorrelation among the independent variables may cause problems of 
multicollinearity when the correlation coefficient is above ±0.90. Multicolinearity 
may substantially effect the predictive ability of the regression model as well as the 
estimation of the regression coefficients.   
 
4.6.2 Multivariate regression 
Most of the multivariate regression in the prior literature used ordinary least square 
regression (hereafter OLS) to examine the relationship between a single dependent 
variable and several independent variables (predictors). However, there are five 
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fundamental assumptions to be fulfilled in order for the OLS regression model to be 
valid (Chen et al., 2003; Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 2010). These assumptions include:   
(1) Normality - The errors (residuals) should be normally distributed 
(2) Linearity - The relationship between the predictors and the response variable 
should be linear.  
(3) Homoscedasticity - The error variance should be constant  
(4) Independent - The errors associated with one observation should not be 
correlated with the errors of other observations.  
(5) Multicollinearity - There should be no exact collinearity among predictors. 
 
In addition to these assumptions, Chen et al. (2006) suggest that the analyst consider 
any unusual and influential data that may substantially change the estimation of 
coefficients. When these assumptions are violated, the results of OLS regression may 
be distorted and biased (Chen et al., 2003; Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 2010).  
 
Several regression estimators, such as least square regression with robust standard 
error, weighted least square regression (sometimes known as generalized least square 
regression or GLS), robust regression, and quantile regression provide an alternative 
to OLS regression when the assumptions have been violated. For example, when the 
normality assumption has not been fulfilled, and in the presence of moderate outliers, 
robust regression (iteratively reweighted least squares) provides better estimation than 
OLS regression (Hamilton, 1999; Chen et al., 2003). In the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, either the least square estimator with robust 
standard error (Huber-White standard errors) or GLS regressions are able to reweight 
the error variance and thus to correct heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation  (Adkins 
and Hill, 2007: 196; Gujarati, 2003: 387).  In addition to these, non-parametric 
regression, such as quantile regression disregards all the OLS assumptions (Gujarati, 
2003).  
 
In general, the present study finds that most of the OLS assumptions are not 
adequately fulfilled, even though several steps have been taken to conform to these 
assumptions (by using data transformation, for example). In the prior literature, many 
statisticians agree that mild violations of the OLS assumptions are robust and 
unaffected in many situations (Box, 1953; 1954; Glass and Hopkins, 1984; Glass et 
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al., 1972; Newman et al., 1989). Thus, in the main analysis of this study, most models 
have been analysed using OLS regression, except the heteroscedastic models, where 
the use of OLS regression would be questionable. Where the models reveal 
pronounced heteroscedasticity, the analysis will be performed using the least square 
estimator with robust standard error. This regression estimates the standard errors 
using the Huber-White sandwich. It can be interpreted in the same manner as OLS 
regression, but is more precise and efficient than the OLS estimator and able to 
correct heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Adkins and Hill, 2007). In the 
sensitivity analysis, the alternative regression estimators such will be reported as a 
benchmark for comparison. 
 
OLS regression is applicable when the dependent variable is continuous variable. 
However, when the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, OLS regression 
may not be able to fulfil the OLS assumptions and may thus lead to inefficient 
estimation (Pampel, 2000; Menard, 2002). Thus, transforming the dichotomous 
variable into a logit or probit model may overcome the inefficiency. As pointed out by 
Menard (2002: V): 
“… with a dichotomous dependent variable, assumptions of homoskedasticity, 
linearity, and normality are violated, and OLS estimates are inefficient at best. 
The maximum likelihood estimation of a logistic regression overcomes this 
inefficiency, transforming Y (1, 0) into a logit (log of the odds of falling into the 
„1‟ category).” 
 
Therefore, taking into account these circumstances, when the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, multivariate regression is estimated using the heteroskedastic ordinal 
regression as a control for heteroscedasticity (Williams, 2009). In the sensitivity 
analysis, probit regression is used as an alternative estimator. According to Pampel 
(2000: 54) logit and probit regression give essentially similar results and it is up to the 
researcher to choose between these two estimators.  
 
4.6.3 Further analysis and robustness test 
Several tests were performed after the multivariate regression analysis. The purpose 
of these additional tests was to give reasonable assurance that the main findings were 
robust to the various model specifications. The robustness tests include tests for 
multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity, various regression estimators, client size 
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analysis, various definitions of corporate governance characteristics, and tests for 
additional control variables and endogeneity.     
 
4.7 Summary 
The sample population for this thesis is the largest 350 firms listed on the LSE, giving 
an initial sample of 1,400 firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 2008. After 
eliminating regulated firms, firms with missing information and firms not audited by 
the Big 4 auditors, the final sample consisted of 674 and 613 firm-year observations 
for two empirical investigations. The data was gathered from Datastream, FAME, 
Thomson One Banker and the firms‟ annual reports. The computation and description 
of three main groups of hypothesis variables have been explained in this chapter: (1) 
the characteristics of the board of directors and the audit committee (e.g. size, 
composition, expertise and level of activities), (2) the audit quality proxies (e.g. audit 
fees, NAS fees and industry specialist auditors), and (3) earnings management. This 
has been followed by a discussion of the model specifications and related control 
variables. Table 4.6 presents a summary of the variables used in the current study. 
Most of the analyses employed OLS regression and the least square estimator with 
robust standard error (Huber-White sandwich).   
 
Table4.6: Summary of all variables used  
Variable Label Description Data source 
Board of 
directors size 
BRDSIZE the numbers of board‟ members  
during the year; 
Annual 
report 
Board of 
director 
composition 
BDRNED the proportion of non-executive 
directors on board to board size; 
Annual 
report 
Board of 
directors 
expertise 
BRDEXP the proportion of directors with 
accounting experience and financial 
qualification to board size; 
Annual 
report 
Board of 
directors 
meeting 
BRDMEET the number of board meetings during 
the year;  
Annual 
report 
Audit 
committee 
size 
ACSIZE the number of audit committee 
members; 
Annual 
report 
Audit 
committee  
composition 
ACIND coded as 1 if audit committee had 
solely non-executive directors; 0 
otherwise; 
Annual 
report 
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Table4.6 (continued)  
Audit 
committee  
expertise 
ACEXP the proportion of audit committee 
members with accounting experience 
and financial qualification to audit 
committee size; 
Annual 
report 
Audit 
committee 
meeting 
ACMEET the number of audit committee 
meetings during the year; 
Annual 
report 
Audit fees LNAFEE the natural log of audit fees FAME 
NAS fees LNNAF natural log of NAS fees;  FAME 
NAS fees LNTOTALFEES natural log of the sum of audit and 
NAS fees 
FAME 
NAS fees FEERATIO1 the fee ratio of NAS fees to total fees FAME 
NAS fees FEERATIO2 the fee ratio of NAS fees to audit fees FAME 
Industry 
specialist 
auditors 
SPECLST_ 
MSLEADER 
coded as 1 if the auditor earned the 
largest market share in each particular 
industry, 0 if otherwise;  
FAME 
Industry 
specialist 
auditors 
SPECLST_MS30 coded as 1 if the auditor‟ market share 
exceed 30 percent in each particular 
industry, 0 if otherwise; 
FAME 
Industry 
specialist 
auditors 
SPECLST_MS continuous variable which equals to 
the respective auditor‟ market share;   
FAME 
Industry 
specialist 
auditors 
SPECLST_PS continuous variable which equals to 
the respective auditor‟ portfolio share 
FAME 
Industry 
specialist 
auditors 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
continuous variable which equals to 
the compliment between auditor‟ 
market share (SPECLST_MS) and 
portfolio share (SPECLST_PS) 
FAME 
Earnings 
management 
DACCJM discretionary accrual based on Jones 
Model; 
Datastream 
Earnings 
management 
DACCMJM discretionary accruals based on 
Modified Jones model; 
Datastream 
Earnings 
management 
DACCROA discretionary accruals by Kothari et al. 
(2005), including lagged ROA in the  
accrual regression to control for firm 
performance; 
Datastream 
Consolidated 
subsidiaries 
SQSUBS the square root of total consolidated 
subsidiaries; 
Datastream 
Foreign 
subsidiaries 
FORGN the proportion of foreign subsidiaries 
to total consolidated subsidiaries; 
Datastream 
Ratio of 
account 
receivable 
and 
inventory to 
total asset 
RECINV the proportion of total assets in 
account receivable and inventory; 
Datastream 
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Table4.6 (continued)  
Leverage LEVERG the proportion of debts to total 
assets; 
Datastream 
Total asset LNASSET the natural logarithm of total assets; Datastream 
Board of 
director 
ownership 
INOWN the cumulative percentage of total 
shares owned by the directors of a 
firm;  
Annual 
report 
Blockholder 
ownership 
BLOCK the cumulative percentage shares 
ownership of the blockholders who 
hold at least 5 percent or more of 
outstanding common shares and who 
are unaffiiliated with management;  
Annual 
report 
Stock return RETURN the fiscal year total stock return; Datastream 
Number of 
acquisition 
ACQ the number of acquisitions made by 
the company during the year; 
Thomson 
One Banker 
New shares 
or debt for 
cash 
NWFUND coded as 1 if the firm issued new 
shares or debt for cash during the 
year, 0 otherwise; 
Annual 
report 
New external 
director 
NEWDIR coded as 1 if the firm appoint new 
external director during the year, 0 
otherwise; 
Annual 
report 
Restructuring RESTR coded as 1 if the restructuring 
program has occurred during the 
year, 0 otherwise; 
Annual 
report 
New debt 
and equity 
NWFUNDRATIO proceed from new debt and equity 
issuances/ total assets; 
Annual 
report and 
Datastream 
Return on 
assets 
ROA return on assets; Datastream 
Foreign sale FORGNSALE the proportion of the firm‟ foreign 
sales. 
Datastream 
Growth MTBV the market to book value ratio; Datastream 
Firm 
performance 
LOSS coded as 1 if the firm had two or 
more years of negative income, 0 
otherwise;   
Datastream 
Cash flow CFO cash flow from operation scaled by 
lagged total asset; 
Datastream 
Liquidity LIQ ratio of current assets divided by 
current liabilities;  
Datastream 
Sales growth GROWTH growth rate in sales over the 
previous fiscal year; 
Datastream 
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS: THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, AUDIT 
COMMITTEE AND AUDIT QUALITY 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the results for the first empirical analysis of the characteristics 
of boards of directors and audit committees and their relationship to audit quality. 
There are three proxies of audit quality to be examined, namely the audit fees, the 
NAS fees and the use of industry specialist auditors.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: the next section presents the descriptive statistics 
and correlation matrix. This is followed by a separate section on research design, 
multivariate results and a sensitivity analysis of each proxy. The last section 
summarises and concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1 present the descriptive statistics of three measures of audit quality- audit 
fees (LNAFEE), NAS or auditor independence measures (LNNAF, LNTOTALFEES, 
FEERATIO1, FEERATIO2) and auditor industry specialist measures 
(SPECLST_MSLEADER, SPECLST_MS30, SPECLST_MS, SPECLST_PS, 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED, the hypothesis variables (BRDSIZE, BRDNED, BRDEXP, 
BRDMEET, ACSIZE, ACIND, ACEXP, ACMEET) and the related control variables 
containing mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum, skewness and 
kurtosis. The following are important descriptive statistics to highlight.   
 
The mean (median) of audit fees and NAS fees for 674 firm-years are £1.466 million 
(£0.805 million) and £1.296 million (£0.600 million) respectively. The mean (median) 
of total fees is £2.762 million (£1.521 million). The NAS fees captured almost 50% of 
total audit fees. In a previous UK study, O‟ Sullivan (2000) reported that the mean 
(median) of audit fees and NAS fees for the 402 largest firms in the fiscal year of 
1992 are £0.638 million (£0.279 million) and £0.320 million (£0.144 million) 
respectively. As compared to O‟Sullivan (2000), audit fees have increased about 
130% and the NAS fees of UK firms have grown by about 305%, suggesting the 
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importance of NAS as an alternative source of income for auditors in addition to 
auditing services. These figures support the argument that NAS seems to be 
associated with luxury income as it contains a higher profit margin than audit fees 
(Lee, 2008). The mean (median) ratio of NAS fees to total fees (FEERATIO1) and 
ratio of NAS fees to total audit fees (FEERATIO2) are 0.418 (0.400) and 1.0810 
(0.667) respectively. Under the SPECLST_MSLEADER and SPECLST_MS30 
definitions, 40.6% and 50% of firms, respectively, have engaged the services of an 
industry specialist auditor.  
 
For board of director variables, the average board size is 9, which is relatively 
consistent with the figure reported in Peasnell et al. (2005) who report that the average 
board size was 8. The average proportion of independent non-executive directors on 
boards is 46%.
46
 The average proportion of boards of directors with accounting or 
financial qualifications and experience is 35% and the average frequency of board 
meetings is 8 times a year. This can be compared to the US studies of Abbott et al. 
(2003) and Carcello et al. (2002) who report that the proportions of independent non-
executive directors on boards are 68% and 75% respectively, and that on average 
board meetings are held 7 times a year.
47
 This comparison implies that firms in the US 
are more likely to be dominated by independent non-executive directors, while in the 
UK, board members have an almost balanced representation of executive and 
independent non-executive directors. The board meeting frequencies are relatively 
similar. 
 
With regard to audit committee‟s variables, the mean (median) audit committee size is 
3.635 (3.000). 72.2% of the samples report that their audit committees are made up of 
solely independent non-executive directors with an average of 39% of them having 
accounting and financial expertise; or at least 93% of the samples had one member 
with financial expertise. The average frequency of audit committee meetings is 4 
                                                          
46
 Using the 1992 data from 402 of the largest UK firms, O‟Sullivan (2000) reports that the percentage 
of non-executive directors on boards was 41%. Similarly, Peasnell et al (2005), report that the 
percentage of non-executive director on boards in their sample was 43%. However, both studies do not 
mention whether they include the grey or affiliated directors. 
47
 Abbott et al. (2003) and Carcello et al. (2002) define the independent non-executive directors as non-
employee directors while the present study measures the independence of non-executive directors more 
specifically using the definition outlined in the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). 
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times a year. In US, Abbott et al. (2003) report that 75% of their samples had audit 
committees that were composed of solely independent non-executive directors and 
80% had at least one financial expert.
48
 This suggests that the proportion of firms with 
a percentage of solely independent audit committee members are relatively similar in 
the US and the UK but that the proportion of firms that have at least one audit 
committee equipped with financial expertise in the UK are relatively higher than is 
reported in the US. One of the possible reasons for this is because the sample 
represented in this study comprised current data where the board and audit committee 
system in the UK is already established, following the recommendations set out in the 
UK Combined Code in July 2003.  
 
The mean (median) of the cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the director 
(INOWN) and the blockholders (BLOCK) are 4.201% (0.230%) and 23.159% and 
(20.64%) respectively. In an earlier UK study, O‟Sullivan (2000) reported that the 
mean (median) of shares owned by the directors was 5.55% (0.291%), while the 
figures for shares owned by external shareholders were about 31.292% (21.640%).
49
 
The mean (median) of INOWN is relatively similar but the mean (median) of BLOCK 
is relatively lower than reported by O‟Sullivan (2000). The inconsistent mean 
(median) may be due to different definitions of variables. The present study defines 
BLOCK as the blockholders holding at least at 5% of the shares and O‟Sullivan 
(2000) defines this at 3% of the shares. Allowing for the time difference from the 
previous UK study, it shows that there was not much change in the directors‟ 
ownership pattern.  
 
The mean (median) of total assets is 4,337 (1,379) millions. In natural logarithm form, 
the mean (median) of LNASSET is 6.174 (6.129) of which 29.7% are represented by 
the account receivable and inventories. The mean (median) of FORGNSALE is 45.631 
(50.205), which captured nearly half of the total sales made by the 674 firms. 
 
                                                          
48
 Abbott et al (2003) examined data 2001. 
49
 O‟Sullivan split the directors‟ shares into executive and nonexecutive directors and the block 
shareholders into institutional and external shareholders. To make a comparison the present study adds 
the mean and median of the respective variables.  
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The mean (median) for leverage is 64% (64.2), which is relatively higher than that 
reported in Australia. Chen et al. (2005) report that the mean (median) leverage of 458 
Australian firms is 48.84% (44.42%). The higher leverage figures may suggest that 
the firms in the UK have higher risk levels than firms in Australia. In terms of firm‟s 
performance, the mean (median) of ROA is 9.744 (8.34).  
 
The mean (median) of fiscal year stock returns is 12.853 (7.477). For corporate 
acquisition (ACQ) the mean (median) is 1.195 (1.000), approximately and on average 
every firm will acquire one firm. Previously, Fifth (1997) reported that, for the 500 
largest British industrial firms in 1993 (listed firms ranked in The Times 1000), the 
means of RETURN and ACQ are 0.43 and 0.13 respectively. While Abbott et al. 
(2003b) reported that the means of these variables are 0.0415 and 0.2402 respectively. 
Compared to prior studies, the means of RETURN and ACQ that are documented in 
the present study are relatively higher. This difference may be due the sample 
variations. The firms listed in The Times 1000 and the sample examined by Abbott et 
al (2003b) probably contained both the largest and the smaller firms. The present 
study examined the largest 350 firms listed in LSE, thus, on average, the largest firms 
may have a more stable stock market return and a higher number of acquisitions than 
smaller firms.  
 
NEWFUND, NEWDIR and RESTR are dichotomous variables. These variables are 
associated with special events that demand NAS. The means of these variables are 
0.922, 0.472 and 0.409 respectively. Specifically, there are 642 firm-years in which 
new shares or debt for cash was issued, 318 firm-years in which new directors were 
appointed and 276 firm-years in which a restructuring program took place. Fifth 
(1997) and Abbott et al. (2003b) reported that the means of these variables are 
0.11and 0.0851for ISSUE, 0.09 and 0.0408 for NEWDIR, and 0.05 and 0.0887 for 
RESTR respectively.  
 
The mean and median of the total number of consolidated subsidiaries are 26.866 and 
20 respectively, and about 52.2% of them are foreign subsidiaries. The previous UK 
and Australian studies, O‟Sullivan (2000) and Chen et al (2005) report that the overall 
numbers of subsidiaries in their samples are 23.686 and 27.72 respectively. This 
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suggests that the levels of firms‟ complexities in the UK and Australia are relatively 
similar.  
 
As shown in the skewness and kurtosis columns in Table 5.2, most of the variables are 
not normally distributed. The normal distribution takes a value of 0, and values above 
and below 0 denote departures from normality. To reach the normal distribution, 
several variables are been transformed (e.g. LNAFEE, SQSUBS, LNASSET) using the 
natural log and the square root. One possibility that violates the normality assumption 
may cause the heteroscedasticity problem. Diagnostics on the heteroscedasticity 
problem will be provided in a later section. 
 
5.3 Correlation matrix 
The correlation matrix for all the variables used in the audit quality models is 
presented in Table 5.2. The hypotheses variables and related control variables are 
measured by three proxies of audit quality, namely audit fees (LNAFEE), auditor 
independence measurements (LNNAF, LNTOTALFEES, FEERATIO1 and 
FEERATIO2) and auditor industry specialist measurements (SPECLST_MSLEADER, 
SPECLST_MS30, SPECLST_MS, SPECLST_PS and SPECLST_WEIGHTED). Higher 
correlations among audit quality measurements are always expected since they are 
highly interrelated. Only one measure of audit quality will be included in a single 
empirical test so that this higher correlation does not necessarily influence the 
empirical results. 
 
In general, the overall correlation matrix shows that each of the audit quality measures 
with all variables (i.e. board of directors, audit committee and related control 
variables) are moderately inter-correlated with one and another except for variables 
LNAFEE and LNTOTALFEES with LNASSET (correlation coefficients of 74.6% and 
72.5% respectively) and FORGN with FORGNSALE (correlation coefficients of 
71.3%), which have the largest correlation coefficients above 50%.
50
 The main 
concern arising from the largest correlations is that they may indicate a 
multicollinearity problem in the empirical model. Diagnostics on the multicollinearity 
                                                          
50
 The highest correlation coefficient between FORGN and FORGNSALE is not critical because these 
variables are associated with different model specifications. FORGN is one of the control variables for 
the audit fees model while FORGNSALE is a control variable for the auditor industry specialist model. 
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that is associated with each empirical model will be provided later in the section on 
additional analyses. 
 
LNAFEE is significantly correlated with all board and audit committee variables 
except for BRDMEET. The range of the correlation coefficient is between -8.9% and 
46.7%. LNAFEE is significantly and positively correlated with BRDSIZE and 
BRDNED but negatively correlated with BRDEXP. A positive correlation between 
BRDNED and LNAFEE is consistent with Abbott et al. (2003a) and Carcello et al.‟s 
(2002) studies. LNAFEE is significantly and positively correlated with ACSIZE, 
ACIND and ACMEET (correlation coefficients of 41.4%, 10.6% and 33.7% 
respectively), suggesting that the firms with a larger audit committee made up solely 
of independent members and having more meetings are correlated with higher audit 
fees. These correlations are consistent with the findings of Abbott et al. (2003a).
51
 
However, the ACEXP is found to be negatively correlated with LNAFEE (at p<0.05), 
and this is consistent with the correlation reported by Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2009).  
 
LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES are found to be significantly correlated with most of the 
board and audit committee variables when compared to FEERATIO1 and 
FEERATIO2. LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES are positively correlated at p<0.01 with 
BRDSIZE and BRDNED. Their correlation coefficients are 31.0% and 46.6% 
respectively. A positive correlation between LNNAF and BRDNED is consistent with 
O‟Sullivan (2000). BRDEXP is significantly and negatively correlated with LNNAF 
and LNTOTALFEES (correlation coefficients are -10.6% and -16.7% respectively), 
indicating that the firms with a higher proportion of board members with financial 
expertise are likely to report lower NAS fees and total fees. BRDMEET is 
insignificantly correlated with LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES. None of the board of 
director variables is significantly correlated with FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2. 
ACSIZE and ACIND are significantly and positively correlated with LNNAF and 
LNTOTALFEES but ACSIZE is found to be negatively correlated with FEERATIO2 
 
                                                          
51
Except for audit committee size, Abbott et al. (2003a) was not examined this variable.  
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The correlation coefficients of the board and audit committee variables with the 
auditor industry specialist measures are mixed, depending on how the auditor industry 
specialist data has been computed. They either marginally correlated in the opposite 
directions or insignificantly correlated with board and audit committee variables. For 
example, BRDSIZE is found to be significantly and positively correlated with all the 
auditor industry specialist measures except for SPECLST_PS, which is found to be 
insignificantly correlated with BRDSIZE. BRDEXP is negatively correlated with 
SPECLST_MS, SPECLST_MSLEADER and SPECLST_MS30 (correlation coefficients 
are -10.0%, -14.4%, -7.8% respectively) but it is positively correlated with 
SPECLST_PS (the correlation coefficient is 7.8%). BRDNED is insignificantly 
correlated with all the auditor industry specialist measures. For audit committee 
variables, ACSIZE is significantly and negatively correlated with SPECLST_PS but it 
is positively correlated with SPECLST_PS, SPECLST_MSLEADER and 
SPECLST_MS30. ACIND is found to be positively and significantly correlated only 
with SPECLST_PS, SPECLST_WEIGHTED, and SPECLST_MS30. ACEXP and 
ACMEET are positively correlated with SPECLST_PS. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics (N=674) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Audit fees (£‟000) 1466.024 805.500 1920.880 70.000 17000.000 3.320 18.201 
NAS fees (£‟000) 1296.004 600.000 2058.770 0.000 25000.000 4.579 37.131 
Total fees (£‟000) 2762.028 1521.000 3631.154 117.000 30000.000 3.279 17.411 
LNAFEE 2.920 2.906 0.456 1.845 4.230 0.203 2.606 
LNNAF 2.699 2.778 0.729 0.000 4.397 -1.309 6.406 
LNTOTALFEES 3.189 3.182 0.466 2.068 4.477 0.137 2.635 
FGEERATIO1 0.418 0.400 0.199 0.000 0.917 0.212 2.589 
FEERATIO2 1.080 0.667 1.307 0.000 11.113 3.661 21.792 
SPECLST_MS 0.349 0.321 0.215 0.015 0.903 0.704 2.835 
SPECLST_PS 0.170 0.133 0.147 0.003 0.537 1.037 3.239 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED 0.064 0.045 0.064 0.000 0.228 1.172 3.281 
SPECLST_MSLEADER 0.407 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.381 1.145 
SPECLST_MS30 0.540 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 -0.161 1.026 
BRDSIZE 9.202 9.000 2.299 5.000 19.000 1.101 4.377 
BRDNED 0.457 0.455 0.116 0.052 0.778 -0.337 3.466 
BRDEXP 0.352 0.333 0.142 0.083 0.857 0.529 2.959 
BRDMEET 8.637 8.000 2.584 3.000 21.000 0.972 5.392 
ACSIZE 3.635 3.000 0.838 3.000 8.000 1.528 6.015 
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
Variables Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
ACIND 0.722 1.000 0.448 0.000 1.000 -0.994 1.988 
ACEXP 0.388 0.333 0.209 0.000 2.000 1.089 8.109 
ACMEET 4.009 4.000 1.212 2.000 10.000 1.483 6.563 
INOWN 4.201 0.231 12.221 0.002 147.525 5.076 39.416 
BLOCK 23.159 20.64 16.081 0.000 76.120 0.832 3.550 
LEVERG 0.640 0.642 0.217 0.056 2.055 0.773 7.215 
RETURN 12.852 7.477 16.053 -0.939 179.763 3.448 24.270 
SQSUBS 4.702 4.472 2.076 0.000 17.321 1.189 6.434 
FORGN 0.524 0.632 0.338 0.000 0.987 -0.358 1.618 
LNASSET 6.174 6.129 0.567 4.516 8.122 0.533 3.334 
FORGNSALE 45.631 50.205 35.853 0.000 215.62 0.137 2.204 
RECINV 0.293 0.264 0.204 0.003 1.022 1.105 4.295 
ACQ 1.196 1.000 1.196 0.000 16.000 3.564 22.070 
NWFUND 0.922 1.000 0.267 0.000 1.000 -3.169 11.045 
NWFUNDRATIO 0.132 0.035 0.500 0.000 9.511 14.757 88.208 
NEWDIR 0.472 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.113 1.013 
RESTR 0.409 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.368 1.135 
ROA 9.744 8.34 9.118 -54.44 70.08 0.868 14.755 
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
LNAFEE= the natural log of audit fees; LNNAF=natural log of NAS fees; LNTOTALFEES=natural log of the sum of audit and NAS fees; 
FEERATIO1= the fee ratio of NAS fees to total fees; FEERATIO2= the fee ratio of NAS fees to audit fees; SPECLST_MS= continuous 
variable which equals to the respective auditor‟ market share;  SPECLST_PS= continuous variable which equals to the respective 
auditor‟ portfolio share; SPECLST_WEIGHTED= continuous variable which equals to the compliment between auditor‟ market share 
(SPECLST_MS) and portfolio share (SPECLST_PS); SPECLST_MSLEADER= coded as 1 if the auditor earned the largest market share 
in each particular industry, 0 if otherwise; SPECLST_PSTOP3= coded as 1 if the incumbent auditor earned the highest top three portfolio 
shares and 0 if otherwise, and SPECLST_MS30= coded as 1 if the auditor‟ market share exceed 30 percent in each particular industry, 0 
if otherwise ; BRDSIZE=the numbers of board‟ members  during the year; BDRNED=the proportion of non-executive directors on board 
to board size; BRDEXP=the proportion of directors with accounting experience and financial qualification to board size; BRDMEET= the 
number of board meetings during the year; ACSIZE= the number of audit committee members; ACIND= coded as 1 if audit committee 
had solely non-executive directors; 0 otherwise; ACEXP= the proportion of audit committee members with accounting experience and 
financial qualification to audit committee size; ACMEET= the number of audit committee meetings during the year; INOWN=the 
cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the directors of a firm; BLOCK= the cumulative percentage shares ownership of the 
blockholders who hold at least 5 percent or more of outstanding common shares and who are unaffiiliated with management; 
LEVERG=the proportion of debts to total assets; RETURN= the fiscal year total stock return; SQSUBS= the square root of total 
consolidated subsidiaries; FORGN=the proportion of foreign subsidiaries to total consolidated subsidiaries; LNASSET= the natural 
logarithm of total assets; FORGNSALE= proportion of the firm‟ foreign sales; RECINV= the proportion of total assets in account 
receivable and inventory; ACQ= the number of acquisitions made by the company during the year; NWFUND = coded as 1 if the firm 
issued new shares or debt for cash during the year, 0 otherwise; NWFUNDRATIO= proceed from new debt and equity issuances/ total 
assets; NEWDIR=coded as 1 if the firm appoint new external director during the year, 0 otherwise; RESTR= coded as 1 if the 
restructuring program has occurred during the year; ROA= return on assets. 
 
  
163 
 
Table 5.2: Pairwise correlation matrix (N=674) 
Variable A B C D E F G H I J K 
A LNAFEE 1.000           
B LNNAF 0.552 1.000          
C LNTOTALFEES 0.919 0.756 1.000         
D FEERATIO1 -0.113 0.637 0.273 1.000        
E FEERATIO2 -0.165 0.413 0.211 0.805 1.000       
F SPECLST_MS 0.244 0.140 0.234 0.000 -0.023 1.000      
G SPECLST_PS 0.172 0.057 0.128 -0.099 -0.091 0.161 1.000     
H SPECLST_WEIGHTED 0.212 0.109 0.183 -0.057 -0.065 0.504 0.883 1.000    
I SPECLST_MSLEADER 0.206 0.098 0.190 -0.018 -0.038 0.799 0.395 0.657 1.000   
J SPECLST_MS30 0.271 0.147 0.241 -0.039 -0.076 0.776 0.400 0.628 0.764 1.000  
K BRDSIZE 0.475 0.310 0.466 0.017 -0.008 0.261 -0.063 0.077 0.231 0.224 1.000 
L BRDNED 0.467 0.310 0.453 0.013 -0.021 0.019 0.026 0.015 0.037 0.058 0.062 
M BRDEXP -0.167 -0.106 -0.167 -0.011 -0.005 -0.100 0.077 -0.025 -0.144 -0.078 -0.362 
N BRDMEET -0.022 -0.019 -0.003 0.033 0.052 -0.110 0.098 0.034 -0.043 -0.027 -0.138 
O ACSIZE 0.414 0.207 0.375 -0.054 -0.085 0.145 -0.098 -0.025 0.126 0.131 0.451 
P ACIND 0.106 0.084 0.096 -0.012 -0.027 0.039 0.115 0.087 0.027 0.080 -0.012 
Q ACEXP -0.089 -0.050 -0.078 0.014 0.039 -0.031 0.089 0.044 -0.052 0.036 -0.066 
R ACMEET 0.337 0.271 0.361 0.090 0.069 -0.027 -0.016 -0.022 0.004 -0.040 0.230 
S INOWN -0.164 -0.034 -0.120 0.074 0.140 -0.083 -0.007 0.029 -0.043 -0.104 -0.025 
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
Variable A B C D E F G H I J K 
T BLOCK -0.172 -0.060 -0.126 0.078 0.134 -0.023 -0.103 -0.092 -0.031 -0.053 0.010 
U LEVERG 0.200 0.090 0.178 -0.044 -0.039 0.069 0.105 0.118 0.052 0.099 0.092 
V RETURN -0.011 0.015 -0.017 0.006 -0.034 0.444 -0.062 -0.097 -0.082 -0.090 -0.014 
W SQSUBS 0.406 0.226 0.364 -0.061 -0.097 0.083 0.227 0.199 0.085 0.122 0.203 
X FORGN  0.481 0.253 0.421 -0.113 -0.103 0.084 0.167 0.116 0.072 0.084 0.179 
Y LNASSET 0.746 0.458 0.725 0.016 -0.046 0.235 -0.051 0.067 0.192 0.218 0.504 
Z FORGNSALE  0.470 0.257 0.425 -0.070 -0.077 0.070 0.189 0.136 0.059 0.120 0.174 
AA RECINV -0.172 -0.172 -0.200 -0.099 -0.043 -0.106 0.028 0.002 -0.128 -0.124 -0.155 
AB ACQ 0.246 0.111 0.218 -0.055 -0.058 0.062 0.155 0.131 0.082 0.120 0.120 
AC NWFUND 0.126 0.053 0.084 -0.078 -0.119 -0.053 -0.016 -0.055 -0.089 -0.066 0.028 
AD NWFUNDRATIO -0.030 0.000 -0.008 0.038 0.057 -0.054 -0.087 -0.083 -0.046 -0.072 -0.043 
AE NEWDIR  0.065 0.078 0.086 0.060 0.047 0.077 -0.067 -0.024 0.029 0.049 0.098 
AF RESTR 0.251 0.216 0.265 0.068 0.014 -0.037 0.003 -0.028 -0.093 -0.006 0.111 
AG ROA -0.096 -0.044 -0.103 -0.013 -0.007 0.014 0.025 0.009 0.019 -0.013 -0.056 
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
Variable L M N O P Q R S T U V 
L BRDNED 1.000           
M BRDEXP 0.003 1.000          
N BRDMEET 0.139 0.010 1.000         
O ACSIZE 0.363 -0.211 -0.012 1.000        
P ACIND 0.446 0.086 0.121 0.023 1.000       
Q ACEXP -0.045 0.586 -0.041 -0.229 0.080 1.000      
R ACMEET 0.263 -0.036 0.220 0.160 0.024 -0.059 1.000     
S INOWN -0.170 -0.025 -0.192 -0.100 -0.091 0.003 -0.133 1.000    
T BLOCK -0.121 0.012 -0.093 -0.129 -0.065 0.073 -0.092 0.064 1.000   
U LEVERG 0.074 0.024 0.182 0.049 0.087 0.024 0.089 -0.168 -0.072 1.000  
V RETURN 0.079 0.089 -0.019 0.036 0.054 0.101 -0.042 -0.005 0.040 0.078 1.000 
W SQSUBS 0.070 0.055 -0.028 0.134 0.036 0.004 0.094 -0.055 -0.043 0.089 0.009 
X FORGN  0.203 0.019 -0.145 0.127 0.066 0.023 0.148 0.038 0.018 -0.109 0.047 
Y LNASSET 0.432 -0.218 0.034 0.416 0.053 -0.115 0.336 -0.149 -0.227 0.059 -0.092 
Z FORGNSALE  0.168 -0.023 -0.173 0.139 -0.037 0.056 0.128 0.022 -0.023 -0.140 -0.016 
AA RECINV -0.087 0.044 -0.037 -0.098 0.066 -0.017 -0.126 0.014 -0.040 -0.001 0.050 
AB ACQ 0.103 -0.011 0.016 0.003 0.099 0.022 -0.046 -0.060 -0.103 0.082 0.022 
AC NWFUND -0.008 -0.005 0.035 0.000 -0.043 -0.085 0.030 -0.153 -0.018 0.038 -0.045 
AD NWFUNDRATIO -0.019 0.054 0.028 -0.047 0.006 0.043 0.023 -0.000 0.022 -0.035 -0.022 
AE NEWDIR  0.147 0.052 -0.015 0.142 0.015 0.057 0.050 -0.057 -0.035 0.031 0.008 
AF RESTR 0.131 0.002 -0.024 0.125 0.044 -0.008 0.151 -0.105 -0.039 0.060 0.097 
AG ROA -0.075 0.048 -0.060 -0.084 -0.065 0.051 0.022 0.063 0.049 -0.087 -0.024 
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
Variable W X Y Z AA AB AC AD AE AF AG 
W SQSUBS 1.000           
X FORGN  0.346 1.000          
Y LNASSET 0.141 0.119 1.000         
Z FORGNSALE  0.298 0.713 0.137 1.000        
AA RECINV 0.012 -0.037 -0.260 -0.060 1.000       
AB ACQ 0.071 0.112 0.162 0.078 0.028 1.000      
AC NWFUND 0.064 0.093 0.103 0.058 -0.004 0.083 1.000     
AD NWFUNDRATIO -0.013 0.044 -0.063 0.080 -0.069 -0.003 0.085 1.000    
AE NEWDIR  0.032 -0.010 0.077 -0.001 -0.026 0.043 0.039 0.034 1.000   
AF RESTR 0.194 0.152 0.150 0.135 -0.011 -0.005 0.083 0.022 0.059 1.000  
AG ROA 0.028 0.112 -0.211 0.095 -0.12 -0.050 -0.061 0.102 -0.004 -0.101 1.000 
LNAFEE= the natural log of audit fees; LNNAF=natural log of NAS fees; LNTOTALFEES=natural log of the sum of audit and NAS fees; FEERATIO1= the fee 
ratio of NAS fees to total fees; FEERATIO2= the fee ratio of NAS fees to audit fees; SPECLST_MS= continuous variable which equals to the respective 
auditor‟ market share;  SPECLST_PS= continuous variable which equals to the respective auditor‟ portfolio share; SPECLST_WEIGHTED= continuous 
variable which equals to the compliment between auditor‟ market share (SPECLST_MS) and portfolio share (SPECLST_PS); SPECLST_MSLEADER= coded 
as 1 if the auditor earned the largest market share in each particular industry, 0 if otherwise; SPECLST_PSTOP3= coded as 1 if the incumbent auditor earned 
the highest top three portfolio shares and 0 if otherwise, and SPECLST_MS30= coded as 1 if the auditor‟ market share exceed 30 percent in each particular 
industry, 0 if otherwise ; BRDSIZE=the numbers of board‟ members  during the year; BDRNED=the proportion of non-executive directors on board to board 
size; BRDEXP=the proportion of directors with accounting experience and financial qualification to board size; BRDMEET= the number of board meetings 
during the year; ACSIZE= the number of audit committee members; ACIND= coded as 1 if audit committee had solely non-executive directors; 0 otherwise; 
ACEXP= the proportion of audit committee members with accounting experience and financial qualification to audit committee size; ACMEET= the number of 
audit committee meetings during the year; INOWN=the cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the directors of a firm; BLOCK= the cumulative 
percentage shares ownership of the blockholders who hold at least 5 percent or more of outstanding common shares and who are unaffiiliated with 
management; LEVERG=the proportion of debts to total assets; RETURN= the fiscal year total stock return; SQSUBS= the square root of total consolidated 
subsidiaries; FORGN=the proportion of foreign subsidiaries to total consolidated subsidiaries; LNASSET= the natural logarithm of total assets; FORGNSALE= 
proportion of the firm‟ foreign sales; RECINV= the proportion of total assets in account receivable and inventory; ACQ= the number of acquisitions made by 
the company during the year; NWFUND = coded as 1 if the firm issued new shares or debt for cash during the year, 0 otherwise; NWFUNDRATIO= proceed 
from new debt and equity issuances/ total assets; NEWDIR=coded as 1 if the firm appoint new external director during the year, 0 otherwise; RESTR= coded as 
1 if the restructuring program has occurred during the year; ROA= return on assets. Correlation in bold are significant at p<0.01, in italic are significant at 
p<0.05 and underline at p<0.10. 
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5.4 ANALYSIS I: AUDIT FEES 
5.4.1 Multivariate regression 
Table 5.3 presents the results for the audit fees model for each year and for the pooled 
sample. The F-statistics for all models are significant at p<0.01, suggesting that the 
models are statistically valid. The adjusted R
2
 for all models ranges between 77.2% 
and 79.5%, showing that the models have a higher explanatory power and this is 
consistent with prior studies on audit fees (Simunic, 1980; Abbott et al., 2003a). 
As expected the BRDNED is significant and positively related to audit fees across all 
models, suggesting the firms with a higher proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on board are likely to have higher audit fees. This result confirms the results 
from Carcello et al. (2002) and Abbot et al. (2003a) who argued that independent non-
executive directors on boards demand an additional and extensive audit effort in order 
to certify their monitoring function, thus increasing the audit fees and the perceived 
audit quality, primarily for the purpose of safeguarding their interests. Compared to 
the previous UK studies by O‟Sullivan (2000) and Adelopo (2010), the primary 
evidence suggests that in terms of „independent‟ characteristics, it seems to be 
insensitive in differentiating the types of non-executive director.
52
 This result is 
consistent with prior UK studies. 
 
The other hypotheses variables such as BRDSIZE, BRDEXP, BRDMEET, ACSIZE, 
ACIND, ACEXP and ACMEET are either marginally significant in the opposite 
predictions or insignificant with audit fees in year-by-year or pooled samples. 
BRDSIZE is insignificant with audit fees in all models. However, in the year 2008 and 
in the pooled sample, the results contradict those of Carcello et al. (2002). BRDMEET 
and BRDEXP are significantly and negatively related to audit fees, suggesting that 
boards of directors that are equipped with financial expertise and that have a higher 
frequency of board meetings are associated with lower audit fees. These results may 
be influenced by the supply-based perspective (Tsui et al., 2001; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2009). There is a possibility that auditors value the financial expertise 
                                                          
52
 In O‟Sullivan (2000), he defines the proportion of non-executive directors as the percentage of 
outsider members, while in Adelopo (2010) the independent non-executive directors are defined as 
those directors with no business or contractual relationships with the firms. Both studies suggest a 
positive relationship between non-executive directors and audit fees. In this thesis the „independent‟ 
characteristic is assigned on the basis of the criteria outlined in the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010). 
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and the active involvement of board members, and perceive these characteristics to be 
associated with a more effective monitoring function of the board, consequently 
reduce their risk assessment, audit effort and fees accordingly.  
 
ACSIZE is significant and positively related to audit fees in the year 2005 at 
p<0.10(t=1.78). This weak relationship is also shown in other models and suggests 
that there is no evidence that it is linked with audit fees. The other audit committee 
characteristics (ACIND, ACMEET, and ACEXP) are insignificant with audit fees in all 
models. The insignificant findings on these variables contradict the findings of Abbott 
et al. (2003a) but are relatively similar to Carcello et al. (2002). The mixed findings 
may be due variation in the nature of the sample selections. Abbott et al. (2003) 
examine an overall sample of firms that filed their statements with SEC, which 
contains both smaller and larger firms. On the other hand, Carcello et al. (2002) 
examine a sample of Fortune 1000 firms which basically contains larger firms than 
are found in the sample population examined by Abbott et al. (2003a). The nature of 
the sample examined by Carcello et al (2002) was similar to that which has been 
analysed in this study. Thus, it is reasonable to expect similar findings to Carcello et 
al. (2002). 
 
The results for all the control variables are significant in the predicted directions 
except for RECINV, which is insignificant with audit fees across all models. There is a 
significant positive relationship between audit fees and the complexity of a firms‟ 
operations (SQSUBS and FORGN) at p<0.01. As predicted, the firms with a higher 
number of consolidated subsidiaries and foreign subsidiaries are likely to have higher 
audit fees since the auditors need to put more audit effort and audit hours into dealing 
with complex operations, thus increasing the audit fees. These results are consistent 
with Simunic (1980), Craswell and Francis (1999), Abbott et al. (2003a) and Carcello 
et al. (2002). 
 
LEVERG is positive and significantly related to audit fees at p<0.01, suggesting that 
auditors perceive that the firms with higher leverage are associated with a higher 
litigation risk, which may lead to more frequent audit failures, due to their poor 
financial condition. Thus, an auditor may increase their audit effort and fees for these 
firms (i.e. higher leverage firms) in order to compensate their litigation risk. This 
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result is consistent with the findings of prior studies (Simunic and Stein, 1996; Menon 
and Williams, 2001, Pratt and Stice, 1994). 
 
The firm size (LNASSET) is positive and significant with audit fees at p<0.01. This 
may suggest that as a firm‟s size increases, auditors enlarge the audit scope and 
extend the audit hours, which in turn results in higher audit fees. This result is 
consistent with the results from Simunic (1980), Abbott et al. (2003a) and Carcello et 
al. (2002).   
 
In summary, the result from the multivariate regression is consistent with the 
proposition of agency theory, which suggests that independent non-executive 
directors on boards are associated with effective monitoring. They complement their 
monitoring function by demanding a higher quality audit from an external auditor in 
terms of a more extensive audit effort and a higher number of audit hours, resulting in 
higher audit fees and a higher perceived audit quality. The other corporate governance 
variables seem to provide inconsistent results or suggest insignificant relationships 
with audit fees across the samples by year and within the pooled sample. In particular, 
the effect of the monitoring role of an independent board outweighs the other effective 
characteristics of a board and audit committee. Therefore, there is no consistent 
evidence that board size, the financial expertise and meeting frequency of boards, and 
all audit committee characteristics (e.g. size, composition of independent members, 
financial expertise and meeting frequency) are associated with increased audit fees. 
The results of all the control variables are significant in the predicted directions and 
consistent with the prior studies, except for RECINV, which suggest that it has no 
relationship to audit fees.  
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Table 5.3: The result of multivariate regression for audit fees  model 
LNAFEE = α
0
 + β
1
BRDSIZE + β
2
BRDNED + β
3
BRDEXP + β4BRDMEET + β5ACSIZE + 
β
6
ACIND + β
7
ACEXP + β
8
ACMEET + β
9
SQSUBS + β
10
FORGN + β
11
RECINV + 
β
12
LEVERG + β
13
LNASSET   + ε    
Variables  
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
2005 
(N=167) 
2006 
(N=181) 
2007 
(N=181) 
2008 (N=145) 
Pooled 
(N=674) 
Intercept 
-1.152 
 (-5.10)*** 
-0.894 
 (-3.92)*** 
-0.807  
(-3.72)*** 
-0.629  
(-2.60)*** 
-0.882  
(-8.04)*** 
BRDSIZE  
0.001  
(0.07) 
0.008  
(0.73) 
0.015  
(1.43) 
-0.101  
(-1.00) 
0.004  
(0.72) 
BRDNED 
0.526  
(2.62)*** 
0.421  
(1.97)** 
0.419  
(2.16)** 
0.443  
(2.10)** 
0.445  
(4.52)*** 
BRDEXP 
-0.110  
(-0.68) 
-0.174  
(-1.04) 
-0.130  
(-0.91) 
-0.285  
(-1.70)* 
-0.163  
(-2.08)** 
BRDMEET 
-0.002  
(-0.33) 
-0.007  
(-1.06) 
-0.003  
(-0.48) 
-0.014  
(-1.77)* 
-0.007  
(-1.95)* 
ACSIZE 
0.046  
(1.78)* 
0.040  
(1.44) 
0.0180  
(0.78) 
-0.010  
(-0.41) 
0.019  
(1.72) 
ACIND 
-0.037  
(-0.87) 
-0.052  
(-1.13) 
0.031  
(0.77) 
-0.019  
(-0.40) 
-0.014  
(-0.65) 
ACEXP 
0.092  
(0.84) 
0.062  
(0.53) 
-0.027  
(-0.31) 
0.034  
(0.29) 
0.025  
(0.51) 
ACMEET 
0.004  
(0.32) 
0.024  
(1.53) 
0.005  
(0.32) 
0.004  
(0.20) 
0.010  
(1.39) 
SQSUBS 
0.038 
 (4.27)*** 
0.038  
(4.45)*** 
0.035  
(4.13)*** 
0.048  
(4.94)*** 
0.038  
(9.02)*** 
FORGN 
0.468  
(8.75)*** 
0.448  
(7.99)*** 
0.463  
(8.21)*** 
0.393  
(6.72)*** 
0.449  
(16.58)*** 
RECINV 
0.104  
(0.233) 
0.076  
(0.91) 
0.031  
(0.37) 
-0.143  
(-1.62) 
0.025  
(0.60) 
LEVERG 
0.401  
(5.00)*** 
0.382  
(5.50)*** 
0.314  
(4.09)*** 
0.376  
(3.87)*** 
0.382  
(9.81)*** 
LNASSET 
0.481  
(12.45)*** 
0.447  
(10.30)*** 
0.447 
(11.46)*** 
0.495 
(11.70)*** 
0.470  
(23.94)*** 
Adj. R
2 
0.783 0.772 0.780 0.795 0.789 
 *** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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5.4.3 The additional analyses and robustness tests 
This section further investigates the results obtained in the primary analysis. The 
purpose of additional analyses is to provide reasonable assurance that the main 
findings are robust to the specifications of various models.
53
 
 
5.4.3.1 Heteroscedasticity and muticollinearity checks 
To confirm whether or not heteroscedasticity exists, the present study uses the 
Breush-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg test. If the p-value is significant, then the null 
hypothesis, that the variance of the residuals is constant, would be rejected, suggesting 
the presence of heteroscedasticity. As can be seen from Table 5.4, the p-value is 
insignificant at p<0.10. Therefore, the null hypothesis has to be accepted, indicating 
no presence of heteroscedasticity.
54
   
 
The Pearson correlation matrix in the previous section (Table 5.2) shows that several 
variables have largest correlations. LNASSETS has higher correlation with LNAFEE, 
BRDSIZE and BRDNED, while BRDEXP has higher correlation with ACEXP. These 
higher correlations with total assets may be harmful and thus degrade the influences 
of audit fees, board size and proportion of independent board members. The higher 
correlations between BRDEXP and ACEXP are expected since audit committee 
expertise is a part of board of directors‟ expertise. In order to further investigate 
whether these larger correlations may indicate the problem of muticollinearity, the 
present study calculates the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance value. The 
results are presented in Table 5.5. If the variables have VIF values greater than 10 or 
tolerance values lower than 0.10, then they are considered to have multicollinearity 
problems (Gujarati, 2003: 339). Since all the variables have VIF values that are 
approximately 1.09 to 2.10 and tolerance values that are higher than 0.10 this suggests 
that no multicollinearity problem exists.  
 
 
 
                                                          
53
 The additional analyses and the robustness tests are been performed on the pooled sample and 
analysed using the OLS regression, unless stated otherwise. 
54
 Besides the Breush-Pagan test, White test is also been performed and the result relatively similar that 
suggest no indication of heteroskedasticity.  
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5.4.3.2 Different regression estimators 
This section provides alternative regression estimators such as robust regression 
(iteratively reweighted least squares), least square with clustered robust regression and 
quantile regressions.
55
The robust regression (iteratively reweighted least squares) and 
the least square with clustered robust regression provide better estimations when the 
sample contains mild outliers and does not adequately fulfil the OLS assumptions 
(Hamilton, 1999; Chen et al., 2003; Adkins and Hill, 2007; Gujarati, 2003), while 
quantile regression disregards all the OLS assumptions (Gujarati, 2003). The results 
are presented in Table 5.6. As can be seen, the results of these estimators are 
consistent with the main finding. There is not much difference between the results of 
OLS regression and the other alternative estimators. BRDNED is positively and 
significantly related to audit fees at p<0.01. BRDEXP and BRDMEET are also found 
to be significantly and negatively related to audit fees across all regression estimators, 
including the OLS regression. Similarly, ACSIZE is significantly and positively 
related to audit fees. All the control variables are significantly correlated in predicted 
directions except that there is no significant correlation between RECINV and audit 
fees. This is relatively consistent with the results reported in the primary findings. 
Overall, these results may suggest that the main findings reported in Table 5.6 are 
robust to various estimators and to the violation of OLS assumptions 
 
5.4.3.3Client size effects  
The main findings suggest significant results for BRDNED. There is a possibility that 
this result is driven by client size. Thus, several tests are performed to examine the 
influence of firm size on BRDNED. Following the example of Carcello et al. (2002), 
the present study split the pooled sample into two subsets of data at the median of 
LNASSET (proxy for firm size). The first data set is comprised of the firms that have a 
LNASSET below the median and this group is identified as the “small firms”. The 
second data set is comprised of the firms that have a LNASSET above the median and 
this group is identified as the “large firms”. The regressions are re-run separately on 
                                                          
55
 Using the Stata program, the command of rreg was used to perform the robust regression. For the 
least square with clustered robust regression, the cluster is based on the industry supersector code. The 
cluster option helps to deal with the independent assumption that the errors associated with one 
observation are not correlated with errors of other observation. In the current situation, for example, the 
firms within each industry supersector will tend to be more like those in the same supersector than the 
firms from different industry supersectors from which their errors are not independent. 
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these two subsets of firms. The results are presented in Table 5.7. Consistent with the 
primary finding, BRDNED is positive and significant for “small” and “large” firms. 
However, the result of BRDEXP does not hold in the sample of “large firms”. ACSIZE 
is insignificant with audit fees in either of the samples. The results of control variables 
in both subsets of firms are relatively similar to those that are reported in the primary 
findings. In addition to these, the ACEXP and ACMEET are found to be significantly 
and positively related to audit fees in the “small” firms but not in the “large” firms. 
 
The Chow test is also performed to test the differences in the regression coefficient 
between the “small” and “large” subsets. As can be seen from the Table 5.8, the F-
statistic values of board and audit committee variables are insignificant except for 
ACEXP, thus the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients of board and audit 
committee variables in both subsets are equal cannot be rejected, suggesting that the 
regression coefficients of board and audit committee variables in the “small” and 
“large” firms are essentially similar and consistent (except for ACEXP).   
 
In summary, the BRNED appeared to be reasonably consistent across both subsets, 
suggesting the significant result on BRNED is not influenced by the client size.  
 
5.4.3.4 New definitions for board and audit committee variables 
The primary results suggest that most of the audit committee variables are 
insignificant with audit fees, except for ACSIZE. Following Abbott et al. (2003a), the 
present study provides new definitions for audit committee variables to see whether 
alternative definitions affect the main results. The new definitions are as follows:  
 (1) ACIND is now in the continuous version, defined as the proportion of 
independent non-executive director on audit committee (ACIND1).  
(2) ACEXP is defined as a dichotomous variable, ACEXP1, and coded as 1 if audit 
committee had at least one director equipped with financial expertise, and 0 if 
otherwise. 
(3) ACMEET is also defined as a dichotomous variable, ACMEET1, coded as 1 if 
an audit committee meeting frequency is more than the sample median, and 0 
if otherwise.  
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Besides the new definitions of audit committee variables, the present study also 
provides alternative specifications for board of director variables. Instead of 
continuous versions, BRDNED is now defined as a dummy variable, coded as 1 if 
60% of the firm‟s directors are independent, and 0 if otherwise. This variable is 
known as BRDNED1. Similarly, BRDSIZE is also now defined as a dummy variable; 
BRDSIZE1 is coded as 1 if the firm‟s board size is less than sample median, and 0 if 
otherwise. These specifications are cited from DeFond et al. (2005). The other 
variable‟s descriptions remain unchanged. The results are presented in Table 5.9. 
None of the audit committee variables were significant except ACSIZE, which has a 
positive relationship with audit fees in the year 2005, and this is consistent with the 
primary findings. The result of BRDNED remains significant in every year and in the 
pooled regressions, while BRDEXP and BRDMEET are significantly and negatively 
related to audit fees in the pooled model only. The control variables remained 
quantitatively significant across all models. In summary, the primary findings are 
robust to the alternative definitions of board and audit committee variables. 
 
5.4.3.5Additional control variables 
In addition to the control variables included in the main model, there are several 
variables that are argued to influence the determinants of audit fees. These variables 
are return on assets (ROA), liquidity ratio (LIQ), and growth (GROWTH). The present 
study tested whether the inclusion of these variables would affect the primary results. 
All of these variables are sourced from Datastream. Following Whisenant et al. 
(2003) and Lee and Mande (2005), LIQ is defined as the ratio of current assets 
divided by current liabilities, while GROWTH represents the growth rate in sales over 
the previous fiscal year. In line with Whisenant et al. (2003), ROA and LIQ are 
proxies for risk sharing factors, and thus positive relationships are expected between 
these variables and audit fees. GROWTH is a proxy for the client size and the larger 
the firms are expected to have higher the audit fees due to the increased scope of 
audits and audit testing (Whisenant et al., 2003; Lee and Mande, 2005). Hence, 
GROWTH is expected to be positively related to audit fees. The results are presented 
in Table 5.10. BRDNED is significant in all year-by-year and pooled regressions. 
BRDMEET and BRDEXP are found to be negatively and significantly related to audit 
fees in the year 2008 and in the pooled models. ACINSIZE is positive and only 
significant in the year 2005 model. The results for all control variables are significant 
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in the predicted directions in all models except for RECINV, ROA and LIQ, which are 
insignificantly related to audit fees across all models. GROWTH is positive and 
significantly related to audit fees in the year 2006 and in the pooled models. In 
general, the main findings reported in Table 5.6 hold, even with the inclusion of these 
additional control variables. 
 
5.4.3.6 Endogeneity and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression  
Prior literature suggests that there is a significant relationship between auditing 
services and NAS when both are jointly provided by the same auditor (Simunic, 1984; 
Palmrose, 1986b). There are two sets of arguments that NAS fees may affect audit 
fees or vice versa. The first argument relates to knowledge spillovers that are thought 
to reduce the fixed or marginal costs of audits or NAS. Such decreases in the marginal 
cost of audits or NAS may then affect the level of audit fees or NAS fees, depending 
on the price elasticity of the demand function for audits or NAS (Siminuc, 1984). This 
suggests that there will be a positive relationship between audit and NAS fees. The 
second argument is that there is a possibility that auditing services may be used as a 
“loss-leader” in order to gain a higher profit margin on NAS fees (Hillson and 
Kennelley, 1988: 33). In other words, the auditor discounts auditing services in order 
to hold on to the lucrative fees of NAS, which in turn suggests that there will be a 
negative relationship between audit and NAS fees. Evidences from prior literature 
also suggest that board of director and audit committee characteristics may influence 
an auditors‟ risk assessment and audit planning, which in turn affects the audit pricing 
(Tsui et al., 2001; Boo and Sharma, 2008; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). To 
address these issues, the present study first identifies whether the NAS fees or board 
of director and audit committee characteristics may suffer from the endogeneity 
problem by performing the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test on each of these variables. 
Following Larcker and Rusticus (2010) the instrumental variables (IV) are the lagged 
values of the endogenous variables.
56
 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests the null 
hypothesis that the residual values of LNNAF, BRDSIZE, BDRNED, BRDMEET, 
                                                          
56
 The IV must fulfill the following conditions: (1) outside the regression model, (2) uncorrelated with 
regression errors and (3) strongly correlated with endogenous variables. To ensure the IV is valid the 
present study estimated the reduced form equations on the first stage of 2SLS regression and examined 
the significance level of the endogenous variables. The t-statistic should be at least 3.3 (Adkins and 
Hill, 2007: 249-250). All the IVs meet the suggested criterions.    
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BRDEXP, ACSIZE, ACIND, ACMEET and ACEXP are jointly equal to zero.
57
 If the 
F-statistic is significant, then the null hypothesis would be rejected, suggesting that 
endogeneity is present. Table 5.11 present the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. 
Most of the variables suggest insignificant F-statistics except for LNNAF, BDRNED, 
BRDEXP and ACSIZE, which confirm the presence of endogeneity since the F-
statistic is significant.  
 
To mitigate the bias caused by endogeneity, the 2SLS regression is performed on 
LNNAF, BDRNED, BRDEXP and ACSIZE. The results are presented in Table 5.12. 
Compared with the main finding, the results of 2SLS regressions are relatively 
consistent, except for the ACSIZE, which is found to be positively related to LNAFE 
in most of the 2SLS models. LNNAF is significant and positively related to LNAFEE, 
suggesting that the firms with higher audit fees are likely to have higher NAS fees. 
The other variables remained unchanged. In summary, the main finding on BRDNED 
is that it continues to have positive relationship with LNAFEE, suggesting that the 
inference made regarding BRDNED in the main finding is robust to the presence of 
endogeneity.  
  
  
                                                          
57
 Since the ACIND is a dummy variable, it is changed to a continuous version, ACIND1, which is 
defined as the proportion of independent non-executive directors on an audit committee 
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Table 5.4: Heteroscedasticity test for audit fees model 
Breusch-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg Test 
 
H0 = The variance of the residuals is constant 
 
Reject H0 if  p-value is significant 
 
chi2(1)         =    0.25 
Prob > chi2  =    0.6167 
 
 
Table 5.5: VIF and tolerance  value for audit fees model 
Variables VIF Tolerance 
BRDSIZE 2.10 0.477 
BRDNEXP 2.00 0.500 
BRDNED 1.91 0.524 
LNASSET 1.90 0.527 
ACEXP 1.71 0.586 
ACSIZE 1.60 0.625 
ACIND 1.36 0.732 
FORGN 1.28 0.780 
ACMEET 1.27 0.786 
SQSUBS 1.21 0.825 
BRDMEET 1.18 0.844 
RECINV 1.09 0.916 
LEVERG 1.09 0.917 
Mean VIF 1.52  
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Table 5.6: The results of different estimators for audit fees model (N=674) 
Variables  
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
Robust regression 
Least square regression 
with clustered robust 
Quantile regression 
Intercept 
-0.881 
(-7.75)*** 
-0.883 
(-5.45)*** 
-0.888 
(-8.80)*** 
BRDSIZE  
0.003 
(0.60) 
0.004 
(0.41) 
-0.003 
(-0.60) 
BRDNED 
0.449 
(4.40)*** 
0.446 
(3.14)*** 
0.307 
(3.39)*** 
BRDEXP 
-0.201 
(-2.42)** 
-0.171 
(-1.40)* 
-0.350 
(-4.70)** 
BRDMEET 
-0.006 
(-1.73)* 
-0.007 
(-3.14)** 
-0.009 
(-2.94)** 
ACSIZE 
0.017 
(1.56)* 
0.020 
(1.77)* 
0.016 
(1.74)* 
ACIND 
-0.015 
(-0.70) 
-0.014 
(-0.68) 
-0.006 
(-0.33) 
ACEXP 
0.047 
(0.84) 
0.035 
(0.52) 
0.082 
(0.73) 
ACMEET 
0.007 
(0.96) 
0.011 
(1.73) 
0.005 
(0.73) 
SQSUBS 
0.039 
(8.72)*** 
0.039 
(8.38)*** 
0.036 
(9.33)*** 
FORGN 
0.465 
(16.56)*** 
0.449 
(9.28)*** 
0.495 
(19.79)*** 
RECINV 
0.004 
(0.10) 
0.025 
(0.15) 
-0.031 
(-0.80) 
LEVERG 
0.385 
(9.54)*** 
0.381 
(7.12)*** 
0.406 
(11.26)*** 
LNASSET 
0.473 
(23.25)*** 
0.470 
(12.51)*** 
0.504 
(27.99)*** 
Adj. R
2
/ 
Pseudo R
2 0.780 0.789 0.552 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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Table 5.7: The results of the multivariate regression of audit fees model for “small” and 
“large” firms. 
Variables  
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
“Small firms” (N=337) “Large firms” (N=337) 
Intercept 
-0.712 
(-3.04)*** 
-0.596 
(-2.43)*** 
BRDSIZE  
0.003 
(0.45) 
0.010 
(1.19) 
BRDNED 
0.402 
(3.01)*** 
0.526 
(3.59)*** 
BRDEXP 
-0.239 
(-2.38)** 
-0.065 
(-0.49) 
BRDMEET 
-0.003 
(-0.64) 
-0.008 
(-1.56) 
ACSIZE 
0.009 
(0.42) 
0.015 
(0.95) 
ACIND 
-0.0203 
(-0.70) 
-0.008 
(-0.26) 
ACEXP 
0.116 
(1.65) 
-0.067 
(-0.81) 
ACMEET 
0.018 
(1.76) 
0.005 
(0.49) 
SQSUBS 
0.049 
(8.49)*** 
0.030 
(4.68)*** 
FORGN 
0.368 
(10.14)*** 
0.519 
(12.21)*** 
RECINV 
0.014 
(-0.27) 
0.049 
(0.73) 
LEVERG 
0.353 
(7.64)*** 
0.398 
(5.41)*** 
LNASSET 
0.441 
(10.51)*** 
0.418 
(10.00)*** 
Adj. R
2 
0.647 0.708 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
 
 
Table 5.8: Chow Test 
H0 = The regression coefficient on the small and large subsets are essentially the same  
Reject H0 if p-value is significant 
 F (1, 646) Prob > F 
BRDSIZE  0.55 0.460 
BRDNED 0.49 0.485 
BRDEXP 1.25 0.264 
BRDMEET 0.68 0.409 
ACSIZE 0.05 0.817 
ACIND 0.09 0.768 
ACEXP 3.75 0.053 
ACMEET 0.75 0.386 
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Table 5.9: The results of audit fees model for the alternative test variable definitions 
Variables  
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
2005 
(N=167) 
2006  
(N=181) 
2007  
(N=181) 
2008  
(N=145) 
Pooled 
(N=674) 
Intercept 
-1.021 
 (-4.15)*** 
-0.919 
 (-4.01)*** 
-0.660  
(-2.50)** 
-0.690 
(-2.84)*** 
-0.836 
(-6.98)*** 
BRDSIZE1  
0.022 
(0.56) 
-0.002  
(-0.05) 
-0.036 
(-0.94) 
0.024 
(0.55) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
BRDNED1 
0.083  
(2.05)** 
0.068 
(1.75)* 
0.088 
(2.35)** 
0.088 
(2.00)** 
0.083  
(4.46)*** 
BRDEXP 
-0.010  
(-0.08) 
-0.172 
(-1.41) 
-0.152  
(-1.45) 
-0.194  
(-1.23) 
-0.132 
(-2.26)** 
BRDMEET 
-0.002  
(-0.28) 
-0.007  
(-1.20) 
-0.002  
(-0.27) 
-0.012  
(-1.60) 
-0.005  
(-1.74)* 
ACSIZE 
0.052 
(1.72)* 
0.038 
(1.66) 
0.023  
(1.08) 
-0.012 
(-0.49) 
0.024 
(1.11) 
ACIND1 
-0.012  
(-0.13) 
0.022 
(0.22) 
0.009  
(0.48) 
-0.019 
(-0.17) 
0.013 
(0.66) 
ACEXP1 
-0.032  
(-0.45) 
0.079  
(0.90) 
0.005  
(0.07) 
-0.011 
(-0.18) 
0.008 
(0.23) 
ACMEET1 
0.018 
(0.47) 
0.013  
(0.30) 
0.017  
(0.39) 
-0.010 
(-0.23) 
0.013  
(0.62) 
SQSUBS 
0.040 
(5.05)*** 
0.035 
(4.43)*** 
0.035  
(3.95)*** 
0.044 
(4.96)*** 
0.038 
(9.04)*** 
FORGN 
0.473 
(8.40)*** 
0.479 
(8.69)*** 
0.471 
(8.36)*** 
0.411 
(6.57)*** 
0.461 
(16.68)*** 
RECINV 
0.089  
(0.91) 
0.047  
(0.56) 
0.038  
(0.43) 
-0.112  
(-1.15) 
0.022 
(0.51) 
LEVERG 
0.373 
(4.80)*** 
0.381  
(6.56)*** 
0.337 
(4.44)*** 
0.381 
(4.52)*** 
0.371 
(10.70)*** 
LNASSET 
0.494 
(12.93)*** 
0.488 
(13.56)*** 
0.467 
(13.30)*** 
0.511 
(15.64)*** 
0.491 
(27.99)*** 
Adj.  R
2 
0.795 0.783 0.793 0.810 0.792 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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Table 5.10: The results of audit fees model with the additional control variables 
Variables  
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
2005 
(N=167) 
2006  
(N=181) 
2007 
(N=181) 
2008 
(N=145) 
Pooled 
(N=674) 
Intercept 
-1.061 
 (-4.91)*** 
-0.770 
 (-3.65)*** 
-0.855 
(-3.88)** 
-0.663 
(-3.03)** 
-0.872 
(-8.44)*** 
BRDSIZE  
0.002 
(0.19) 
0.006  
(0.68) 
0.012 
(1.33) 
-0.012 
(-1.11) 
0.003 
(0.60) 
BRDNED 
0.523  
(2.64)*** 
0.407 
(2.09)** 
0.348 
(1.91)* 
0.507 
(2.44)** 
0.427  
(4.59)*** 
BRDEXP 
-0.107 
(-0.64) 
-0.239 
(-1.39) 
-0.146  
(-1.22) 
-0.242 
(-1.67)* 
-0.163 
(-2.26)** 
BRDMEET 
-0.002  
(-0.29) 
-0.008  
(-1.46) 
-0.003  
(-0.42) 
-0.014 
(-1.91)* 
-0.007  
(-2.09)** 
ACSIZE 
0.049 
(2.17)** 
0.035 
(1.44) 
0.023 
(1.11) 
0.010 
(1.33) 
0.019 
(1.52) 
ACIND 
-0.042 
(-1.05) 
-0.063 
(-1.47) 
0.039  
(0.93) 
-0.030 
(-0.61) 
-0.011 
(-0.56) 
ACEXP 
0.103  
(0.91) 
0.089 
(0.74) 
-0.015  
(-0.22) 
0.013 
(0.11) 
0.033 
(0.70) 
ACMEET 
0.006 
(0.47) 
0.028  
(1.24) 
0.005 
(0.32) 
0.007  
(0.38) 
0.011  
(1.49) 
SQSUBS 
0.038  
(4.98)*** 
0.041 
(5.36)*** 
0.034  
(4.00)*** 
0.046 
(5.32)*** 
0.039 
(9.14)*** 
FORGN 
0.467  
(8.28)*** 
0.461 
(8.26)*** 
0.467 
(8.40)*** 
0.373 
(5.39)*** 
0.451 
(16.01)*** 
RECINV 
0.090  
(0.90) 
0.070  
(0.80) 
0.046  
(0.49) 
-0.116 
(-1.20) 
0.013 
(0.28) 
LEVERG 
0.381  
(4.65)*** 
0.371  
(5.97)*** 
0.354 
(4.53)*** 
0.376 
(4.43)*** 
0.374 
(10.49)*** 
LNASSET 
0.467  
(11.00)*** 
0.441  
(11.63)*** 
0.457 
(11.89)*** 
0.495 
(13.88)*** 
0.472 
(24.79)*** 
ROA 
-0.001 
(-0.64) 
-0.002 
(1.02) 
0.002 
(1.02) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
0.001 
(0.80) 
LIQ 
0.095 
 (1.65) 
-0.997 
 (-1.43) 
0.000  
(0.01) 
0.111 
(1.38) 
0.034 
(1.13) 
GROWTH 
0.000 
 (0.11) 
0.001 
 (1.78)* 
0.001  
(1.08) 
-0.000 
(-0.03) 
0.001 
(1.98)** 
Adj.  R
2 
0.804 0.795 0.799 0.817 0.795 
** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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Table 5.11: Endogeneity test for audit fees model 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 
 
H0 = the residual of LNNAF, BRDSIZE, BDRNED, BRDMEET, BRDEXP, ACSIZE,  
        ACIND, ACMEET and ACEXP are exogenous 
 
Reject H0 if  F-statistic significant 
 
Variable Chi2 (1) 
LNNAF 27.432 (p=0.000) 
BRDSIZE  1.476 (p=0.224) 
BRDNED 7.469 (p=0.006) 
BRDEXP 4.157 (p=0.041) 
BRDMEET 2.398 (p=0.121) 
ACSIZE 6.521 (p=0.010) 
ACIND 0.101 (p=0.749) 
ACEXP 0.688 (p=0.406) 
ACMEET 0.367 (p=0.544) 
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Table 5.12: The results of 2SLS regression for audit fees model (N=674) 
Variables  
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
LNNAF BRDNED BRDEXP ACSIZE 
Intercept 
-0.750 
 (-6.42)*** 
-0.788 
 (-7.66)*** 
-0.792 
(-7.63)*** 
-0.865 
(-8.57)*** 
LNNAF 
0.242 
(6.42)*** 
0.072 
(3.98)*** 
0.076 
(4.27)*** 
0.078 
(4.43) 
BRDSIZE  
-0.003 
(-0.55) 
0.006 
(1.37) 
-0.002 
(-0.38) 
-0.003 
(-0.66) 
BRDNED 
0.235 
(2.20)** 
0.661 
(4.77)*** 
0.378 
(4.09)*** 
0.294 
(3.03)*** 
BRDEXP 
-0.131 
(-1.64) 
-0.152 
(-2.12)** 
-0.292 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.170 
(-2.37)** 
BRDMEET 
-0.003 
(-0.85) 
-0.006 
(-1.84)* 
-0.006 
(-1.80)* 
-0.006 
(-1.74)* 
ACSIZE 
0.033 
(2.73)*** 
0.012 
(0.99) 
0.025 
(2.37)** 
0.054 
(3.37)*** 
ACIND 
-0.014 
(-0.57) 
-0.042 
(-1.79)* 
-0.012 
(-0.59) 
-0.006 
(-0.30) 
ACEXP 
0.031 
(0.59) 
0.023 
(0.49) 
0.081  
(1.47) 
0.054 
(1.14) 
ACMEET 
-0.003 
(-0.40) 
0.003  
(0.46) 
0.008 
(1.07) 
0.007  
(1.06) 
SQSUBS 
0.029 
(6.41)*** 
0.037 
(8.91)*** 
0.037  
(9.04)*** 
0.035 
(8.74)*** 
FORGN 
0.381 
(12.27)*** 
0.414 
(15.04)*** 
0.429 
(15.84)*** 
0.429 
(15.83)*** 
RECINV 
0.078 
(1.52) 
0.042 
(0.93) 
0.041 
(0.91) 
0.041 
(0.90) 
LEVERG 
0.329  
(9.01)*** 
0.361  
(10.14)*** 
0.368 
(10.71)*** 
0.366 
(10.59)*** 
LNASSET 
0.377  
(13.88)*** 
0.420 
(20.21)*** 
0.440 
(21.68)*** 
0.437 
(21.51)*** 
Adj.  R
2 
0.754 0.801 0.803 0.802 
** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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5.5 ANALYSIS II: NAS FEES 
5.5.1 Multivariate regression 
Table 5.13 presents the results of the NAS fees model by year and in the pooled 
samples. All models are estimated using the OLS regression, except for FEERATIO2, 
which is regressed using the least square regression with robust standard error, 
because the evidence suggests that the FEERATIO2 model is heteroscedastic. The 
result of the heteroscedastic test is provided in the additional analyses and robustness 
tests section.  
 
FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2 are regressed only on the pooled model since year-by-
year models lack of significant F-statistics. The adjusted R
2
 for LNNAF and 
LNTOTALFEES models‟ are between 23.5% and 63.8% relatively. The adjusted R2 
for LNTOTALFEES is relatively similar to that reported in Ashbaugh et al. (2003). 
Compared to LNTOTALFEES, the adjusted R
2
 for the LNNAF model is relatively 
lower and this is partially due to the 18 firms that report zero NAS fees.
58
 The 
adjusted R
2
 for FEERATIO1 is 2.2% and FEERATIO2 is 7.5%, which is relatively 
lower than that documented in Abbott et al.‟s (2003b) study, which reports that the 
adjusted R
2
 for FEERATIO2 is in between 9.3% and 17.4%.
59
  
 
In general, the regression results of the LNNAF model are consistent with the 
LNTOTALFEES model, while the results of FEERATIO1 are relatively similar to 
FEERATIO2. BRDSIZE has positive correlation coefficients with all auditor 
independence measurements. It is significantly related to LNNAF (in the year 2005 
and in the pooled models) and to LNTOTALFEES (in the years 2005 and 2006 and in 
the pooled model) but it is insignificant with FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2. The 
positive relationship may suggest that the firms with smaller board size are more 
likely to limit NAS purchased as they believe that the higher level of NAS may 
compromise auditor independence. The significant results are relatively consistent 
with the previous audit quality study documented in Abbott et al (2004), which 
                                                          
58
 The results of multivariate regressions for LNNAF, FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2 are relatively 
similar when we include or exclude the sample firms that report zero NAS fees. 
59
 Abbott et al. (2003b: 229) show the regression results based on a full sample and two subsamples.  
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concluded that a smaller board is more effective in controlling the incidence of 
restatement.  
 
Contrary to the expectation, BRDNED is found to be positively and significantly 
related to LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES in most years and in the pooled models. 
However it is insignificant with FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2. Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003) and Larcker and Richardson (2004) suggest that LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES 
are better measurements than NAS ratios for capturing the economic importance of 
the client to the auditor. The positive relationship of BRDNED and LNNAF to 
LNTOTALFEES may imply that independent boards view the joint provision of audit 
and NAS as not necessarily compromising audit independence but possibly 
broadening the auditors‟ knowledge and improving their judgments, resulting in a 
higher audit quality (see Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988a; Arruñada, 1999a; 1999b; 
2000; Wallman, 1996; Goldman and Barlev, 1974).  
  
BRDEXPR is insignificant with all the auditor independence measures. Previously, 
Lee (2008) documents BRDEXP as composite index is positively related to the 
changes in FEERATIO2. Specifically, the composite index is measured as a 
dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if more than half NAS committee board members 
are independent and at least 27.27% (sample median) of them are financial expertise, 
and 0 if otherwise. Lee‟s study, however, does not report the result for BRDNED and 
BRDEXP as single variable. BRDMEET is negative and significant only with 
LNTOTALFEES (in the year 2008 and in the pooled models), but no statistical 
evidence is found to associate it with other measures.   
 
ACSIZE is negatively related to LNNAF (in the year 2008), FEERATIO1 and 
FEERATIO2 (both in the pooled model), but there is no evidence that it is associated 
with LNTOTALFEES. ACIND is significantly and negatively related to 
LNTOTALFEES in the year 2006 but is insignificant with other measures. Previous 
studies report ACIND to be negatively and significantly related to FEERATIO2 as 
separate variables (Abbott et al., 2003b) and as composite index variables (Abbott et 
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al., 2003b; Lee and Mande, 2005 and Lee, 2008).
60
 Likewise, the result indicates no 
significant association between ACEXP and all other auditor independence measures; 
this is consistent with the findings of Abbott et al (2003b). However Lee (2008) 
reports ACEXPR to be significantly related to LNNAF when it is modelled as a 
composite index variable. 
 
The present study finds that ACMEET is positive and significant across all auditor 
independence measures in the year 2008 and in the pooled models except for the 
FEERATIO2 measure. These results suggest that the firms with an active audit 
committee are likely to have higher NAS fees, higher total fees and a higher ratio of 
NAS fees to total fees. It may be perceived that, where higher levels of NAS are 
purchased, an auditor‟s knowledge is broadened thus improving the overall audit 
quality. As prior studies have acknowledged, possible benefits flow from the joint 
provision of audit and NAS (Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988a; Arruñada, 1999a; 
1999b; 2000; Wallman, 1996; Goldman and Barlev, 1974). Previous studies report 
ACMEET to be negatively and significantly related to FEERATIO2 and LNNAF when 
it is defined as a composite index (Abbott et al., 2003b; Lee and Mande, 2005), but 
provide no such evidence when it is modelled as a separate variable (Abbott et al., 
2003b).  
 
In general, the coefficients of the control variables are relatively significant and stable 
across the all measures of auditor independence. The coefficient of INOWN is positive 
but only significant in the case of LNNAF and FEERATIO1 (in the pooled models), 
whereas the coefficient of BLOCK is also positive but significant only in relation to 
FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2. These results are consistent with the findings of Firth 
(1997) but contradictory to Abbott et al (2003b) who find negative coefficients for 
these two variables. LEVERG is significantly and positively related to 
LNTOTALFEES in the years 2005 and 2006, and in the pooled models, but no 
evidence of significant relationships are found in the other models. The present study 
finds that there is no significant relationship between RETURN and all other measures 
                                                          
60
 Abbott et al. (2003b) and Lee and Mande (2005) define audit committee effectiveness as a dummy 
variable, coded as 1 if the audit committee is solely independent and meets at least four times a year. 
Lee (2008) defines audit committee effectiveness as a dummy variable as well by taking into 
consideration the audit committee‟s expertise variable, coded as 1 if audit committee is solely 
independent and at least one-third of them are financial experts. 
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of auditor independence and this is consistent with the findings of Abbott et al. 
(2003b). LNASSET is significantly and positively related to LNNAF and 
LNTOTALFEES in the year-by-year and pooled models but there is no evidence to 
indicate an association with FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2.  
 
ACQ is positive and significantly related to LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES but only in 
the selected year. NWFUND is conditional to the measures of auditor independence, it 
is found to be positively related to LNTOTALFEES (in the year 2007) but negatively 
related to FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2 in the pooled models. NEWDIR is 
significantly and positively related to FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2 but no evidence 
associates it with LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES. RESTR is found to be positively and 
significantly related to LNNAF, LNTOTALFEES and FEERATIO in most years and in 
the pooled regressions. In general, most of the events that are associated with the 
demand for the purchase of NAS are in the predicted directions, in agreement with 
Firth (1997), except for NWFUND, which has a negative relationship to FEERATIO1 
and FEERATIO2 that may suggest that the firms with new shares issued or debt for 
cash do not necessarily require professional advice from the auditors  
 
Overall, the multivariate regression finds consistent evidence that the independent 
board is positively correlated with the purchase of NAS. Rather than holding the view 
that higher levels of NAS impair auditor independence, independent non-executive 
directors on boards seem to support the view that a higher NAS provision improves an 
auditor‟s judgment and audit quality due to the knowledge spillover effect. The other 
hypothesis variables provide inconsistent support for the view that they are linked 
with NAS fees. Among the control variables, LNASSET is found to be significantly 
and positively related with NAS fees across both the year-by-year and the pooled 
samples. 
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Table 5.13: The results of multivariate regression for NAS fees  model 
FEE = α
0
 + β
1
BRDSIZE + β
2
BRDNED + β
3
BRDEXP + β4BRDMEET +   β5ACSIZE + β6ACIND + β7ACEXP+  β8ACMEET + 
β
9
INOWN + β
10
BLOCK + β
11
LEVERG + β
12
RETURN +β
13
LNASSET + β
14
 ACQ + β
15
NWFUND  + β
16
NEWDIR  + β
17
RESTR 
+ ε    
The dependent variable of FEE is measured as follows:  
(1) LNNAF;  (2) LNTOTALFEES; (3) FEERATIO1; (4) FEERATIO2 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
2005 (N=167) 2006 (N=181) 2007 (N=181) 2008 (N=145) Pooled (N=674) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 
-1.682 
(-2.27)** 
-0.644 
(-1.79)* 
-0.580 
(-0.87) 
-0.116 
(-0.38) 
-0.780 
(-1.04) 
-0.432 
(-1.33) 
-0.863 
(-1.16) 
-0.211 
(-0.60) 
-0.776 
(-2.24)** 
-0.336 
(-2.10)** 
0.348 
(3.18)*** 
1.091   
(1.33) 
BRDSIZE 
0.069  
(2.03)** 
0.028  
(1.67)* 
0.022  
(0.74) 
0.026  
(1.91)* 
0.020  
(0.62) 
0.019 
(1.41) 
0.048  
(1.54) 
0.022  
(1.50) 
0.036 
(2.37)** 
0.024 
(3.37)*** 
0.002 
(0.39) 
0.010  
(0.28) 
BRDNED 
0.973 
(1.54) 
0.866 
(2.82)*** 
1.214  
(1.96)* 
0.764 
(2.70)*** 
1.260  
(2.06)** 
0.741  
(2.81)*** 
0.790  
(1.33) 
0.748  
(2.66)*** 
0.982 
(3.32)*** 
0.754 
(5.54)*** 
0.034  
(0.37) 
0.289  
(0.46) 
BRDEXP 
0.505  
(1.00) 
0.137 
(0.56) 
-0.441 
(-0.91) 
-0.185 
(-0.84) 
-0.193  
(-0.43) 
-0.132 
(-0.69) 
0.435  
(0.85) 
0.145 
(0.60) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.026 
(-0.24) 
-0.023  
(-0.30) 
-0.315  
(-0.71) 
BRDMEET 
0.001  
(0.04) 
-0.007  
(-0.62) 
-0.012  
(-0.62) 
-0.007  
(-0.85) 
-0.006  
(-0.25) 
-0.013  
(-1.33) 
-0.029  
(-1.36) 
-0.020  
(-1.97)* 
-0.015  
(-1.45) 
-0.011  
(-2.34)** 
0.004  
(1.24) 
0.042 
(1.60) 
ACSIZE 
-0.037  
(-0.45) 
0.013  
(0.31) 
-0.027  
(-0.33) 
0.035  
(0.93) 
-0.045  
(-0.62) 
0.019 
(0.60) 
-0.118  
(-1.67)* 
-0.050 
(-1.49) 
-0.055  
(-1.49) 
0.004 
(0.25) 
-0.024  
(-2.06)** 
-0.143  
(-1.93)* 
ACIND 
-0.094  
(-0.71) 
-0.016  
(-0.25) 
-0.095  
(-0.73) 
-0.109  
(-0.183)* 
0.001  
(0.01) 
-0.030  
(-0.54) 
0.212  
(1.57) 
0.041  
(0.64) 
-0.003  
(-0.05) 
-0.031  
(-1.05) 
-0.007 
(-0.36) 
-0.081  
(-0.55) 
ACEXP 
0.021  
(0.06) 
0.066  
(0.39) 
-0.044  
(-0.13) 
0.017 
(0.11) 
-0.077  
(-0.28) 
-0.008 
(-0.07) 
-0.239  
(-0.72) 
-0.097  
(-0.62) 
-0.056 
(-0.37) 
0.010 
(0.14) 
0.001  
(0.01) 
0.204 
(0.58) 
ACMEET 
0.032  
(0.69) 
0.033  
(1.48) 
0.049  
(1.07) 
0.034  
(1.63) 
0.043 
(0.89) 
0.032  
(1.54) 
0.113  
(2.06)** 
0.066  
(2.52)** 
0.065  
(2.88)*** 
0.041  
(3.88)*** 
0.013  
(1.84)* 
0.089   
(1.35) 
INOWN 
0.005 
(1.06) 
0.003 
(1.20) 
0.004 
(0.87) 
-0.001 
(-0.29) 
0.003 
(0.86) 
0.002 
(1.40) 
0.006 
(0.97) 
0.000 
(0.15) 
0.004 
(1.77)* 
0.001 
(1.21) 
0.001 
(1.91)* 
0.015 
(1.63) 
BLOCK 
0.001 
(0.18) 
0.002 
(1.02) 
0.003 
(0.90) 
0.002 
(1.14) 
0.005 
(1.46) 
0.001 
(0.73) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
-0.000 
(-0.09) 
0.002 
(1.00) 
0.001 
(1.51) 
0.001 
(1.95)* 
0.010  
(2.54)** 
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Table 5.13 (continued) 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
2005 (N=167) 2006 (N=181) 2007 (N=181) 2008 (N=145) Pooled (N=674) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LEVERG 
0.227 
(0.90) 
0.334 
(2.74)*** 
0.322 
(1.55) 
0.320 
(3.38)*** 
-0.019 
(-0.07) 
0.119 
(1.06) 
0.050 
(0.18) 
0.198 
(1.52) 
0.176 
(1.51) 
0.255 
(4.74)*** 
-0.039 
(-1.07) 
-0.126  
(-0.57) 
RETURN 
0.001 
(0.32) 
-0.000 
(-0.22) 
0.003 
(0.83) 
0.000 
(0.15) 
0.001 
(0.23) 
0.000 
(0.15) 
-0.001 
(-0.23) 
0.000 
(0.56) 
0.001 
(0.66) 
-0.000 
(-0.09) 
0.000 
(0.20) 
-0.003  
(-1.27) 
LNASSET 
0.402 
(3.32)*** 
0.418 
(7.13)*** 
0.389 
(3.06)*** 
0.382 
(6.58)*** 
0.419 
(3.27)*** 
0.434 
(7.84)*** 
0.465 
(3.65)*** 
0.462 
(7.69)*** 
0.400 
(6.60)*** 
0.425 
(15.19)*** 
0.013  
(0.67) 
-0.026   
(-0.20) 
ACQ 
0.012 
(0.40) 
0.019 
(1.34) 
0.062 
(2.41)** 
0.044 
(3.73)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.13) 
0.023 
(2.07)** 
-0.014 
(-0.54) 
0.010 
(0.86) 
0.015 
(1.18) 
0.025 
(4.23)*** 
-0.004  
(-0.87) 
-0.014   
(-0.75) 
NWFUND 
0.441 
(2.20)** 
0.075 
(0.77) 
-0.269 
(-1.51) 
-0.096 
(-1.18) 
0.162 
(0.78) 
0.265 
(2.972)*** 
-0.226 
(-1.15) 
-0.124 
(-1.33) 
0.029 
(0.31) 
0.014 
(0.33) 
-0.058  
(-1.99)** 
-0.510  
(-1.68)* 
NEWDIR 
0.007 
(0.06) 
0.023 
(0.44) 
0.129 
(1.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
-0.084 
(-0.79) 
0.028 
(0.61) 
0.048 
(0.45) 
-0.075 
(-1.51) 
0.029 
(0.59) 
-0.003 
(-0.15) 
0.028 
(1.79)* 
0.174   
(1.73)* 
RESTR 
0.237 
(2.10)** 
0.142 
(2.60)** 
0.421 
(4.24)*** 
0.221 
(4.87)*** 
0.069 
(0.63) 
0.070 
(1.48) 
0.052 
(0.51) 
0.082 
(1.69)* 
0.188 
(3.70)*** 
0.123 
(5.25)*** 
0.031 
(1.90)* 
0.111  
(1.16) 
Adj. R2 0.235 0.559 0.311 0.638 0.147 0.598 0.317 0.653 0.260 0.614 0.022 0.075 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. All models are been estimated using the OLS regression except for 
FEERATIO2 which been regressed using the least square regression with robust standard error because the evidence suggest that the FEERATIO2 model 
is heterscedastic.  
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5.5.3 The additional analyses and robustness tests 
In this section the present study examines whether the primary findings hold in the 
case of the violation of OLS assumptions, and whether they are robust in various other 
model specifications. The tests include heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity 
checks, different regression estimators, client size analysis, alternative definitions of 
hypotheses variables, additional control variables, and an endogeneity test and 2SLS 
regression.  
 
5.5.3.1 Heteroscedasticity and muticollinearity checks  
Table 5.14 presents the results of the heteroscedasticity test according to the specific 
dependent variables. Based on the Breusch-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg test, most 
models indicate an insignificant p-value, suggesting that the variances of the residuals 
are homogeneous, except for FEERATIO2, which has a significant p-value at p<0.01, 
which indicates the present of heteroscedasticity.
61
  
 
The results of VIF test and tolerance value are presented in Table 5.15.
62
 None of the 
variables had a VIF value of more than 10 or a tolerance value lower than 0.10, 
suggesting no indication of a multicollinearity problem. 
 
5.5.3.2 Different regression estimators 
This section provides the results of multivariate regression using different estimators. 
Previously, LNNAF, LNTOTALFEES and FEERATIO1 were regressed using the OLS 
estimator, while FEERATIO2 was regressed using the least square regression with 
robust standard errors. In this section, LNNAF, LNTOTALFEES and FEERATIO1 will 
be regressed using robust regression and quantile regression, while FEERATIO2 will 
be regressed using the OLS and GLS regressions. The results are presented in Table 
5.16.  
 
                                                          
61
 The White test also revealed a similar result. There was no indication of heteroscedasticity in any of 
the auditor independence measurements except for the FEERATIO2 model. 
62
 This result is based on the modelling of LNNAF as a dependent variable. The other models indicate 
relatively similar VIF and tolerance values. 
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The robust regression is efficient when the models contain mild outliers and do not 
fulfil the normality assumption (Hamilton, 1999; Chen et al., 2003; Adkins and Hill, 
2007; Gujarati, 2003). The quantile regression is one of the non-parametric tests 
which do not require any assumptions (Gujarati, 2003). The GLS regression is an 
alternative to the least square regression with robust standard error that is efficient in 
controlling heteroscedastic models. 
 
As can be seen, the results of robust and quantile regressions are relatively consistent 
with the OLS regression presented in the main findings (Table 5.6) except for the 
relationship between LNNAF and INOWN and the relationship between FEERATIO1 
and BLOCK. Both of these relationships are insignificant in the quantile regression. 
The hypothesis variables remain unchanged.
63
  
 
For the FEERATIO2 model, GLS regression provides consistent results with the least 
square regression with robust standard error, as shown in the main findings (Table 
5.6). This may be due to the efficiency of both estimators in controlling error 
variances so that each sample observation would have a constant variance. However, 
the results of OLS regression were slightly different. The main findings and those of 
the GLS regression (pooled sample) suggest that ACMEET and INOWN are 
insignificantly related with FEERATIO2 but, under OLS regression, both are found to 
be positively and significantly related to FEERATIO2 at p<0.10 and p<0.01 
respectively. The results for the other variables are relatively consistent with the main 
findings. The inconsistency of the results, for variables ACMEET and INOWN under 
the OLS regression, may be partly due to the presence of the heteroscedasticity 
problem identified in the FEERATIO2 model. The statisticians suggests that in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, the least square estimator with robust standard error 
(Huber-White standard errors) or GLS regression are much more efficient than the 
OLS estimator because they able to reweight the error variances and thus correct for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Adkins and Hill, 2007: 196; Gujarati, 2003: 
387). In other words, in the presence of heteroscedasticity, the results of OLS 
regression may be distorted and biased. 
 
                                                          
63
 They might be different in terms of levels of significance but this does not change the content of the 
main findings. 
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5.5.3.3Client size effects  
The present study re-regress the NAS fees model to see whether the results of 
BRDNED are driven by client size. Following the approach of Carcello et al. (2002), 
the pooled samples are split into two groups at the median of LNASSET. Firms with 
LNASSET below median are grouped together as the “small” firms and those with 
LNASSET above median are grouped together as the “large” firms. The regressions 
are re-run separately using the OLS estimator.
64
 The results are presented in Table 
5.17. Consistent with the primary findings (pooled model), BRDNED is significantly 
and positively related to LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES for both “small” and “large” 
firms. The other hypotheses variables and the control variables are either significant in 
“small” or “large” firms or significant/insignificant in both groups, depending on the 
auditor independence measures. In summary, BRDNED is the only hypotheses 
variable that is found to be consistent across “large” and “small” firms and thus it 
confirms the main finding that the independent boards is not driven by client size.   
 
5.4.3.4 New definitions for board and audit committee variables 
As with the audit fees model, the present study tests whether alternative specifications 
for hypotheses variables affect the main analysis. Following to approaches of Abbott 
et al. (2003a) and DeFond et al. (2005), the alternative definitions for board and audit 
committee variables (BRDSIZE, BRDNED, ACIND, ACEXP, ACMEET) are as 
follows: 
(1) BRDSIZE1is coded as 1 if the firm‟s board size is less than sample median, 
and 0 if otherwise. 
(2) BRDNED1 is coded as 1 coded as 1 if 60% of the firm‟s directors are 
independent, and 0 if otherwise. 
(3) ACIND1is defines as the proportion of independent non-executive director on 
the audit committee.   
(2) ACEXP1 is coded as 1 if audit committee had at least one director equipped 
with financial expertise, and 0 if otherwise. 
(3) ACMEET1 is coded as 1 if audit committee meeting frequency is more than 
the sample median, and 0 if otherwise.  
                                                          
64
 The FEERATIO2 model revealed an insignificant F-statistic (regressed using the least square 
regression with robust standard error), suggesting that the model is statistically invalid. Thus, the 
results are not reported. 
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The definitions of the other variables remain unchanged. Table 5.18 presents the 
results for the new definitions.
65
 As can be seen, the results for the alternative 
definitions are relatively consistent with the main findings, except for BRDSIZE1 and 
ACEXP1. BRDSIZE1 is found to be negatively related to NAS fees measurements, 
suggesting the firms with a board size that is smaller than the sample median are 
likely to have higher NAS fees. This may indicate that the firms with fewer board 
members are likely to have more NAS. The results for the NAS fees variables seem to 
be sensitive to the alternative definition of board size. BRDNED1 and ACMEET1 are 
positively related to NAS fees, suggesting that the firms with boards that have more 
than 60% independent membership, and whose audit committee meetings are more 
frequent than the sample median, are likely to have higher NAS fees. ACEXP1 is 
negatively related to all auditor independence measurements. This suggesting that the 
audit committees with at least one member equipped with financial expertise are more 
likely to limit the level of NAS purchased as they have the perception that higher 
NAS impairs auditor independence. The results from the control variables are 
relatively unchanged. Overall, the primary findings on the independence of boards are 
not modified by alternative definitions for independent non-executive directors.  
 
5.4.3.5Additional control variables 
Several control variables are included in the primary model to see whether the 
inclusion of these variables affect the results. As with the audit fees model, these 
variables are: return on assets (ROA), liquidity ratio (LIQ), and growth (GROWTH). 
These are predicted to be positively related to NAS fees. Prior literature suggests that 
more profitable firms and higher growth firms are likely to have more resources to 
purchase NAS (Habib and Islam, 2007; Antle et al., 2006). The results are presented 
in Table 5.19. The results for the hypotheses variables and the main control variables 
are relatively similar to the main findings. ROA is positively related to 
LNTOTALFEES at p<0.10, but insignificantly related with other measures. GROWTH 
is found to be positively related to FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2. These results are 
relatively consistent with the findings of Habib and Islam (2007) who suggest that 
firms with a higher profitability and higher growth are likely to purchase more NAS. 
                                                          
65
 All the models are regressed using the OLS except for FEERATIO2 model, which is estimated using 
the least square regression with robust standard error. 
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Overall, the main finding is unchanged and the additional control variables are 
unlikely to affect the results 
 
5.4.3.6 Endogeneity and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression  
As previously highlighted in the section of additional analysis and robustness tests for 
the audit fees model, evidence from prior studies suggests that there are two possible 
outcomes of the joint provision of audit and NAS. The first possibility is related to the 
knowledge spillover effect that suggests that there will be a positive relationship 
between audit fees and NAS fees. . The second possibility is that higher NAS fees are 
used to discount auditing services in order to gain a higher profit margin on the 
lucrative NAS fees. This leads to a negative relationship between audit and NAS fees. 
Both arguments lead to the issue of endogeneity. In addition, prior literature also 
suggests that board of director and audit committee characteristics are likely to be 
associated with endogeneity (e.g. Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010).  Therefore, to investigate these concerns, the present study first 
examined whether these variables suffer from endogeneity by performing the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test.
66
 Table 5.11 presents the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
for each variable analysed under LNNAF, LNTOTALFEES, FEERATIO1 and 
FEERATIO2 models.  As can be seen, the F-statistics are insignificant in all models 
suggesting no indication of endogeneity. This may not required the 2SLS test. As 
suggested by Baum et al. (2003), in the absence of endogeneity, the results of 2SLS 
regressions are unacceptable and biased. In summary,  the results estimated using the 
least square regression with robust standard error in the main analysis is more 
efficient due to the absence of endogeneity. 
  
                                                          
66
 As with the audit fees model, ACIND is changed to a continuous version of the variable and is called 
ACIND1 (defined as the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee) in 
order to perform the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. 
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Table 5.14: Heteroscedasticity test for NAS fees model 
Breusch-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg Test 
H0 = The variance of the residuals is constant 
Reject H0 if  p-value is significant 
Dependent variable chi2(1) Prob > chi2   
LNNAF 0.27 0.606 
LNTOTALFEES 0.47 0.492 
FEERATIO1 1.62 0.203 
FEERATIO2 417.92 0.000 
   
 
Table 5.15: VIF and tolerance values for NAS fees model 
Variables VIF Tolerance 
BRDSIZE 2.11 0.474 
LNASSET 2.02 0.495 
BRDNED 2.01 0.498 
BRDEXP 1.89 0.531 
ACEXP 1.73 0.579 
ACSIZE 1.65 0.605 
ACIND 1.37 0.730 
ACMEET 1.30 0.771 
BRDMEET 1.19 0.843 
INOWN 1.12 0.890 
BLOCK 1.11 0.898 
ACQ 1.09 0.915 
LEVERG 1.09 0.916 
RESTR 1.07 0.932 
NWFUND 1.07 0.937 
RETURN 1.06 0.940 
NEWDIR 1.06 0.943 
Mean VIF 1.41  
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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Table 5.16: The results of different estimators for NAS fees model (N=674) 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics)  
Robust regression Quantile regression 
OLS 
regression 
GLS 
regression 
LNNAF LNTOTALFEES FEERATIO1 LNNAF LNTOTALFEES FEERATIO1 FEERATIO2 FEERATIO2 
Intercept 
-0.855 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.348 
(-2.17)** 
0.326 
(2.82)*** 
-0.756 
(-3.49)*** 
-0.235 
(-1.22) 
0.293 
(2.43)** 
1.091 
(1.55) 
1.06 
(1.26) 
BRDSIZE 
0.025 
(2.33)** 
0.024 
(3.44)*** 
0.002  
(0.34) 
0.022 
(2.27)** 
0.021 
(2.46)** 
0.003 
(0.57) 
0.010 
(0.31) 
0.007 
(0.21) 
BRDNED 
0.693  
(3.40)*** 
0.733 
(5.35)*** 
0.020  
(0.20) 
0.709  
(3.84)*** 
0.751 
(4.56)*** 
0.037 
(0.36) 
0.289 
(0.48) 
0.318  
(0.50) 
BRDEXP 
-0.086  
(-0.53) 
-0.033 
(-0.31) 
-0.015  
(-0.19) 
-0.042  
(-0.29) 
-0.132 
(-1.02) 
-0.017 
(-0.22) 
-0.315 
(-0.66) 
-0.306 
(-0.69) 
BRDMEET 
-0.006  
(-0.92) 
-0.010  
(-2.08)** 
0.004  
(1.14) 
-0.018  
(-1.38) 
-0.012  
(-2.06)** 
0.003  
(0.80) 
0.042 
(1.05) 
0.044 
(1.59) 
ACSIZE 
0.000  
(0.01) 
0.007 
(0.40) 
-0.023  
(-1.90)* 
0.012 
(0.53) 
0.027 
(1.29) 
-0.026 
(-1.98)** 
-0.143 
(-1.89)* 
-0.151 
(-1.99)** 
ACIND 
-0.022  
(-0.50) 
-0.033  
(-1.11) 
-0.005 
(-0.22) 
-0.019  
(-0.48) 
-0.055  
(-1.58) 
-0.018 
(-0.80) 
-0.081 
(-0.63) 
-0.097 
(-0.64) 
ACEXP 
0.002  
(0.02) 
-0.013 
(-0.18) 
-0.001  
(-0.03) 
0.013  
(0.14) 
0.046 
(0.55) 
-0.037 
(-0.75) 
0.204 
(0.66) 
0.197 
(0.54) 
ACMEET 
0.06  
(3.85)*** 
0.039 
(3.75)*** 
0.014 
(1.82)* 
0.035  
(2.51)** 
0.031  
(2.51)** 
0.012 
(1.67)* 
0.089 
(1.93)* 
0.091 
(1.29) 
INOWN 
0.003 
(1.73)* 
0.001  
(0.22) 
0.001 
(1.65)* 
0.000 
(1.15) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
0.001 
(1.64)* 
0.015 
(3.44)*** 
0.015 
(1.59) 
BLOCK 
0.002 
(1.02) 
0.001  
(1.51) 
0.001 
(1.79)* 
0.001 
(0.66) 
0.001  
(1.22) 
0.001  
(1.45) 
0.010 
(1.45)*** 
0.010 
(2.43)** 
LEVERG 
0.164 
(1.43) 
0.266 
(4.91)*** 
-0.043 
(-1.10) 
0.162  
(1.41) 
0.265  
(4.10)*** 
-0.045  
(-1.11) 
-0.126 
(-0.53) 
-0.103 
(-0.46) 
Table 5.16 (continued) 
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Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics)  
Robust regression Quantile regression 
OLS 
regression 
GLS 
regression 
LNNAF LNTOTALFEES FEERATIO1 LNNAF LNTOTALFEES FEERATIO1 FEERATIO2 FEERATIO2 
RETURN 
-0.000 
(-0.27) 
-0.000 
(-0.08) 
0.000 
(0.30) 
0.000  
(0.20) 
0.000 
(0.14) 
0.000 
(0.44) 
-0.003 
(-0.99) 
-0.003 
(-1.28) 
LNASSET 
0.445 
(10.64)*** 
0.4259 
(15.28)*** 
0.018  
(0.87) 
0.455 
(12.085)*** 
0.411  
(12.20)*** 
0.026  
(1.21) 
-0.026 
(-0.21) 
-0.015 
(-0.11) 
ACQ 
0.021 
(2.39)** 
0.025 
(4.13)*** 
-0.003  
(-0.73) 
0.032 
(4.03)*** 
0.031 
(4.32)*** 
0.001 
(0.30) 
-0.014 
(-0.53) 
-0.014 
(-0.72) 
ISSUE 
-0.088 
(-1.36) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.068  
(-2.16)** 
0.075 
(1.32) 
0.012 
(0.23) 
-0.077 
(-2.38)** 
-0.510 
(-2.69)*** 
-0.536  
(-1.72)* 
NEWDIR 
0.035 
(1.02) 
0.002  
(0.07) 
0.028 
(1.78)* 
-0.010  
(-0.33) 
0.025  
(0.90) 
0.029 
(1.67)* 
0.174 
(1.72)* 
0.179 
(1.75)* 
REST 
0.131  
(3.72)*** 
0.121  
(5.12)*** 
0.029 
(1.83)* 
0.115 
(3.58)** 
0.113  
(3.99)*** 
0.040 
(2.25)** 
0.111 
(1.07)** 
0.113 
(1.15) 
Adj. R
2
/ Pseudo 
R
2 0.295 0.618 0.018 0.418 0.409 0.024 0.051 0.052 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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Table 5.17: The results of NAS fees model for “small” and “large” firms (N=337) 
Variables  
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
LNNAF LNTOTALFEES FEERATIO1 
“Small” “Large” “Small” “Large” “Small” “Large” 
Intercept 
-0.010 
(-0.01) 
-1.013  
(-1.28) 
-0.015  
(-0.04) 
-0.392  
(-1.14) 
0.595 
(2.31)** 
0.216 
(0.96) 
BRDSIZE  
0.42 
(2.03)** 
0.031 
(1.24) 
0.028  
(2.82)*** 
0.023 
(2.08)** 
0.000 
(0.06) 
0.007 
(0.92) 
BRDNED 
1.337 
(3.30)*** 
0.755 
(1.66)* 
0.819  
(4.14)*** 
0.733 
(3.73)*** 
0.148 
(1.05) 
-0.021 
(-0.16) 
BRDEXP 
0.019  
(0.06) 
0.020 
(0.05) 
-0.236  
(-1.56) 
0.246  
(1.49) 
0.016 
(0.15) 
-0.059 
(-0.55) 
BRDMEET 
0.001 
(0.07) 
-0.029 
(-1.82)* 
-0.001 
(-0.19) 
-0.021 
(-3.11)*** 
0.005 
(1.11) 
0.004 
(0.77) 
ACSIZE 
-0.149 
(-2.25)** 
-0.029 
(-0.59) 
-0.052 
(-1.67)* 
0.017 
(0.83) 
-0.059 
(-2.57)** 
-0.011 
(-0.79) 
ACIND 
-0.149 
(-1.70)* 
0.097 
(1.02) 
-0.041 
(-0.961)*** 
-0.041 
(-0.99) 
-0.056 
(-1.84)* 
0.031 
(1.14) 
ACEXP 
-0.011 
(-0.05) 
-0.076 
(-0.34) 
0.108 
(1.03) 
-0.087 
(-0.90) 
-0.016 
(-0.22) 
0.038 
(0.59) 
ACMEET 
0.039 
(1.25) 
0.087 
(2.53)** 
0.041 
(2.68)*** 
0.040 
(2.65)*** 
0.001 
(0.10) 
0.024 
(2.47)** 
INOWN 
0.001 
(0.43) 
0.007 
(1.91)* 
-0.000 
(-0.34) 
0.003  
(1.96)* 
0.000 
(0.47) 
0.002  
(1.81)* 
BLOCK 
0.002 
(0.93) 
0.001 
(0.48) 
0.001 
(1.01) 
0.001 
(1.18) 
0.001 
(0.96) 
0.001 
(1.95)* 
LEVERG 
0.145 
(1.03) 
0.164 
(0.74) 
0.194 
(2.82)*** 
0.296 
(3.05)*** 
-0.042 
(-0.85) 
-0.049 
(-0.76) 
RETURN 
0.001 
(0.58) 
0.001 
(0.63) 
0.000  
(0.18) 
0.000  
(0.32) 
0.000 
(0.22) 
0.000 
(0.34) 
LNASSET 
0.312 
(2.40)** 
0.418 
(3.20)*** 
0.398 
(6.29)*** 
0.421 
(7.44)*** 
0.005 
(0.10) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
ACQ 
0.025 
(1.06) 
0.013  
(0.79) 
0.032  
(2.78)*** 
0.023  
(3.27)*** 
0.001 
(0.11) 
-0.005 
(-1.08) 
NWFUND 
-0.064 
(-0.57) 
0.160 
(0.96) 
-0.028  
(-0.51) 
0.066  
(0.91) 
-0.119 
(-3.09)*** 
0.037 
(0.79) 
NEWDIR 
0.029 
(0.43) 
0.028 
(0.37) 
-0.023 
(-0.73) 
0.021  
(0.64) 
0.032 
(1.39) 
0.018 
(0.84) 
REST 
0.162 
(2.30)** 
0.218 
(2.82)*** 
0.116 
(3.39)*** 
0.142 
(4.24)*** 
0.045 
(1.85)* 
0.011 
(0.50) 
Adj. R
2 
0.080 0.190 0.309 0.504 0.027 0.027 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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Table 5.18: The results of NAS fees model for the alternative test variable definitions 
(N=674) 
Variables  
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
LNNAF LNTOTALFEES FEERATIO1 FEERATIO2 
Intercept 
-0.407 
(-1.01) 
-0.043 
(-0.23) 
0.448  
(3.69)*** 
1.604 
(1.87)* 
BRDSIZE1  
-0.080 
(-1.70)* 
-0.064 
(-2.30)** 
0.026 
(1.41) 
-0.208 
(-1.69)* 
BRDNED1 
0.121 
(2.11)** 
0.115 
(4.31)*** 
-0.011 
(-0.63) 
-0.165 
(-1.41) 
BRDEXP 
0.073 
(0.37) 
0.059 
(0.65) 
0.049 
(0.83) 
0.250 
(0.64) 
BRDMEET 
-0.012 
(-1.21) 
-0.009 
(-1.92)* 
0.005 
(1.47) 
0.047 
(1.95)* 
ACSIZE 
-0.023 
(-0.66) 
0.021 
(1.27) 
-0.022 
(-2.20)** 
-0.139 
(-2.22)** 
ACIND1 
0.016 
(0.18) 
-0.025 
(-0.58) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
-0.011 
(-0.09) 
ACEXP1 
-0.184 
(-1.77)* 
-0.100 
(-2.06)** 
-0.093 
(-2.81)*** 
-0.386 
(-2.11)** 
ACMEET1 
0.152 
(2.44)** 
0.079 
(2.71)*** 
0.025 
(1.79)* 
0.222 
(1.39) 
INOWN 
0.003 
(1.43) 
0.001 
(0.82) 
0.001 
(1.35) 
0.013 
(1.49) 
BLOCK 
0.002 
(1.38) 
0.001 
(1.98)* 
0.001 
(2.31)** 
0.011 
(2.77)*** 
LEVERG 
0.197 
(1.67)* 
0.256 
(4.66)*** 
-0.030 
(-0.86) 
-0.075 
(-0.33) 
RETURN 
0.001 
(0.63) 
-0.000 
(-0.03) 
0.000  
(0.14) 
-0.003 
(-1.19) 
LNASSET 
0.493 
(8.92)*** 
0.486 
(18.84)*** 
0.020 
(1.22) 
0.032 
(0.30) 
ACQ 
0.018 
(1.40) 
0.026 
(4.23)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.79) 
-0.010 
(-0.50) 
NWFUND 
-0.004 
(-0.05) 
-0.008 
(-0.18) 
-0.072 
(-2.09)** 
-0.613 
(-2.03)** 
NEWDIR 
0.038 
(0.76) 
0.004 
(0.16) 
0.028 
(1.79)* 
0.177 
(1.77)* 
REST 
0.198 
(3.85)*** 
0.130 
(5.43)*** 
0.032 
(2.00)** 
0.118 
(1.22) 
Adj. R
2 
0.244 0.598 0.034 0.062 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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Table 5.19: The results of NAS fees model with the additional control variables (N=674) 
Variables  
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
LNNAF LNTOTALFEES FEERATIO1 FEERATIO2 
Intercept 
0.923 
(-2.55)** 
-0.434 
(-2.61)*** 
0.357 
(3.14)*** 
1.211 
(1.43) 
BRDSIZE 
0.036 
(2.32)** 
0.023 
(3.26)*** 
0.003 
(0.59) 
0.017 
(0.50) 
BRDNED 
0.958 
(3.22)*** 
0.754 
(5.50)*** 
0.050 
(0.53) 
0.445 
(0.69) 
BRDEXP 
0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.028 
(-0.26) 
-0.020 
(-0.27) 
-0.313 
(-0.72) 
BRDMEET 
-0.014 
(-1.37) 
-0.010 
(-2.21)** 
0.004 
(1.25) 
0.043 
(1.64) 
ACSIZE 
-0.055 
(-1.47) 
0.005 
(0.30) 
-0.025 
(-2.10)** 
-0.147 
(-1.98)** 
ACIND 
0.002 
(0.04) 
-0.027 
(-0.94) 
-0.009 
(-0.44) 
-0.096 
(-0.65) 
ACEXP 
-0.067 
(-0.44) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.009 
(-0.19) 
0.142 
(0.42) 
ACMEET 
0.061 
(2.67)*** 
0.037 
(3.54)*** 
0.012 
(1.70)* 
0.082 
(1.27) 
INOWN 
0.004 
(1.69)* 
0.001 
(1.06) 
0.001 
(1.67)* 
0.013 
(1.49) 
BLOCK 
0.002 
(0.99) 
0.001 
(1.56) 
0.001 
(1.84)* 
0.010 
(2.44)** 
LEVERG 
0.193 
(1.64) 
0.267 
(4.95)*** 
-0.0033 
(-0.89) 
-0.076 
(-0.35) 
RETURN 
0.001 
(0.71) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
0.000  
(0.26) 
-0.003 
(-1.16) 
LNASSET 
0.418 
(6.74)*** 
0.436 
(15.26)*** 
0.010 
(0.51) 
-0.056 
(-0.42) 
ACQ 
0.015 
(1.19) 
0.024 
(4.06)*** 
-0.004 
(-0.96) 
-0.018 
(-0.95) 
NWFUND 
0.032 
(0.34) 
0.012 
(0.27) 
-0.062 
(-2.10)** 
-0.547 
(-1.82)* 
NEWDIR 
0.028 
(0.55) 
-0.003 
(-0.15) 
0.027 
(1.72)* 
0.167 
(1.65)* 
REST 
0.194 
(3.80)*** 
0.127 
(5.40)*** 
0.030 
(1.86)* 
0.104 
(1.09) 
ROA 
0.004 
(1.35) 
0.002 
(1.85)* 
-0.001 
(-0.74) 
-0.007 
(-1.22) 
LIQ 
-0.046 
(-0.48) 
0.019 
(0.42) 
-0.027 
(-0.88) 
-0.154 
(-0.80) 
GROWTH 
0.001 
(0.45) 
0.001 
(1.00) 
0.001 
(1.99)** 
0.006 
(2.07)** 
Adj. R
2 
0.260 0.616 0.024 0.058 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
  
201 
 
Table 5.20: Endogeneity test for NAS fees model 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 
 
H0 = the residual of LNNAF, BRDSIZE, BDRNED, BRDMEET, BRDEXP, ACSIZE,  
        ACIND1, ACMEET and ACEXP are exogenous 
 
Reject H0 if  F-statistic significant 
 
Variable 
LNNAF LNTOTALFEES FEERATIO1 FEERATIO2 
Chi2 (1) 
LNNAF 2.544 (p=0.110) 0.361 (p=0.548) 2.544 (p=0.110) 0.249 (p=0.617) 
BRDSIZE  0.188 (p=0.664) 0.191 (p=0.661) 0.188 (p=0.664) 0.021 (p=0.884) 
BRDNED 1.492 (p=0.221) 0.133 (p=0.715) 1.492 (p=0.221) 0.076 (p=0.782) 
BRDEXP 0.250 (p=0.614) 0.088 (p=0.766) 0.254 (p=0.614) 0.001 (p=0.965) 
BRDMEET 0.136 (p=0.711) 0.106 (p=0.744) 0.136 (p=0.711) 0.092 (p=0.760) 
ACSIZE 0.016 (p=0.898) 0.930 (p=0.335) 0.016 (p=0.898) 0.269 (p=0.603) 
ACIND1 1.299 (p=0.254) 0.185 (p=0.667) 1.299 (p=0.254) 0.188 (p=0.664) 
ACEXP 0.101 (p=0.750) 0.026 (p=0.870) 0.101 (p=0.750) 0.031 (p=0.859) 
ACMEET 0.205 (p=0.650) 1.069 (p=0.301) 0.205 (p=0.650) 1.026 (p=0.310) 
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5.6 ANALYSIS II1: INDUSTRY SPECIALIST AUDITOR 
5.6.1 Univariate test 
Table 5.21 presents the results of mean differences tests for all the variables in the 
industry specialist model according to the dichotomous definitions of SPEC_AUD. 
Based on the SPECLST_MSLEADER and the SPECLST_30MS definitionss, industry 
specialists are employed in 274 and 364 firm-years, while non-specialist auditors are 
employed in 400 and 310, respectively. In general, the results of the t-test using the 
SPECLST_30MS definition show more significant differences between the groups of 
auditors in the hypothesis and control variables than using the SPEC_MSLEADER 
definition. 
 
The results of the t-tests of both definitions show that the firms with the larger board 
size tend to employ industry specialists rather than non-specialist auditors, while the 
boards with higher levels of financial expertise are more likely to appoint a non-
specialist auditor. However, there are no significant differences between the two 
groups of auditors for firms that have higher percentages of independent board 
members and higher board meeting frequencies.  
 
In regard to audit committee characteristics, the results of the t-tests suggest that there 
are significant differences in audit committee size between the two groups of auditors. 
Both dichotomous definitions suggest that the larger audit committees are more likely 
to appoint industry specialists than they are to appoint non-specialist auditors. The 
result for independent audit committees is conditional. Under the 
SPECLST_MSLEADER definition, the results for independent audit committees show 
no significant difference between these two groups of auditors. However, using the 
SPECLST_30MS definition, the likelihood of firms with solely independent audit 
committees is higher in the group that employ industry specialist auditors than in the 
group that employ non-specialist auditors. These findings are consistent with Chen et 
al. (2005). However, when either definition is used, audit committee expertise and 
audit committee meeting frequencies do not appear to be associated with any 
significant difference between the group of firms using industry specialists and the 
group of firms using non-specialists. 
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The means that the levels of LNASSETS, LEVERGN, SQSUBS and FORGNSALE are 
higher for firms with specialist auditors, and this is consistent with the argument that: 
the higher a firms‟ risk and the higher the complexity of firm operations, the more the 
need for a higher quality auditor (Collier and Gregory, 1996; Simon and Francis, 
1988). In addition, the result also suggests that the firms with higher percentages of 
total shares owned by the directors (INOWN) are more likely to employ non-
specialists, and this is consistent with the report found in Abbott and Parker (2000).  
 
 5.6.2 Multivariate regression 
The results for the IND_SPEC model are presented in Table 5.22, by year and by 
pooled samples.
67
 However, SPECLST_MS, SPECLST_PS and 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED are modelled only on the pooled sample due to the lack of F-
statistics for several years. The adjusted R
2
s, or pseudo-R
2
s, for all models are 
between 6.2% and 15.9%, and these values are relatively higher than those reported in 
Abbott et al.‟ (2003b) and Chen et al.‟ (2005), who report them to be in between 2 % 
and 10 %, and 6.7% and 7.6 % respectively.  
 
In general, the regression results for SPEC_AUD, which is measured using the market 
share approach, are relatively consistent across both the year-by-year and the pooled 
samples. In contradiction to the expectation, the present study finds that BRDSIZE is 
significant and positively related to SPECLIST_MSLEADER, SPECLST_MS30 and 
SPECLST_MS in the year 2005 and in the pooled models but that it is insignificantly 
related to other measures. Similarly, BRDNED is found to be negatively related to 
SPECLST_MS30 and SPECLST_MS in the year 2007 and in the pooled sample. 
However, it is insignificant with the SPECLIST_MSLEADER, SPECLST_PS and 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED. Likely, BRDEXP is also insignificant with all the other 
auditor industry specialist measures. BRMEET is conditional on the auditor industry 
specialist measures. It is significant and negatively related to SPECLST_MS and 
positively related to SPECLST_PS, but it is not significantly related to 
SPECLST_MS30, SPECLIST_MSLEADER or SPECLST_WEIGHTED.  
                                                          
67
 For the SPECLIST_MSLEADER and the SPECLST_MS30 measures, the present study employs the 
hetroscedastic ordinal regression and logit regression, since the dependent variable is dichotomous. The 
hetroscedastic ordinal regression is estimated using the function of the oglm command in Stata.  
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Table 5.21: Univariate tests  
SPEC_AUD 
SPECLST_MSLEADER SPECLST_30MS 
Mean Std. Dev. 
t-test 
Mean Std. Dev. 
t-test 
Specialization 
1 
(N=274) 
0 
(N=400) 
1 
(N=274) 
0 
(N=400) 
1 
(N=364) 
0  
(N=310) 
1 
(N=364) 
0  
(N=310) 
BRDSIZE 9.843 8.763 2.586 1.965 -6.156*** 9.676 8.645 2.529 1.849 -5.947*** 
BRDNED 0.462 0.453 0.121 0.113 -0.951 0.463 0.449 0.119 0.112 -1.492 
BRDEXP 0.327 0.369 0.130 0.148 3.781*** 0.341 0.364 0.136 0.149 2.039** 
BRDMEET 8.504 8.730 2.400 2.703 1.117 8.574 8.713 2.357 2.830 0.694 
ACSIZE 3.762 3.548 0.929 0.758 -3.301*** 3.736 3.516 0.934 0.691 -3.427*** 
ACIND 0.737 0.713 0.441 0.453 -0.703 0.755 0.684 0.430 0.466 -2.073** 
ACEXP 0.374 0.397 0.183 0.226 1.346 0.394 0.379 0.189 0.232 -0.927 
ACMEET 4.015 4.005 1.155 1.253 -0.101 3.964 4.061 1.087 1.346 1.035 
INOWN 3.563 4.638 10.050 13.503 1.122 3.034 5.572 9.005 15.051 2.699*** 
LNASSET 6.306 6.084 0.612 0.516 -5.068*** 6.288 6.041 0.602 0.492 -5.777*** 
LEVERGN 0.654 0.631 0.224 0.211 -1.348 0.660 0.617 0.212 0.220 -2.586*** 
NWFUNDRATIO 0.108 0.149 0.261 0.542 1.181 0.102 0.168 0.235 0.611 1.872 
ROA 9.949 9.604 7.764 9.946 -0.482 9.639 9.867 7.781 10.484 0.323 
SQSUB 4.916 4.556 2.227 1.956 -2.218** 4.937 4.428 2.168 1.931 -3.189 
FORGSALE 48.198 43.872 35.268 36.187 -1.540 49.600 40.971 35.472 35.794 -3.134*** 
Specialization is according to dummy definitions. The value 1 is denotes firms that employ industry specialist auditor, 0 if otherwise. The significant 
level is based on two tailed tests, *** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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ACSIZE is significant and negatively related only to SPECLST_PS and 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED in the pooled sample, while ACIND is significant and 
positively related across all the auditor industry specialist measures in the pooled 
samples, except in SPECLIST_MSLEADER model. This positive relationship may 
suggest that the audit committees comprised solely of independent members are more 
likely to appoint industry specialist auditors than non-specialist auditors.  In contrast 
to the prediction and the prior documented evidence, the present study finds that in 
most years and in the pooled sample, ACMEET is significant and negatively related to 
all the auditors industry specialist measures (except SPECLST_PS), suggesting that 
firms with lower audit committee meetings frequencies are more likely to appoint 
industry specialist auditors. However, ACEXP is found to be insignificantly related 
with all the IND_SPEC measures.  
 
INOWN is found to be negatively related to SPECLST_MS30 and SPECLST_MS in 
pooled sample. This may indicate that, as the percentage of insider ownership 
increases, there is less need for industry specialist auditors and this is due to the 
volume of detailed information that is received by the directors.  LNASSET and 
LEVERGN suggest positive relationships with IND_SPEC in most models, suggesting 
that larger firms and higher leverage firms require more specialist auditors in order to 
compensate for the increases in agency costs. In contrast to the prediction, 
NWFUNDRATIO is found to be negatively related to the most of SPEC_AUD 
measures, while ROA, SQSUB and FORGNSALE are positively related to SPEC_AUD 
in most models under the pooled samples. This indicates that higher risk firms and the 
more complex firms‟ have an increased need for industry specialist auditors. 
 
Overall, the results for board and audit committee characteristics and related control 
variables are sensitive to the choice of SPEC_AUD measures. However, despite the 
inconsistent results in year-by-year analysis, in the pooled model, in four out of five 
of auditor industry specialist measures, ACIND and ACMEET are found to be 
significantly related to the use of industry specialist auditors. The firms with audit 
committees that are comprised solely of independent members are more likely to 
engage industry specialist auditors. In addition, contrary to the expectation, the higher 
audit committee meetings frequencies are not necessarily associated to the choice of 
higher quality auditors.   
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Table 5.22: The results of multivariate regression for auditor industry specialist  model  
SPEC_AUD= α
0
 + β
1
BRDSIZE + β
2
BRDNED + β
3
BRDEXP + β4BRDMEET +   β5ACSIZE + β6ACIND + β7ACEXP+  β8ACMEET + β9INOWN + 
β
10
LNASSET + β
11
LEVERG + β12NWFUNDRATIO + β13ROA + β14SQSUB + β15FORGSALE + ε    
The dependent variable of SPEC_AUD is measured as follows:  
 (1)  SPECLST_MSLEADER ; (2) SPECLST_MS30; (3) SPECLST_MS; (4) SPECLST_PS; and (5) SPECLST_WEIGHTED 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics)
a 
2005 (N=167) 2006 (N=181) 2007 (N=181) 2008 (N=145) Pooled (N=674) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 
6.068 
(2.59)** 
7.257 
(2.98)*** 
4.785 
(2.00)** 
5.267 
(2.16)** 
3.640 
(1.51) 
4.718 
(1.84)* 
5.973  
(2.13)** 
8.996 
(2.99)** 
4.426 
(3.86)*** 
5.952 
(4.93)*** 
-0.187 
(-1.66)* 
0.097 
(1.47) 
-0.019 
(-0.65) 
BRDSIZE 
0.291  
(2.28)** 
0.293 
(2.31)** 
0.144 
(1.37) 
0.029 
(0.27) 
0.055  
(0.50) 
0.046 
(0.39) 
0.173 
(1.41) 
0.225 
(1.78)* 
0.126 
(2.39)** 
0.114 
(2.09)** 
0.014  
(2.84)*** 
-0.005 
(-1.50) 
0.000 
(0.23) 
BRDNED 
-0.390 
(-0.18) 
-1.812 
(-0.85) 
-0.081 
(-0.04) 
-1.276 
(-0.60) 
-3.126  
(-1.53) 
 -5.227 
(-2.37)** 
0.417 
(0.18) 
0.603 
(0.26) 
-0.898 
(-0.90) 
-1.778 
(-1.74)* 
-0.215 
(-2.26)** 
-0.045 
(-0.73) 
-0.037  
(-1.33) 
BRDEXP 
-0.838 
(-0.48) 
0.074 
(0.04) 
-2.449 
(-1.45) 
-2.980 
(-1.77)* 
-0.833 
(-0.55) 
-0.255 
(-0.17) 
0.162 
(0.08) 
0.822 
(0.40) 
-1.154 
(-1.43) 
-0.712 
(-0.88) 
0.008 
(0.11) 
-0.018 
(-0.36) 
-0.030 
(-1.35) 
BRDMEET 
0.005 
(0.06) 
0.012 
(0.15) 
-0.071 
(-1.06) 
-0.062 
(-0.99) 
0.110 
(1.46) 
0.130 
(1.64) 
-0.050  
(-0.58) 
-0.007  
(-0.08) 
-0.011 
(-0.31) 
0.010 
(0.30) 
-0.007  
(-2.06)** 
0.007  
(2.98)*** 
0.002 
(1.38) 
ACSIZE 
-0.218 
(-0.78) 
-0.177  
(-0.64) 
-0.359 
(-1.31) 
0.180 
(0.62) 
0.426 
(1.50) 
0.545 
(1.63) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.242 
(-0.84) 
0.020  
(0.17) 
0.069 
(0.54) 
0.006 
(0.54) 
-0.017 
(-2.25)** 
-0.006  
(-1.80)* 
ACIND 
0.224 
(0.50) 
0.212 
(0.48) 
0.543 
(1.18) 
0.528 
(1.16) 
-0.141 
(-0.33) 
0.627 
(1.39) 
0.723 
(1.25) 
0.908 
(1.70)* 
0.234 
(1.09) 
0.491 
(2.25)** 
0.042 
(1.95)** 
0.037 
(2.76)*** 
0.015 
(2.42)** 
ACEXP 
0.384  
(0.33) 
0.475 
(0.42) 
1.011 
(0.88) 
2.465 
(2.11)** 
0.224  
(0.26) 
0.982  
(1.06) 
-1.569 
(-1.19) 
-0.265 
(-0.20) 
0.039 
(0.08) 
0.825 
(1.54) 
-0.021 
(-0.43) 
0.036 
(1.08) 
0.017 
(1.07) 
ACMEET 
-0.326 
(-1.91)* 
-0.392 
(-2.33)** 
-0.226 
(-1.37) 
-0.168 
(-1.03) 
-0.276 
(-1.65)* 
-0.438 
(-2.55)** 
0.344  
(1.62) 
-0.122  
(-0.58) 
-0.151 
(-1.92)* 
-0.291 
(-3.63)*** 
-0.021 
(-3.16)*** 
-0.006 
(-1.05) 
-0.004 
(-1.66)* 
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Table 5.22 (continued) 
INOWN 
0.001 
(0.08) 
-0.003 
(-0.23) 
0.003 
(0.19) 
-0.011 
(-0.67) 
-0.018 
(-1.12) 
-0.034 
(-1.75)* 
-0.017 
(-0.71) 
-0.028 
(-1.24) 
-0.006 
(-0.79) 
-0.016 
(-2.08)** 
-0.001 
(-3.05)*** 
0.000 
(0.62) 
-0.000 
(-0.11) 
LNASSET 
0.638 
(1.53) 
1.052 
(2.47)** 
0.882  
(1.94)** 
0.819 
(1.79)* 
0.369 
(0.86) 
0.500 
(1.11) 
0.552 
(1.15) 
1.037 
(2.08)** 
0.571 
(2.79)*** 
0.847 
(3.99)*** 
0.087 
(4.35)*** 
-0.004 
(-0.31) 
0.010 
(1.84)* 
LEVERGN 
1.609 
(1.77)* 
1.552 
(1.70) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
0.491 
(0.67) 
0.552 
(0.63) 
1.683 
(1.80)* 
-0.478 
(-0.44) 
0.757 
(0.70) 
0.423 
(1.06) 
0.918 
(2.19)** 
0.063 
(1.53) 
0.072  
(2.74)*** 
0.034 
(2.92)*** 
NWFUNDRATIO 
0.758 
(0.68) 
0.343  
(0.31) 
-0.148  
(-0.29) 
-0.382  
(-0.73) 
-0.911 
(-1.21) 
-1.489 
(-1.76)* 
-1.908  
(-1.08) 
-0.709  
(-0.41) 
-0.320 
(-1.01) 
-0.651 
(-1.78)* 
-0.018 
(-1.35) 
-0.037 
(-4.48)*** 
-0.013 
(-3.25)*** 
ROA 
0.008 
(0.35) 
-0.019 
(-0.77) 
0.031 
(1.40) 
0.019 
(0.90) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
0.003 
(0.17) 
0.048 
(2.06)** 
0.043 
(1.95)* 
0.017 
(1.73)* 
0.013 
(1.34) 
0.002 
(1.83)* 
0.000 
(0.50) 
0.000 
(0.96) 
SQSUB 
0.002 
(0.02) 
-0.061 
(-0.65) 
0.065 
(0.76) 
0.084 
(0.96) 
0.087 
(1.02) 
0.104 
(1.13) 
-0.076 
(-0.75) 
-0.019 
(-0.18) 
0.036 
(0.83) 
0.041 
(0.94) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
0.013 
(5.05)*** 
0.005 
(3.80)*** 
FORGSALE 
0.003 
(0.58) 
0.002 
(0.27) 
0.000 
(0.06) 
0.007 
(1.25) 
0.004  
(0.69) 
0.010  
(1.69) 
-0.005 
(-0.73) 
0.010 
(1.62) 
0.001 
(0.52) 
0.007 
(2.57)*** 
0.000 
(0.90) 
0.001 
(5.49)*** 
0.000 
(3.24)*** 
Adj. R2/ Pseudo 
R2 
0.120 0.137 0.092 0.108 0.103 0.168 0.134 0.159 0.062 0.099 0.127 0.148 0.095 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10, a=z-statistics for hetroskedastic ordinal regression. 
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5.6.3 The additional analyses and robustness tests 
Several tests are performed to observe whether the main results of the auditor industry 
specialist models are robust to various other model specifications. These tests include 
the heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity check, different regression estimators, 
alternative definitions of hypotheses variables, additional control variables, an 
endogeneity test and the 2SLS regression. 
 
5.6.3.1 Heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity checks 
The results of heteroscedasticity test are presented in Table 5.23, according to the 
specific auditor industry specialist measures. All models indicate significant p-values 
that range from p<0.01 and p<0.10, suggesting that the models are heteroscedastic.
68
  
 
Table 5.24 presents the result of VIF and tolerance values.
69
 None of the variables had 
a VIF value of more than 10 or a tolerance value lower than 0.10. This may suggest 
that the models had no indication of a multicollinearity problem. 
 
5.6.3.2 Different regression estimators 
Previously, SPEC_MSLEADER and SPECLST_MS30 were estimated using 
heteroscedastic ordinal regression and the other measures were regressed using a least 
square regression with robust standard errors, which is efficient in controlling for 
heteroscedasticity. As the benchmark of comparison, in this section, 
SPEC_MSLEADER and SPECLST_MS30 regressed using probit regression, while 
other measures are estimated using OLS and GLS regressions. The results are 
presented in Table 5.25. As can be seen, the results of GLS, OLS and Probit 
regressions are relatively consistent with the main finding, suggesting that the main 
results are robust to different regression estimators. 
 
 
                                                          
68
For dependent variable which is a continuous version (e.g. SPECLST_MS, SPECLST_PS and 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED), the heteroscedasticity test was performed using the Breusch-Pagan or Cook-
Weisberg test, while for dichotomous version (e.g. SPECLST_MSLEADER and SPECLST_MS30),   the 
present study used the heteroskedasticity test for Logit/ Probit model that available in Stata program by 
using the hetprob command.  
69
 This result is based on the modelling of SPECLST_WEIGHTED as a dependent variable. The other 
models indicate relatively similar VIF and tolerance values. 
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5.6.3.3 New definitions for board and audit committee variables 
As with the audit fees and NAS fees model, new definitions of board and audit 
committee variables are introduced to see whether the results are robust to alternative 
specifications of variables. Following the approach of Abbott et al. (2003) and 
DeFond et al. (2005), the variables are: (1) BRDSIZE1, which is coded as 1 if the 
firm‟s board size is less than the sample median, and 0 if otherwise; (2) BRDNED1, 
which is coded as 1 if 60% of the firm‟s directors are independent, and 0 if otherwise;  
(3) ACIND1, which is defined as the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on the audit committee; (4) ACEXP1, which is coded as 1 if the audit 
committee has at least one director who is equipped with financial expertise, and 0 if 
otherwise; (5) ACMEET1, which is is coded as 1 if the audit committee meeting 
frequency is more than the sample median, and 0 if otherwise. The other variable 
definitions remained unchanged.  
 
The results are presented in Table 5.26. The main results suggest that, in the pooled 
sample, four out of five SPEC_AUD measures indicate that audit committees with 
solely independent members and lower audit committee meetings frequencies are 
associated with a greater likelihood of industry specialist auditors being chosen. 
However, when the new definitions are introduced to audit committee independence 
variable and audit committee meeting frequency variable, none of these variables are 
significant (except for ACMEET1 and SPECLST_MS30). In addition, the present 
study finds consistent evidence that firms with audit committees with at least one 
member equipped with financial expertise are more likely to employ industry 
specialist auditor. In summary, the results for ACIND and ACMEET in the main 
findings are sensitive to new definitions.  
 
5.6.3.4 Additional control variables 
In line with the audit fees and NAS fees models, several control variables are included 
in the primary model to see whether the inclusion of these variables affect the results. 
These variables are liquidity ratio (LIQ), and growth (GROWTH), which are predicted 
to be positively related to the employment of industry specialist auditors. Prior 
literature suggests that higher risk firms and higher growth firms are associated with 
higher agency cost (Francis and Wilson, 1988; Firth and Smith, 1992) and that they 
are thus likely to engage industry specialist auditor.  The results are presented in Table 
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5.27. The results for hypothesis variables and the main control variables are relatively 
similar to the main findings. LIQ and GROWTH are insignificant to all SPEC_AUD 
measures. Overall, the main finding is unchanged and the additional control variables 
are unlikely to affect the results.   
 
5.6.3.5 Endogeneity and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression  
In line with the approach used with the previous models, the present study performs 
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (for continuous dependent variables) and the Wald test 
(for dichotomous dependent variables) to see whether the corporate governance 
variables are associated with the endogeneity problem. BRDSIZE, BDRNED, 
BRDMEET, BRDEXP, ACSIZE, ACIND1, ACMEET and ACEXP are treated as 
endogenous variables. The results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test are presented in 
Table 5.28. As can be seen, most of the corporate governance variables show 
insignificant F-statistics, except for BRDSIZE (in the SPECLST_MSLEADER model), 
BDRMEET (for the SPECLIST_MS and the SPECLST_WEIGHTED measures) and 
ACMEET (for most of SPEC_AUD measures), each of which suggest significant F-
statistics, indicating the presence of endogeneity.  
 
Furthermore, 2SLS tests are performed on selected models that contain endogenous 
variables in order to mitigate the potential bias in the main model of SPEC_AUD.
70
 
Table 5.29 presents the results of 2SLS regressions. The results are relatively similar 
to the main findings. ACIND is positively and significantly related with SPEC_AUD 
(except SPECLST_MSLEADER), while ACMEET has a negative relationship to 
SPEC_AUD, suggesting that the audit committees that are comprised solely of 
independent members and that have a lower frequency of meetings are more likely to 
appoint industry specialist audits. This is consistent with the inference that is made 
from the main findings. The others hypotheses variables and control variables remain 
unchanged. 
 
  
                                                          
70
 For the models that have dichotomous dependent variables the 2SLS test are regressed using the 
Stata command, ivprobit, while for the models that contained continuous dependent variables the 
command is ivregress.  
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Table 5.23: Heteroscedasticity test for auditor industry specialist model 
 
H0 = The variance of the residuals is constant  
 
Reject H0 if  p-value is significant 
 
Dependent variable chi2 Prob > chi2   
SPECLST_MSLEADER 27.99 0.000 
SPECLST_30MS 35.97 0.000 
SPECLIST_MS 5.67 0.017 
SPECLIST_PS 33.63 0.000 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED 17.01 0.000 
   
 
Table 5.24: VIF and tolerance values for auditor industry specialist model  
Variables VIF Tolerance 
BRDSIZE 2.08 0.481 
BRDNED 2.00 0.500 
LNASSET 1.93 0.518 
BRDEXP 1.92 0.522 
ACEXP 1.72 0.581 
ACSIZE 1.60 0.624 
ACIND 1.38 0.726 
ACMEET 1.28 0.780 
FORGSALE 1.27 0.786 
BRDMEET 1.21 0.825 
SQSUB 1.18 0.845 
LEVERG 1.12 0.896 
INOWN 1.10 0.912 
ROA 1.09 0.914 
NWFUNDRATIO 1.03 0.975 
Mean VIF 1.46  
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Table 5.25: The results of different estimators for auditor industry specialist model (N=674) 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics)
a 
GLS regression OLS regression Probit regression 
SPECLST_MS SPECLST_PS 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
SPECLST_MS SPECLST_PS 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
SPECLST_ 
MSLEADER 
SPECLST_MS30 
Intercept 
-0.167 
(-1.46) 
0.091 
(1.33) 
-0.020 
(-0.67) 
-0.187 
(-1.74)* 
0.097 
(1.34) 
-0.019 
(-0.58) 
-2.702 
(-3.89)*** 
-3.618 
(-5.00)*** 
BRDSIZE 
0.014 
(2.92)*** 
-0.005 
(-1.53) 
0.000 
(0.21) 
0.014 
(2.76)*** 
-0.005 
(-1.44) 
0.000 
(0.25) 
0.077 
(2.41)** 
0.070 
(2.13)** 
BRDNED 
-0.216 
(-2.26)** 
-0.047 
(-0.76) 
-0.038 
(-1.36) 
 -0.215 
(-2.25)** 
-0.045 
(-0.70) 
-0.037 
(-1.27) 
-0.580 
(-0.94) 
-1.120 
(-1.81)* 
BRDEXP 
-0.005 
(-0.07) 
-0.015 
(-0.30) 
-0.030 
(-1.35) 
0.008 
(0.11) 
-0.018 
(-0.35) 
-0.030 
(-1.29) 
-0.715 
(-1.45) 
-0.440 
(-0.90) 
BRDMEET 
-0.006 
(-1.83)* 
0.007 
(3.08)*** 
0.002 
(1.58) 
-0.007 
(-2.02)** 
0.007  
(3.09)*** 
0.002  
(1.47) 
-0.007 
(-0.32) 
0.006 
(0.28) 
ACSIZE 
0.006 
(0.50) 
-0.016 
(-2.12)** 
-0.006 
(-1.73)* 
0.006 
(0.55) 
-0.017 
(-2.07)** 
-0.006 
(-1.72)* 
0.014 
(0.18) 
0.044 
(0.56) 
ACIND 
0.041 
(1.87)* 
0.037 
(2.76)*** 
0.015 
(2.41)** 
0.042 
(2.04)** 
0.037 
(2.65)*** 
0.015 
(2.33)** 
0.143 
(1.09) 
0.304 
(2.30)** 
ACEXP 
-0.009 
(-0.19) 
0.039 
(1.16) 
0.020 
(1.27) 
-0.021 
(-0.43) 
0.036 
(1.08) 
0.017 
(1.10) 
0.026 
(0.08) 
0.481 
(1.56) 
ACMEET 
-0.021 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.006 
(-1.20) 
-0.005 
(-1.82)** 
-0.021 
(-2.89)*** 
-0.006  
(-1.12) 
-0.004  
(-1.92)* 
-0.091 
(-1.91)* 
-0.177 
(-3.68)*** 
INOWN 
-0.001 
(-2.88)*** 
0.000 
(0.69) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
 -0.001 
(-2.11)** 
0.000 
(0.62) 
-0.000 
(-0.11) 
-0.004 
(-0.80) 
-0.010 
(-2.15)** 
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Table 5.25 (continued) 
LNASSET 
0.084 
(4.11)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.27) 
0.010 
(1.82)* 
 0.087 
(4.56)*** 
-0.004 
(-0.29) 
0.010 
(1.69)* 
0.347 
(2.80)*** 
0.515 
(4.06)*** 
LEVERGN 
0.052 
(1.26) 
0.065 
(2.43)** 
0.030 
(2.54)** 
 0.063 
(1.57) 
0.072 
(2.78)*** 
0.034 
(2.88)*** 
0.275 
(1.12) 
0.574 
(2.33)** 
NWFUNDRATIO 
-0.019 
(-1.53) 
-0.036 
(-4.76)*** 
-0.012 
(-3.52)*** 
 -0.018 
(-1.03) 
-0.037 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.013 
(-2.37)** 
-0.182 
(-1.01) 
-0.370 
(-1.87)* 
ROA 
0.002 
(1.74)* 
0.000 
(0.61) 
0.000 
(1.05) 
 0.002 
(2.06)** 
0.000 
(0.39) 
0.000 
(0.78) 
0.010 
(1.75)* 
0.008 
(1.37) 
SQSUB 
0.000 
(0.10) 
0.014 
(5.47)*** 
0.005 
(4.13)*** 
 0.001 
(0.16) 
0.013 
(4.85)*** 
0.005 
(3.86)*** 
0.023 
(0.86) 
0.025 
(0.94) 
FORGSALE 
0.000 
(1.15) 
0.001 
(5.43)*** 
0.000 
(3.36)*** 
 0.000 
(0.96) 
0.001 
(5.31)*** 
0.000 
(3.28)*** 
0.001 
(0.56) 
0.004 
(2.58)** 
Adj. R
2
/ Pseudo 
R
2 0.120 0.153 0.100 0.127 0.148 0.095 0.062 0.100 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10, a=z-statistics for probit regression. 
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Table 5.26: The results of auditor industry specialist model for the alternative test variable 
definitions (N=674) 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics)
a 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 
4.364 
(3.27)*** 
5.820 
(4.24)*** 
-0.124 
(-0.97) 
-0.014 
(-0.17) 
-0.049  
(-1.40) 
BRDSIZE1 
-0.252 
(-1.27) 
-0.279 
(-1.42) 
-0.020 
(-1.04) 
0.017 
(1.25) 
0.002 
(0.30) 
BRDNED1 
-0.101 
(-0.52) 
-0.203 
(-1.07) 
-0.007 
(-0.37) 
-0.021 
(-1.65)* 
-0.008 
(-1.49) 
BRDEXP 
-1.989 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.863 
(-1.32) 
-0.080 
(-1.29) 
-0.016 
(-0.38) 
-0.036 
(-1.90)* 
BRDMEET 
-0.032 
(-0.94) 
-0.018 
(-0.55) 
-0.010 
(-3.13)*** 
0.007 
(3.24)*** 
0.001 
(1.14) 
ACSIZE 
0.040 
(0.31) 
0.039  
(0.32) 
0.007 
(0.66) 
-0.019 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.19)** 
ACIND1 
-0.276 
(-0.82) 
-0.124 
(-0.42) 
-0.030 
(-1.09) 
0.037 
(1.22) 
0.007 
(0.68) 
ACEXP1 
1.073 
(2.88)*** 
1.124 
(3.13)*** 
0.044 
(1.19) 
0.064  
(3.34)*** 
0.029 
(2.95)*** 
ACMEET1 
-0.118 
(-0.58) 
-0.426 
(-2.06)** 
-0.028 
(-1.47) 
-0.002 
(-0.18) 
-0.005 
(-0.76) 
INOWN 
-0.003 
(-0.37) 
-0.012 
(-1.57) 
-0.001 
(-2.31)** 
 0.000 
(0.73) 
0.000 
(0.18) 
LNASSET 
0.580 
(3.16)*** 
0.748 
(3.94)*** 
0.080 
(4.54)*** 
 -0.007 
(-0.62) 
0.009 
(1.77)* 
LEVERGN 
0.442 
(1.11) 
0.917 
(2.23)** 
0.068 
(1.62) 
 0.074 
(2.85)*** 
0.035 
(3.05)*** 
NWFUNDRATIO 
-0.277 
(-0.90) 
-0.631 
(1.72)* 
-0.018 
(-1.33) 
 -0.036 
(-4.46)*** 
-0.013 
(-3.35)*** 
ROA 
0.014 
(1.48) 
0.010 
(1.00) 
0.002 
(1.52) 
 0.000 
(0.28) 
0.000 
(0.69) 
SQSUB 
0.055 
(1.30) 
0.056 
(1.30) 
0.003 
(0.90) 
 0.013 
(5.14)*** 
0.006 
(4.08)*** 
FORGSALE 
0.001 
(0.27) 
0.006 
(2.27)* 
0.000 
(0.26) 
 0.001 
(5.81)*** 
0.000 
(3.32)*** 
Adj. R
2
/ Pseudo 
R
2 0.062 0.085 0.099 0.150 0.093 
The dependent variable of SPEC_AUD is measured as follows:  
 (1)  SPECLST_MSLEADER ; (2) SPECLST_MS30; (3) SPECLST_MS; (4) SPECLST_PS; 
and (5) SPECLST_WEIGHTED 
 *** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10, a=z-statistics for 
hetroskedastic ordinal regression. 
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Table 5.27: The results of auditor industry specialist model with the additional control 
variables (N=674) 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics)
a 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 
4.458 
(3.87)*** 
5.924 
(4.90)*** 
-0.190 
(-1.68)* 
0.094 
(1.40) 
-0.020 
(-0.69) 
BRDSIZE 
0.127 
(2.40)** 
0.113 
(2.05)** 
0.014 
(2.88)*** 
-0.005 
(-1.43) 
0.000 
(0.27) 
BRDNED 
-1.043 
(-1.03) 
-1.882 
(-1.83)* 
-0.218 
(-2.28)** 
 -0.051 
(-0.84) 
-0.042 
(-1.46) 
BRDEXP 
-1.147 
(-1.42) 
-0.724 
(-0.89) 
0.009 
(0.12) 
-0.017 
(-0.33) 
-0.030 
(-1.31) 
BRDMEET 
-0.011 
(-0.30) 
0.010 
(0.28) 
-0.007 
(-2.05)* 
0.007 
(2.99)*** 
0.002  
(1.39) 
ACSIZE 
0.016 
(0.13) 
0.068  
(0.53) 
0.006 
(0.52) 
-0.017 
(-2.31)** 
-0.006 
(-1.86)* 
ACIND 
0.244 
(1.13) 
0.497 
(2.28)** 
0.042 
(1.95)* 
0.037 
(2.77)*** 
0.015 
(2.44)** 
ACEXP 
0.046  
(0.09) 
0.858 
(1.59) 
-0.023 
(-0.46) 
0.035 
(1.03) 
0.016 
(1.03) 
ACMEET 
-0.150 
(-1.90)* 
-0.288 
(-3.58)*** 
-0.021 
(-3.17)*** 
-0.006 
(-1.07) 
-0.004  
(-1.65)* 
INOWN 
-0.005 
(-0.73) 
-0.015 
(-1.99)** 
-0.001 
(-3.07)*** 
 0.000 
(0.60) 
-0.000 
(-0.09) 
LNASSET 
0.589 
(2.87)*** 
0.856 
(4.02)*** 
0.088 
(4.38)*** 
 -0.003 
(-0.23) 
0.011 
(1.97)** 
LEVERGN 
0.416 
(1.03) 
0.894 
(2.11)** 
0.065 
(1.54) 
 0.073 
(2.76)*** 
0.034 
(2.88)*** 
NWFUNDRATIO 
-0.246 
(-0.79) 
-0.576 
(-1.64) 
-0.018 
(-1.31) 
-0.035 
(-4.56)*** 
-0.012 
(-3.32)*** 
ROA 
0.017 
(1.78)* 
0.014 
(1.39) 
0.002 
(1.82)* 
 0.000 
(0.51) 
0.000 
(1.00) 
SQSUB 
0.037 
(0.87) 
0.043 
(0.97) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
 0.013 
(5.04)*** 
0.005 
(3.80)*** 
FORGSALE 
0.002 
(0.62) 
0.007 
(2.62)*** 
0.000 
(0.92) 
 0.001 
(5.49)*** 
0.000 
(3.32)*** 
LIQ 
-0.274 
(-0.84) 
-0.072 
(-0.22) 
-0.018 
(-0.53) 
 0.000 
(0.09) 
-0.012 
(-1.23) 
GROWTH 
-0.002 
(-0.54) 
-0.003 
(-0.75) 
0.000 
(0.19) 
 -0.024 
(-1.14) 
-0.000 
(-0.26) 
Adj. R
2
/ Pseudo 
R
2 0.064 0.100 0.127 0.149 0.098 
The dependent variable of SPEC_AUD is measured as follows:  
 (1)  SPECLST_MSLEADER ; (2) SPECLST_MS30; (3) SPECLST_MS; (4) SPECLST_PS; 
and (5) SPECLST_WEIGHTED 
 *** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10, a=z-statistics for 
hetroskedastic ordinal regression. 
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Table 5.28: Endogeneity test for industry specialist model 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test and Wald test 
 
H0 = the residual of BRDSIZE, BDRNED, BRDMEET, BRDEXP, ACSIZE,  
        ACIND1, ACMEET and ACEXP are exogenous 
 
Reject H0 if  F-statistic significant 
 
Variable 
Chi2 (1) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BRDSIZE  
3.74 
(p=0.053) 
2.58 
(p=0.108) 
2.620 
(p=0.105) 
0.238 
(p=0.625) 
2.620 
(p=0.105) 
BRDNED 
0.11 
(p=0.744) 
0.44 
(p=0.506) 
0.048 
(p=0.825) 
0.079 
(p=0.779) 
0.048 
(p=0.825) 
BRDEXP 
0.24 
(p=0.624) 
0.03 
(p=0.868) 
0.004 
(p=0.984) 
0.062 
(p=0.802) 
0.000 
(p=0.984) 
BRDMEET 
0.32 
(p=0.574) 
0.65 
(p=0.421) 
2.813 
(p=0.093) 
1.351 
(p=0.245) 
2.813 
(p=0.093) 
ACSIZE 
0.03 
(p=0.866) 
0.18 
(p=0.670) 
0.198 
(p=0.656) 
0.210 
(p=0.646) 
0.198 
(p=0.656) 
ACIND1 
1.01 
(p=0.315) 
0.86 
(p=0.354) 
0.080 
(p=0.777) 
1.339 
(p=0.247) 
0.080 
(p=0.777) 
ACEXP 
0.41 
(p=0.520) 
0.68 
(p=0.410) 
0.078 
(p=0.780) 
0.497 
(p=0.480) 
0.077 
(p=0.780) 
ACMEET 
10.06 
(p=0.001) 
5.67 
(p=0.017) 
7.47 
(p=0.006) 
1.507 
(p=0.219) 
7.470 
(p=0.006) 
The dependent variable of SPEC_AUD is measured as follows:  
 (1)  SPECLST_MSLEADER ; (2) SPECLST_MS30; (3) SPECLST_MS; (4) SPECLST_PS; and (5) 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED 
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Table 5.29: The results of 2SLS regression for auditor industry specialist model (N=674) 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
SPECLST_MSLEADER 
SPECLST_ 
MS30 
SPECLST_MS SPECLST_WEIGHTED 
BRDSIZE ACMEET ACMEET BRDMEET ACMEET BRDMEET ACMEET 
Intercept -2.612 (-3.76)*** -2.859 (-4.15)*** -3.743 (5.19)*** -0.158 (-1.40) -0.209 (-1.88)* -0.021 (-0.70) -0.023 (-0.82) 
BRDSIZE 0.123 (3.09)**** 0.092 (2.89)**** 0.084 (2.51)** 0.013 (2.65)*** 0.016 (3.24)*** 0.000 (0.27) 0.001 (0.49) 
BRDNED -0.320 (-0.51) -0.269 (-0.43) 0.903 (-1.45) -0.211 (-2.25)** -0.179 (-1.88)* -0.037 (-1.35) -0.030 (-1.09) 
BRDEXP -0.449 (-0.87) -0.537 (-1.09) -0.321(-0.66) 0.003 (0.04) 0.028 (0.39) -0.029 (-1.34) -0.026 (1.18) 
BRDMEET -0.001 (-0.06) 0.009 (0.39) 0.018 (0.81) -0.010 (-2.51)** -0.005 (-1.43) 0.002 (1.33) 0.002 (1.68)* 
ACSIZE -0.029 (-0.37) -0.002 (-0.03) 0.030 (0.38) 0.007 (0.57) 0.004 (0.35) -0.006 (-1.83)* -0.007 (-1.93)* 
ACIND 0.116 (0.88) 0.101 (0.77) 0.271 (2.05)** 0.043 (2.03)** 0.037 (1.73)* 0.015 (2.43)** 0.014 (2.32)** 
ACEXP -0.091 (-0.28) -0.061 (-0.20) 0.421 (1.37) -0.020 (-0.42) -0.032 (-0.66) 0.016 (1.08) 0.014 (0.349) 
ACMEET -0.103 (-2.15)** -0.245 (-3.70)*** 
-0.286 (-
4.38)*** 
-0.019 (-2.92)*** -0.039 (-4.07)*** -0.004 (-1.69)* -0.008 (-2.24)** 
INOWN -0.004 (-0.86) -0.004 (-0.95) -0.010 (-2.24)** -0.002 (3.23)*** -0.001 (-3.20)*** -0.000 (-0.09) -0.000 (-0.19) 
LNASSET 0.275 (2.12)** 0.407 (3.29)*** 0.557 (4.48)*** 0.088 (4.39)*** 0.095 (4.74)*** 0.010 (1.86)* 0.011 (2.10)** 
LEVERGN 0.239 (0.97) 0.296(1.21) 0.588 (2.39)** 0.069 (1.67)* 0.066 (1.62) 0.033 (2.90)*** 0.034 (3.02)*** 
NWFUNDRATIO -0.189 (-1.04) -0.146 (-0.86) -0.338 (-1.72)* -0.017 (-1.31) -0.017 (-1.30) 
-0.013 (-
3.30)*** 
-0.013 (-
3.22)*** 
ROA 0.010 (1.69)* 0.012 (2.04)** 0.009 (1.58) 0.002 (1.81)* 0.002 (2.05)** 0.000 (0.98) 0.000 (1.14) 
SQSUB 0.017 (0.64) 0.022 (0.84) 0.025 (0.93) 0.000 (0.21) 0.001 (0.16) 0.005 (3.83)*** 0.005 (3.84)*** 
FORGSALE 0.001 (0.47) 0.001 (0.78) 0.004 (2.74)*** 0.000 (0.74) 0.000 (1.11) 0.002 (3.26)*** 0.000 (3.37)*** 
Adj. R
2 
- - - 0.125 0.118 0.095 0.092 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10 
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5.7 Summary 
This chapter reports the empirical findings on the effects of the characteristics of 
boards of directors and audit committees on audit quality. The hypothesis variables 
for the size of committees, the proportion of independent members, the financial 
expertise and meeting frequencies of boards of directors and audit committees are 
examined under three models of audit quality: audit fees, NAS fees and the use of 
industry specialist auditors. Higher audit fees, lower NAS fees and the engagement of 
auditor industry specialists are all associated with higher quality audits. 
 
In the audit fees model, the multivariate regression suggests that independent boards 
are positively related to audit fees. These may imply that independent boards use their 
oversight function to demand extensive audit efforts from auditors, resulting in higher 
audit fees. The other characteristics of boards and audit committees provide 
inconsistent results with audit fees across the years and in the pooled samples. The 
control variables are significant in the predicted direction, except of RECINV, which 
is found to be insignificantly related to audit fees. The result for independent board is 
robust to various model specifications including different estimators, clients‟ size 
analysis, alternative definitions of hypotheses variables, additional control variables 
and 2SLS regression. 
 
There are four measures of auditor independence (FEE) examined in the NAS model: 
LNNAF, LNTOTALFEE, FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2. The present study finds 
positive relationship between independent board and FEE, specifically the LNNAF 
and LNTOTALFEES measures, in most year-by-year analysis and pooled samples. 
FEERATIO1 and FEERATIO2 are insignificantly related to the independent board but 
report similar positive coefficients. Prior studies suggest that the auditor independence 
measured by the LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES are better than NAS fees ratios when it 
comes to capturing the economic importance of the client-auditor relationship 
(Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Larcker and Richardson, 2004). The positive relationship may 
suggest that independent boards seem to support that higher provision of  NAS are not 
necessarily compromise the audit independence, but may enhance the quality of audits 
due to the knowledge spillover effects. The knowledge spillover effects broaden the 
auditors‟ knowledge and improved the audit judgment, which in turn results in a 
higher audit quality. The other hypothesis variables provide inconsistent support to be 
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linked with NAS. Among the control variables, LNASSET is found to be the main 
determinant for NAS in most year-by-year and pooled sample. The results for 
independent non-executive director on boards are robust to various model 
specifications and tests.  
 
In the auditor industry specialist model, five measures of SPEC_AUD are employed: 
SPECLST_MSLEADER, SPECLST_30MS, SPECLIST_MS, SPECLIST_PS and 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED. The multivariate regressions of SPEC_AUD models suggest 
that the characteristics of board and audit committee and related control variables are 
sensitive to the choice of SPEC_AUD measures. However, in the pooled sample, 
when four out of five SPEC_AUD measures are used, the results suggest that the firms 
with audit committees that are comprised solely of independent members and also 
have a lower number of meetings are more likely to engage industry specialist 
auditors. Although these results are robust to different estimators and the 2SLS test, 
they are sensitive to new variable definitions. When the definition of ACIND is 
changed from sole independence to the proportion of independent members (i.e. 
ACIND1) and the definition of ACMEET is changed from total number of meeting to 
is dichotomous variable (coded as 1 if audit committee meeting is more than the 
sample median, and 0 if otherwise), the results are no longer significant. The 
summary of the hypothesis and findings are presented in Table 5.30. The significant 
findings are based on the consistency of the results in year-by-year analysis and 
pooled samples.   
 
Table 5.30: The summary of the hypothesis and the findings – the relationship 
between the corporate governance characteristics‟ and auditor quality. 
Hypotheses Findings 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the board’s 
size and audit fees.  
Not supported 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the board’s 
size and NAS fees. 
Not supported 
H3: There is a negative relationship between the board’s 
size and the engagement of industry specialist 
auditor  
Not supported 
H4: There is a positive relationship between the 
independent board and audit fees.  
Supported 
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Table 5.30 (continued) 
H5: There is a negative relationship between the 
independent board and NAS fees. 
Not supported 
H6: There is a positive relationship between the 
independent board and the engagement of industry 
specialist auditor  
Not supported 
H7: There is a positive relationship between the board’s 
financial expertise and audit fees.  
Not supported 
H8: There is a negative relationship between the board’s 
financial expertise and NAS fees. 
Not supported 
H9: There is a positive relationship between the board’s 
financial expertise and the engagement of industry 
specialist auditor  
Not supported 
H10: There is a positive relationship between the board’s 
meeting frequency and audit fees.  
Not supported 
H11: There is a negative relationship between the board’s 
meeting frequency and NAS fees. 
Not supported 
H12: There is a positive relationship between the board’s 
meeting frequency and the engagement of industry 
specialist auditor  
Not supported 
H13: There is a positive relationship between the audit 
committee’s size and audit fees.  
Not supported 
H14: There is a negative relationship between the audit 
committee’s size and NAS fees. 
Not supported 
H15: There is a positive relationship between the audit 
committee’s size and the engagement of industry 
specialist auditor  
Not supported 
H16: There is a positive relationship between the solely 
independent audit committee and audit fees.  
Not supported 
H17: There is a negative relationship between the solely 
independent audit committee and NAS fees. 
Not supported 
H18: There is a positive relationship between the solely 
independent audit committee and the engagement of 
industry specialist auditor  
Not supported 
H19: There is a positive relationship between the audit 
committee’s financial expertise and audit fees.  
Not supported 
H20: There is a negative relationship between the audit 
committee’s financial expertise and NAS fees. 
Not supported 
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Table 5.30 (continued) 
H21: There is a positive relationship between the audit 
committee’s financial expertise and the engagement 
of industry specialist auditor  
Not supported 
H22: There is a positive relationship between the audit 
committee’s meeting frequency and audit fees.  
Not supported 
H23: There is a negative relationship between the audit 
committee’s meeting frequency and NAS fees. 
Not supported 
H24: There is a positive relationship between the audit 
committee’s meeting frequency and the engagement 
of industry specialist auditor  
Not supported 
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CHAPTER 6 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS, AUDIT COMMITTEE, AUDIT QUALITY AND EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT  
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the results for the second empirical analysis: the relationships 
between the board of directors, audit committee and external auditor quality in 
constraining earnings management. Consistent with the previous chapter, the audit 
fees, NAS fees and industry specialist auditor variables represent the proxies for audit 
quality, while the board and audit committee variables are measured in term of their 
effectiveness characteristics (e.g. size, composition, financial expertise and meeting).  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: next section presents the descriptive statistics, 
the univariate test and the correlation matrix. This is then followed by the research 
design, results and sensitivity analysis. The last section summarises this chapter.  
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics and univariate test 
This section reports the descriptive statistics and the results of the univariate test. 
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all related variables used to examine 
the association between the board, audit committee, audit quality and earnings 
management for the sample of 613 firm-year observations. The present study 
highlights the descriptive statistics for earnings management, MTBV, LOSS and CFO, 
since the other variables have fairly similar means and standard deviations, as 
described in Chapter 5.1.  
 
Across the three measures of DACC, the mean (median) of DACCJM, DACCMJM 
and DACCROA are relatively consistent, at 0.056 (0.037), 0.056 (0.037) and 0.059 
(0.038), respectively. Yet a study conducted by Furgeson et al. (2004), which used the 
modified Jones model, found the mean and median absolute values of the sample 
firms‟ discretionary accruals over the period 1996 to 1998 to be 0.092 and 0.073, 
which is considerably higher than those documented in this study. This is probably 
due to the reforms initiated by the regulatory agency in promoting best practices in 
corporate behaviour.  Such improvements, for example, can be seen from the Peasnell 
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at al.‟ (2000) study that suggest that in the post-Cadbury period, earnings 
managements (e.g. income-increasing accruals to avoid losses or a decline in 
earnings) are smaller in firms whose board of directors has a higher proportion of 
non-executive directors. This is contrast to the pre-Cadbury period, during which 
there is no evidence suggest the composition of non-executive directors on board is 
associates to the earnings manipulation. They conclude that the publication of the 
Cadbury Report (1992) had a material impact on board monitoring function by 
helping firms to raise the standard of corporate behaviour, and especially the 
monitoring roles of the non-executive. 
 
The mean (median) of MTBV and CFO are 3.066 (2.95) and 0.135 (0.110), 
respectively. Only 5.22% of the sample firms had two or more years of negative 
income (LOSS).  Previous UK study by Peasnell et al. (2005) report the mean 
(median) of CFO in their sample was 0.116 (0.108), which is relatively consistent as 
documented in this study.  
 
Table 6.2 presents the results of the mean difference tests for all variables in the 
earnings management model, according to the DACC measures. DACC found to be 
below the median are considered „lower‟ earnings, whilst DACC above median are 
identified as „higher‟ earnings. As can be seen in Table 6.2, the results of the t-tests 
for all variables under the DACCJM and DACCMJM models are fairly consistent. 
Most audit quality variables using these measures show significant mean differences 
between the two groups of earnings, including LNAFEE, LNNAF, LNTOTALFEES, 
SPECLST_MSLEADER, SPECLST_PS and SPECLST_WEIGHTED. However, under 
the DACCROA definition, the results of the t-tests suggest that only the variables 
SPECLST_PS and SPECLST_WEIGHTED indicate a significant difference between 
the lower and higher groups of earnings management.  
 
For the board of director variables (under the DACCJM and DACCMJM), the results 
of the t-tests indicate that the BRDNED show a significant mean difference between 
the lower and higher groups of earnings.  However, across the three DACC measures, 
there are no significant difference between these two groups of earnings for variables 
on BDRSIZE, BRDEXP and BRDMEET.  
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With respect to audit committee characteristics, the results for ACSIZE are 
conditional. Under the DACCJM definition, the results show that the mean audit 
committee size differs between the lower and higher groups of earnings, whilst when 
DACCMJM and DACCROA measures are used there is no significant difference. In 
addition, the t-test results for ACIND suggest that the means differ between the lower 
and higher groups of earnings across all measures of DACC. Among the control 
variables, the mean of INOWN is found to differ significantly between the higher and 
lower groups of earnings (under the DACCJM and DACCMJM measures). Other 
variables provide no evidence that their means are differ between the two groups of 
earnings. 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics (N=613) 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
First Quartile Median Third Quartile Minimum Maximum 
DACCJM 0.056 0.072 0.018 0.037 0.069 0.000 0.851 
DACCMJM 0.056 0.071 0.018 0.037 0.068 0.000 0.817 
DACCROA 0.059 0.072 0.016 0.038 0.074 0.000 0.583 
LNAFEE 2.897 0.434 2.587 2.903 3.176 1.845 4.176 
LNNAF 2.677 0.726 2.307 2.752 3.113 0.000 4.398 
LNTOTALFEES 3.170 0.447 2.845 3.159 3.477 2.068 4.477 
FEERATIO1 0.421 0.204 0.278 0.400 0.555 0.000 0.918 
FEERATIO2 1.111 1.354 0.385 0.667 1.250 0.000 11.113 
SPECLST_MSLEADER 0.401 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
SPECLST_MS30 0.530 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
SPECLST_MS 0.342 0.208 0.199 0.321 0.426 0.015 0.902 
SPECLST_PS 0.180 0.150 0.049 0.159 0.257 0.003 0.537 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED 0.068 0.067 0.013 0.045 0.097 0.000 0.228 
BRDSIZE 9.083 2.229 7.00 9.000 10.000 5.000 19.000 
BRDNED 0.450 0.116 0.375 0.444 0.538 0.053 0.778 
BRDEXP 0.353 0.141 0.250 0.333 0.444 0.083 0.8333 
BRDMEET 8.672 2.626 7.000 8.000 10.000 3.000 21.000 
ACSIZE 3.572 0.792 3.000 3.000 4.000 3.000 8.000 
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Table 6.1 (continued) 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
First Quartile Median Third Quartile Minimum Maximum 
ACIND 0.718 0.450 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
ACEXP 0.390 0.206 0.000 0.333 0.500 0.000 2.000 
ACMEET 3.974 1.206 3.000 4.000 4.000 2.000 10.000 
INOWN 4.488 12.713 0.088 0.252 1.459 0.002 147.525 
BLOCK 23.588 15.795 12.010 21.280 33.250 0.000 76.120 
MTBV 3.066 24.718 1.940 2.95 4.45 -318.53 194.68 
LOSS 0.052 0.222 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CFO 0.135 0.105 0.072 0.110 0.174 -0.063 1.273 
LEVERGN 0.645 0.218 0.513 0.645 0.758 0.056 2.055 
LNASSET 6.143 0.526 5.766 6.105 6.449 4.516 7.706 
DACCJM=discretionary accrual based on Jones Model, DACCMJM=discretionary accruals based on Modified Jones model; 
DACCROA=discretionary accruals by Kothari et al. (2005), including lagged ROA in the  accrual regression to control for firm performance; 
LNAFEE= the natural log of audit fees; LNNAF=natural log of NAS fees; LNTOTALFEES=natural log of the sum of audit and NAS fees; 
FEERATIO1= the fee ratio of NAS fees to total fees; FEERATIO2= the fee ratio of NAS fees to audit fees; SPECLST_MSLEADER= coded as 1 if the 
auditor earned the largest market share in each particular industry, 0 if otherwise; SPECLST_MS30= coded as 1 if the auditor‟ market share exceed 30 
percent in each particular industry, 0 if otherwise; SPECLST_MS= continuous variable which equals to the respective auditor‟ market share;  
SPECLST_PS= continuous variable which equals to the respective auditor‟ portfolio share; SPECLST_WEIGHTED= continuous variable which 
equals to the compliment between auditor‟ market share (SPECLST_MS) and portfolio share (SPECLST_PS); BRDSIZE=the numbers of board‟ 
members  during the year; BDRNED=the proportion of non-executive directors on board to board size; BRDEXP=the proportion of directors with 
accounting experience and financial qualification to board size; BRDMEET= the number of board meetings during the year; ACSIZE= the number of 
audit committee members; ACIND= coded as 1 if audit committee had solely non-executive directors; 0 otherwise; ACEXP= the proportion of audit 
committee members with accounting experience and financial qualification to audit committee size; ACMEET= the number of audit committee 
meetings during the year; INOWN=the cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the directors of a firm; BLOCK= the cumulative percentage 
shares ownership of the blockholders who hold at least 5 percent or more of outstanding common shares and who are unaffiiliated with management; 
MTBV= market to book value ratio; LOSS= coded as 1 if the firm had two or more years of negative income, 0 otherwise;  CFO=cash flow from 
operation scaled by lagged total asset; LEVERGN=proportion of debts to total assets; LNASSET= the natural logarithm of total assets; 
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Table 6.2: Univariate Tests 
DACC 
DACCJM DACCMJM DACCROA 
Mean Std. Dev. 
t-test 
Mean Std. Dev. 
t-test 
Mean Std. Dev. 
t-test 
lower higher lower higher lower higher lower higher lower higher lower higher 
LNAFEE 2.857 2.936 0.435 0.429 -2.263** 2.857 2.937 0.432 0.433 -2.290** 2.878 2.915 0.455 0.411 -1.060 
LNNAF 2.627 2.727 0.714 0.736 -1.720* 2.621 2.733 0.735 0.714 -1.912* 2.654 2.700 0.736 0.716 -0.776 
LNTOTALFEES 3.123 3.216 0.452 0.438 -2.569** 3.127 3.212 0.447 0.444 -2.358** 3.152 3.188 0.466 0.428 -0.997 
FEERATIO1 0.412 0.430 0.207 0.201 -1.131 0.415 0.427 0.211 0.197 -0.715 0.418 0.424 0.209 0.199 -0.344 
FEERATIO2 1.076 1.147 1.330 1.378 -0.652 1.105 1.118 1.357 1.353 -0.115 1.133 1.089 1.437 1.267 0.408 
SPECLST_ 
MSLEADER 
0.359 0.443 0.481 0.498 -2.114** 0.366 0.436 0.483 0.497 -1.781* 0.389 0.414 0.488 0.493 -0.625 
SPECLST_MS30 0.497 0.564 0.501 0.497 -1.658* 0.5000 0.560 0.501 0.497 -1.495 0.529 0.531 0.499 0.499 -0.038 
SPECLST_MS 0.335 0.350 0.214 0.202 -0.872 0.338 0.347 0.213 0.203 -0.494 0.351 0.334 0.013 0.011 1.030 
SPECLST_PS 0.150 0.211 0.131 0.161 -5.141*** 0.155 0.205 0.133 0.160 -4.219*** 0.158 0.203 0.130 0.164 -3.781*** 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
0.055 0.080 0.057 0.073 -4.857*** 0.057 0.078 0.058 0.072 -3.996*** 0.060 0.075 0.060 0.072 -2.851*** 
BRDSIZE 9.006 9.160 2.159 2.297 -0.850 9.049 9.117 2.173 2.287 -0.389 9.072 9.084 2.196 2.266 -0.125 
BRDNED 0.438 0.463 0.113 0.117 -2.621*** 0.440 0.461 0.115 0.116 -2.168** 0.449 0.452 0.116 0.116 -0.399 
BRDEXP 0.348 0.358 0.135 0.147 -0.934 0.348 0.358 0.135 0.147 -0.886 0.347 0.358 0.133 0.149 -0.950 
BRDMEET 8.578 8.765 2.609 2.644 -0.882 8.611 8.733 2.644 2.611 -0.574 8.618 8.726 2.569 2.686 -0.512 
ACSIZE 3.513 3.632 0.702 0.870 -1.861* 3.546 3.599 0.764 0.820 -0.837 3.621 3.652 0.853 0.724 1.509 
ACIND 0.673 0.762 0.470 0.426 -2.456** 0.676 0.759 0.469 0.428 -2.275** 0.686 0.749 0.465 0.434 -1.732* 
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Table 6.2 (continued) 
ACEXP 0.383 0.397 0.198 0.214 -0.853 0.382 0.399 0.197 0.215 -1.023 0.377 0.403 0.192 0.219 -1.535 
ACMEET 3.938 4.010 1.214 1.198 -0.738 3.951 3.997 1.212 1.200 -0.470 3.899 4.049 1.153 1.253 -1.544 
INOWN 5.621 3.359 15.300 9.347 2.209** 5.524 3.456 15.316 9.344 2.019** 5.063 3.916 14.475 10.667 1.117 
BLOCK 23.687 23.489 15.962 15.652 0.1551 23.831 23.346 15.792 15.821 0.380 24.543 22.636 15.854 15.704 1.496 
MTBV 2.163 3.967 30.504 17.113 -0.904 1.932 4.197 30.725 16.688 -1.134 3.028 3.105 31.438 15.389 -0.039 
LOSS 0.918 0.977 0.274 0.150 3.302*** 0.918 0.977 0.274 0.150 3.302** 0.915 0.980 0.279 0.139 3.675*** 
CFO 0.146 0.124 0.106 0.104 2.621*** 0.147 0.123 0.106 0.104 2.774*** 0.144 0.126 0.103 0.107 2.032** 
LEVERGN 0.637 0.653 0.214 0.221 -0.908 0.634 0.654 0.212 0.224 -1.055 0.647 0.644 0.204 0.231 0.185 
LNASSET 6.154 6.131 0.501 0.550 0.549 6.160 6.126 0.498 0.553 0.797 6.187 6.099 0.525 0.524 2.074** 
DACCJM=discretionary accrual based on Jones Model, DACCMJM=discretionary accruals based on Modified Jones model; DACCROA=discretionary accruals by Kothari et al. 
(2005), including lagged ROA in the  accrual regression to control for firm performance; LNAFEE= the natural log of audit fees; LNNAF=natural log of NAS fees; 
LNTOTALFEES=natural log of the sum of audit and NAS fees; FEERATIO1= the fee ratio of NAS fees to total fees; FEERATIO2= the fee ratio of NAS fees to audit fees; 
SPECLST_MSLEADER= coded as 1 if the auditor earned the largest market share in each particular industry, 0 if otherwise; SPECLST_MS30= coded as 1 if the auditor‟ market share 
exceed 30 percent in each particular industry, 0 if otherwise; SPECLST_MS= continuous variable which equals to the respective auditor‟ market share;  SPECLST_PS= continuous 
variable which equals to the respective auditor‟ portfolio share; SPECLST_WEIGHTED= continuous variable which equals to the compliment between auditor‟ market share 
(SPECLST_MS) and portfolio share (SPECLST_PS); BRDSIZE=the numbers of board‟ members  during the year; BDRNED=the proportion of non-executive directors on board to 
board size; BRDEXP=the proportion of directors with accounting experience and financial qualification to board size; BRDMEET= the number of board meetings during the year; 
ACSIZE= the number of audit committee members; ACIND= coded as 1 if audit committee had solely non-executive directors; 0 otherwise; ACEXP= the proportion of audit 
committee members with accounting experience and financial qualification to audit committee size; ACMEET= the number of audit committee meetings during the year; INOWN=the 
cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the directors of a firm; BLOCK= the cumulative percentage shares ownership of the blockholders who hold at least 5 percent or more 
of outstanding common shares and who are unaffiiliated with management; MTBV= market to book value ratio; LOSS= coded as 1 if the firm had two or more years of negative 
income, 0 otherwise;  CFO=cash flow from operation scaled by lagged total asset; LEVERGN=proportion of debts to total assets; LNASSET= the natural logarithm of total assets; The 
sample populations for „lower‟ is 306 firm-year observation, while for „higher‟ is 307 firm-year observation; The significant level is based on two tailed tests, *** are significant at 
p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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Table 6.3: Pairwise correlation matrix (N=613) 
Variable A B C D E F G H I J K 
A DACCJM 1.000           
B DACCMJM 0.986 1.000          
C DACCROA 0.850 0.854 1.000         
D LNAFEE -0.049 -0.042 -0.025 1.000        
E LNNAF 0.014 0.006 0.001 0.510 1.000       
F LNTOTALFEES -0.028 -0.029 -0.015 0.906 0.736 1.000      
G FEERATIO1 0.037 0.019 0.004 -0.113 0.662 0.300 1.000     
H FEERATIO2 0.062 0.042 0.045 -0.160 0.437 0.243 0.805 1.000    
I SPECLST_MSLEADER -0.054 -0.047 0.000 0.223 0.095 0.205 -0.018 -0.039 1.000   
J SPECLST_MS30 -0.061 -0.049 0.001 0.279 0.139 0.246 -0.037 -0.075 0.771 1.000  
K SPECLST_MS -0.017 -0.010 0.082 0.261 0.137 0.251 0.007 -0.018 0.793 0.774 1.000 
L SPECLST_PS -0.195 -0.191 -0.189 0.215 0.070 0.156 -0.117 -0.113 0.423 0.431 0.187 
M SPECLST_WEIGHTED -0.172 -0.167 -0.108 0.248 0.119 0.207 -0.068 -0.080 0.679 0.653 0.534 
N BRDSIZE 0.092 0.097 0.094 0.423 0.270 0.423 0.043 0.016 0.243 0.204 0.260 
O BRDNED -0.076 -0.080 -0.027 0.444 0.282 0.429 0.016 -0.010 0.031 0.045 0.008 
P BRDEXP -0.023 -0.027 -0.019 -0.129 -0.090 -0.133 -0.022 -0.010 -0.179 -0.105 -0.137 
Q BRDMEET -0.009 -0.018 -0.015 -0.017 -0.017 -0.001 0.027 0.040 -0.031 -0.008 -0.095 
R ACSIZE -0.035 -0.036 0.030 0.361 0.161 0.329 -0.034 -0.063 0.102 0.107 0.099 
S ACIND -0.090 -0.095 -0.057 0.132 0.109 0.125 0.003 -0.018 0.033 0.092 0.039 
T ACEXP 0.035 0.039 0.010 -0.050 -0.029 -0.042 0.007 0.036 -0.051 0.021 -0.042 
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Table 6.3 (continued) 
Variable A B C D E F G H I J K 
U ACMEET 0.029 0.025 0.007 0.340 0.264 0.365 0.092 0.079 0.007 -0.029 -0.007 
V INOWN 0.029 0.026 0.023 -0.161 -0.023 -0.112 0.078 0.139 -0.040 -0.098 -0.078 
W BLOCK 0.083 0.086 0.055 -0.142 -0.035 -0.093 0.075 0.134 -0.032 -0.067 -0.020 
X MTBV 0.042 0.046 0.003 -0.007 0.030 0.032 0.060 0.111 0.022 0.005 0.021 
Y LOSS 0.231 0.247 0.317 0.032 0.001 0.042 0.006 0.019 0.058 0.044 0.058 
Z CFO 0.103 0.102 0.042 -0.179 -0.069 -0.168 0.008 0.029 -0.010 -0.050 0.011 
AA LEVERGN -0.062 -0.054 -0.035 0.211 0.083 0.178 -0.061 -0.054 0.057 0.114 0.083 
AB LNASSET 0.032 0.031 0.082 0.700 0.415 0.686 0.044 -0.021 0.209 0.216 0.251 
  L M N O P Q R S T U V 
L SPECLST_PS 1.000           
M SPECLST_WEIGHTED 0.882 1.000          
N BRDSIZE -0.047 0.094 1.000         
O BRDNED 0.057 0.034 0.013 1.000        
P BRDEXP 0.083 -0.030 -0.343 0.019 1.000       
Q BRDMEET 0.098 0.034 -0.134 0.146 0.018 1.000      
R ACSIZE -0.062 -0.002 0.398 0.339 -0.190 0.013 1.000     
S ACIND 0.139 0.103 -0.014 0.480 0.085 0.130 0.005 1.000    
T ACEXP 0.094 0.044 -0.029 -0.027 0.564 -0.040 -0.204 0.076 1.000   
U ACMEET 0.004 -0.005 0.242 0.247 -0.018 0.228 0.156 0.047 -0.020 1.000  
V INOWN -0.022 -0.039 -0.013 -0.158 -0.022 -0.205 -0.087 -0.097 0.008 -0.132 1.000 
  
231 
 
Table 6.3 (continued) 
Variable L M N O P Q R S T U V 
W BLOCK -0.129 -0.109 0.046 -0.077 0.006 -0.083 -0.086 -0.079 0.065 0.065 0.057 
X MTBV 0.037 0.054 0.029 0.004 0.027 -0.013 -0.040 0.027 0.001 0.059 0.010 
Y LOSS 0.054 0.044 0.028 0.045 0.037 0.088 -0.025 -0.049 0.004 0.084 0.054 
Z CFO -0.032 -0.036 0.019 -0.186 -0.036 -0.060 -0.072 -0.080 0.026 -0.023 0.069 
AA LEVERGN 0.099 0.114 0.115 0.098 0.027 0.172 0.061 0.093 0.015 0.119 -0.182 
AB LNASSET -0.039 0.083 0.443 0.398 -0.192 0.045 0.361 0.066 -0.092 0.356 -0.146 
  W X Y Z AA AB      
W BLOCK 1.000           
X MTBV 0.003 1.000          
Y LOSS 0.051 0.070 1.000         
Z CFO 0.110 0.088 0.159 1.000        
AA LEVERGN -0.070 -0.012 -0.120 0.078 1.000       
AB LNASSET -0.189 0.011 -0.045 -0.254 0.063 1.000      
DACCJM=discretionary accrual based on Jones Model, DACCMJM=discretionary accruals based on Modified Jones model; DACCROA=discretionary accruals by Kothari et al. 
(2005), including lagged ROA in the  accrual regression to control for firm performance; LNAFEE= the natural log of audit fees; LNNAF=natural log of NAS fees; 
LNTOTALFEES=natural log of the sum of audit and NAS fees; FEERATIO1= the fee ratio of NAS fees to total fees; FEERATIO2= the fee ratio of NAS fees to audit fees; 
SPECLST_MSLEADER= coded as 1 if the auditor earned the largest market share in each particular industry, 0 if otherwise; SPECLST_MS30= coded as 1 if the auditor‟ market 
share exceed 30 percent in each particular industry, 0 if otherwise; SPECLST_MS= continuous variable which equals to the respective auditor‟ market share;  SPECLST_PS= 
continuous variable which equals to the respective auditor‟ portfolio share; SPECLST_WEIGHTED= continuous variable which equals to the compliment between auditor‟ market 
share (SPECLST_MS) and portfolio share (SPECLST_PS); BRDSIZE=the numbers of board‟ members  during the year; BDRNED=the proportion of non-executive directors on 
board to board size; BRDEXP=the proportion of directors with accounting experience and financial qualification to board size; BRDMEET= the number of board meetings during the 
year; ACSIZE= the number of audit committee members; ACIND= coded as 1 if audit committee had solely non-executive directors; 0 otherwise; ACEXP= the proportion of audit 
committee members with accounting experience and financial qualification to audit committee size; ACMEET= the number of audit committee meetings during the year; 
INOWN=the cumulative percentage of total shares owned by the directors of a firm; BLOCK= the cumulative percentage shares ownership of the blockholders who hold at least 5 
percent or more of outstanding common shares and who are unaffiiliated with management; MTBV= market to book value ratio; LOSS= coded as 1 if the firm had two or more years 
of negative income, 0 otherwise;  CFO=cash flow from operation scaled by lagged total asset; LEVERGN=proportion of debts to total assets; LNASSET= the natural logarithm of 
total assets; Correlation in bold are significant at p<0.01, in italic are significant at p<0.05 and underline at p<0.10. 
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6.3 Correlation matrix 
The correlation matrix for all variables indicate in the earning management model is 
presented in Table 6.3. The higher correlations among discretionary accruals and audit 
quality measures are always expected since they are highly interrelated to each other. 
Among the audit quality proxies, the SPECLST_PS and SPECLST_WEIGHTED 
variables are significant and negatively correlated with all DACC measures at p<0.01, 
suggesting that the industry specialist auditors are effective in constraining 
opportunistic earnings. The range of the correlation coefficient is from -0.0167 to -
0.195. None of the audit fees and NAS measures are significantly correlated with 
DACC However, with respect to the independence of the board of directors and audit 
committee, BRDNED and ACIND are significant and negatively correlated with 
DACCJM and DACCMJM (the correlation coefficients range from -0.035 to -0.080). 
Even though BRDNED and ACIND are insignificantly correlated with DACCROA, 
their signs of coefficient do indicate a negative relationship. This may suggest that the 
independent non-executive directors either on the board or the audit committee 
contribute to the oversight of the firm and are thus likely to constrain opportunistic 
earnings. The other board and audit committee characteristics are insignificantly 
correlated to all DACC measures. 
 
6.4 Multivariate regression 
The multivariate regressions are estimated using least square regression with robust 
standard error to control for heteroscedasticity. Table 6.4 presents the results based on 
the three measures of discretionary accruals: DACCJM, DACCMJM and 
DACCROA.
71
 Since there is multiple variables surrogate for audit quality proxy and 
most of them are highly correlated with each other, each of them is included in a 
single empirical model.  In total there are thirty models of earnings management 
examined. The F-statistic for all models is significant at p<0.01. The adjusted R
2
 
range is between 0.108 and 0.159, which is lower than that documented in a prior UK 
study conducted by Peasnell et al. (2005). This may be due to the sample size and 
different model specification.  
 
                                                          
71
 The multivariate regression was estimated only for the pooled sample, due to the insignificant F-
statistic that is obtained when it is modeled in the year-by-year samples. 
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As can be seen from Table 6.4, LNAFEE is significant and negatively related to all 
DACC measures, suggesting that firms with higher audit fees are more likely to 
constrain earnings management. There is possibility that the firms with higher audit 
fees induce more audit effort, which in turn reduces the likelihood of opportunistic 
earnings. This result is consistent with the argument set forth by Caramis and Lennox 
(2008), who state that when audit hours are lower, firms report larger income-
increasing discretionary accruals.   
 
In all models, none of NAS fees measures are significantly related with DACC. This 
result is consistent with Chung and Kallapur (2003) and Ruddock et al. (2006), who 
find no evidence of a relationship between NAS and earnings management. Although 
there is no significant relationship, the results provide mix directional sign of the NAS 
coefficients and earnings management, suggesting the measures of auditor 
independent are sensitive to the research design. 
 
The results for industry specialist auditors are conditional. The industry specialist 
auditors measured by the SPECLST_PS and SPECLST_WEIGHTED are significant 
and negatively related to earnings management across three measures of discretionary 
accruals (DACCJM, DACCMJM and DACCROA). However, using the market share 
approach to compute the variables of industry specialist auditors, it appears that none 
of these measures are significantly related with DACC. Krishnan (2001) notes that the 
portfolio approach is better at capturing auditors‟ efforts to differentiate their products 
from those of their competitors than the market share approach. These significant 
results may suggest that earnings management in firms with industry specialist 
auditors is lower than firms with non-specialist auditors. This is consistent with 
Krishnan (2003a), who suggests that the industry specialist auditors provide a higher 
quality audit than non-specialist auditors by mitigating accruals-based earnings.  
 
In relation to the board of director and audit committee characteristics, none of these 
variables are significantly related with DACC except for ACSIZE, which is found to 
be negatively related with earnings management in the DACCJM and DACCMJM 
models for the pooled sample. Even though the relationship is weak (at p<0.10), these 
results are consistent with those found by Yang and Krishnan (2005). As compared to 
prior UK studies, the results are contradicted to Habbash (2010) and Habbash et al 
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(2010). The possible explanation on this contradictory may be due to the different 
research design. Habbash (2010) segregates the board and audit committee variables 
in two different earnings management model, while Habbash et al. (2010) do not 
control the audit committee variables in their earnings management model.  
 
For the control variables, INOWN and BLOCK suggest insignificant relationship with 
DACC, and MTBV is negatively related with earnings management, particularly in the 
DACCJM and DACCMJM models. This negative relationship contradicts the results 
reported by Klein (2002), but is relatively consistent with Bowen et al. (2008). All of 
the models indicate positive relationships between LOSS and CFO with DACC, 
suggesting that the firms with negative income and higher cash flow have greater 
incentive to manage reported earnings. The positive coefficient between CFO and 
DACC is consistent with Frankel et al. (2002).  In addition, there is a negative 
relationship between LEVERGN and DACC in most of the DACCJM models (at 
p<0.10), but it is insignificantly related to the other DACC measures.  The negative 
relationship between LEVERGN and DACC are consistent with prior studies (Klein, 
2002; Bédard et al., 2004). LNASSET is significant and positively related with DACC 
in most models, consistent with Becker et al. (1998) and DeFond and Park (1997).  
 
In summary, the results from the multivariate analyses indicate that the firms 
engaging the auditor industry specialist and paying higher audit fees are associated 
with lower earnings management. This is consistent with prior studies (e.g.  Caramis 
and Lennox, 2008; Krishnan, 2003a) that suggest higher quality auditors have a 
greater ability to constrain earnings manipulation through the extent of their 
monitoring function, thus improving the quality of reported earnings. In addition, 
there is no significant relationship between NAS and earnings management, 
suggesting that joint provision of audit and NAS have no effect on opportunistic 
earnings. This result is contradicted to the prior study in the UK done by Antle at al. 
(2006) that suggests a negative relationship between NAS and earnings management. 
One of the possible reasons on this may be due to the increased of NAS studies and 
the reformation of the UK corporate governance system. 
 
However, none of the results suggest that the board of director or audit committee 
characteristics can be clearly linked with earnings management. As previously noted 
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by Larker and Richardson (2004), the monitoring role of auditors depends on the 
strength of a firms‟ corporate governance structure, and therefore it is possible that the 
auditor monitoring roles outweigh the oversight functions of boards and audit 
committees, and hence contribute to the insignificant results for corporate governance 
variables and earnings management.   
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Table 6.4: The results of multivariate regression for the earnings management  model  
DACC = β
0
 + β
1
AQ + β
2
BRDSIZE + β
3
BRDNED + β
4
BRDEXP + β5BRDMEET + β6ACSIZE + β7ACIND + β8ACEXP + β9ACMEET + 
β
10
INOWN + β
11
BLOCK + β
12
MTBV+ β13CFO + β14LEVERGN  + β15LNASSET + ε 
The dependent variable of DACC is measured as follows:  (1)  DACCJM ; (2) DACCMJM; and (3) DACCROA 
The AQ proxies are: LNAFEE, LNNAF, LNTOTALFEES, FEERATIO1, FEERATIO2, SPECLST_MSLEADER, SPECLST_MS30, SPECLST_MS, 
SPECLST_PS or SPECLST_WEIGHTED 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
(1) DACCJM 
Model (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
Intercept 
0.061 
(1.41) 
0.071 
(1.63) 
0.066 
(1.52) 
0.069 
(1.61) 
0.069 
(1.61) 
0.064 
(1.49) 
0.064 
(1.48) 
0.068 
(1.57) 
0.085 
(1.98) 
0.070 
(1.64) 
LNAFEE 
-0.019 
(-2.23)** 
 
 
        
LNNAF  
0.001 
(0.24) 
        
LNTOTALFEES   
-0.014 
(-1.53) 
       
FEERATIO1    
0.007 
(0.48) 
      
FEERATIO2     
0.002 
(0.70) 
     
SPECLST_ 
MSLEADER 
     
-0.009 
(-1.51) 
    
SPECLST_MS30       
-0.008 
(-1.28) 
   
SPECLST_MS        
-0.009 
(-0.55) 
  
SPECLST_PS         
-0.078 
(-4.70)*** 
 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
         
-0.167 
(-
4.92)*** 
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Table 6.4 (continued) 
BRDSIZE 
0.004 
(1.51) 
0.003 
(1.31) 
0.004 
(1.46) 
0.003 
(1.31) 
0.003 
(1.31) 
0.004 
(1.40) 
0.004 
(1.36) 
0.003 
(1.31) 
0.003 
(1.39) 
0.004 
(1.50) 
BRDNED 
0.005 
(0.13) 
-0.011 
(-0.32) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.011 
(-0.31) 
-0.011 
(-0.32) 
-0.012 
(-0.34) 
-0.013 
(-0.39) 
-0.012 
(-0.35) 
-0.007 
(-0.21) 
-0.012 
(-0.37) 
BRDEXP 
0.017 
(0.61) 
0.016 
(0.57) 
0.016 
(0.58) 
0.016 
(0.58) 
0.016 
(0.61) 
0.012 
(0.44) 
0.013 
(0.49) 
0.015 
(0.56) 
0.016 
(0.60) 
0.011 
(0.42) 
BRDMEET 
0.000 
(0.30) 
0.001 
(0.59) 
0.000 
(0.42) 
0.001 
(0.58) 
0.001 
(0.54) 
0.001 
(0.58) 
0.001 
(0.59) 
0.001 
(0.54) 
0.001 
(0.90) 
0.001 
(0.71) 
ACSIZE 
-0.007 
(-1.43) 
-0.007 
(-1.50) 
-0.007 
(-1.51) 
-0.007 
(-1.48) 
-0.007 
(-1.43) 
-0.007 
(-1.50) 
-0.007 
(-1.47) 
-0.007 
(-1.49) 
-0.008 
(-1.68)* 
-0.008 
(-1.66)* 
ACIND 
-0.013 
(-1.52) 
-0.013 
(-1.49) 
-0.013 
(-1.51) 
-0.013 
(-1.49) 
-0.012 
(-1.49) 
-0.012 
(-1.46) 
-0.012 
(-1.41) 
-0.012 
(-1.49) 
-0.010 
(1.23) 
-0.010 
(-1.26) 
ACEXP 
0.004 
(0.26) 
0.004 
(0.27) 
0.004 
(0.28) 
0.004 
(0.26) 
0.004 
(0.23) 
0.005 
(0.30) 
0.006 
(0.37) 
0.004 
(0.26) 
0.009 
(0.53) 
0.008 
(0.49) 
ACMEET 
0.000 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.30) 
-0.001 
(-0.33) 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
-0.000 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.46) 
INOWN 
0.000 
(0.33) 
0.000 
(0.44) 
0.000 
(0.49) 
0.000 
(0.41) 
0.000 
(0.29) 
0.000 
(0.41) 
0.000 
(0.34) 
0.000 
(0.39) 
0.000 
(0.51) 
0.000 
(0.40) 
BLOCK 
0.000 
(1.05) 
0.000 
(1.12) 
0.000 
(1.18) 
0.000 
(1.09) 
0.000 
(0.97) 
0.000 
(1.11) 
0.000 
(1.10) 
0.000 
(1.13) 
0.000 
(0.61) 
0.000 
(0.75) 
MTBV 
-0.000 
(-2.01)** 
-0.000 
(-1.99)** 
-0.000 
(-1.59)* 
-0.000 
(-2.03)** 
-0.000 
(-2.11)** 
-0.000 
(-1.88)* 
-0.000 
(-1.92)* 
-0.000 
(-1.94)* 
-0.000 
(-1.71)* 
-0.000 
(-1.63) 
LOSS 
0.083 
(4.47)*** 
0.084 
(4.44)*** 
0.084 
(4.45)*** 
0.084 
(4.44)*** 
0.084 
(4.43)*** 
0.083 
(4.37)*** 
0.083 
(4.37)*** 
0.083 
(4.42)*** 
0.080 
(4.30)*** 
0.081 
(4.32)*** 
CFO 
0.095 
(2.47)** 
0.095 
(2.46)** 
0.095 
(2.48)** 
0.095 
(2.46)** 
0.095 
(2.47)** 
0.096 
(2.45)** 
0.095 
(2.44)** 
0.096 
(2.48)** 
0.092 
(2.34)** 
0.093 
(2.38)** 
LEVERGN 
-0.022 
(-1.40) 
-0.028 
(-1.76)* 
-0.025 
(-1.55) 
-0.028 
(-1.74)* 
-0.027 
(-1.72)* 
-0.027 
(-1.72)* 
-0.026 
(-1.70)* 
-0.027 
(-1.77)* 
-0.024 
(-1.54) 
-0.023 
(-1.50) 
LNASSET 
0.018 
(2.92)*** 
0.010 
(1.54) 
0.016 
(2.29)** 
0.010 
(1.66)* 
0.010 
(1.70)* 
0.011 
(1.94)* 
0.012 
(1.95)* 
0.011 
(1.84)* 
0.008 
(1.41) 
0.011 
(1.90)* 
Adj. R
2 
0.113 0.108 0.111 0.108 0.109 0.111 0.110 0.108 0.132 0.130 
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 Table 6.4 (continued) 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
(2) DACCMJM 
Model (k) (l) (l) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) 
Intercept 
0.070 
(1.68)* 
0.079 
(1.86)* 
0.074 
(1.77)* 
0.079 
(1.89)* 
0.078 
(1.87)* 
0.074 
(1.75)* 
0.074 
(1.77)* 
0.077 
(1.84)* 
0.093 
(2.22)** 
0.079 
(1.87)* 
LNAFEE 
-0.017 
(-1.99)** 
 
 
        
LNNAF  
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
        
LNTOTALFEES   
-0.014 
(-1.63) 
       
FEERATIO1    
0.000 
(0.03) 
      
FEERATIO2     
0.001 
(0.43) 
     
SPECLST_ 
MSLEADER 
     
-0.008 
(-1.35) 
    
SPECLST_MS30       
-0.006 
(-0.99) 
   
SPECLST_MS        
-0.006 
(-0.40) 
  
SPECLST_PS         
-0.074 
(-4.65)*** 
 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
         
-0.160 
(-4.83)*** 
BRDSIZE 
0.004 
(1.50) 
0.003 
(1.34) 
0.004 
(1.48) 
0.003 
(1.34) 
0.003 
(1.33) 
0.004 
(1.41) 
0.003 
(1.37) 
0.003 
(1.32) 
0.003 
(1.40) 
0.004 
(1.51) 
BRDNED 
0.004 
(0.11) 
-0.009 
(-0.25) 
0.002 
(0.06) 
-0.009 
(-0.26) 
-0.010 
(-0.27) 
-0.010 
(-0.29) 
-0.011 
(-0.32) 
-0.010 
(-0.29) 
-0.006 
(-0.17) 
-0.011 
(-0.31) 
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Table 6.4 (continued) 
BRDEXP 
0.012 
(0.47) 
0.011 
(0.44) 
0.012 
(0.45) 
0.011 
(0.44) 
0.012 
(0.46) 
0.008 
(0.31) 
0.009 
(0.36) 
0.011 
(0.42) 
0.012 
(0.46) 
0.007 
(0.28) 
BRDMEET 
0.000 
(0.07) 
0.000 
(0.34) 
0.000 
(0.17) 
0.000 
(0.35) 
0.000 
(0.32) 
0.000 
(0.34) 
0.000 
(0.35) 
0.000 
(0.31) 
0.001 
(0.67) 
0.000 
(0.47) 
ACSIZE 
-0.007 
(-1.48) 
-0.007 
(-1.55) 
-0.007 
(-1.55) 
-0.007 
(-1.54) 
-0.007 
(-1.50) 
-0.007 
(-1.54) 
-0.007 
(-1.52) 
-0.007 
(-1.54) 
-0.008 
(-1.71)* 
-0.008 
(-1.69)* 
ACIND 
-0.014 
(-1.59) 
-0.013 
(-1.57) 
-0.014 
(-1.59) 
-0.013 
(-1.57) 
-0.013 
(-1.56) 
-0.013 
(-1.54) 
-0.013 
(-1.50) 
-0.013 
(-1.58) 
-0.011 
(-1.32) 
-0.011 
(-1.35) 
ACEXP 
0.007 
(0.46) 
0.007 
(0.47) 
0.007 
(0.48) 
0.007 
(0.47) 
0.007 
(0.45) 
0.008 
(0.50) 
0.008 
(0.55) 
0.007 
(0.47) 
0.011 
(0.73) 
0.011 
(0.69) 
ACMEET 
-0.000 
(-0.11) 
-0.001 
(-0.29) 
-0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.001 
(-0.31) 
-0.001 
(-0.36) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.44) 
-0.001 
(-0.35) 
-0.001 
(-0.36) 
-0.001 
(-0.57) 
INOWN 
0.000 
(0.26) 
0.000 
(0.38) 
0.000 
(0.42) 
0.000 
(0.37) 
0.000 
(0.29) 
0.000 
(0.33) 
0.000 
(0.28) 
0.000 
(0.32) 
0.000 
(0.43) 
0.000 
(0.32) 
BLOCK 
0.000 
(1.07) 
0.000 
(1.14) 
0.000 
(1.19) 
0.000 
(1.13) 
0.000 
(1.04) 
0.000 
(1.12) 
0.000 
(1.11) 
0.000 
(1.13) 
0.000 
(0.62) 
0.000 
(0.76) 
MTBV 
-0.000 
(-2.11)** 
-0.000 
(-2.09)** 
-0.000 
(-2.00)** 
-0.000 
(-2.09)** 
-0.000 
(-2.14)** 
-0.000 
(-2.01)** 
-0.000 
(-2.05)** 
-0.000 
(-2.06)*** 
-0.000 
(-1.82)* 
-0.000 
(-1.76)* 
LOSS 
0.087 
(4.45)*** 
0.088 
(4.43)*** 
0.088 
(4.44)*** 
0.088 
(4.43)*** 
0.088 
(4.42)*** 
0.087 
(4.36)*** 
0.087 
(4.37)*** 
0.088 
(4.42)*** 
0.085 
(4.30)*** 
0.085 
(4.31)*** 
CFO 
0.094 
(2.57)** 
0.095 
(2.57)** 
0.094 
(2.58)** 
0.094 
(2.57)** 
0.095 
(2.57)** 
0.095 
(2.56)** 
0.094 
(2.54)** 
0.095 
(2.59)** 
0.091 
(2.45)** 
0.092 
(2.48)** 
LEVERGN 
-0.020 
(-1.28) 
-0.025 
(-1.60) 
-0.022 
(-1.39) 
-0.025 
(-1.61) 
-0.025 
(-1.58) 
-0.024 
(-1.57) 
-0.024 
(-1.56) 
-0.024 
(-1.62) 
-0.021 
(-1.38) 
-0.020 
(-1.34) 
LNASSET 
0.017 
(2.76)*** 
0.010 
(1.65)* 
0.016 
(2.45)** 
0.010 
(1.69)* 
0.010 
(1.72)* 
0.011 
(1.94)* 
0.011 
(1.92)* 
0.010 
(1.84)* 
0.008 
(1.44) 
0.011 
(1.92)* 
Adj. R
2 
0.121 0.117 0.120 0.117 0.117 0.119 0.118 0.117 0.140 0.138 
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Table 6.4 (continued) 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
(3) DACCROA 
Model (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z) (aa) (ab ) (ac) (ad) 
Intercept 
0.050 
(1.01) 
0.061 
(1.23) 
0.056 
(1.13) 
0.064 
(1.32) 
0.062 
(1.27) 
0.063 
(1.29) 
0.064 
(1.30) 
0.072 
(1.50) 
0.077 
(1.59) 
0.063 
(1.29) 
LNAFEE 
-0.025 
(-2.54)** 
 
 
        
LNNAF  
-0.003 
(-0.76) 
        
LNTOTALFEES   
-0.022 
(-1.28) 
       
FEERATIO1    
-0.004 
(-0.26) 
      
FEERATIO2     
0.002 
(0.55) 
     
SPECLST_ 
MSLEADER 
     
-0.000 
(-0.09) 
    
SPECLST_MS30       
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
   
SPECLST_MS        
0.028 
(1.56) 
  
SPECLST_PS         
-0.074 
(-4.63)*** 
 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
         
-0.100 
(-
2.64)*** 
BRDSIZE 
0.003 
(1.37) 
0.003 
(1.11) 
0.003 
(1.35) 
0.002 
(1.07) 
0.002 
(1.06) 
0.002 
(1.05) 
0.002 
(1.05) 
0.002 
(0.89) 
0.003 
(1.13) 
0.003 
(1.18) 
BRDNED 
0.011 
(0.28) 
-0.006 
(-0.15) 
0.009 
(0.23) 
-0.008 
(-0.22) 
-0.009 
(-0.24) 
-0.009 
(-0.23) 
-0.008 
(-0.22) 
-0.003 
(-0.09) 
-0.005 
(-0.14) 
-0.098 
(-0.26) 
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Table 6.4 (continued) 
BRDEXP 
0.031 
(1.24) 
0.029 
(1.18) 
0.030 
(1.20) 
0.029 
(1.18) 
0.030 
(1.22) 
0.029 
(1.19) 
0.029 
(1.20) 
0.031 
(1.28) 
0.030 
(1.22) 
0.026 
(1.08) 
BRDMEET 
-0.000 
(-0.22) 
0.000 
(0.11) 
-0.000 
(-0.08) 
0.000 
(0.17) 
0.000 
(0.11) 
0.000 
(0.16) 
0.000 
(0.16) 
0.000 
(0.32) 
0.000 
(0.45) 
0.000 
(0.22) 
ACSIZE 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
-0.001 
(-0.19) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
-0.001 
(-0.29) 
ACIND 
-0.009 
(-1.15) 
-0.009 
(-1.10) 
-0.009 
(-1.14) 
-0.009 
(-1.11) 
-0.009 
(-1.10) 
-0.009 
(-1.11) 
-0.009 
(-1.11) 
-0.010 
(-1.26) 
-0.007 
(-0.83) 
-0.008 
(-0.95) 
ACEXP 
-0.005 
(-0.30) 
-0.005 
(-0.31) 
-0.005 
(-0.28) 
-0.005 
(-0.30) 
-0.005 
(-0.33) 
-0.005 
(-0.30) 
-0.005 
(-0.31) 
-0.005 
(-0.30) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
-0.003 
(-0.16) 
ACMEET 
-0.003 
(-1.14) 
-0.003 
(-1.32) 
-0.003 
(-0.03) 
-0.003 
(-1.39) 
-0.004 
(-1.47) 
-0.004 
(-1.40) 
-0.004 
(-1.37) 
-0.003 
(-1.19) 
-0.004 
(-1.48) 
-0.004 
(-1.58) 
INOWN 
0.000 
(0.59) 
0.000 
(0.79) 
0.000 
(0.82) 
0.000 
(0.78) 
0.000 
(0.62) 
0.000 
(0.74) 
0.000 
(0.75) 
0.000 
(0.90) 
0.000 
(0.82) 
0.000 
(0.72) 
BLOCK 
0.000 
(0.64) 
0.000 
(0.77) 
0.000 
(0.83) 
0.000 
(0.77) 
0.000 
(0.63) 
0.000 
(0.74) 
0.000 
(0.75) 
0.000 
(0.72) 
0.000 
(0.21) 
0.000 
(0.50) 
MTBV 
0.000 
(0.57) 
0.000 
(0.70) 
0.000 
(0.76) 
0.000 
(072) 
0.000 
(0.58) 
0.000 
(0.70) 
0.000 
(0.69) 
0.000 
(0.62) 
0.000 
(1.02) 
0.000 
(0.94) 
LOSS 
0.110 
(5.74)*** 
0.111 
(5.60)*** 
0.111 
(5.76)*** 
0.111 
(5.61)*** 
0.111 
(5.59)*** 
0.111 
(5.61)*** 
0.111 
(5.63)*** 
0.113 
(5.69)*** 
0.108 
(5.53)*** 
0.109 
(5.55)*** 
CFO 
0.073 
(2.00)** 
0.073 
(2.02)** 
0.073 
(2.01)** 
0.073 
(2.01)** 
0.073 
(2.01)** 
0.073 
(2.01)** 
0.073 
(2.01)** 
0.070 
(2.01)** 
0.069 
(1.90)* 
0.071 
(1.96)* 
LEVERGN 
-0.014 
(-1.04) 
-0.021 
(-1.55) 
-0.016 
(-1.21) 
-0.022 
(-1.59) 
-0.021 
(-1.55) 
-0.021 
(-1.57) 
-0.022 
(-1.59) 
-0.024 
(-1.64) 
-0.017 
(-1.31) 
-0.019 
(-1.39) 
LNASSET 
0.027 
(3.56)*** 
0.017 
(2.51)** 
0.025 
(3.21)*** 
0.016 
(2.44)** 
0.016 
(2.47)** 
0.016 
(2.48)** 
0.016 
(2.42)** 
0.013 
(2.03)** 
0.014 
(2.22)** 
0.017 
(2.56)** 
Adj. R
2 
0.146 0.137 0.145 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.142 0.159 0.145 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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6.6 The additional analyses and robustness tests 
This section details the additional analyses that were carried out in order to see 
whether the primary findings are robust in the various model specifications. The tests 
include the heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity checks, various regression 
estimators, alternative definitions of the board and audit committee variables, the 
endogeneity test and 2SLS regressions.  
 
6.6.1 Heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity checks 
The results of the heteroscedasticity tests are presented in Table 6.5, according to the 
models indicated in Table 6.4. Based on the Breusch-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg tests, 
all models indicate a significant p-value, suggesting the presence of heteroscedasticity 
 
The VIF and tolerance values are reported in Table 6.6. All models suggest that the 
VIF values are between 1.00 to 2.50, and none of the variables have a VIF value of 
more than 10 or a tolerance value of lower than 0.10.72 This suggests that there is no 
multicollinearity problem.  
 
6.6.2 Different regression estimators 
Due to the heteroscedasticity problem, the main analyses were regressed using the 
least square regression with robust standard error. This section provides the results of 
the multivariate regression analysis using GLS regression, which is also efficient in 
controlling for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, as benchmark for comparison. 
The results are presented in Table 6.7. As can be seen, the results of the GLS 
regression analysis are relatively consistent with the main findings.  
 
In addition to GLS estimator, the earnings management model is also been estimated 
using fixed-effect or random-effect estimators to control for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity in the pooled sample. The Hausman specification test was 
used to show which estimator was more appropriate. Whilst the fixed-effect estimator 
always provides consistent results, it might not be the most efficient; the random-
effect estimator, on the other hand, is a more efficient estimator and therefore 
                                                          
72
 Since there are 30 models of earnings management examined in the main analysis, the results of the 
VIF tests are reported for the selected models. However, all models suggest a relatively similar VIF 
value, which is between 1.00 to 3.00. 
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provides a better p-value. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the preferred 
estimator is the random-effects. If the chi-square is more than 0.05, reject the null 
hypothesis that the random effect is preferable than fixed effect estimator. The results 
of the Hausman test are presented in Table 6.8. As can be seen in Table 6.8, model 
(a), (b), (c), (k), (l), (m), (u), (v) and (w) indicate chi-square more than 0.05, and thus 
the random-effect estimator is more appropriate. The other models were regressed 
using the fixed-effect estimator. 
 
Table 6.9 presents the results of the preferred estimator according to the Hausman 
test. The results for the variables LNAFEE, SPECLST_PS, and 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED are significant and negatively related with DACC in all 
models. In addition, SPECLST_MSLEADER appears to have a negative relationship 
with earnings management across all models. The other variables are relatively 
unchanged, except ACSIZE, INOWN, MTBV and CFO, which are found to be 
contradictory to the main findings. ACSIZE is no longer significant, as indicated in 
models (i) and (j), while INOWN is significant and positively related with DACC in 
most of the fixed effect models. MTBV is significant and positively related with 
DACC in most models, while CFO is only significant when the models are estimated 
using the random-effect estimator. In summary, the audit fees and industry specialist 
auditor variables appear to be reasonably consistent and robust across the different 
estimators. 
  
6.6.3  New definitions for board and audit committee variables 
In order to check whether the results are robust to the new variable definitions, as in 
the previous chapter, the present study provides alternative definitions for the board 
and audit committee variables. Following Abbott et al. (2003a) and DeFond et al. 
(2005), these variables are: 
(1) BRDSIZE1 - coded as 1 if the firm‟s board size is less than the sample median, 
and 0 if otherwise; 
(2) BRDNED1 - coded as 1 if 60% of the firm‟s directors are independent, and 0 if 
otherwise; 
(3) ACIND1 - defined as the proportion of independent non-executive directors on 
the audit committee;  
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(4) ACEXP1 - coded as 1 if the audit committee has at least one director equipped 
with financial expertise, and 0 if otherwise; and 
(5) ACMEET1 - coded as 1 if the audit committee meetings frequency is more than 
the sample median, and 0 if otherwise.  
 
The other variables remain unchanged. Table 6.9 presents the results on the selected 
models.73  
 
As can be seen in Table 6.10, the results for the alternative definitions are relatively 
consistent with the main findings except for ACIND1, which is found to be negatively 
related across all the DACC measures in all the models. Furthermore, in contrast to 
the primary findings, LEVERGN is insignificant with DACCJM, while LNASSET is 
significant and positively related with DACCJM in Model (i). Likewise, the 
BRDSIZE1, BRDNED1, BRDMEET, ACEXP1 and ACMEET variables are all 
insignificant across all DACC measures. The other results are relatively unchanged, as 
documented in the primary findings.  
 
The negative relationship between ACIND and DACC suggests that firms with whose 
audit committees with a higher proportion of independent non-executive directors are 
likely to be associated with reduced earnings management - this is not the case, 
however, for audit committees consisting solely of independent members. This may 
indicate the importance of the role of executive members and of their contribution to 
an effective audit committee. Overall, the results obtained for industry specialist 
auditor variables hold for the selected models.      
 
6.6.4 Endogeneity and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression  
The main results suggest that the levels of earnings management reduced when firms 
hire industry specialist auditors, this is consistent with the argument that industry 
specialist auditors use their industry skills and competence to constrain opportunistic 
earnings. However, it can be argued that since the non-executive directors (e.g. 
outsiders) have difficulty to differentiating discretionary and non-discretionary 
accruals, it is possible that firms will choose industry specialist auditor to signal the 
                                                          
73
 All of the models are regressed using least square regression with robust standard error. 
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earnings management are constrained by the presence of a higher quality auditor and 
not necessarily because of their skills and competence (Francis et al., 1999 in Becker 
et al., 1998).  
 
In addition, Caramanis and Lennox (2008) argue firms which had attention to manage 
earnings would have an incentive to contract for lower auditor effort (i.e. audit fees), 
which suggests a negative relationship between audit fees and earnings management. 
Moreover, the prior literature suggests that corporate governance characteristics are 
associated with endogeneity. Thus, taking into consideration all these possibilities, the 
present study tests whether the earnings management models contain these variables 
indicate in the main analysis are subject to endogeneity problem.  
 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is been performed on the selected models. The results 
are presented in Table 6.11. The null hypotheses are that LNAFEE, SPECLST_PS, 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED, BRDSIZE, BDRNED, BRDMEET, BRDEXP, ACSIZE, 
ACIND1, ACMEET and ACEXP BDRSIZE and BRDNED are exogeneous.
74
If the F-
statistic were significant, then the null hypothesis would be rejected, suggesting that 
the presence of endogeneity.  As can be seen, the p-values of LNAFEE (in models „a‟ 
and „k‟), BRDMEET (in model „u‟ and „ad‟) and ACEXP (in models „i‟, „j‟ and „ac‟) 
indicate significant F-statistic, suggesting that these variables are exogenous.  
 
In order to mitigate the potential endogeneity in the models contained these variables, 
the 2SLS regressions are further regressed on the selected models. Table 6.12 presents 
the results of the 2SLS regressions. As can be seen, the LNAFEE, SPECLST_PS, 
SPECLST_WEIGHTED are significant and negatively related with DACC in all 
models. BRDSIZE and ACEXP are positively related with DACC at p<0.10, 
suggesting a weak relationship with earnings management. ACIND and LEVERGN are 
no longer significant under the DACCJM and DACCMJM models, and the other 
variables are relatively unchanged. Likely, the results for audit fees and industry 
                                                          
S 
As with the first empirical investigation, the IV variables for corporate governance and audit fees are 
the lagged values, while the IV for the industry specialist auditor is the residual value from the first 
regression of SPEC_AUD, consistent with Velury et al. (2003). Similar procedures are applied to all the 
IV variables to ensure that they are valid (refer footnote 55). 
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specialist auditors SPECLST_PS and SPECLST_WEIGHTED) are consistent with the 
main findings, suggesting that the main results are robust to endogeneity. 
 
Table 6.5: Heteroscedasticity test for earnings management model 
Breusch-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg Test 
H0 = The variance of the residuals is constant 
Reject H0 if  p-value is significant 
DACC=  β
0
 + β
1
AQ + β
2
BRDSIZE + β
3
BRDNED + β
4
BRDEXP + β5BRDMEET + 
β
6
ACSIZE + β
7
ACIND + β
8
ACEXP + β
9
ACMEET + β
10
INOWN + β
11
BLOCK + 
β
12
MTBV+ β13CFO + β14LEVERGN  + β15LNASSET + ε 
Model 
Dependent 
variable (DACC) 
Audit quality proxy (AQ) chi2(1) Prob > chi2 
a DACCJM LNAFEE 217.78 0.000 
b DACCJM LNNAF 221.14 0.000 
c DACCJM LNTOTALFEES 205.23 0.000 
d DACCJM FEERATIO1 226.24 0.000 
e DACCJM FEERATIO2 230.69 0.000 
f DACCJM SPECLST_MSLEADER 231.21 0.000 
g DACCJM SPECLST_MS30 241.32 0.000 
h DACCJM SPECLST_MS 224.57 0.000 
i DACCJM SPECLST_PS 318.99 0.000 
j DACCJM SPECLST_WEIGHTED 301.86 0.000 
k DACCMJM LNAFEE 231.75 0.000 
l DACCMJM LNNAF 236.76 0.000 
m DACCMJM LNTOTALFEES 224.53 0.000 
n DACCMJM FEERATIO1 237.53 0.000 
o DACCMJM FEERATIO2 239.95 0.000 
p DACCMJM SPECLST_MSLEADER 247.12 0.000 
q DACCMJM SPECLST_MS30 251.82 0.000 
r DACCMJM SPECLST_MS 240.79 0.000 
s DACCMJM SPECLST_PS 328.35 0.000 
t DACCMJM SPECLST_WEIGHTED 312.79 0.000 
u DACCROA LNAFEE 116.72 0.000 
v DACCROA LNNAF 117.12 0.000 
w DACCROA LNTOTALFEES 111.62 0.000 
x DACCROA FEERATIO1 118.91 0.000 
y DACCROA FEERATIO2 124.08 0.000 
z DACCROA SPECLST_MSLEADER 119.47 0.000 
aa DACCROA SPECLST_MS30 119.50 0.000 
ab DACCROA SPECLST_MS 131.70 0.000 
ac DACCROA SPECLST_PS 174.19 0.000 
ad DACCROA SPECLST_WEIGHTED 140.92 0.000 
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Table 6.6: VIF and tolerance values for earnings management model 
Model (a) (b) (c) (d) (f) (h) (i) (j) 
Variable VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance 
LNAFEE 2.39 0.419               
LNNAF   1.29 0.774             
LNTOTALFEES     2.23 0.448           
FEERATIO1       1.04 0.965         
SPECLST_ 
MSLEADER 
        1.11 0.901       
SPECLST_MS           1.16 0.865     
SPECLST_PS             1.07 0.935   
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
              1.06 0.944 
BRDSIZE 1.99 0.503 1.95 0.512 1.99 0.504 1.94 0.509 1.96 0.510 1.98 0.506 1.94 0.517 1.94 0.515 
BRDNED 2.07 0.483 2.00 0.500 2.06 0.485 1.96 0.509 1.96 0.509 1.98 0.506 1.96 0.509 1.96 0.509 
BRDEXP 1.80 0.555 1.80 0.555 1.80 0.555 1.80 0.555 1.82 0.550 1.80 0.554 1.80 0.555 1.80 0.554 
BRDMEET 1.21 0.829 1.19 0.842 1.19 0.837 1.19 0.844 1.18 0.845 1.19 0.840 1.19 0.841 1.18 0.844 
ACSIZE 1.52 0.656 1.53 0.655 1.52 0.657 1.53 0.655 1.52 0.657 1.52 0.657 1.53 0.656 1.52 0.656 
ACIND 1.43 0.698 1.43 0.697 1.43 0.697 1.43 0.698 1.44 0.696 1.44 0.693 1.44 0.693 1.44 0.693 
ACEXP 1.63 0.614 1.63 0.614 1.63 0.614 1.63 0.614 1.63 0.613 1.63 0.614 1.64 0.611 1.63 0.611 
ACMEET 1.32 0.760 1.32 0.757 1.33 0.753 1.31 0.763 1.31 0.762 1.32 0.760 1.30 0.767 1.31 0.765 
INOWN 1.10 0.907 1.10 0.906 1.10 0.909 1.11 0.903 1.10 0.908 1.11 0.905 1.10 0.909 1.10 0.909 
BLOCK 1.10 0.908 1.10 0.908 1.10 0.909 1.11 0.904 1.10 0.909 1.10 0.909 1.12 0.895 1.11 0.901 
MTBV 1.02 0.976 1.02 0.977 1.02 0.977 1.03 0.975 1.02 0.977 1.02 0.977 1.02 0.976 1.03 0.975 
LOSS 1.06 0.939 1.07 0.939 1.06 0.940 1.06 0.940 1.07 0.935 1.07 0.936 1.07 0.936 1.07 0.937 
CFO 1.16 0.865 1.16 0.865 1.06 0.940 1.16 0.865 1.16 0.865 1.16 0.863 1.16 0.865 1.16 0.865 
LEVERGN 1.16 0.863 1.11 0.899 1.14 0.878 1.11 0.898 1.11 0.899 1.12 0.896 1.12 0.896 1.12 0.894 
LNASSET 2.48 0.404 1.97 0.507 2.42 0.413 1.86 0.537 1.89 0.529 1.94 0.516 1.87 0.536 1.86 0.537 
Mean VIF 1.53  1.42  1.51  1.39  1.40  1.41  1.39  1.39  
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Table 6.7: The results of GLS regression for the earnings management  model (N=613) 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
(1) DACCJM 
Model (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
Intercept 
-0.026 
(-0.66) 
-0.017 
(-0.42) 
-0.021 
(-0.54) 
-0.019 
(-0.50) 
-0.019 
(-0.49) 
-0.022 
(-0.56) 
-0.022 
(-0.57) 
-0.019 
(-0.49) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.014 
(-0.38) 
LNAFEE 
-0.019 
(-2.10)** 
 
 
        
LNNAF  
0.001 
(0.29) 
        
LNTOTALFEES   
-0.012 
(-1.36) 
       
FEERATIO1    
0.007 
(0.52) 
      
FEERATIO2     
0.003 
(0.80) 
     
SPECLST_ 
MSLEADER 
     
-0.009 
(-1.51) 
    
SPECLST_MS30       
-0.008 
(-1.26) 
   
SPECLST_MS        
-0.007 
(-0.46) 
  
SPECLST_PS         
-0.078 
(-4.65)*** 
 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
         
-0.167 
(-4.89)*** 
BRDSIZE 
0.004 
(1.42) 
0.003 
(1.22) 
0.003 
(1.36) 
0.003 
(1.23) 
0.003 
(1.23) 
0.003 
(1.32) 
0.003 
(1.28) 
0.003 
(1.23) 
0.003 
(1.31) 
0.004 
(1.42) 
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Table 6.7 (continued) 
BRDNED 
-0.000 
(-0.00) 
-0.016 
(-0.45) 
-0.005 
(-0.13) 
-0.015 
(-0.44) 
-0.016 
(-0.45) 
-0.016 
(-0.47) 
-0.018 
(-0.52) 
-0.016 
(-0.48) 
-0.011 
(-0.33) 
-0.017 
(-0.49) 
BRDEXP 
0.013 
(0.49) 
0.013 
(0.47) 
0.013 
(0.47) 
0.013 
(0.47) 
0.014 
(0.51) 
0.009 
(0.33) 
0.010 
(0.38) 
0.012 
(0.45) 
0.014 
(0.50) 
0.008 
(0.31) 
BRDMEET 
0.000 
(0.38) 
0.001 
(0.65) 
0.001 
(0.50) 
0.001 
(0.63) 
0.001 
(0.59) 
0.001 
(0.64) 
0.001 
(0.64) 
0.001 
(0.61) 
0.001 
(0.97) 
0.001 
(0.79) 
ACSIZE 
-0.007 
(-1.51) 
-0.007 
(-1.56) 
-0.007 
(-1.58) 
-0.007 
(-1.54) 
-0.007 
(-1.49) 
-0.007 
(-1.58) 
-0.007 
(-1.55) 
-0.007 
(-1.57) 
-0.008 
(-1.74)* 
-0.008 
(-1.73)* 
ACIND 
-0.013 
(-1.47) 
-0.013 
(-1.45) 
-0.013 
(-1.46) 
-0.013 
(-1.45) 
-0.012 
(-1.44) 
-0.012 
(-1.41) 
-0.012 
(-1.37) 
-0.012 
(-1.45) 
-0.010 
(-1.18) 
-0.010 
(-1.22) 
ACEXP 
0.004 
(0.27) 
0.004 
(0.27) 
0.004 
(0.28) 
0.004 
(0.27) 
0.003 
(0.22) 
0.005 
(0.32) 
0.006 
(0.38) 
0.004 
(0.27) 
0.009 
(0.55) 
0.009 
(0.54) 
ACMEET 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.31) 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.33) 
-0.001 
(-0.41) 
-0.001 
(-0.40) 
-0.001 
(-0.45) 
-0.000 
(-0.33) 
-0.001 
(-0.35) 
-0.001 
(-0.55) 
INOWN 
0.000 
(0.37) 
0.000 
(0.48) 
0.000 
(0.52) 
0.000 
(0.44) 
0.000 
(0.29) 
0.000 
(0.45) 
0.000 
(0.38) 
0.000 
(0.44) 
0.000 
(0.55) 
0.000 
(0.45) 
BLOCK 
0.000 
(1.06) 
0.000 
(1.13) 
0.000 
(1.18) 
0.000 
(1.09) 
0.000 
(0.96) 
0.000 
(1.12) 
0.000 
(1.10) 
0.000 
(1.13) 
0.000 
(0.60) 
0.000 
(0.75) 
MTBV 
-0.000 
(-2.00)** 
-0.000 
(-1.99)** 
-0.000 
(-1.89)* 
-0.000 
(-2.04)** 
-0.000 
(-2.14)** 
-0.000 
(-1.87)* 
-0.000 
(-1.91)* 
-0.000 
(-1.94)* 
-0.000 
(-1.72)* 
-0.000 
(-1.64) 
LOSS 
0.081 
(4.43)*** 
0.082 
(4.41)*** 
0.082 
(4.41)*** 
0.082 
(4.41)*** 
0.082 
(4.40)*** 
0.080 
(4.33)*** 
0.081 
(4.32)*** 
0.081 
(4.39)*** 
0.078 
(4.25)*** 
0.079 
(4.28)*** 
CFO 
0.085 
(2.13)** 
0.084 
(2.12)** 
0.084 
(2.14)** 
0.085 
(2.11)** 
0.085 
(2.13)** 
0.085 
(2.11)** 
0.084 
(2.10)** 
0.085 
(2.13)** 
0.081 
(1.99)** 
0.082 
(2.03)** 
LEVERGN 
-0.023 
(-1.42) 
-0.028 
(-1.78)* 
-0.025 
(-1.59) 
-0.028 
(-1.75)* 
-0.028 
(-1.73)* 
-0.027 
(-1.75)* 
-0.027 
(-1.72)* 
-0.028 
(-1.79)* 
-0.025 
(-1.60) 
-0.024 
(-1.56) 
LNASSET 
0.020 
(3.17)*** 
0.011 
(1.80)* 
0.017 
(2.43)** 
0.012 
(1.93)* 
0.012 
(2.00)** 
0.013 
(2.21)** 
0.013 
(2.22)** 
0.013 
(2.08)** 
0.010 
(1.70) 
0.013 
(1.17)** 
Adj. R
2 
0.108 0.103 0.105 0.103 0.105 0.106 0.105 0.103 0.127 0.125 
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Table 6.7 (continued) 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
(2) DACCMJM 
Model (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) 
Intercept 
-0.021 
(-0.56) 
-0.013 
(-0.36) 
-0.017 
(-0.47) 
-0.014 
(-0.37) 
-0.014 
(0.39) 
-0.017 
(-0.47) 
-0.017 
(-0.47) 
-0.015 
(-0.39) 
0.004 
(0.11) 
-0.011 
(-0.29) 
LNAFEE 
-0.016 
(-1.86)* 
 
 
        
LNNAF  
-0.000 
(-0.03) 
        
LNTOTALFEES   
-0.013 
(-1.48) 
       
FEERATIO1    
0.001 
(0.08) 
      
FEERATIO2     
0.001 
(0.55) 
     
SPECLST_ 
MSLEADER 
     
-0.008 
(-1.35) 
    
SPECLST_MS30       
-0.006 
(-0.97) 
   
SPECLST_MS        
-0.005 
(-0.31) 
  
SPECLST_PS         
-0.074 
(-4.62)*** 
 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
         
-0.160 
(-
4.82)*** 
BRDSIZE 
0.004 
(1.40) 
0.003 
(1.25) 
0.004 
(1.37) 
0.003 
(1.24) 
0.003 
(1.24) 
0.003 
(1.32) 
0.003 
(1.27) 
0.003 
(1.23) 
0.003 
(1.32) 
0.004 
(1.42) 
BRDNED 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
-0.014 
(-0.38) 
-0.004 
(-0.10) 
-0.014 
(-0.39) 
-0.015 
(-0.40) 
-0.015 
(-0.43) 
-0.016 
(-0.45) 
-0.015 
(-0.42) 
-0.011 
(-0.30) 
-0.016 
(-0.45) 
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Table 6.7 (continued) 
BRDEXP 
0.009 
(0.34) 
0.008 
(0.32) 
0.008 
(0.32) 
0.008 
(0.32) 
0.009 
(0.35) 
0.005 
(0.19) 
0.006 
(0.25) 
0.008 
(0.31) 
0.009 
(0.35) 
0.004 
(0.16) 
BRDMEET 
0.000 
(0.16) 
0.000 
(0.40) 
0.000 
(0.26) 
0.000 
(0.41) 
0.000 
(0.37) 
0.000 
(0.41) 
0.000 
(0.41) 
0.000 
(0.39) 
0.001 
(0.75) 
0.000 
(0.56) 
ACSIZE 
-0.007 
(-1.55) 
-0.007 
(-1.61) 
-0.007 
(-1.61) 
-0.007 
(-1.60) 
-0.007 
(-1.56) 
-0.007 
(-1.61) 
-0.007 
(-1.59) 
-0.007 
(-1.60) 
-0.008 
(-1.77)* 
-0.008 
(-1.75)* 
ACIND 
-0.013 
(-1.54) 
-0.013 
(-1.53) 
-0.013 
(-1.54) 
-0.013 
(-1.53) 
-0.013 
(-1.52) 
-0.013 
(-1.50) 
-0.013 
(-1.46) 
-0.013 
(-1.54) 
-0.011 
(-1.27) 
-0.011 
(-1.31) 
ACEXP 
0.007 
(0.49) 
0.007 
(0.48) 
0.007 
(0.50) 
0.007 
(0.48) 
0.007 
(0.46) 
0.008 
(0.53) 
0.008 
(0.57) 
0.007 
(0.48) 
0.011 
(0.76) 
0.011 
(0.74) 
ACMEET 
-0.000 
(-0.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.38) 
-0.000 
(-0.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.39) 
-0.001 
(-0.46) 
-0.001 
(-0.49) 
-0.001 
(-0.51) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.45) 
-0.001 
(-0.65) 
INOWN 
0.000 
(0.28) 
0.000 
(0.39) 
0.000 
(0.42) 
0.000 
(0.39) 
0.000 
(0.27) 
0.000 
(0.36) 
0.000 
(0.30) 
0.000 
(0.35) 
0.000 
(0.45) 
0.000 
(0.35) 
BLOCK 
0.000 
(1.06) 
0.000 
(1.13) 
0.000 
(1.17) 
0.000 
(1.12) 
0.000 
(1.02) 
0.000 
(1.11) 
0.000 
(1.10) 
0.000 
(1.12) 
0.000 
(0.60) 
0.000 
(0.74) 
MTBV 
-0.000 
(-2.11)** 
-0.000 
(-2.10)** 
-0.000 
(-2.01)** 
-0.000 
(-2.11)** 
-0.000 
(-2.18)** 
-0.000 
(-2.00)** 
-0.000 
(-2.05)** 
-0.000 
(-2.06)** 
-0.000 
(-1.83)* 
-0.000 
(-1.77)* 
LOSS 
0.085 
(4.42)*** 
0.019 
(4.40)*** 
0.086 
(4.41)*** 
0.086 
(4.40)*** 
0.086 
(4.39)*** 
0.085 
(4.33)*** 
0.085 
(4.34)*** 
0.086 
(4.39)*** 
0.082 
(4.25)*** 
0.083 
(4.27)*** 
CFO 
0.085 
(2.25)** 
0.085 
(2.25)** 
0.085 
(2.26)** 
0.085 
(2.25)** 
0.085 
(2.25)** 
0.085 
(2.23)** 
0.084 
(2.22)** 
0.085 
(2.26)** 
0.081 
(2.11)** 
0.082 
(2.15)** 
LEVERGN 
-0.021 
(-1.33) 
-0.025 
(-1.64) 
-0.023 
(-1.44) 
-0.025 
(-1.64) 
-0.025 
(-1.62) 
-0.025 
(-1.62) 
-0.024 
(-1.60) 
-0.025 
(-1.66)* 
-0.022 
(-1.47) 
-0.022 
(-1.43) 
LNASSET 
0.019 
(3.05)*** 
0.012 
(1.98)** 
0.017 
(2.67)** 
0.012 
(2.04)** 
0.012 
(2.07)** 
0.013 
(2.28)** 
0.013 
(2.25)** 
0.012 
(2.15)** 
0.010 
(1.79)* 
0.013 
(2.26)** 
Adj. R
2 
0.116 0.112 0.115 0.112 0.113 0.115 0.113 0.112 0.135 0.133 
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Table 6.7 (continued) 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
(3) DACCROA 
Model (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z) (aa) (ab ) (ac) (ad) 
Intercept 
-0.061 
(-1.38) 
-0.052 
(-1.18) 
-0.056 
(-1.28) 
-0.049 
(-1.14) 
-0.051 
(-1.18) 
-0.050 
(-1.16) 
-0.050 
(-1.13) 
-0.043 
(-1.01) 
-0.033 
(-0.76) 
-0.048 
(-1.11) 
LNAFEE 
-0.025 
(-2.44)** 
 
 
        
LNNAF  
-0.002 
(-0.68) 
        
LNTOTALFEES   
-0.021 
(-1.15) 
       
FEERATIO1    
-0.002 
(-0.18) 
      
FEERATIO2     
0.002 
(0.65) 
     
SPECLST_ 
MSLEADER 
     
-0.001 
(-0.14) 
    
SPECLST_MS30       
0.001 
(0.09) 
   
SPECLST_MS        
0.027 
(1.54) 
  
SPECLST_PS         
-0.074 
(-4.66)*** 
 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
         
-0.103 
(-
2.80)*** 
BRDSIZE 
0.003 
(1.28) 
0.002 
(1.03) 
0.003 
(1.25) 
0.002 
(1.00) 
0.002 
(0.99) 
0.002 
(0.99) 
0.002 
(0.98) 
0.002 
(0.82) 
0.002 
(1.07) 
0.003 
(1.12) 
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Table 6.7 (continued) 
BRDNED 
0.007 
(0.15) 
-0.011 
(-0.27) 
0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.013 
(-0.34) 
-0.014 
(-0.36) 
-0.013 
(-0.34) 
-0.013 
(-0.33) 
-0.008 
(-0.21) 
-0.010 
(-0.26) 
-0.014 
(-0.37) 
BRDEXP 
0.027 
(1.09) 
0.026 
(1.05) 
0.026 
(1.05) 
0.026 
(1.05) 
0.027 
(1.10) 
0.025 
(1.05) 
0.026 
(1.07) 
0.028 
(1.17) 
0.026 
(1.09) 
0.023 
(0.94) 
BRDMEET 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
0.000 
(0.25) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
0.000 
(0.29) 
0.000 
(0.23) 
0.000 
(0.28) 
0.000 
(0.28) 
0.000 
(0.43) 
0.000 
(0.60) 
0.000 
(0.37) 
ACSIZE 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
-0.002 
(-0.38) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
-0.002 
(-0.31) 
-0.002 
(-0.35) 
-0.002 
(-0.35) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
-0.002 
(-0.50) 
-0.002 
(-0.44) 
ACIND 
-0.009 
(-1.07) 
-0.009 
(-1.04) 
-0.009 
(-1.07) 
-0.009 
(-1.04) 
-0.008 
(-1.04) 
-0.009 
(-1.05) 
-0.009 
(-1.05) 
-0.010 
(-1.19) 
-0.006 
(-0.76) 
-0.007 
(-0.88) 
ACEXP 
-0.005 
(-0.31) 
-0.005 
(-0.34) 
-0.005 
(-0.30) 
-0.005 
(-0.33) 
-0.006 
(-0.37) 
-0.005 
(-0.33) 
-0.005 
(-0.34) 
-0.006 
(-0.35) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
-0.003 
(-0.16) 
ACMEET 
-0.003 
(-1.23) 
-0.004 
(-1.43) 
-0.003 
(-1.14) 
-0.004 
(-1.51) 
-0.004 
(-1.61) 
-0.004 
(-1.52) 
-0.004 
(-1.49) 
-0.003 
(-1.32) 
-0.004 
(-1.61) 
-0.004 
(-1.70) 
INOWN 
0.000 
(0.65) 
0.000 
(0.85) 
0.000 
(0.87) 
0.000 
(0.83) 
0.000 
(0.65) 
0.000 
(0.80) 
0.000 
(0.81) 
0.000 
(0.95) 
0.000 
(0.88) 
0.000 
(0.79) 
BLOCK 
0.000 
(0.71) 
0.000 
(0.84) 
0.000 
(0.89) 
0.000 
(0.83) 
0.000 
(0.68) 
0.000 
(0.81) 
0.000 
(0.82) 
0.000 
(0.79) 
0.000 
(0.25) 
0.000 
(0.54) 
MTBV 
0.000 
(0.61) 
0.000 
(0.72) 
0.000 
(0.78) 
0.000 
(0.73) 
0.000 
(0.58) 
0.000 
(0.72) 
0.000 
(0.72) 
0.000 
(0.66) 
0.000 
(1.04) 
0.000 
(0.96) 
LOSS 
0.108 
(5.71)*** 
0.109 
(5.58)*** 
0.109 
(5.72)*** 
0.109 
(5.58)*** 
0.109 
(5.55)*** 
0.109 
(5.57)*** 
0.109 
(5.59)*** 
0.111 
(5.66)*** 
0.106 
(5.48)*** 
0.107 
(5.51)*** 
CFO 
0.065 
(1.78)* 
0.065 
(1.80)* 
0.065 
(1.80)* 
0.065 
(1.79)* 
0.065 
(1.79)* 
0.065 
(1.79)* 
0.065 
(1.79)* 
0.063 
(1.80)* 
0.062 
(1.67)* 
0.064 
(1.96)* 
LEVERGN 
-0.015 
(-1.10) 
-0.021 
(-1.59) 
-0.017 
(-1.27) 
-0.022 
(-1.63) 
-0.021 
(-1.59) 
-0.022 
(-1.62) 
-0.022 
(-1.63) 
-0.024 
(-1.75)* 
-0.019 
(-1.40) 
-0.019 
(-1.45) 
LNASSET 
0.028 
(3.75)*** 
0.018 
(2.69)*** 
0.026 
(3.31)*** 
0.018 
(2.65)*** 
0.018 
(2.69)*** 
0.018 
(2.70)*** 
0.017 
(2.64)*** 
0.015 
(2.26)** 
0.016 
(2.43)** 
0.018 
(2.76)** 
Adj. R
2 
0.143 0.134 0.141 0.134 0.135 0.134 0.133 0.139 0.156 0.142 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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Table 6.8: Fixed or random effect estimator 
Hausman test 
H0 = The preferred model is random effect 
Reject H0 if chi-square was more than 0.05. 
Model Dependent variable (DACC) chi2(16) Prob > chi2 
a DACCJM 25.49 0.061 
b DACCJM 24.22 0.085 
c DACCJM 23.92 0.091 
d DACCJM 30.17 0.017 
e DACCJM 29.58 0.020 
f DACCJM 41.19 0.000 
g DACCJM 26.81 0.043 
h DACCJM 28.70 0.026 
i DACCJM 30.04 0.017 
j DACCJM 30.14 0.017 
k DACCMJM 25.53 0.061 
l DACCMJM 24.68 0.075 
m DACCMJM 23.47 0.102 
n DACCMJM 30.20 0.017 
o DACCMJM 37.95 0.001 
p DACCMJM 29.63 0.020 
q DACCMJM 27.80 0.033 
r DACCMJM 27.88 0.032 
s DACCMJM 30.48 0.015 
t DACCMJM 30.65 0.014 
u DACCROA 26.21 0.051 
v DACCROA 25.75 0.057 
w DACCROA 24.13 0.086 
x DACCROA 30.18 0.017 
y DACCROA 38.50 0.001 
z DACCROA 28.93 0.024 
aa DACCROA 26.03 0.053 
ab DACCROA 28.93 0.024 
ac DACCROA 27.85 0.033 
ad DACCROA 27.22 0.039 
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Table 6.9: The results of fixed-effect/ random effect estimators for the earnings management  model (N=613) 
Variable 
Coefficient (z-statistics) 
(1) DACCJM 
Model (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
Intercept 
-0.031 
(-0.68) 
-0.022 
(-0.48) 
-0.028 
(-0.60) 
-0.709 
(-3.12)*** 
-0.699 
(-3.05)*** 
-0.730 
(-3.33)*** 
-0.741 
(-3.27)*** 
-0.732 
(-3.30)*** 
-0.740 
(-3.39)*** 
-0.759 
(-3.48)*** 
LNAFEE 
-0.017 
(-1.95)* 
 
 
        
LNNAF  
0.001 
(0.34) 
        
LNTOTALFEES   
-0.013 
(-1.38) 
       
FEERATIO1    
-0.018 
(-0.78) 
      
FEERATIO2     
-0.005 
(-1.40) 
     
SPECLST_ 
MSLEADER 
     
-0.038 
(-2.78)*** 
    
SPECLST_MS30       
-0.007 
(-0.73) 
   
SPECLST_MS        
-0.070 
(-1.55) 
  
SPECLST_PS         
-0.176 
(-3.88)*** 
 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
         
-0.350 
(-5.30)*** 
BRDSIZE 
0.004 
(1.59) 
0.003 
(1.40) 
0.004 
(1.54) 
0.005 
(1.13) 
0.005 
(1.10) 
0.005 
(1.23) 
0.005 
(1.21) 
0.005 
(1.17) 
0.006 
(1.41) 
0.006 
(1.35) 
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Table 6.9 (continued) 
BRDNED 
-0.009 
(-0.25) 
-0.005 
(-0.15) 
0.006 
(0.18) 
0.040 
(0.68) 
0.037 
(0.64) 
0.025 
(0.44) 
-0.040 
(-0.67) 
0.030 
(0.51) 
0.024 
(0.40) 
0.024 
(0.40) 
BRDEXP 
0.019 
(0.60) 
0.018 
(0.56) 
0.018 
(0.57) 
0.054 
(0.88) 
0.054 
(0.87) 
0.053 
(0.88) 
0.055 
(0.89) 
0.052 
(0.84) 
0.062 
(1.03) 
0.055 
(0.91) 
BRDMEET 
0.001 
(0.44) 
0.001 
(0.65) 
0.000 
(0.53) 
-0.001 
(-0.31) 
-0.001 
(-0.28) 
-0.001 
(-0.45) 
0.000 
(0.39) 
-0.001 
(-0.54) 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
-0.001 
(-0.34) 
ACSIZE 
-0.006 
(-1.26) 
-0.007 
(-1.30) 
-0.007 
(-1.30) 
-0.007 
(-0.92) 
-0.007 
(-0.97) 
-0.004 
(-0.60) 
-0.007 
(-0.94) 
-0.006 
(-0.83) 
-0.006 
(-0.80) 
-0.006 
(-0.82) 
ACIND 
-0.012 
(-1.34) 
-0.011 
(-1.29) 
-0.012 
(-1.32) 
-0.011 
(-1.30) 
-0.011 
(-1.27) 
-0.011 
(-1.26) 
-0.011 
(-1.33) 
-0.012 
(-1.35) 
-0.011 
(-1.23) 
-0.010 
(-1.11) 
ACEXP 
0.002 
(0.15) 
0.003 
(0.16) 
0.003 
(0.17) 
-0.007 
(-0.26) 
-0.006 
(-0.24) 
-0.007 
(-0.28) 
-0.007 
(-0.27) 
-0.006 
(-0.23) 
-0.010 
(-0.38) 
-0.008 
(-0.31) 
ACMEET 
-0.001 
(-0.39) 
-0.001 
(-0.59) 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.23) 
-0.001 
(-0.25) 
-0.002 
(-0.29) 
-0.002 
(-0.32) 
-0.002 
(-0.26) 
-0.002 
(-0.29) 
INOWN 
0.000 
(0.64) 
0.000 
(0.73) 
0.000 
(0.79) 
0.000 
(2.00)** 
0.000 
(2.22)** 
0.000 
(1.89)* 
0.000 
(1.79)* 
0.000 
(1.90)* 
0.000 
(2.13)** 
0.000 
(2.14)** 
BLOCK 
0.000 
(1.11) 
0.000 
(1.15) 
0.000 
(1.21) 
0.000 
(0.39) 
0.000 
(0.44) 
0.000 
(0.21) 
0.000 
(0.45) 
0.000 
(0.38) 
0.000 
(0.28) 
0.000 
(0.21) 
MTBV 
-0.000 
(-1.99)** 
-0.000 
(-1.97)** 
-0.000 
(-2.01)* 
-0.000 
(-1.83)* 
-0.000 
(-1.75)* 
-0.000 
(-1.74)* 
-0.000 
(-1.75)* 
-0.000 
(-1.75)* 
-0.000 
(-1.93)* 
-0.000 
(-1.99)** 
LOSS 
0.081 
(4.07)*** 
0.081 
(4.04)*** 
0.081 
(4.06)*** 
0.073 
(2.78)*** 
0.074 
(2.88)*** 
0.073 
(2.87)*** 
0.075 
(2.89)*** 
0.074 
(2.87)*** 
0.074 
(2.93)*** 
0.074 
(2.92)*** 
CFO 
0.086 
(2.16)** 
0.085 
(2.12)** 
-0.085 
(-2.16)** 
-0.033 
(-0.54) 
-0.031 
(-0.52) 
-0.037 
(-0.59) 
0.038 
(0.60) 
-0.037 
(-0.59) 
-0.036 
(-0.59) 
-0.036 
(-0.58) 
LEVERGN 
-0.025 
(-1.49) 
-0.030 
(-1.80)* 
-0.027 
(-1.60) 
-0.018 
(-0.43) 
-0.020 
(-0.47) 
-0.016 
(-0.36) 
-0.019 
(-0.44) 
-0.015 
(-0.34) 
-0.012 
(-0.29) 
-0.010 
(-0.22) 
LNASSET 
0.019 
(2.78)*** 
0.011 
(1.56) 
0.017 
(2.19)*** 
0.121 
(2.98)*** 
0.120 
(2.90)** 
0.126 
(3.15)*** 
0.126 
(3.06)*** 
0.129 
(3.19)*** 
0.128 
(3.24)*** 
0.131 
(3.31)*** 
R
2 
0.112 0.107 0.074 0.121 0.122 0.126 0.122 0.125 0.137 0.142 
  
257 
 
Table 6.9 (continued) 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
(2) DACCMJM 
Model (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) 
Intercept 
-0.021 
(-0.48) 
-0.014 
(-0.31) 
-0.017 
(-0.47) 
-0.699 
(-3.11)*** 
-0.392 
(-3.05)*** 
-0.722 
(-3.31)*** 
-0.724 
(-3.23)*** 
-0.723 
(-3.28)*** 
-0.732 
(-3.37)*** 
-0.750 
(-
3.45)*** 
LNAFEE 
-0.016 
(-1.85)* 
 
 
        
LNNAF  
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
        
LNTOTALFEES   
-0.013 
(-1.48) 
       
FEERATIO1    
-0.021 
(-0.91) 
      
FEERATIO2     
-0.005 
(-1.42) 
     
SPECLST_ 
MSLEADER 
     
-0.033 
(-2.34)** 
    
SPECLST_MS30       
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
   
SPECLST_MS        
-0.030 
(-0.61) 
  
SPECLST_PS         
-0.163 
(-2.85)*** 
 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
         
-0.329 
(-
4.22)*** 
BRDSIZE 
0.004 
(1.59) 
0.003 
(1.43) 
0.004 
(1.37) 
0.003 
(0.81) 
0.003 
(0.77) 
0.004 
(0.88) 
0.004 
(0.86) 
0.004 
(0.86) 
0.005 
(1.06) 
0.004 
(1.01) 
BRDNED 
0.006 
(0.17) 
-0.005 
(-0.16) 
-0.004 
(-0.10) 
0.049 
(0.82) 
0.046 
(0.79) 
0.037 
(0.62) 
0.050 
(0.83) 
0.045 
(0.76) 
0.034 
(0.56) 
0.033 
(0.55) 
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Table 6.9 (continued) 
BRDEXP 
0.013 
(0.46) 
0.012 
(0.43) 
0.008 
(0.32) 
0.052 
(0.82) 
0.052 
(0.81) 
0.051 
(0.81) 
0.052 
(0.82) 
0.051 
(0.80) 
0.059 
(0.95) 
0.053 
(0.84) 
BRDMEET 
0.000 
(0.14) 
0.000 
(0.36) 
0.000 
(0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.44) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.57) 
-0.001 
(-0.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.58) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.48) 
ACSIZE 
-0.007 
(-1.34) 
-0.007 
(-1.39) 
-0.007 
(-1.61) 
-0.006 
(-0.87) 
-0.007 
(-0.93) 
-0.004 
(-0.58) 
-0.006 
(-0.89) 
-0.006 
(-0.83) 
-0.005 
(-1.75) 
-0.005 
(-0.76) 
ACIND 
-0.013 
(-1.46) 
-0.013 
(-1.42) 
-0.013 
(-1.54) 
-0.013 
(-1.58) 
-0.013 
(-1.55) 
-0.013 
(-1.54) 
-0.014 
(-1.61) 
-0.014 
(-1.62) 
-0.013 
(-1.49) 
-0.012 
(-1.37) 
ACEXP 
0.006 
(0.38) 
0.006 
(0.39) 
0.007 
(0.50) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
-0.004 
(-0.16) 
-0.003 
(-0.10) 
ACMEET 
-0.000 
(-0.37) 
-0.001 
(-0.54) 
-0.000 
(-0.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.32) 
-0.002 
(-0.29) 
-0.002 
(-0.32) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
-0.002 
(-0.35) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
-0.002 
(-0.35) 
INOWN 
0.000 
(0.42) 
0.000 
(0.54) 
0.000 
(0.42) 
0.000 
(1.57) 
0.000 
(1.75)* 
0.000 
(1.46) 
0.000 
(1.35) 
0.000 
(1.41) 
0.000 
(1.69)* 
0.000 
(1.68)* 
BLOCK 
0.000 
(1.08) 
0.000 
(1.13) 
0.000 
(1.17) 
0.000 
(0.30) 
0.000 
(0.36) 
0.000 
(0.17) 
0.000 
(0.39) 
0.000 
(0.35) 
0.000 
(0.22) 
0.000 
(0.14) 
MTBV 
-0.000 
(-1.87)* 
-0.000 
(-1.86)* 
-0.000 
(-2.01)** 
-0.000 
(-1.71)* 
-0.000 
(-1.66)* 
-0.000 
(-1.61) 
-0.000 
(-1.64) 
-0.000 
(-1.62) 
-0.000 
(-1.77)* 
-0.000 
(-1.83)* 
LOSS 
0.086 
(4.28)*** 
0.086 
(4.25)*** 
0.086 
(4.41)*** 
0.079 
(2.92)*** 
0.080 
(3.02)*** 
0.079 
(3.02)*** 
0.080 
(3.01)*** 
0.080 
(3.01)*** 
0.080 
(3.06)*** 
0.079 
(3.06)*** 
CFO 
0.089 
(2.35)** 
0.089 
(2.32)** 
0.085 
(2.26)** 
-0.040 
(-0.66) 
-0.039 
(-0.66) 
-0.046 
(-0.72) 
-0.046 
(-0.72) 
-0.046 
(-0.72) 
-0.045 
(-0.72) 
-0.044 
(-0.72) 
LEVERGN 
-0.022 
(-1.33) 
-0.026 
(-1.61) 
-0.023 
(-1.44) 
-0.016 
(-0.38) 
-0.018 
(-0.43) 
-0.014 
(-0.33) 
-0.017 
(-0.40) 
-0.015 
(-0.36) 
-0.010 
(-0.25) 
-0.008 
(-0.19) 
LNASSET 
0.017 
(2.61)*** 
0.011 
(1.61) 
0.017 
(2.67)** 
0.12 
(2.97)*** 
0.012 
(2.91)** 
0.126 
(3.13)*** 
0.125 
(3.01)*** 
0.127 
(3.12)*** 
0.129 
(3.22)*** 
0.131 
(3.28)*** 
Adj. R
2 
0.112 0.117 0.115 0.131 0.134 0.137 0.129 0.130 0.143 0.148 
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Table 6.9 (continued) 
Variable 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
(3) DACCROA 
Model (u) (v) (w) (x) (y) (z) (aa) (ab ) (ac) (ad) 
Intercept 
-0.062 
(-1.29) 
-0.053 
(-1.09) 
-0.056 
(-1.28) 
-0.656 
(-3.05)*** 
-0.660 
(-3.05)*** 
-0.690 
(-3.30)*** 
-0.687 
(-3.21)*** 
-0.689 
(-3.27)*** 
-0.695 
(-3.32)*** 
-0.704 
(-
3.35)*** 
LNAFEE 
-0.024 
(-2.56)** 
 
 
        
LNNAF  
-0.003 
(-0.71) 
        
LNTOTALFEES   
-0.021 
(-1.15) 
       
FEERATIO1    
-0.031 
(-1.35) 
      
FEERATIO2     
-0.005 
(-1.49) 
     
SPECLST_ 
MSLEADER 
     
-0.028 
(-2.07)** 
    
SPECLST_MS30       
0.001 
(0.10) 
   
SPECLST_MS        
-0.003 
(-0.06) 
  
SPECLST_PS         
-0.107 
(-1.78)* 
 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
         
-0.176 
(-1.87)* 
BRDSIZE 
0.003 
(1.59) 
0.003 
(1.30) 
0.003 
(1.25) 
0.002 
(0.37) 
0.002 
(0.35) 
0.002 
(0.45) 
0.002 
(0.44) 
0.002 
(0.45) 
0.002 
(0.57) 
0.002 
(0.51) 
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Table 6.9 (continued) 
BRDNED 
0.015 
(0.39) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.003 
(0.08) 
0.115 
(1.63) 
0.112 
(1.61) 
0.104 
(1.55) 
0.115 
(1.63) 
0.116 
(1.64) 
0.106 
(1.57) 
0.108 
(1.59) 
BRDEXP 
0.031 
(1.15) 
0.029 
(1.09) 
0.026 
(1.05) 
0.067 
(1.07) 
0.067 
(1.07) 
0.066 
(1.07) 
0.067 
(1.08) 
0.067 
(1.07) 
0.072 
(1.17) 
0.067 
(1.09) 
BRDMEET 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
0.000 
(0.25) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
0.002 
(0.68) 
0.001 
(0.65) 
0.001 
(0.51) 
0.001 
(0.55) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
0.001 
(0.63) 
0.001 
(0.58) 
ACSIZE 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
-0.001 
(-0.25) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
-0.003 
(-0.40) 
-0.004 
(-0.46) 
-0.002 
(-0.20) 
-0.004 
(-0.43) 
-0.004 
(-0.42) 
-0.003 
(-0.34) 
-0.003 
(-0.36) 
ACIND 
-0.009 
(-1.12) 
-0.009 
(-1.05) 
-0.009 
(-1.07) 
-0.013 
(-1.31) 
-0.013 
(-1.31) 
-0.013 
(-1.35) 
-0.014 
(-1.41) 
-0.014 
(-1.41) 
-0.013 
(-1.33) 
-0.013 
(-1.30) 
ACEXP 
-0.006 
(-0.37) 
-0.006 
(-0.38) 
-0.005 
(-0.30) 
-0.013 
(-0.53) 
-0.013 
(-0.52) 
-0.014 
(-0.58) 
-0.014 
(-0.58) 
-0.014 
(-0.58) 
-0.016 
(-0.64) 
-0.015 
(-0.59) 
ACMEET 
-0.003 
(-1.17) 
-0.003 
(-1.31) 
-0.003 
(-1.14) 
0.002 
(-1.41)) 
0.002 
(0.43) 
0.002 
(0.40) 
0.002 
(0.40) 
0.002 
(0.39) 
0.002 
(0.39) 
0.002 
(0.38) 
INOWN 
0.000 
(0.82) 
0.000 
(1.04) 
0.000 
(0.87) 
0.001 
(2.13)** 
0.000 
(2.19)** 
0.000 
(1.77)* 
0.000 
(1.68)* 
0.000 
(1.69)* 
0.000 
(1.97)* 
0.001 
(1.92)* 
BLOCK 
0.000 
(0.76) 
0.000 
(0.88) 
0.000 
(0.89) 
0.000 
(0.76) 
0.000 
(0.88) 
0.000 
(0.68) 
0.000 
(0.90) 
0.000 
(0.90) 
0.000 
(0.77) 
0.000 
(0.74) 
MTBV 
0.000 
(0.48) 
0.000 
(0.61) 
0.000 
(0.78) 
-0.000 
(-0.39) 
-0.000 
(-0.18) 
-0.000 
(-0.35) 
-0.000 
(-0.39) 
-0.000 
(-0.39) 
-0.000 
(-0.30) 
-0.000 
(-0.26) 
LOSS 
0.111 
(5.53)*** 
0.111 
(5.40)*** 
0.109 
(5.72)*** 
0.117 
(4.89)*** 
0.118 
(5.06)*** 
0.118 
(5.05)*** 
0.119 
(5.01)*** 
0.119 
(5.01)*** 
0.119 
(5.08)*** 
0.118 
(5.08)*** 
CFO 
0.070 
(1.89)* 
0.070 
(1.88)* 
0.065 
(1.80)* 
0.012 
(0.20) 
0.010 
(0.17) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
0.005 
(0.08) 
0.005 
(0.08) 
LEVERGN 
-0.016 
(-1.10) 
-0.022 
(-1.56) 
-0.017 
(-1.27) 
-0.017 
(-0.41) 
-0.019 
(-0.47) 
-0.016 
(-0.38) 
-0.019 
(-0.44) 
-0.019 
(-0.44) 
-0.015 
(-0.34) 
-0.014 
(-0.33) 
LNASSET 
0.027 
(3.40)*** 
0.017 
(2.34)*** 
0.026 
(3.31)*** 
0.104 
(2.78)*** 
0.104 
(2.77)*** 
0.109 
(2.99)*** 
0.107 
(2.87)*** 
0.108 
(2.94)*** 
0.111 
(3.04)*** 
0.111 
(3.05)*** 
R
2 
0.146 0.137 0.141 0.188 0.188 0.189 0.184 0.189 0.189 0.189 
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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Table 6.10: The results of  earning management  model for the alternative test variable definitions (N=613) 
Dependent 
variable 
Coefficient (z-statistics) 
DACCJM DACCMJM DACCROA 
Model (a) (i) (j) (k) (s) (t) (u) (ac) (ad) 
Intercept 
0.019 
(0.39) 
0.043 
(0.89) 
0.030 
(0.62) 
0.015 
(0.32) 
0.037 
(0.80) 
0.024 
(0.52) 
-0.044 
(-0.88) 
-0.017 
(-0.34) 
-0.030 
(-0.60) 
LNAFEE 
-0.019 
(-2.58)** 
  
-0.017 
(-2.29)** 
  
-0.025 
(-2.89)*** 
  
SPECLST_PS  
-0.078 
(-4.85)*** 
  
-0.076 
(-4.88)*** 
  
-0.075 
(-4.83)*** 
 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
  
-0.161 
(-4.95)*** 
  
-0.156 
(-4.92)*** 
  
-0.095 
(-2.54)** 
BRDSIZE1 
0.007 
(0.89) 
0.006 
(0.79) 
0.007 
(0.87) 
0.005 
(0.66) 
0.004 
(0.57) 
0.005 
(0.65) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
BRDNED1 
0.005 
(0.53) 
0.004 
(0.42) 
0.032 
(0.34) 
0.005 
(0.54) 
0.004 
(0.44) 
0.003 
(0.36) 
0.002 
(0.20) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
BRDEXP 
0.015 
(0.60) 
0.016 
(0.64) 
0.010 
(0.39) 
0.008 
(0.33) 
0.009 
(0.37) 
0.003 
(0.12) 
0.018 
(0.78) 
0.019 
(0.81) 
0.014 
(0.62) 
BRDMEET 
-0.000 
(-0.32) 
0.000 
(0.28) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(-0.57) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.000 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.74) 
-0.000 
(-0.08) 
-0.000 
(-0.35) 
ACSIZE 
-0.005 
(-1.35) 
-0.007 
(-1.89)** 
-0.007 
(-1.85)* 
-0.005 
(-1.41) 
-0.007 
(-1.91)* 
-0.007 
(-1.87)* 
0.002 
(0.44) 
-0.000 
(-0.05) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
ACIND1 
-0.022 
(-1.65) 
-0.022 
(-1.69)* 
-0.023 
(-1.73)* 
-0.024 
(-1.71)* 
-0.023 
(-1.76)* 
-0.024 
(-1.79)* 
-0.018 
(-1.88)* 
-0.018 
(-1.92)* 
-0.019 
(-1.97)* 
ACEXP1 
-0.007 
(-0.48) 
-0.002 
(-0.15) 
-0.003 
(-0.18) 
-0.005 
(-0.04) 
0.004 
(0.32) 
0.004 
(0.30) 
-0.003 
(-0.28) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
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Table 6.10 (continued) 
ACMEET1 
0.008 
(1.14) 
0.007 
(1.07) 
0.007 
(0.99) 
0.006 
(0.92) 
0.006 
(0.85) 
0.005 
(0.77) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
-0.002 
(-0.28) 
INOWN 
0.000 
(0.38) 
0.000 
(0.62) 
0.000 
(0.54) 
0.000 
(0.40) 
0.000 
(0.64) 
0.000 
(0.55) 
0.000 
(0.62) 
0.000 
(0.92) 
0.000 
(0.82) 
BLOCK 
0.000 
(1.31) 
0.000 
(0.85) 
0.000 
(1.01) 
0.000 
(1.32) 
0.000 
(0.87) 
0.000 
(1.02) 
0.000 
(0.96) 
0.000 
(0.43) 
0.000 
(0.73) 
MTBV 
-0.000 
(-1.93)* 
-0.000 
(-1.71)* 
-0.000 
(-1.63) 
-0.000 
(-2.02)** 
-0.000 
(-1.78)* 
-0.000 
(-1.72)** 
0.000 
(0.56) 
0.000 
(0.97) 
0.000 
(0.87) 
LOSS 
0.083 
(4.38)*** 
0.080 
(4.21)*** 
0.081 
(4.23)*** 
0.087 
(4.34)*** 
0.084 
(4.19)*** 
0.084 
(4.20)*** 
0.109 
(5.56)*** 
0.106 
(5.37)*** 
0.108 
(5.39)*** 
CFO 
0.097 
(2.51)** 
0.093 
(2.37)** 
0.095 
(2.41)** 
0.096 
(2.62)** 
0.092 
(2.48)** 
0.094 
(2.51)** 
0.072 
(2.01)** 
0.068 
(1.89)* 
0.071 
(1.96)* 
LEVERGN 
-0.021 
(-1.28) 
-0.022 
(-1.47) 
-0.022 
(-1.43) 
-0.019 
(-1.18) 
-0.020 
(-1.32) 
-0.019 
(-1.28) 
-0.013 
(-0.91) 
-0.017 
(-1.24) 
-0.018 
(-1.33) 
LNASSET 
0.020 
(3.39)*** 
0.010 
(1.80)* 
0.012 
(2.27)** 
0.020 
(3.36)* 
0.010 
(1.99)** 
0.013 
(2.46)** 
0.029 
(3.96)** 
0.015 
(2.54)** 
0.017 
(2.84)*** 
Adj. R
2 
0.110 0.129 0.126 0.116 0.135 0.132 0.143 0.156 0.140 
 *** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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Table 6.11: Endogeneity test for the earnings management model 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 
H0 = the residual of LNAFEE, SPECLST_PS,  SPECLST_WEIGHTED, BRDSIZE, BDRNED, BRDMEET, BRDEXP, ACSIZE,  ACIND1, ACMEET and 
ACEXP are exogenous 
 
Reject H0 if  F-statistic significant 
Variable 
Chi2 (1) 
DACCJM DACCMJM DACCROA 
Model (a) Model (i) Model (j) Model (k) Model (s) Model (t) Model (u) Model (ac) Model (ad) 
LNAFEE 
5.621 
(p=0.017) 
  
5.818 
(p=0.015) 
  
2.466 
(p=0.116) 
  
SPECLST_ 
PS 
 
1.826 
(p=0.176) 
  
1.875 
(p=0.171) 
  
0.489 
(p=0.484) 
 
SPECLST_
WEIGHTED 
  
1.637 
(p=0.208) 
  
1.054 
(p=0.306) 
  
0.212 
(p=0.644) 
BRDSIZE  
1.826 
(p=0.176) 
1.837 
(p=0.175) 
1.585 
(p=0.208) 
1.046 
(p=0.306) 
1.012 
(p=0.314) 
0.824 
(p=0.363) 
0.319 
(p=0.572) 
0.379 
(p=0.537) 
0.385 
(p=0.534) 
BRDNED 
0.353 
(p=0.552) 
0.549 
(p=0.458) 
0.626 
(p=0.428) 
0.232 
(p=0.629) 
0.372 
(p=0.541) 
0.435 
(p=0.509) 
1.235 
(p=0.266) 
1.788 
(p=0.181) 
1.890 
(p=0.169) 
BRDEXP 
0.842 
(p=0.358) 
1.168 
(p=0.279) 
1.164 
(p=0.280) 
0.501 
(p=0.478) 
0.711 
(p=0.399) 
0.708 
(p=0.399) 
0.714 
(p=0.398) 
1.042 
(p=0.307) 
0.995 
(p=0.318) 
BRDMEET 
0.312 
(p=0.575) 
0.008 
(p=0.929) 
0.058 
(p=0.809) 
0.256 
(p=0.612) 
0.003 
(p=0.954) 
0.042 
(p=0.835) 
4.347 
(p=0.037) 
1.042 
(p=0.307) 
3.087 
(p=0.078) 
ACSIZE 
0.633 
(p=0.426) 
0.864 
(p=0.352) 
0.855 
(p=0.355) 
0.056 
(p=0.813) 
0.122 
(p=0.727) 
0.117 
(p=0.731) 
0.002 
(p=0.962) 
0.009 
(p=0.920) 
0.011 
(p=0.916) 
ACIND1 
0.860 
(p=0.353) 
0.926 
(p=0.335) 
0.888 
(p=0.346) 
0.804 
(p=0.369) 
0.864 
(p=0.352) 
0.830 
(p=0.362) 
1.016 
(p=0.313) 
1.074 
(p=0.299) 
1.007 
(p=0.315) 
ACEXP 
2.564 
(p=0.109) 
2.985 
(p=0.084) 
2.924 
(p=0.087) 
2.124 
(p=0.145) 
2.475 
(p=0.116) 
2.427 
(p=0.119) 
2.423 
(p=0.119) 
2.797 
(p=0.094) 
2.570 
(p=0.108) 
ACMEET 
0.169 
(p=0.680) 
0.353 
(p=0.552) 
0.465 
(p=0.495) 
0.216 
(p=0.641) 
0.417 
(p=0.518) 
0.537 
(p=0.463) 
1.193 
(p=0.165) 
2.500 
(p=0.114) 
2.512 
(p=0.113) 
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Table 6.12: The results of 2SLS regression for earnings management model  
Dependent variable 
Coefficient (z-statistics) 
DACCJM DACCMJM DACCROA 
Model (a) (i) (j) (k) (u) (ac) (ad) 
Intercept 
-0.035 
(-0.88) 
0.002 
(0.06) 
-0.015 
(-0.38) 
-0.029 
(-0.78) 
-0.047 
(-1.06) 
-0.033 
(-0.74) 
-0.035 
(-0.80) 
LNAFEE 
-0.047 
(-3.07)*** 
  
-0.044 
(-2.98)*** 
-0.027 
(-2.80)*** 
  
SPECLST_PS  
-0.086 
(-4.59)*** 
  
 
 
-0.082 
(-4.59)*** 
 
SPECLST_ 
WEIGHTED 
  
-0.185 
(-4.72)*** 
   
-0.097 
(-2.64)*** 
BRDSIZE 
0.005 
(1.75)* 
0.000 
(0.11) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
0.005 
(1.74)* 
0.003 
(1.17) 
-0.000 
(-0.16) 
0.002 
(0.99) 
BRDNED 
0.027 
(0.68) 
-0.016 
(-0.45) 
-0.022 
(-0.62) 
0.025 
(0.62) 
0.012 
(0.32) 
-0.014 
(-0.35) 
-0.010 
(-0.26) 
BRDEXP 
0.018 
(0.67) 
-0.096 
(-1.39) 
-0.100 
(-1.45) 
0.014 
(0.53) 
0.028 
(1.17) 
-0.076 
(-1.12) 
0.025 
(1.02) 
BRDMEET 
-0.00 
(-0.12) 
0.001 
(0.94) 
0.001 
(0.74) 
-0.00 
(-0.36) 
-0.001 
(-1.43) 
0.000 
(0.50) 
-0.001 
(-0.85) 
ACSIZE 
-0.006 
(-1.37) 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.25) 
-0.006 
(-1.42) 
-0.000 
(-0.09) 
0.004 
(0.67) 
-0.007 
(-0.26) 
ACIND 
-0.013 
(-1.57) 
-0.011 
(-1.29) 
-0.011 
(-1.32) 
-0.014 
(-1.64) 
-0.008 
(-1.04) 
-0.007 
(-0.90) 
-0.006 
(-0.86) 
ACEXP 
0.004 
(0.25) 
0.132 
(1.75)* 
0.131 
(1.73)* 
0.007 
(0.45) 
-0.005 
(-0.31) 
0.116 
(1.58) 
-0.003 
(-0.17) 
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Table 6.12 (continued) 
ACMEET 
0.001 
(0.31) 
0.000 
(0.16) 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
0.000 
(0.19) 
-0.002 
(-0.79) 
-0.003 
(-1.06) 
-0.003 
(-1.29) 
INOWN 
0.000 
(0.16) 
0.000 
(0.48) 
0.000 
(0.36) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
0.000 
(0.33) 
0.000 
(0.78) 
0.000 
(0.50) 
BLOCK 
0.000 
(0.97) 
0.000 
(0.33) 
0.000 
(0.49) 
0.000 
(0.98) 
0.000 
(0.60) 
-0.000 
(-0.05) 
0.000 
(0.47) 
MTBV 
-0.000 
(-2.02)** 
-0.000 
(-1.12) 
-0.000 
(-0.99) 
-0.000 
(-2.12)** 
0.000 
(0.53) 
0.000 
(1.33) 
0.000 
(0.91) 
LOSS 
0.082 
(4.54)*** 
0.076 
(4.35)*** 
0.077 
(4.37)*** 
0.086 
(4.52)*** 
0.110 
(5.96)*** 
0.104 
(5.49)*** 
0.110 
(5.73)*** 
CFO 
0.095 
(2.50)** 
0.082 
(2.15)** 
0.084 
(2.19)** 
0.094 
(2.60)*** 
0.072 
(2.01)** 
0.060 
(1.69)* 
0.071 
(1.98)** 
LEVERGN 
-0.014 
(-0.96) 
-0.021 
(-1.33) 
-0.020 
(-1.29) 
-0.012 
(-0.84) 
-0.011 
(-0.81) 
-0.015 
(-1.06) 
-0.016 
(-1.23) 
LNASSET 
0.029 
(3.58)*** 
0.009 
(1.43) 
0.011 
(1.96)* 
0.028 
(3.58)*** 
0.027 
(3.70)*** 
0.014 
(2.24)** 
0.017 
(2.57)** 
Adj. R
2 
0.102 0.055 0.054 0.110 0.143 0.089 0.142 
 *** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and *at p<0.10. 
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6.7 Summary  
This chapter presents the empirical findings regarding the relationship between the 
effectiveness of the board of directors, the audit committee and auditor quality in 
constraining earnings management. The effectiveness of the board and the audit 
committee is measured based on size, composition of independent members, financial 
expertise and number of meetings. The auditor quality proxies are surrogates by audit 
fees, NAS fees and industry specialist auditors. Earnings management is measured by 
the absolute value of the discretionary accruals using the Jones model, the modified 
Jones model and performance-adjusted discretionary accruals.  
 
The multivariate regression analysis conducted on the sample of 613 firm-year 
observations suggests that firms paying higher audit fees and employing the industry 
specialist auditors are less likely to manage earnings. These results are robust to 
various model specifications, including the 2SLS test. The negative relationship 
between audit fees and discretionary accruals may suggest that auditor effort, which 
driven by the audit hours, indirectly minimises opportunistic earnings among 
managers, due to their concern that such actions may be discovered by the extensive 
auditor efforts. This argument is consistent with Caramanis and Lennox (2008), who 
suggest that higher audit hours reduce earnings management.  
 
With respect to the auditor independence measures, there is no evidence support that 
the NAS fees associates with earnings management. Furthermore, the results for 
industry specialist auditors are significant only with respect to the portfolio and 
complementary approaches. Previously, Krishnan (2001) has suggested that the 
portfolio approach is better suited to capturing the auditors‟ industry expertise, 
because some industries which they invest may not be reflected under the market 
share approach. The complementary approach, however, captures the complementary 
effect s between both the market share and portfolio approaches (Neal and Riley, 
2004).  
 
In contrast to the predictions regarding the effectiveness of the board of directors and 
audit committee in constraining opportunistic earnings, the present study finds no 
evidence that the size, composition, financial expertise or number of meetings affect 
the extent of earnings manipulation. It may be due to the monitoring characteristics of 
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the board and audit committee are offset by the increased auditor quality. The 
summary of findings is presented in Table 6.13. 
 
Table 6.13: The summary of the hypothesis and the findings – the relationship 
between the corporate governance characteristics‟ and auditor quality in constraining 
earnings management. 
Hypotheses Findings 
H24: There is a positive relationship between the audit 
committee’s meeting frequency and the engagement 
of industry specialist auditor  
Not supported 
H25: There is a positive relationship between the board’s 
size and earnings management. 
Not supported 
H26: There is a negative relationship between the 
independent board and earnings management. 
Not supported 
H27: There is a negative relationship between the board’s 
financial expertise and earnings management. 
Not supported 
H28: There is a negative relationship between the board’s 
meeting frequency and earnings management. 
Not supported 
H29: There is a negative relationship between the audit 
committee’s size and earnings management. 
Not supported 
H30: There is a negative relationship between the solely 
independent audit committee and earnings 
management. 
Not supported 
H31: There is a negative relationship between the audit 
committee’s financial expertise and earnings 
management 
Not supported 
H32: There is a negative relationship between the audit 
committee’s meeting frequency and earnings 
management. 
Not supported 
H33: There is a negative relationship between audit fees 
and earnings management.  
Supported 
H34: There is a positive relationship between NAS fees 
and earnings management.  
Not supported 
H35: There is a negative relationship between industry 
specialist auditor and earnings management.  
Supported 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This final chapter presents the overview, summary and conclusion of the two 
empirical investigations that have been examined in this thesis. The first investigation 
looked at the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors, the 
audit committee and audit quality, whilst the second examined the relationship of the 
board, the audit committee and external auditor quality in constraining earnings 
management. The chapter also details the implications and limitations of the 
investigations, as well as suggestions for future research. 
 
7.2 Overview, summary and conclusion of the study 
Issues relating to audit quality and earnings management have been the focus of many 
scholarly and regulatory debates all around the world. The board of directors, audit 
committee and external auditors have been recognised as the mechanisms which, 
having the ability to monitor opportunistic earnings and thereby directly linked with 
financial reporting quality, consistent with the agency theory proposition. 
Unfortunately, previous studies are predominantly US based research where the 
litigation environment, governance structure and the auditor reputation are perceived 
to be different, thus limit the generalizability of the findings to other countries. This 
thesis examines these issues in the context of the UK, based on the FTSE 350 between 
the fiscal years 2004 and 2008. 
 
Since investors are unable to directly observe audit quality and earnings management, 
they rely on the board of directors, audit committee and auditors to obtain financial 
statements that are free from misstatement, error or fraud. Therefore, in this thesis, 
there are eight corporate governance characteristics and three proxies of auditor 
quality have been empirically examined. Consistent with agency theory and with prior 
evidence regarding the effective of certain characteristics of board of directors and 
audit committee, the present study posits that the board of director with smaller 
number of members, have more independent non-executive directors, possess 
financial expertise and have more regular meetings are defined as effective board. 
Similarly, an audit committee with more members, comprise solely independent 
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directors, have more financial expert and meet frequently is also considered as an 
effective audit committee. Based on the signalling or reputation hypothesis, audit fees 
and industry specialist auditor are used as the proxies of audit quality. In addition, the 
NAS is surrogates for auditor independence that have been viewed with scepticism by 
the regulators to impair the auditor objectivity while providing the auditing services. 
Accordingly, higher audit fees (Abbott et al., 2003a; Carcello et al., 2002; O‟Sullivan, 
2000)
75
, lower NAS fees (Wines, 1994; Firth, 2002; Frankel et al. 2002; 
Raghunandan, 2003; Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; Larcker and Richardson, 2004) and the 
engagement of industry specialist auditors (Owhoso et al., 2002; Bédard and Biggs, 
1991; O‟Keefe at al., 1994; Carcello and Nagy, 2004) are viewed as a higher audit 
quality or higher auditor quality. These characteristics of board and audit committee 
and auditor quality proxies are expected to signal to market participants how effective 
a given firm is in monitoring financial reporting, therefore conveying the credibility of 
the firm‟s financial statements.  
 
Specifically, there are two empirical associations have been examined in this thesis. 
First, it examines the association between the effective monitoring characteristics of 
board and audit committee on audit quality. In particular, three models of audit quality 
are examined: audit fees, NAS fees and industry specialist auditors. From the audit 
fees model, the present study finds a positive relationship between audit fees and the 
independent non-executive directors on board. This result suggests that independent 
board members demand additional and extensive audit effort from auditors in order to 
certify their monitoring function, thus increasing audit fees and perceived audit 
quality. This result is consistent with the findings of Carcello et al. (2002), Abbot et 
al. (2003a), O‟Sullivan (2000) and Adelopo (2010). The other characteristics of the 
board and audit committee either marginally correlated or insignificantly correlated 
with audit fees. The present study conjectures that these might be due to the 
independent board characteristic counteract the other effective characteristics of the 
board and audit committee. These results are robust to various model specifications 
and tests. 
 
                                                          
75
 Despite the proposition that higher audit fees are associated with a higher audit quality, consistent 
with extensive audit effort and time, the present study is aware of the possibility that lower audit fees 
could also be associated with higher audit quality. Refer to Chapter 3 for a detailed argument on this. 
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The results from NAS fees model yield the opposite proposition, suggesting that a 
higher proportion of independent board is associated with higher NAS fees. This 
contradicts to the view that independent board use their vigilant oversight function to 
limit the NAS as they perceive the higher NAS fees impair the auditor independence. 
It is possible that independent board perceive the joint provision of audit and NAS are 
not necessarily compromise the auditor independence, but may possibly broaden the 
auditors‟ knowledge and improve their audit judgments, resulting in higher audit 
quality (see Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988a; Arruñada, 1999a; 1999b; 2000; 
Wallman, 1996; Goldman and Barlev, 1974). However, this result is conditional. It is 
significant when the levels of NAS (LNNAF) and the sum of the total fees 
(LNTOTALFEES) are applied, but no significant evidence is documented when the 
NAS ratios are used to measure auditor independence. Prior studies suggest that 
LNNAF and LNTOTALFEES are the best measures to capture the economic 
importance of the client to the auditor as compared with NAS fees ratios (Ashbaugh et 
al., 2003; Larcker and Richadson, 2004). The other corporate governance 
characteristics provide inconsistent results to be linked with the NAS fees. These 
results are robust to various model specifications and tests. 
 
In association with the auditor industry specialist model, the evidence suggests 
inconsistent results between the effectiveness of the board and the audit committee 
and their engagement of industry specialist auditors in the year-by-by analysis. In the 
pooled sample, four out of five measures of industry specialist auditors suggest that 
firms whose audit committee consist solely of independent members and have a lower 
number of committee meetings during the year are more likely to employ industry 
specialist auditors. Whilst significant, these relationships are, however, sensitive to 
the measures of auditor industry expertise and the new variable definition of 
independence and meeting frequency of audit committee, thus the present study 
caution against drawing inferences from this finding.  
 
The second investigation carried out by this study examines the roles of board of 
directors, audit committee and auditor quality in constraining opportunistic earnings. 
In order to identify the level of opportunistic earnings behaviour and extreme 
reporting decisions made by the management , the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals is employed (e.g. Jones 1991; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam 
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1996; Becker et al., 1998).  As in prior studies, the absolute values of discretionary 
accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional Jones model and the modified Jones 
model as well as performance-adjusted discretionary accruals. As predicted, and 
consistent with the prior US studies, the present study finds that firms paying higher 
audit fees and engaging industry specialist auditors are likely to be associated with 
lower levels of discretionary accruals, suggesting that a higher quality auditor 
constrains opportunistic earnings. Firms paying higher audit fees are associated with a 
higher auditor effort, thereby minimising the management‟s opportunistic earnings 
due to their concern that such actions may be discovered by the extensive auditor 
efforts. This proposition is consistent with the prior evidence documented by 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008), who suggest a negative relationship between audit 
hours (proxy for audit effort) and earnings management. These results are robust to 
various model specifications and tests. 
 
In association with auditor independence, there is no evidence to suggest a 
relationship between NAS fees and earnings management. This result is contrary to 
the evidence reported by Ferguson et al. (2004) and Antle et al. (2006), who suggest 
positive and negative relationships between the NAS and earnings management of UK 
firms in the periods 1996-1998 and 1994-2000, respectively. This may be due to the 
reformation of governance practices in the UK resulting from the revision of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010), which first was introduced in July 2003 and 
placed major emphasis on the oversight functions of board and audit committees. It 
may also be explained by developments in NAS studies. Consistent with this, the first 
empirical evidence documented in this thesis suggests that NAS fees are viewed by 
independent board members as being able to contribute to a higher quality audit. This 
may compensate for the monitoring effects of NAS on opportunistic earnings. As a 
result, there is insignificant relationship between NAS and earnings management. 
 
The results of the industry specialist auditor model seem to be sensitive to auditor 
industry expertise measures. It suggests a significant relationship with earnings 
management when auditor industry specialist is measured using the portfolio and 
complementary approaches, but insignificant relationship when the market share 
approach is applied. The significant relationship indicates that the industry specialist 
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auditor has a greater ability to constrain opportunistic earnings than the non-specialist 
auditor. 
 
The results for the characteristics of boards and audit committees suggest no evidence 
that size, composition, financial expertise and meeting frequency affect the extent of 
earnings manipulation. Similarly, the results for ownership structure also suggest an 
insignificant relationship with earnings management. These insignificant relationships 
may be offset by the monitoring characteristics of a board, audit committee and 
institutional investors with the increased in auditor quality. Overall, the results may 
suggest that auditors are more effective in constraining opportunistic earnings than 
boards of directors, audit committees and institutional investors. 
 
The results on effective characteristics of board and audit committee suggest no 
evidence the size of committee, composition of independent members, financial 
expertise and number of committee meeting effect the extent of earnings manipulation 
in all models. Similarly, the results on the ownership structures also suggest 
insignificant relationship with earnings management. These insignificant relationships 
may be offset by the effective monitoring characteristics of board, audit committee 
and the institutional investor with the increased in auditor quality. Overall, the results 
may suggest that the auditors are more effective in constraining the opportunistic 
earnings than the board of director, audit committee and institutional investors.  
 
In relation to audit quality measures, both empirical investigations may suggest that 
the audit quality surrogates by NAS fees and auditor industry specialist are sensitive 
to different type of measures. This may support prior claims that the measurements 
for audit quality are complex and problematic (see, for example, Wooten, 2003; 
Niemi, 2004; Jensen and Payne, 2005).  
 
Overall, the present study concludes that the findings confirm the proposition of 
agency theory on independent board characteristic that certify their monitoring 
function by demanding a higher quality audit from the auditors, and that higher 
quality auditors have a greater ability to constrain opportunistic earnings than low 
quality auditor, resulting in the improvement of financial reporting quality. These 
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results are generally consistent with the prior studies in this field (see Cohen et al., 
2002; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). 
 
7.3 Implications of the study 
The findings of this thesis should be of potential interest to policy makers, 
professionals, the boards of directors and academics, especially on issues relating to 
audit quality and corporate governance practice.  
 
Policy makers may use the findings regarding NAS fees to consider the potential 
benefits of the joint provision of auditing and NAS. Previously, they claim that NAS 
compromises the auditor independence and thus banning the several NAS. In relation 
to governance practice, the policy makers should continuously recognise the 
important roles played by independent non-executive as one of the fundamental 
characteristics of corporate governance system in UK since their monitoring effects 
improved the governance systems of the firms. 
 
The professionals, such as financial analysts, may use the findings to integrate the 
study on how the market perceived higher audit quality as constraining earnings 
management effects the capital market decisions. If the market perceived the firms 
with higher audit fees and audited by the industry specialist auditor are associated 
with higher financial reporting quality, the reported financial statement may be 
viewed as more reliable for investment decision and credit assessment. 
 
The study‟s analysis of corporate governance and audit quality may be of use to 
boards of directors as a parameter to estimate how the characteristics of board and the 
choice of auditor may influence financial reporting quality. The findings may help 
boards of directors to see the positive impact of independent members and higher 
quality auditors on audit quality and earnings management.  
 
Finally, the study‟s findings regarding industry specialist auditors may interest 
academics, particularly with regard to designing industry specialist auditor measures, 
since industry specialist measures are sensitive to the type of approach taken.  
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 7.4 Limitations of the study 
This thesis is subject to several potential limitations. Firstly, the sample for this thesis 
is drawn from a selection of the larger FTSE 350 UK firms operating in unregulated 
industries. Thus, the results of the study may not be applicable to firms below the 
FTSE 350 or to regulated firms, because the internal strength of the firms‟ governance 
structures varies according to firm size and industry. However, in general, the findings 
are in agreement with prior evidence and with agency theory, particularly in relation 
to the monitoring function of board of directors and of higher quality auditors.   
 
Secondly, the data used in this thesis are from 2005 to 2008, in which 2008 has been 
considered by the economists as the year of global financial crisis due to the collapse 
of large financial institutions.  There is possibility that the findings may be driven by 
the changes in the particular year(s) during or before the financial crisis. 
 
Thirdly, it is possible that some variables may be subjected to some measurement 
error. The accruals measures are criticised due to the likelihood of misclassifying the 
discretionary and non-discretionary accruals.  
 
Fourthly, the phenomena of earnings management that are indicated in this thesis are 
related to the opportunistic earnings. Given that the GAAP practice allowed the 
flexibility of accounting choices, the managers may also use their discretion over 
earnings to convey the private information, by which could potentially maximise the 
firm‟s value. The auditors may underestimate the earnings discretion made by 
management since the earnings management involved a higher degree of managerial 
judgement. Therefore, the findings in this thesis are restricted on the assumption of 
opportunistic earnings rather than the beneficial information. 
 
Fifthly, the audit quality variables may be proxies for something other than is 
assumed in the underlying construct of the tests. In this thesis, the audit quality 
measures are driven by the auditor‟s reputation capital and perceived auditor 
independence, and thus the results are based on market perceptions (audit quality as 
perceived by market participants). The use of other audit quality measures such as 
restatements and auditors‟ litigation may help to generalise the actual audit quality 
rather than the perceived audit quality. 
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Lastly, there is always the possibility that the models employed in this thesis remain a 
potential for certain omitted variables bias that are correlated both with audit quality 
and earnings management. However, several steps have been taken to reduce the 
likelihood of correlated variables, including the tests for additional control variables, 
endogeneity and fixed or random effects models.   
 
Given these limitations, the findings and implications of the study need to be 
interpreted with caution.   
 
7.5 Recommendations for future research 
There are several ways to extend the studies examined in this thesis. Firstly, as well as 
financial expertise characteristic, it is argued that strong industry backgrounds 
increase understanding of the business environment, thus helping to improve the 
quality of financial reporting. Cohen et al. (2008) argue that audit committee with the 
strong industry expertise the will have significant business knowledge and highly 
access to the resources that contribute to superior ability to understand and interpret 
the business activities and risk. Thus, they able to evaluate whether the firms used 
theappropriate reporting procedures, make estimation and assumptions that fit 
accordingly to their business environment. Subsequently these may reflect the true 
economic value of a given firm, hence enhancing financial reporting quality. Thus, 
future research should consider whether financial expertise and strong industry 
background make board of directors and the audit committee more effective. 
 
Secondly, as previously noted in the limitations, the results of this thesis are based on 
the perceived audit quality measures that driven from the auditors‟ reputation capital 
theory. Francis (2004) argues that audit quality can range from low to very high, and 
that audit failure can be classified as extremely low audit quality (end quality), which 
includes several forms, such as regulatory sanction, litigation, business failure and 
earnings restatement. These forms of audit failure are classified as the actual audit 
quality measures. Therefore, future studies should investigate how the used of actual 
audit quality measures effect the corporate governance and earnings management 
could be different compared to the perceived audit quality measures. 
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Thirdly, the studies on corporate governance and auditor quality in constraining 
earnings management can be further examined by taking into account the 
complementary and substituting nature of joint effect of both corporate governance 
and auditor quality mechanisms.  Such research may contribute to the understanding 
of the behaviour of auditors and corporate governance mechanisms in association to 
the financial reporting quality. 
 
Lastly, the final suggestion for future research can also consider the importance of 
corporate voluntary disclosure as a mechanism to limit the opportunistic earnings.  
Several studies suggest that the high disclosure quality reduce earnings manipulation 
(Jo and Kim, 2007; Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2006). In addition, Beattie (2005) and 
Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2006) suggest that the studies of voluntary disclosure and 
earnings management are not fully being explored. Thus, the research in this area may 
provide comprehensive studies in earnings management.  
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Appendix 1 
The prohibitions of the specific non-audit services as outlined in ES 5 (revised) –  
NAS provided to audited entities 
  
INTERNAL AUDIT SERVICES 
44  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to provide internal audit 
services to an audited entity where it is reasonably foreseeable that: 
(a)  For the purposes of the audit of the financial statements, the auditor would 
place significant reliance on the internal audit work performed by the 
audit firm; or 
(b)  For the purposes of the internal audit services, the audit firm would 
undertake part of the role of management. 
 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICES 
52  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to design, provide or 
implement information technology systems for an audited entity where: 
(a)  the systems concerned would be important to any significant part of the 
accounting system or to the production of the financial statements and the 
auditor would place significant reliance upon them as part of the audit of 
the financial statements; or 
(b) For the purposes of the information technology services, the audit firm 
would undertake part of the role of management. 
 
VALUATION SERVICES 
56  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to provide a valuation to: 
(a)  an audited entity that is a listed company or a significant affiliate of such 
an entity, where the valuation would have a material effect on the listed 
company‟s financial statements, either separately or in aggregate with 
other valuations provided; or 
(b)  Any other audited entity, where the valuation would both involve a 
significant degree of subjective judgment and have a material effect on the 
financial statements either separately or in aggregate with other valuations 
provided. 
 
ACTUARIAL VALUATION SERVICES 
63  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to provide actuarial 
valuation services to: 
(a)  An audited entity that is a listed company or a significant affiliate of such 
an entity, unless the firm is satisfied that the valuation has no material 
effect on the listed company‟s financial statements, either separately or in 
aggregate with other valuations provided; or 
(b) any other audited entity, unless the firm is satisfied that either all 
significant judgments, including the assumptions, are made by informed 
management or the valuation has no material effect on the financial 
statements, either separately or in aggregate with other valuations 
provided.  
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TAX SERVICES 
72  The audit firm shall not promote tax structures or products or undertake an 
engagement to provide tax advice to an audited entity where the audit 
engagement partner has, or ought to have, reasonable doubt as to the 
appropriateness of the related accounting treatment involved, having regard to 
the requirement for the financial statements to give a true and fair view in 
accordance with the relevant financial reporting framework. 
 
74  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to provide tax services 
wholly or partly on a contingent fee basis where: 
(a)  the services are provided to an audited entity and the engagement fees are 
material to   the audit firm or the part of the firm by reference to which the 
audit engagement partner‟s profit share is calculated; or 
(b)  The outcome of those tax services (and, therefore, the amount of the fee) 
is dependent on:  
(i)    The application of tax law which is uncertain or has not been 
established; and 
(ii) A future or contemporary audit judgment relating to a material matter 
in the financial statements of an audited entity. 
 
76  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to provide tax services to an 
audited entity where the engagement would involve the audit firm undertaking 
a management role. 
 
78  For an audited entity that is a listed company or a significant affiliate of such 
an entity, the audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to prepare current 
or deferred tax calculations for the purpose of preparing accounting entries 
that are material to the relevant financial statements, save where the 
circumstances contemplated in paragraph 131 apply. 
 
82  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to provide tax services to an 
audited entity where this would involve acting as an advocate for the audited 
entity, before an appeals tribunal or court5 in the resolution of an issue: 
(a)  that is material to the financial statements; or 
(b) where the outcome of the tax issue is dependent on a future or 
contemporary audit judgment. 
 
LITIGATION SUPPORT SERVICES 
88  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to provide litigation support 
services to: 
(a)  an audited entity that is a listed company or a significant affiliate of such 
an entity, where this would involve the estimation by the audit firm of the 
likely outcome of a pending legal matter that could be material to the 
amounts to be included or the disclosures to be made in the listed 
company‟s financial statements, either separately or in aggregate with 
other estimates and valuations provided; or  
(b)  any other audited entity, where this would involve the estimation by the 
audit firm of the likely outcome of a pending legal matter that could be 
material to the amounts to be included or the disclosures to be made in the 
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Consultation on audit firms providing non-audit services to listed 
companies that they audit financial statements, either separately or in 
aggregate with other estimates and valuations provided and there is a 
significant degree of subjectivity involved. 
 
LEGAL SERVICES 
91  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to provide legal services to 
an audited entity where this would involve acting as the solicitor formally 
nominated to represent the audited entity in the resolution of a dispute or 
litigation which is material to the amounts to be included or the disclosures to 
be made in the financial statements. 
 
RECRUITMENT AND REMUNERATION SERVICES 
93  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to provide recruitment 
services to an audited entity that would involve the firm taking responsibility 
for the appointment of any director or employee of the audited entity. 
 
95  For an audited entity that is a listed company, the audit firm shall not 
undertake an engagement to provide recruitment services in relation to a key 
management position of the audited entity, or a significant affiliate of such an 
entity.  
 
99  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to provide advice on the 
quantum of the remuneration package or the measurement criteria on which 
the quantum is calculated, for a director or key management position of an 
audited entity. 
 
CORPORATE FINANCE SERVICES 
109  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to provide corporate finance 
services in respect of an audited entity where: 
(a) the engagement would involve the audit firm taking responsibility for 
dealing in, underwriting or promoting shares; or 
(b)  the audit engagement partner has, or ought to have, reasonable doubt as to 
the appropriateness of an accounting treatment that is related to the advice 
provided, having regard to the requirement for the financial statements to 
give a true and fair view in accordance with the relevant financial 
reporting framework; or 
(c)  such corporate finance services are to be provided on a contingent fee 
basis and: 
(i) the engagement fees are material to the audit firm or the part of the 
firm by reference to which the audit engagement partner‟s profit 
share is calculated; or 
(ii) the outcome of those corporate finance services (and, therefore, the 
amount of the fee) is dependent on a future or contemporary audit 
judgment relating to a material matter in the financial statements of 
an audited entity; or 
(d)  the engagement would involve the audit firm undertaking a management 
role in the audited entity. 
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TRANSACTION RELATED SERVICES 
119  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to provide transaction 
related services in respect of an audited entity where:  
(a) the audit engagement partner has, or ought to have, reasonable doubt as to 
the appropriateness of an accounting treatment that is related to the advice 
provided, having regard to the requirement for the financial statements to 
give a true and fair view in accordance with the relevant financial 
reporting framework; or 
(b)  such transaction related services are to be provided on a contingent fee 
basis and: 
(i)  the engagement fees are material to the audit firm or the part of the 
firm by reference to which the audit engagement partner‟s profit 
share is calculated; or 
(ii) the outcome of those transaction related services (and, therefore, 
the amount of the fee) is dependent on a future or contemporary 
audit judgment relating to a material matter in the financial 
statements of an audited entity; or 
(c)  the engagement would involve the audit firm undertaking a management 
role in the audited entity. 
 
ACCOUNTING SERVICES 
127  The audit firm shall not undertake an engagement to provide accounting 
services to: 
(a)  an audited entity that is a listed company or a significant affiliate of such 
an entity, save where the circumstances contemplated in paragraph 131 
apply; or 
(b) any other audited entity, where those accounting services would involve 
the audit firm undertaking part of the role of management. 
 
